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Apogee Consulting Inc

Goodbye GAGAS?

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ChangeWe used to write letters to the Director, DCAA every year and publish them on this website. We wrote two before we were advised to cease the practice. Why? Well, because (1) the Director, DCAA, was not going to read our words, and (2) the Director, DCAA, was not going to direct DCAA based on the words of some blogger who never even worked for DCAA. We were told it was an exercise in futility.

Plus, you know, it struck certain people as being more than slightly arrogant. Who were we at Apogee Consulting, Inc., to tell a member of the Senior Executive Service, whose appointment was vetted (if not pushed) by powerful members of Congress and approved at the highest levels of the Defense Department?

So we stopped writing annual open letters to the Director, DCAA after the second one.

Truly, we were trying to be helpful. Our belief was that the Director, DCAA, wasn't getting the full and correct story from the auditors in the trenches; the ones actually doing the work and interacting with contractors. Our belief was that if the Director, DCAA, actually knew the effect audit guidance was having on the defense acquisition system, that audit guidance would be revised.

Okay, we were naïve. Sure, we get that. But please believe our intentions were pure and free of the normal levels of sarcasm and snark one encounters in our blog.

The two open letters are still on the blog. You can find 'em, if you are so inclined.

We were reminded of our naïve and perhaps patronizing advice to the Director, DCAA, when we noticed how many DCAA activities are being designed to avoid compliance with GAGAS. We think that's kind of a good thing … almost like the Director, DCAA, finally got around to reading our advice and nodded, and then made it happen.

What advice , you may ask?

In our first letter, written in December, 2009, we suggested the following to the Director, DCAA:

… consider whether all DCAA audits need to be subject to GAGAS. Reasonable people will disagree with GAO's stringent definition of 'independence' under GAGAS, but you can avoid the issue altogether if you make certain audits subject to GAGAS while others are not. There is precedent for this change: the AICPA has Consulting Standards that differ from Auditing Standards. Since DCAA performs both financial advisory services and audits, it would seem to make sense to apportion each type of audit into GAGAS-compliant and non-GAGAS-compliant groupings. And, by the way, DCMA really wants DCAA to participate in the process as an advisor; it wants your audits to offer value-added advice and to support the acquisition process. Contractors want to hear from auditors as well; they want to know where they need to improve and what should be done to fix system deficiencies. Your auditors can't do this if GAO will allege they've compromised 'independence' whenever this happens-so change the rules of the game to eliminate the issue altogether.

In our second letter, we expressed disappointment that the audit agency hadn't moved forward on our suggestion. But in the roughly 30 months since that second letter was published, we've come to see that, indeed, DCAA has decided to split out GAGAS-compliant audits from procedures that do not have to comply with GAGAS. Sometimes DCAA explicitly notes in its audit program that the procedures do not have to comply with GAGAS, and other times we have to infer it from the fact that the output of the procedures is not an audit report but is, instead, a Memorandum.

Look, we are not going to claim any special credit for this sea-change in approach to performing audits. But nonetheless, we smile a secret little smile when we see it happening. It's a good step forward and we are happy to see the change in approach.

The fact that it will reduce the audit agency's exposure to allegations of GAGAS non-compliances is simply a byproduct of the strategic management decision, we are quite sure.

 

Changes to DCAA Disclosure Statement Adequacy Reviews

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A recently published Memorandum for Regional Directors (MRD) announces what most of us have known for some time: DCAA is exiting the business of reviewing contractors' CASB Disclosure Statements for adequacy. Instead, that responsibility is moving over to DCMA, because Administrative Contracting Officers over there have so much free time on their hands.

As we all know, DCAA lacks sufficient resources to perform its audit workload; never mind the fact that the FAR Council keeps adding to that workload (even though public comments from folks such as Apogee Consulting, Inc. try to apprise them of that fact). So of course it makes perfect sense for the audit agency to descope its workload wherever possible, in order to focus on more important audits that generate questioned costs that can be reported to Congress each year.

In fairness and in the name of accuracy, we have to report that DCAA will still be evaluating the adequacy of contractors' Disclosure Statements. However, that evaluation will not be part of the audit scope.

What?

No, really.

Here, let us quote from the MRD:

We no longer will evaluate adequacy as part of the scope of any Disclosure Statement audit (Activity Code 19100). Instead, audit teams will review the submission for adequacy prior to accepting the engagement. The objective of a Disclosure Statement audit will be solely to determine whether the disclosed practices comply with Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). …

As part of determining whether to accept the engagement, the audit team will review whether the contractor's submission is adequate by:

  • determining whether the contractor followed the Disclosure Statement form instructions (see Conformity of Disclosure Statement with General Instructions tool);

  • determining whether contractor disclosures are consistent (see Internal Consistency of Disclosed Practices in a Disclosure Statement tool); and

  • gaining a thorough understanding of the basis of the described practices, usually during the contractor's walkthrough of the submission.

Note that DCAA has created some "tools" to help auditors with their adequacy submission. We checked and those tools are not currently available to the public on the DCAA website. So we don't know their format or content. But we suspect the new tools will be much like other DCAA tools. In other words, we expect more checklists that help auditors do their jobs without the necessity of using professional judgment.

Importantly, the auditors are directed to use their tools and understanding to determine whether the contractor's Disclosure Statement is "current, accurate, and complete." That's kind of amusing, really, because you can't find that phrase anywhere in the CAS Board regulations. DCAA kind of just made it up and then decided it was the sine qua non of Disclosure Statements.

So the auditors will use their tools and understanding to evaluate Disclosure Statement adequacy and to prepare a Memo to the Cognizant Federal Agency Official (CFAO) documenting their evaluation.

Yes, you read that correctly. Even though the adequacy evaluation is out of scope, the evaluation process will result in yet another Memo being issued. (** SIGH **) The Memo, whose conclusions will be based on out-of-scope procedures guided by "black box" tools whose inner workings are not fit for public knowledge, guided by a goal that cannot be found in the CAS Board regulations, will result in a recommendation to the cognizant Contracting Officer regarding the adequacy of the Disclosure Statement.

Only if DCAA and the CFAO reach an agreement on adequacy will the actual CAS compliance review actually begin. Yes, you read that correctly. All of the foregoing procedures are simply a precursor to the real DCAA review. (Although in fairness the MRD does say that the compliance review can continue so long as an agreement is reached on adequacy before the end of the review.)

We wish we were making this up.

But we are not.

What if the auditors and the CFAO disagree on the adequacy of the contractor's Disclosure Statement?

Well, the presumption in the MRD is that the auditors and CFAO will agree. If they agree the Disclosure Statement is adequate, then the review proceeds. If they agree it is inadequate, then the contractor will resubmit its Disclosure Statement and "the audit team will reassess the contractor's revised submission for adequacy." There is no guidance regarding what to do if the CFAO thinks the Disclosure Statement is adequate but the auditors do not.

Perhaps another Review Board?

And what about the notion that the auditors will participate in a "walkthough" of the Disclosure Statement? According to the MRD, the contractor is supposed to describe its intended cost accounting practices and provide "policies and procedures" that support those practices. Certainly, a couple of Cost Accounting Standards do require specified policies and procedures (e.g., describing direct versus indirect costs), but we are unaware of any CAS Board regulations that require all disclosed cost accounting practices to be supported with written policies and procedures. Indeed, the CAS Board regulations use the phrase "established or disclosed" to highlight the fact that what matters is the actual practices themselves and not words on a page.

Moreover, we are unaware of any requirement that contractors must participate in a nebulous "walkthrough" exercise in order to support a DCAA audit of a Disclosure Statement. While we generally applaud the notion that auditors must understand what they are auditing, we also subscribe to the time-honored notion that "the document speaks for itself". Obviously there is a balance between making the auditors happy and indulging in a non-value-added exercise simply to check-off a box on the audit program, but we have become disenchanted with "walkthroughs" and will be devoting an article to this recent DCAA fad in the near future.

We realize that our analysis of the recent revision to DCAA audit guidance has exhibited our usual restraint and subtlety. So let's bottom-line our assessment: Not the best audit guidance we've seen.

Indeed, it's kind of a hot mess, isn't it?

 

Updates on CDA Statute of Limitations

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As our readers know, the evolving case law on the Contract Disputes Act Statute of Limitations (SoL) may be one of the most significant issues affecting disputes between Government and contractor. We’ve been commenting on its impact ever since the first case that came to our attention, in December, 2009. Almost five years ago, we wrote, “Contracting Officer delays in dispositioning audit findings can lead to a forfeiture of amounts to which the government would have otherwise been entitled in a court of law.” Indeed, that assessment has been (generally, with some exceptions) borne out by case after case at both the ASBCA and U.S. Court of Federal Claims.

Although DCAA still pretends its audits of costs aged more than six years actually matter to somebody, DCMA seems to be more realistic about the situation, and has issued direction to its Contracting Officers that recognizes the impact of the SoL expiration. (As a side note, DCAA still pretends its audits of contractors’ Forward Pricing Rate Proposals will be of interest to Contracting Officers even after a FPRA has been negotiated without an audit report, and has directed its auditors to continue to audit in such circumstances, and to issue a formal audit report to the CO, even though nobody will care. *Sigh*)

The takeaway is that if you are a contractor and DCAA is questioning costs aged more than six years, your auditors will turn a deaf ear to your assertions that the SoL has run. However, your DCMA Contracting Officer is likely to take your assertions much more seriously.

One reason your assertion of SoL expiration is likely to be taken seriously by your CO (or ACO or DACO) is that, by and large, Courts keep tossing out Government claims because they were issued “untimely” and thus contractors, by and large, stand a good chance of seeing a complete victory, should they be willing to litigate.

Note that the litigation is not a trial on the merits of the parties' positions. The litigation need not be expensive (well, not too expensive). The litigation is aimed at dismissal based on a lack of jurisdiction. (Or so we are told by attorneys; we are not members of that guild.)

Two recent decisions as the ASBCA illustrate the logic involved.

The first case is that of Laguna Construction Company (ASBCA No. 58569, issued May 29, 2014). The Government claimed that Laguna awarded two subcontracts without adequate competition and failed to “document that these award prices were reasonable.” In addition, other subcontracts were awarded in which Laguna “failed to justify award … to other than the lowest bidder,” and similarly failed to document that subcontractor award prices were reasonable.

During 2005, Laguna received progress payments and in its progress payment requests the subcontractors in question were identified and the subcontract prices were identified. In 2006, DCAA issued an audit report that concluded that Laguna’s “subcontract management system and related internal control policies and procedures are inadequate and cannot be relied upon to ensure subcontracts are awarded in accordance with [FAR requirements] or [that] subcontract payments made by [Laguna] are in accordance with FAR 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment.” The findings were transmitted to the cognizant ACO via Flash Report. (Ah, those were the good ol’ days!) DCAA told the ACO “Due to the deficiencies in the internal controls related to [Laguna’s] subcontract management system we believe a significant risk is present relative to allocability, allowability and reasonableness of subcontract costs billed to the U.S. Government. We believe this deficiency is serious enough to render the subcontract management system inadequate.”

Three years later (March, 2009) the ACO got around to sending that 2006 DCAA audit report to Laguna for comment. Roughly sixty days later, the ACO suspended 30% of interim billing payments in order to protect the Government from “the cost risk ... for the deficiencies reported.” Ouch!

DCAA issued another, strikingly similar, audit report in 2009, alleging many of the same issues. In March, 2011, DCAA issued a Form 1, which “disapproved” $2,089,799 of subcontractor costs incurred by Laguna (i.e., payments made by Laguna to its subcontractors) and that amount was subsequently increased to $2,383,370.

The ACO issued a COFD in December, 2012, for the disputed amounts plus G&A allocated to such amounts, for a total of $3,815,233. Laguna appealed, asserting that “the government's monetary claim was filed more than six years from the date the claim accrued, and therefore is barred under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(A).”

Importantly, the Government immediately retreated from a portion of its claim, conceding in its own pleadings that “its Cost Reasonableness Claim” on one Task Order “was untimely.” Accordingly the Judges immediately pitched that amount of the Government’s claim and then moved on to decide the remainder. Here’s what the decision said:

The legal predicate of the government's claim here is appellant's failure to document the reasonableness of subcontract awards under this contract that were not based upon competition. The DCAA was fully aware of appellant's failure to document the reasonableness of subcontract awards under this contract that were not based upon competition by late 2005, and it documented its findings by audit reports dated 6 December 2005 and 9 February 2006, which latter report was issued to the ACO. That the DCAA did not single out these subcontracts by name in the audit reports is irrelevant. DCAA reviewed 32 subcontracts under the contract totaling $147,701,411 which presumably was a significantly large sample upon which to support its findings. The government was also aware of its ‘injury’ here, i.e., the subcontract prices awarded by appellant and paid by the government, as early as 2005. The ACO did not file this claim until 17 December 2012.

Readers should not be surprised at the final sentence:

Accordingly, the CO's decision dated 17 December 2012 is hereby deemed null and void.

As attorneys from Arnold & Porter wrote:

The [Laguna Construction] case is important because it addresses another form of potential liability (reasonableness of subcontractor costs) and continues to cement the construct that the knowledge standard under the statute of limitations is one of objectivity, not absolute, subjective knowledge.

The second case is Kellogg Brown & Root Services (KBRS). There are various joined cases in the decision (issued June 17, 2014) but the relevant one here is ASBCA No. 58559. In that case the Government claimed that KBRS owed it $55,620,592 in allegedly unallowable Private Security Company (PSC) subcontract costs.

Blah, blah, blah. 35 pages of Findings of Fact that summed up a colossal Charlie Foxtrot, wherein the U.S. Military tried to perform its primary mission under difficult circumstances, a mission that (based on testimony and evidence and Findings of Fact) did not necessarily include protecting the civilian contractors, who were thus forced to protect themselves by hiring PSCs, which led to questioned, suspended, and disallowed costs. We have an opinion on the equity of the situation, but that opinion is not relevant to this article.

Let’s cut to the chase with respect to the one appeal:

A government claim for recovery of payments made for allegedly unallowable costs of KBRS and its subcontractors using PSCs in connection with their performance of Contract 0007 accrued no later than 10 June 2005 …. Prior to that date, on 29 August 2004, LTC O'Day knew that PSCs were being used instead of military escorts (finding 41). Prior to 10 June 2005, between April and August 2004, the DCMA Commander Iraq and Rock Island PCO Watkins knew that PSCs were being used for movement by KBRS personnel within Iraq (findings 47-48). Prior to 10 June 2005, on 24 March 2004, the KBRS contact at MCB, MAJ Sessoms, was told that PSCs were being used for convoys from Kuwait into Iraq (findings 58-59). Finally, on 10 June 2005, the government was expressly advised that PSCs were being used to transport personnel to their respect[ive] sites in Iraq (finding 60). On these findings, the contracting officer's final decision of 30 January 2013 was untimely and thus invalid and a nullity. We give it no further consideration and dismiss the appeal in ASBCA No. 58559 for lack of jurisdiction.

(Note: KBRS won the rest of its appeals on the merits.)

These two recent cases clearly illustrate, readers, why you need to be aware of the CDA SoL and why you should be prepared to assert it when appropriate, and why your DCMA Contracting Officer is going to take that assertion seriously. Unfortunately, DCAA is likely to be deaf and blind to its SoL situation, and is likely to continue its audit procedures in the vain hope that somebody, somewhere, will think its findings have merit. Unfortunately for DCAA, Courts are ruling (with some consistency) that, once six years is up, the auditors should close their computers and walk away from the audit, because the Government very likely lacks legal standing to pursue any findings.

 

DCAA Changes Approach to Reporting Business System Deficiencies

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New DCAA audit guidance, published June 30, 2014, heralded a change in the way auditors will report deficiencies in contractors' business systems. This is important for a couple of reasons.

First and foremost, the DCAA approach to reporting bizsys deficiencies has not corresponded to the approach mandated by Congress and codified in the DFARS. We pointed out that little nuance in this article. As we reported, DCAA stated that its unique approach to identifying and classifying deficiencies was mandated by GAGAS.

Second, the approach chosen by DCAA resulted in a flurry of "deficiency reports" issued to Contracting Officers, in which every deficiency tended to be classified as a "significant deficiency." That approach was founded in a theory that any deficiency identified at a major contractor was obviously a significant deficiency, a position that was contrary both to regulation and common sense. Because all reported deficiencies were equal, the CO had to handle them in a similar fashion, no matter how trivial the matter being reported. Obviously, this situation led to a number of Review Board cases where the CO had to submit an override package and receive approval to exercise the independent business judgment that comes with a Certificate of Appointment. That process took time and it took time away from other pressing matters.

DCAA's new audit guidance clarified that the previous guidance didn't really mean what it said. The new guidance stated:

[The DCAA HQ] Policy [Directorate] did not envision auditors reporting instances of the noncompliances less severe than significant deficiency/material weaknesses separately in an audit report without also reporting significant deficiencies as defined by the DFARS business system criteria (DFARS 252-242.7005). The MRD did not provide specific instructions on how to report noncompliances that are less severe than a significant deficiency/material weakness but warrant the attention of those charged with governance when no significant deficiency/material weakness needs to be reported.

As we parse the foregoing paragraph we are pleased to see that not all bizsys deficiencies are created equal. That was always the case, but it's nice to see an official DCAA acknowledgement.

Further, the audit guidance directs auditors to report non-significant deficiencies via Memo instead of via Deficiency Report. (Another Memo … sigh.) "The memorandum will include a statement of condition and recommendation (SOCAR) and provide the contracting officer with sufficient information to understand the condition and the severity of the deficiency (i.e., a fully-developed audit finding)."

But that's a good thing, because contractors and COs will be able to differentiate between a Deficiency Report that transmits "significant deficiencies" found in a business system from a less-than significant deficiency. That's going to reduce stress and workload all around.

The MRD doesn't say, but we suspect the Memos will not be reported in the DCMA Contract Audit Follow-Up (CAFU) system … which means time and attention can be focused on more pressing matters.

 

Fun with Statistics, Courtesy of the Latest DOD IG Semi-Annual Report to Congress

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It’s time once again to look at the latest DOD Inspector General Semi-Annual Report (SAR) to Congress, covering the six month period October 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014. We focus (as always) on Appendix D, Contract Audit Reports Issued. This is where the official DCAA statistics for the period are reported.

In the latest six month period, DCAA issued 2,267 audit reports, of which 1,419 were related to audits of contractors’ proposals to establish final billing rates (also known as “incurred cost proposals”). That number was slightly less than the 1,707 similar reports the audit agency issued during the same period last year (And by “slightly less” we mean 17 percent less.) Similarly, audit reports related to contractors’ cost proposals were down 14 percent and “post-award” defective pricing audit reports were down 25 percent, when compared to the same period last year. In contrast to the other areas, DCAA reported a 25 percent increase in CAS-related audit reports issued.

We like to track the number of audit assignments completed versus audit reports issued, in order to see how many assignments are completed without being subject to a GAGAS compliance review. We’ve asserted in the past that DCAA has developed a penchant for issuing Memos in lieu of formal audit reports, in order to escape CIGIE scrutiny.

The trend continued in the latest SAR, which reported that 3,515 assignments were completed without issuance of a formal audit report. That means about 61 percent of DCAA’s assignments were completed without an audit report, compared to 54 percent in last year’s six-month period.

We can debate whether the number of audit reports (or Memos) issued is a meaningful measure of productivity. But it’s harder to argue against the notion that the amount of dollars examined is a meaningful measure of management deployment of scarce auditor resources. In the latest SAR period, DCAA examined $50,121,100,000 – yes, that’s 50 Billion with a “B”. That’s a lot of dollars! But it’s not as much as DCAA examined during the comparable six-month period last year. In fact, it’s six percent less. Breaking the numbers down a bit more, DCAA reported that it examined significantly more (nearly 50 percent more!) incurred cost proposal dollars than it did last year; but that increase came at a price. Examination of dollars in contractors’ cost proposals was down about 35 percent, and examination of dollars related to CAS matters was down more than 90 percent.

The stats above tell us that DCAA has, indeed, redeployed auditors to focus on its backlog of incurred cost proposals, and that DCAA is working hard to try to meet its commitment of having the ginormous backlog whittled down to manageable size by the end of GFY 2016 (September 30, 2016). It’s too soon to forecast whether DCAA management will be successful, but we can tell where the audit focus is – and it’s in the right area.

The resource shift also may be driven by outside circumstances. Sequestration and DOD budget pressures would seem to have reduced the number of contract award opportunities, and thus the number of contractor proposals for those opportunities. Consequently, the fact that DCAA auditors are reviewing fewer (or lower dollar value) contractor cost proposals may simply be the result of having fewer to examine, rather than stemming from any intentional management resource redeployment.

We’ve noted in the past (with some angst) DCAA’s focus on the absolute amount of questioned costs, rather than other metrics we believe would be better suited to evaluate how the agency is doing. Nonetheless, that still appears to be DCAA management’s primary metric. In the latest SAR, DCAA reported that 4.7% of every incurred cost dollar examined was questioned. That value is significantly less than the 9.6% questioned-cost-dollar-to-claimed-incurred-cost-dollar ratio reported in the same period last year.

Indeed, reported questioned costs values (a number in which we include “funds put to better use” for our analyses) are down across the board. DCAA’s reported value of $3.213 Billion is down 37 percent from last year’s six-month period. Interesting, isn’t it?

Now, for your amusement and edification, here are some charts to illustrate some trends.

  1. DCAA Audit Reports Issued by SAR Period

chart_1

2. Dollars Examined by SAR Period ($ Millions)

chart-2

3. Questioned Cost as a Percentage of Dollars Examined (Includes Funds Put to Better Use)

chart-3

So what is one to make of the foregoing?

Well, we noticed that “today’s” DCAA is more productive in the second half of the year, on a fairly consistent basis. As the end of the GFY approaches, DCAA seems to concentrate on completing its audit assignments. This phenomenon makes a certain sense, since “carryover” audit assignments are something that we believe DCAA management tracks. There is a natural tendency to minimize that metric by pushing hard to finish the work before the looming (self-imposed) deadline.

We also noticed that despite the undeniable increase in DOD spending over the past several years, “today’s” DCAA is reviewing somewhere in the neighborhood of about one-third of what “yesterday’s” DCAA used to review. For example, in 2007 DCAA reviewed $358.4 billion, but in 2013 DCAA reviewed only $163.1 billion. We are at a loss to explain the phenomenon.

DCAA continues to state that, while it may review fewer dollars and issue fewer audit reports than it used to, it does so with higher quality … as measured by absolute dollars of questioned costs. That may well be the case (though we would argue that the dollars of questioned cost actually sustained by a Contracting Officer would be a better measure of quality). Even so, the percentage of costs questioned seems to have peaked in 2012 and declined in 2013, with the 2014a SAR period being akin to the 2011a SAR period. Of course we’ll have to wait until the GFY is over to see the full-year’s numbers, but on a preliminary basis we’ll go ahead and suggest that we may be seeing the classic “reversion to the mean” in which 2012 and 2013 values were an anomaly and the expected percentage of questioned costs is somewhere closer to six percent instead of double-digit values.

And speaking of questioned costs, the SAR (Appendix G) provides a discussion (by individual audit report) of just what types of costs DCAA auditors are questioning these days.

For example, Audit Report No. 06211-2007C10100004-R1 reported on audit findings associated with a contractor’s Incurred Cost Proposal for its FY 2007. DCAA questioned $75.5 Million, which included $62.4 Million associated with “claimed labor for employees who did not possess the contract required education or experience.”

Not to be outdone, Audit Report No. 03221-2007T10100001 reported on another contractor’s FY 2007 ICP, and questioned $162.3 Million, which included:

$61.2 million of legal costs primarily related to various cases for alleged breach of contract or for which sufficient supporting evidence was not provided to allow evaluation of the costs; $29.2 million of expenses incurred at international offices which were not supported by evidence of the nature of the activities performed at the offices; $15.9 million of professional services costs primarily due to duplicate invoices or lack of adequate supporting documentation; a $15.8 million self-insurance premium because the contractor did not demonstrate that actual loss history was used to determine the premium; $9.6 million of unallowable labor and related fringe benefits primarily for lobbying effort or other unallowable activities; $3.7 million of executive compensation in excess of the Federal Acquisition Regulation ceiling; and $2.5 million of insurance costs for ineligible dependents.

Finally, Audit Report No. 06811-2005U10100001 reported on a contractor’s FY 2005 ICP, with no explanation as to why DCAA thought that its audit findings were within the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations. Nonetheless, DCAA questioned $108.9 Million, which included:

$24.6 million of indirect costs and $84.3 million of direct costs. Significant questioned indirect costs relate to bonuses not supported by the basis for award; payouts for a profit sharing plan that are unreasonable to charge to Government contracts; costs for stock distributions that were not adequately supported; and Independent research and development/bid and proposal costs that were unallowable per Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 31 or were for effort that related to a specific subcontract. The majority of questioned direct costs are the result of (i) lack of adequate supporting documentation; (ii) claimed costs that were not allocable to the contract or cost objective on which they were claimed or the contractor’s inability to demonstrate that the costs were allocable to the contracts on which claimed; (iii) costs related to a prior fiscal year; (iv) costs claimed that represented a significant deviation from the contractor’s policies; and (v) claimed costs that were unallowable per Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 31 and contract terms

Audit Report No. 06271-2003A10100103 reported on a contractor’s FY 2003 ICP; it was issued on December 24, 2013 — which is likely more than nine years after the proposal was submitted. We don’t know the story, but we know that DCAA had “scope restrictions” and had to disclaim its opinion. That disclaimed opinion didn’t stop the auditors from questioning $104.4 Million in “noncompliant costs,” primarily related to “material costs for which adequate supporting documentation … was not provided.” We are surprised that DCAA would be surprised that such documents would not have survived such a long burial. Indeed, the fact that documents disappear and memories fade is why there is a CDA Statute of Limitations in the first place.

We could continue but we trust you get the point. There is little if any acknowledgement by DCAA that the CDA Statute of Limitations moots its findings and leads to a conclusion that the auditors are wasting their time. There is little if any acknowledgement that a disclaimed opinion means that the auditor cannot then express an unmodified opinion or conclusion on the audit objective. The end result is that more contracting officers will have to deal with negotiating positions that are very far apart indeed; and if negotiations are not successful then it’s likely there will be litigation.

And so the circle of submission/audit/litigation will continue, in large part because DCAA continues to operate as if it’s 1990 instead of 2014.

We hope you have had fun with our statistical analyses of the latest DOD Inspector General’s Semi-Annual Report to Congress. May your audits go smoothly!

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.