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DCAA Changes Approach to Reporting Business System Deficiencies

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New DCAA audit guidance, published June 30, 2014, heralded a change in the way auditors will report deficiencies in contractors' business systems. This is important for a couple of reasons.

First and foremost, the DCAA approach to reporting bizsys deficiencies has not corresponded to the approach mandated by Congress and codified in the DFARS. We pointed out that little nuance in this article. As we reported, DCAA stated that its unique approach to identifying and classifying deficiencies was mandated by GAGAS.

Second, the approach chosen by DCAA resulted in a flurry of "deficiency reports" issued to Contracting Officers, in which every deficiency tended to be classified as a "significant deficiency." That approach was founded in a theory that any deficiency identified at a major contractor was obviously a significant deficiency, a position that was contrary both to regulation and common sense. Because all reported deficiencies were equal, the CO had to handle them in a similar fashion, no matter how trivial the matter being reported. Obviously, this situation led to a number of Review Board cases where the CO had to submit an override package and receive approval to exercise the independent business judgment that comes with a Certificate of Appointment. That process took time and it took time away from other pressing matters.

DCAA's new audit guidance clarified that the previous guidance didn't really mean what it said. The new guidance stated:

[The DCAA HQ] Policy [Directorate] did not envision auditors reporting instances of the noncompliances less severe than significant deficiency/material weaknesses separately in an audit report without also reporting significant deficiencies as defined by the DFARS business system criteria (DFARS 252-242.7005). The MRD did not provide specific instructions on how to report noncompliances that are less severe than a significant deficiency/material weakness but warrant the attention of those charged with governance when no significant deficiency/material weakness needs to be reported.

As we parse the foregoing paragraph we are pleased to see that not all bizsys deficiencies are created equal. That was always the case, but it's nice to see an official DCAA acknowledgement.

Further, the audit guidance directs auditors to report non-significant deficiencies via Memo instead of via Deficiency Report. (Another Memo … sigh.) "The memorandum will include a statement of condition and recommendation (SOCAR) and provide the contracting officer with sufficient information to understand the condition and the severity of the deficiency (i.e., a fully-developed audit finding)."

But that's a good thing, because contractors and COs will be able to differentiate between a Deficiency Report that transmits "significant deficiencies" found in a business system from a less-than significant deficiency. That's going to reduce stress and workload all around.

The MRD doesn't say, but we suspect the Memos will not be reported in the DCMA Contract Audit Follow-Up (CAFU) system … which means time and attention can be focused on more pressing matters.

 

Updates on CDA Statute of Limitations

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As our readers know, the evolving case law on the Contract Disputes Act Statute of Limitations (SoL) may be one of the most significant issues affecting disputes between Government and contractor. We’ve been commenting on its impact ever since the first case that came to our attention, in December, 2009. Almost five years ago, we wrote, “Contracting Officer delays in dispositioning audit findings can lead to a forfeiture of amounts to which the government would have otherwise been entitled in a court of law.” Indeed, that assessment has been (generally, with some exceptions) borne out by case after case at both the ASBCA and U.S. Court of Federal Claims.

Although DCAA still pretends its audits of costs aged more than six years actually matter to somebody, DCMA seems to be more realistic about the situation, and has issued direction to its Contracting Officers that recognizes the impact of the SoL expiration. (As a side note, DCAA still pretends its audits of contractors’ Forward Pricing Rate Proposals will be of interest to Contracting Officers even after a FPRA has been negotiated without an audit report, and has directed its auditors to continue to audit in such circumstances, and to issue a formal audit report to the CO, even though nobody will care. *Sigh*)

The takeaway is that if you are a contractor and DCAA is questioning costs aged more than six years, your auditors will turn a deaf ear to your assertions that the SoL has run. However, your DCMA Contracting Officer is likely to take your assertions much more seriously.

One reason your assertion of SoL expiration is likely to be taken seriously by your CO (or ACO or DACO) is that, by and large, Courts keep tossing out Government claims because they were issued “untimely” and thus contractors, by and large, stand a good chance of seeing a complete victory, should they be willing to litigate.

Note that the litigation is not a trial on the merits of the parties' positions. The litigation need not be expensive (well, not too expensive). The litigation is aimed at dismissal based on a lack of jurisdiction. (Or so we are told by attorneys; we are not members of that guild.)

Two recent decisions as the ASBCA illustrate the logic involved.

The first case is that of Laguna Construction Company (ASBCA No. 58569, issued May 29, 2014). The Government claimed that Laguna awarded two subcontracts without adequate competition and failed to “document that these award prices were reasonable.” In addition, other subcontracts were awarded in which Laguna “failed to justify award … to other than the lowest bidder,” and similarly failed to document that subcontractor award prices were reasonable.

During 2005, Laguna received progress payments and in its progress payment requests the subcontractors in question were identified and the subcontract prices were identified. In 2006, DCAA issued an audit report that concluded that Laguna’s “subcontract management system and related internal control policies and procedures are inadequate and cannot be relied upon to ensure subcontracts are awarded in accordance with [FAR requirements] or [that] subcontract payments made by [Laguna] are in accordance with FAR 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment.” The findings were transmitted to the cognizant ACO via Flash Report. (Ah, those were the good ol’ days!) DCAA told the ACO “Due to the deficiencies in the internal controls related to [Laguna’s] subcontract management system we believe a significant risk is present relative to allocability, allowability and reasonableness of subcontract costs billed to the U.S. Government. We believe this deficiency is serious enough to render the subcontract management system inadequate.”

Three years later (March, 2009) the ACO got around to sending that 2006 DCAA audit report to Laguna for comment. Roughly sixty days later, the ACO suspended 30% of interim billing payments in order to protect the Government from “the cost risk ... for the deficiencies reported.” Ouch!

DCAA issued another, strikingly similar, audit report in 2009, alleging many of the same issues. In March, 2011, DCAA issued a Form 1, which “disapproved” $2,089,799 of subcontractor costs incurred by Laguna (i.e., payments made by Laguna to its subcontractors) and that amount was subsequently increased to $2,383,370.

The ACO issued a COFD in December, 2012, for the disputed amounts plus G&A allocated to such amounts, for a total of $3,815,233. Laguna appealed, asserting that “the government's monetary claim was filed more than six years from the date the claim accrued, and therefore is barred under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A).”

Importantly, the Government immediately retreated from a portion of its claim, conceding in its own pleadings that “its Cost Reasonableness Claim” on one Task Order “was untimely.” Accordingly the Judges immediately pitched that amount of the Government’s claim and then moved on to decide the remainder. Here’s what the decision said:

The legal predicate of the government's claim here is appellant's failure to document the reasonableness of subcontract awards under this contract that were not based upon competition. The DCAA was fully aware of appellant's failure to document the reasonableness of subcontract awards under this contract that were not based upon competition by late 2005, and it documented its findings by audit reports dated 6 December 2005 and 9 February 2006, which latter report was issued to the ACO. That the DCAA did not single out these subcontracts by name in the audit reports is irrelevant. DCAA reviewed 32 subcontracts under the contract totaling $147,701,411 which presumably was a significantly large sample upon which to support its findings. The government was also aware of its ‘injury’ here, i.e., the subcontract prices awarded by appellant and paid by the government, as early as 2005. The ACO did not file this claim until 17 December 2012.

Readers should not be surprised at the final sentence:

Accordingly, the CO's decision dated 17 December 2012 is hereby deemed null and void.

As attorneys from Arnold & Porter wrote:

The [Laguna Construction] case is important because it addresses another form of potential liability (reasonableness of subcontractor costs) and continues to cement the construct that the knowledge standard under the statute of limitations is one of objectivity, not absolute, subjective knowledge.

The second case is Kellogg Brown & Root Services (KBRS). There are various joined cases in the decision (issued June 17, 2014) but the relevant one here is ASBCA No. 58559. In that case the Government claimed that KBRS owed it $55,620,592 in allegedly unallowable Private Security Company (PSC) subcontract costs.

Blah, blah, blah. 35 pages of Findings of Fact that summed up a colossal Charlie Foxtrot, wherein the U.S. Military tried to perform its primary mission under difficult circumstances, a mission that (based on testimony and evidence and Findings of Fact) did not necessarily include protecting the civilian contractors, who were thus forced to protect themselves by hiring PSCs, which led to questioned, suspended, and disallowed costs. We have an opinion on the equity of the situation, but that opinion is not relevant to this article.

Let’s cut to the chase with respect to the one appeal:

A government claim for recovery of payments made for allegedly unallowable costs of KBRS and its subcontractors using PSCs in connection with their performance of Contract 0007 accrued no later than 10 June 2005 …. Prior to that date, on 29 August 2004, LTC O'Day knew that PSCs were being used instead of military escorts (finding 41). Prior to 10 June 2005, between April and August 2004, the DCMA Commander Iraq and Rock Island PCO Watkins knew that PSCs were being used for movement by KBRS personnel within Iraq (findings 47-48). Prior to 10 June 2005, on 24 March 2004, the KBRS contact at MCB, MAJ Sessoms, was told that PSCs were being used for convoys from Kuwait into Iraq (findings 58-59). Finally, on 10 June 2005, the government was expressly advised that PSCs were being used to transport personnel to their respect[ive] sites in Iraq (finding 60). On these findings, the contracting officer's final decision of 30 January 2013 was untimely and thus invalid and a nullity. We give it no further consideration and dismiss the appeal in ASBCA No. 58559 for lack of jurisdiction.

(Note: KBRS won the rest of its appeals on the merits.)

These two recent cases clearly illustrate, readers, why you need to be aware of the CDA SoL and why you should be prepared to assert it when appropriate, and why your DCMA Contracting Officer is going to take that assertion seriously. Unfortunately, DCAA is likely to be deaf and blind to its SoL situation, and is likely to continue its audit procedures in the vain hope that somebody, somewhere, will think its findings have merit. Unfortunately for DCAA, Courts are ruling (with some consistency) that, once six years is up, the auditors should close their computers and walk away from the audit, because the Government very likely lacks legal standing to pursue any findings.

 

DOD IG Criticizes DCMA for Failing to Breach Contracts

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Time_Travel
Rarely have we had more difficult time coming up with an appropriate title for an article. Believe us, this one has it all: A DOD Hotline allegation, arguments about the adequacy of a contractor's business systems, untimely DCAA follow-up audits, interference from a DCMA Review Board, untimely Contracting Officer action, the Christian Doctrine … it was truly hard to come up with a unifying theme for the piece.

So we shall just dive in and see where the currents take us.

If you have been reading this blog for any length of time, you will understand that we pay special attention to the administration of the DOD Business Systems oversight regime. In one of the lasting impacts from the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), the DFARS was revised significantly (via interim rule) on May 18, 2011 to address six (6) contractor "Business Systems." Formerly there had been 10 Internal Control Systems; but as of that date the 10 became six, the criteria for system adequacy were codified and revised, and a requirement was added that mandated payment withholds from "covered contracts" for systems deemed "inadequate" or "disapproved" (when the appropriate clause was present). We expect this is old news to most of you; but if it's not then you can search this site and find many articles delving into different aspects of the new oversight regime.

Remember, readers, this all came into effect on May 18, 2011 and it only applied to contracts awarded after that date-and only if those contracts contained the requisite clause(s). As the DOD Inspector General noted, "With minor changes, the interim rule was adopted as a final rule on February 24, 2012." Thus, the rule has been around in final state for about three years.

Let's see what the DOD IG has to say about administration of the Business Systems oversight regime on one "major contractor" in the DCAA's Western Region, by way of an audit report issued June 20, 2014.

According to the audit report, DCAA issued four reports in 2010 and 2011 that identified "significant system deficiencies." The cognizant DCMA Contracting Officer received the reports and requested that the contractor "provide a written response to the reported deficiencies." The contractor "disagreed in principle with some of the reported findings, but agreed to take several corrective actions." Subsequently, "the contractor eventually notified the contracting officer … that it had completed the corrective actions for each system." Within "approximately 8 months" after receiving the contractor's notifications, the CO approved the contractor's billing and accounting systems. It took "nearly 19 months" for the CO to approve the contractor's estimating system; and that approval was issued only after DCAA issued a memo "informing the contracting officer that the contractor appeared to have implemented internal controls to address the remaining deficiencies."

That covers three out of the four systems with significant deficiencies. What about the fourth business system? Well, according to the DOD IG-

Even though the contracting officer has also proposed to approve the compensation system, the contracting officer has not yet received the necessary authorization to do so by the DCMA's Board of Review Committee. … The Committee advised the contracting officer that additional testing of the contractor's corrective actions needs to take place before it could authorize the proposed determination.

And then somebody called the DOD IG Hotline to complain that the DCMA Contracting Officer "did not take timely or appropriate action on several [DCAA] audit reports …."

The table below shows the key dates.

Business System

Date of DCAA Audit Report

Date of Contractor Response

Date CAP was Completed

Date of CO Final Determination

Number of Days to Issue a COFD

Compensation

5/18/2010

6/21/2010

11/03/2010

NEVER

1,373

Billing

11/18/2010

5/23/2011

5/23/2011

2/01/2012

256

Accounting

11/24/2010

2/03/2011

7/20/2011

10/04/2011

243

Estimating

2/15/2011

7/21/2011

1/09/2012

8/06/2013

747

According to the DOD IG, "the contracting officer did not make timely final determinations on the contractor's business systems." The DOD IG is careful to note that the DFARS PGI (at 242.7502(d)) requires that CO Final Determinations must be made within 30 days, but does not take the opportunity to determine the root cause(s) for the CO's failure to comply.

According to the DOD IG, "the contracting officer needed to promptly make a determination that significant deficiencies existed and implement withholdings on contracts containing the business system clause in order to protect the Government's interests." The DOD IG asserted this even though "the contracting officer documented … that the business systems clause does not apply because none of the contractor's contracts contain the clause." However, the DOD IG found several contracts that it believed "should include the business systems clause because they were executed after May 18, 2011, and subject to the Cost Accounting Standards." The audit report noted that the IG had requested a ruling from DCMA as to whether "these contracts actually contain the clause as required," but DCMA had not gotten back to the IG nearly a year later.

Obviously the only way the clause could be read into the contract is by operation of The Christian Doctrine. Color us skeptical.

Moreover, the IG's opinion that "if the business systems clause was omitted in error, the DCMA contracting officer should have instructed the contracting officials who executed the contracts to add the clause" strikes us as disingenuous at best and a violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing at worst. The DOD IG's position elides any discussion as to whether the solicitation contained (or should have contained) the requisite clause and it elides any discussion as to whether the contract that is entered into is the contract that must be enforced.

Vern Edwards tackled that subject in his own blog and unequivocally stated-

Once the government and a contractor enter into a contract a deal is a deal, and the government and the contractor are bound by the clauses in the awarded contracts until the contracts are completed. Nothing in FAR and no standard FAR clause authorizes a CO to unilaterally update, add, or delete clauses in a contract after award. None of the five Changes clauses, FAR 52.243-1 through -5, empower a CO to do that. … Purchase orders and solicitations must include the contract clauses that are applicable on the date the solicitation is issued, and they may include any clauses that become applicable after that date as long as they are expected to be applicable on or after the date of contract award. … Absent express language in the contract to the contrary, a CO may not unilaterally change the clauses in a contract when funding the contract or exercising an option. He or she may change clauses only with the assent of the contractor and with consideration for the change.

[Emphasis in original.]

So the DOD IG essentially criticized the DCMA Contracting Officer for failing to breach the contracts the government had entered into. Suffice to say: we disagree with the IG's position.

Further, the DOD IG did not address whether DCAA audit reports issued before implementation of the new DFARS clauses (in some cases a year before) would subject a Contracting Officer to the same disposition timeline as those issued after the new rule. The new rule also revised (in some cases significantly) the individual system adequacy criteria. The DOD IG skipped over that little nuance. It would be literally impossible for the DCAA audit reports to identify significant deficiencies in the contractor's Business Systems that would be subject to the new rule, a year before that rule was promulgated.

Time machines don't exist in Government Contracting; or if they do they are restricted to use only on classified contracts. Accordingly, it's tough to see how an audit report issued before the Business Systems clauses were effective would be subject to their requirements. It would have been nice if the IG had addressed that implicit timewarp logic; but of course doing so would have undercut its position.

But that's not all.

The DOD IG failed to address why the Compensation System, in particular, would be subject to the DFARS requirements or the DFARS PGI requirements, since it was eliminated as a stand-alone Business System effective May 18, 2011. If we were advising the contractor in question, we would have laughed out loud (and called the attorneys) if the CO tried to implement payment withholds on a Business System that didn't exist. Perhaps that logic problem contributed to the CO's alleged lack of diligence? We don't know the answer, because the IG never addressed the question.

But the DCMA Contracting Officer was not the only entity in the DOD IG crosshairs. As has become the norm, the IG took an opportunity to criticize DCAA for not performing timely follow-up audits on the contractor's four Business Systems. According to the IG audit report, "the FAO told us that the follow-up audits were delayed in part because of other priority work and staffing constraints." In other words, if DCAA wants to play in the Business Systems oversight regime, it needs to jump in and own its responsibilities; otherwise, it should get out of the way.

All in all, this DOD IG audit report is a great illustration of what's so broken in today's defense acquisition system. We've got oversight upon oversight upon oversight, and still it's not working to the level written into the rules. It's almost like the rules were drafted and implemented by clueless political appointees, advised by clueless career bureaucrats-neither group of which had much in the way of real-world, roll-up-your-shirtsleeves-and-dig-into-the-situation, actual experience.

We are loathe to defend DCMA and DCAA from the political predations of the DOD Inspector General. Lord knows we have had our differences with employees of those two entities-especially in regard to the DFARS Business Systems oversight and administration regime. But in this case we believe the DOD IG audit report missed the mark completely and revealed just how superficial the IG can be, when its targets are government civil servants mired in a bureaucratic, Kafkaesque, and damn near unworkable, system.

 

Fun with Statistics, Courtesy of the Latest DOD IG Semi-Annual Report to Congress

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It’s time once again to look at the latest DOD Inspector General Semi-Annual Report (SAR) to Congress, covering the six month period October 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014. We focus (as always) on Appendix D, Contract Audit Reports Issued. This is where the official DCAA statistics for the period are reported.

In the latest six month period, DCAA issued 2,267 audit reports, of which 1,419 were related to audits of contractors’ proposals to establish final billing rates (also known as “incurred cost proposals”). That number was slightly less than the 1,707 similar reports the audit agency issued during the same period last year (And by “slightly less” we mean 17 percent less.) Similarly, audit reports related to contractors’ cost proposals were down 14 percent and “post-award” defective pricing audit reports were down 25 percent, when compared to the same period last year. In contrast to the other areas, DCAA reported a 25 percent increase in CAS-related audit reports issued.

We like to track the number of audit assignments completed versus audit reports issued, in order to see how many assignments are completed without being subject to a GAGAS compliance review. We’ve asserted in the past that DCAA has developed a penchant for issuing Memos in lieu of formal audit reports, in order to escape CIGIE scrutiny.

The trend continued in the latest SAR, which reported that 3,515 assignments were completed without issuance of a formal audit report. That means about 61 percent of DCAA’s assignments were completed without an audit report, compared to 54 percent in last year’s six-month period.

We can debate whether the number of audit reports (or Memos) issued is a meaningful measure of productivity. But it’s harder to argue against the notion that the amount of dollars examined is a meaningful measure of management deployment of scarce auditor resources. In the latest SAR period, DCAA examined $50,121,100,000 – yes, that’s 50 Billion with a “B”. That’s a lot of dollars! But it’s not as much as DCAA examined during the comparable six-month period last year. In fact, it’s six percent less. Breaking the numbers down a bit more, DCAA reported that it examined significantly more (nearly 50 percent more!) incurred cost proposal dollars than it did last year; but that increase came at a price. Examination of dollars in contractors’ cost proposals was down about 35 percent, and examination of dollars related to CAS matters was down more than 90 percent.

The stats above tell us that DCAA has, indeed, redeployed auditors to focus on its backlog of incurred cost proposals, and that DCAA is working hard to try to meet its commitment of having the ginormous backlog whittled down to manageable size by the end of GFY 2016 (September 30, 2016). It’s too soon to forecast whether DCAA management will be successful, but we can tell where the audit focus is – and it’s in the right area.

The resource shift also may be driven by outside circumstances. Sequestration and DOD budget pressures would seem to have reduced the number of contract award opportunities, and thus the number of contractor proposals for those opportunities. Consequently, the fact that DCAA auditors are reviewing fewer (or lower dollar value) contractor cost proposals may simply be the result of having fewer to examine, rather than stemming from any intentional management resource redeployment.

We’ve noted in the past (with some angst) DCAA’s focus on the absolute amount of questioned costs, rather than other metrics we believe would be better suited to evaluate how the agency is doing. Nonetheless, that still appears to be DCAA management’s primary metric. In the latest SAR, DCAA reported that 4.7% of every incurred cost dollar examined was questioned. That value is significantly less than the 9.6% questioned-cost-dollar-to-claimed-incurred-cost-dollar ratio reported in the same period last year.

Indeed, reported questioned costs values (a number in which we include “funds put to better use” for our analyses) are down across the board. DCAA’s reported value of $3.213 Billion is down 37 percent from last year’s six-month period. Interesting, isn’t it?

Now, for your amusement and edification, here are some charts to illustrate some trends.

  1. DCAA Audit Reports Issued by SAR Period

chart_1

2. Dollars Examined by SAR Period ($ Millions)

chart-2

3. Questioned Cost as a Percentage of Dollars Examined (Includes Funds Put to Better Use)

chart-3

So what is one to make of the foregoing?

Well, we noticed that “today’s” DCAA is more productive in the second half of the year, on a fairly consistent basis. As the end of the GFY approaches, DCAA seems to concentrate on completing its audit assignments. This phenomenon makes a certain sense, since “carryover” audit assignments are something that we believe DCAA management tracks. There is a natural tendency to minimize that metric by pushing hard to finish the work before the looming (self-imposed) deadline.

We also noticed that despite the undeniable increase in DOD spending over the past several years, “today’s” DCAA is reviewing somewhere in the neighborhood of about one-third of what “yesterday’s” DCAA used to review. For example, in 2007 DCAA reviewed $358.4 billion, but in 2013 DCAA reviewed only $163.1 billion. We are at a loss to explain the phenomenon.

DCAA continues to state that, while it may review fewer dollars and issue fewer audit reports than it used to, it does so with higher quality … as measured by absolute dollars of questioned costs. That may well be the case (though we would argue that the dollars of questioned cost actually sustained by a Contracting Officer would be a better measure of quality). Even so, the percentage of costs questioned seems to have peaked in 2012 and declined in 2013, with the 2014a SAR period being akin to the 2011a SAR period. Of course we’ll have to wait until the GFY is over to see the full-year’s numbers, but on a preliminary basis we’ll go ahead and suggest that we may be seeing the classic “reversion to the mean” in which 2012 and 2013 values were an anomaly and the expected percentage of questioned costs is somewhere closer to six percent instead of double-digit values.

And speaking of questioned costs, the SAR (Appendix G) provides a discussion (by individual audit report) of just what types of costs DCAA auditors are questioning these days.

For example, Audit Report No. 06211-2007C10100004-R1 reported on audit findings associated with a contractor’s Incurred Cost Proposal for its FY 2007. DCAA questioned $75.5 Million, which included $62.4 Million associated with “claimed labor for employees who did not possess the contract required education or experience.”

Not to be outdone, Audit Report No. 03221-2007T10100001 reported on another contractor’s FY 2007 ICP, and questioned $162.3 Million, which included:

$61.2 million of legal costs primarily related to various cases for alleged breach of contract or for which sufficient supporting evidence was not provided to allow evaluation of the costs; $29.2 million of expenses incurred at international offices which were not supported by evidence of the nature of the activities performed at the offices; $15.9 million of professional services costs primarily due to duplicate invoices or lack of adequate supporting documentation; a $15.8 million self-insurance premium because the contractor did not demonstrate that actual loss history was used to determine the premium; $9.6 million of unallowable labor and related fringe benefits primarily for lobbying effort or other unallowable activities; $3.7 million of executive compensation in excess of the Federal Acquisition Regulation ceiling; and $2.5 million of insurance costs for ineligible dependents.

Finally, Audit Report No. 06811-2005U10100001 reported on a contractor’s FY 2005 ICP, with no explanation as to why DCAA thought that its audit findings were within the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations. Nonetheless, DCAA questioned $108.9 Million, which included:

$24.6 million of indirect costs and $84.3 million of direct costs. Significant questioned indirect costs relate to bonuses not supported by the basis for award; payouts for a profit sharing plan that are unreasonable to charge to Government contracts; costs for stock distributions that were not adequately supported; and Independent research and development/bid and proposal costs that were unallowable per Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 31 or were for effort that related to a specific subcontract. The majority of questioned direct costs are the result of (i) lack of adequate supporting documentation; (ii) claimed costs that were not allocable to the contract or cost objective on which they were claimed or the contractor’s inability to demonstrate that the costs were allocable to the contracts on which claimed; (iii) costs related to a prior fiscal year; (iv) costs claimed that represented a significant deviation from the contractor’s policies; and (v) claimed costs that were unallowable per Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 31 and contract terms

Audit Report No. 06271-2003A10100103 reported on a contractor’s FY 2003 ICP; it was issued on December 24, 2013 — which is likely more than nine years after the proposal was submitted. We don’t know the story, but we know that DCAA had “scope restrictions” and had to disclaim its opinion. That disclaimed opinion didn’t stop the auditors from questioning $104.4 Million in “noncompliant costs,” primarily related to “material costs for which adequate supporting documentation … was not provided.” We are surprised that DCAA would be surprised that such documents would not have survived such a long burial. Indeed, the fact that documents disappear and memories fade is why there is a CDA Statute of Limitations in the first place.

We could continue but we trust you get the point. There is little if any acknowledgement by DCAA that the CDA Statute of Limitations moots its findings and leads to a conclusion that the auditors are wasting their time. There is little if any acknowledgement that a disclaimed opinion means that the auditor cannot then express an unmodified opinion or conclusion on the audit objective. The end result is that more contracting officers will have to deal with negotiating positions that are very far apart indeed; and if negotiations are not successful then it’s likely there will be litigation.

And so the circle of submission/audit/litigation will continue, in large part because DCAA continues to operate as if it’s 1990 instead of 2014.

We hope you have had fun with our statistical analyses of the latest DOD Inspector General’s Semi-Annual Report to Congress. May your audits go smoothly!

 

The Best Navy Contractors, According to the Pentagon

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Fair_Winds
In what is going to be an ongoing thing, in mid-June the Pentagon released a list of “Superior Suppliers” to the U.S. Navy. This is the first list; there will be other lists for suppliers of the other military services. The ranking of Pentagon suppliers was announced a year ago, as part of Better Buying Power 2.1. We noted it right here.

Those contractors on the lists are (theoretically) going to be rewarded, while those not on the list … not so much. It is unclear what rewards are in store for the top tier of Navy suppliers but, in the original announcement, Mr. Kendall stated, “DCAA has agreed to coordinate the results of the low-risk sampling initiative as a potential incentive element of DoD plans to implement a SSIP [Superior Supplier Incentive Program]. DCAA has agreed to work with the Navy to incorporate low-risk sampling into the SSIP and will provide a recommendation on incorporating low-risk sampling into the DoD SSIP incentives for presentation to the BSIG [Business Senior Integration Group] by October 1, 2013.” We do not know the actual content of DCAA’s input to the BSIG, or if they met the deadline.

Government Executive speculated that the intent of the ranking is to “spark competition” – as if those contractors didn’t already compete with cutthroat ruthlessness over the few MDAP opportunities available to them in these sequestered times. The GovExec article is worth reading.

So who are the top Navy suppliers? According to the article, the cream of the cream is as follows:

  • General Dynamics Combat Systems

  • General Dynamics Marine Systems

  • General Electric Aviation

  • Lockheed Mission Systems and Training

  • MHSCo Sikorsky Lockheed Partnership

  • Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems

  • Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems

  • Raytheon Intelligence, Information and Services

  • Rolls-Royce Defence Aerospace

Following in the next tier are:

  • BAE Electronic Systems

  • BAE Systems Land and Armaments

  • Bell Helicopter

  • Boeing Military Aircraft

  • General Dynamics Information Systems and Technology

  • Ingalls Shipbuilding

  • Exelis

  • L-3 Communication Electronic Systems

  • Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems

  • Raytheon Missile Systems

  • Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems

  • Rockwell Collins Simulation

And finally, the third tranche is:

  • ATK Defense

  • Austal USA

  • Bell Boeing Joint Project Office

  • Lockheed Martin Aeronautics

  • Lockheed Martin Space Systems

  • Navistar Defense

  • Newport News Shipbuilding

  • Sikorsky

  • UTC Propulsion and Aerospace Systems

Those not on the list are not “top Navy suppliers” and, really, it is only those in the first tier that would seem to have any ability to capitalize on their status. Importantly, Mr. Kendall promised nothing and it would seem to be more about branding than anything else. If there is a tangible benefit to being the crème de la crème, it remains to be seen.

In the meantime, congratulations to the Top Navy Suppliers. Fair winds and following seas.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.