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Fun with Statistics, Courtesy of the Latest DOD IG Semi-Annual Report to Congress

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It’s time once again to look at the latest DOD Inspector General Semi-Annual Report (SAR) to Congress, covering the six month period October 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014. We focus (as always) on Appendix D, Contract Audit Reports Issued. This is where the official DCAA statistics for the period are reported.

In the latest six month period, DCAA issued 2,267 audit reports, of which 1,419 were related to audits of contractors’ proposals to establish final billing rates (also known as “incurred cost proposals”). That number was slightly less than the 1,707 similar reports the audit agency issued during the same period last year (And by “slightly less” we mean 17 percent less.) Similarly, audit reports related to contractors’ cost proposals were down 14 percent and “post-award” defective pricing audit reports were down 25 percent, when compared to the same period last year. In contrast to the other areas, DCAA reported a 25 percent increase in CAS-related audit reports issued.

We like to track the number of audit assignments completed versus audit reports issued, in order to see how many assignments are completed without being subject to a GAGAS compliance review. We’ve asserted in the past that DCAA has developed a penchant for issuing Memos in lieu of formal audit reports, in order to escape CIGIE scrutiny.

The trend continued in the latest SAR, which reported that 3,515 assignments were completed without issuance of a formal audit report. That means about 61 percent of DCAA’s assignments were completed without an audit report, compared to 54 percent in last year’s six-month period.

We can debate whether the number of audit reports (or Memos) issued is a meaningful measure of productivity. But it’s harder to argue against the notion that the amount of dollars examined is a meaningful measure of management deployment of scarce auditor resources. In the latest SAR period, DCAA examined $50,121,100,000 – yes, that’s 50 Billion with a “B”. That’s a lot of dollars! But it’s not as much as DCAA examined during the comparable six-month period last year. In fact, it’s six percent less. Breaking the numbers down a bit more, DCAA reported that it examined significantly more (nearly 50 percent more!) incurred cost proposal dollars than it did last year; but that increase came at a price. Examination of dollars in contractors’ cost proposals was down about 35 percent, and examination of dollars related to CAS matters was down more than 90 percent.

The stats above tell us that DCAA has, indeed, redeployed auditors to focus on its backlog of incurred cost proposals, and that DCAA is working hard to try to meet its commitment of having the ginormous backlog whittled down to manageable size by the end of GFY 2016 (September 30, 2016). It’s too soon to forecast whether DCAA management will be successful, but we can tell where the audit focus is – and it’s in the right area.

The resource shift also may be driven by outside circumstances. Sequestration and DOD budget pressures would seem to have reduced the number of contract award opportunities, and thus the number of contractor proposals for those opportunities. Consequently, the fact that DCAA auditors are reviewing fewer (or lower dollar value) contractor cost proposals may simply be the result of having fewer to examine, rather than stemming from any intentional management resource redeployment.

We’ve noted in the past (with some angst) DCAA’s focus on the absolute amount of questioned costs, rather than other metrics we believe would be better suited to evaluate how the agency is doing. Nonetheless, that still appears to be DCAA management’s primary metric. In the latest SAR, DCAA reported that 4.7% of every incurred cost dollar examined was questioned. That value is significantly less than the 9.6% questioned-cost-dollar-to-claimed-incurred-cost-dollar ratio reported in the same period last year.

Indeed, reported questioned costs values (a number in which we include “funds put to better use” for our analyses) are down across the board. DCAA’s reported value of $3.213 Billion is down 37 percent from last year’s six-month period. Interesting, isn’t it?

Now, for your amusement and edification, here are some charts to illustrate some trends.

  1. DCAA Audit Reports Issued by SAR Period

chart_1

2. Dollars Examined by SAR Period ($ Millions)

chart-2

3. Questioned Cost as a Percentage of Dollars Examined (Includes Funds Put to Better Use)

chart-3

So what is one to make of the foregoing?

Well, we noticed that “today’s” DCAA is more productive in the second half of the year, on a fairly consistent basis. As the end of the GFY approaches, DCAA seems to concentrate on completing its audit assignments. This phenomenon makes a certain sense, since “carryover” audit assignments are something that we believe DCAA management tracks. There is a natural tendency to minimize that metric by pushing hard to finish the work before the looming (self-imposed) deadline.

We also noticed that despite the undeniable increase in DOD spending over the past several years, “today’s” DCAA is reviewing somewhere in the neighborhood of about one-third of what “yesterday’s” DCAA used to review. For example, in 2007 DCAA reviewed $358.4 billion, but in 2013 DCAA reviewed only $163.1 billion. We are at a loss to explain the phenomenon.

DCAA continues to state that, while it may review fewer dollars and issue fewer audit reports than it used to, it does so with higher quality … as measured by absolute dollars of questioned costs. That may well be the case (though we would argue that the dollars of questioned cost actually sustained by a Contracting Officer would be a better measure of quality). Even so, the percentage of costs questioned seems to have peaked in 2012 and declined in 2013, with the 2014a SAR period being akin to the 2011a SAR period. Of course we’ll have to wait until the GFY is over to see the full-year’s numbers, but on a preliminary basis we’ll go ahead and suggest that we may be seeing the classic “reversion to the mean” in which 2012 and 2013 values were an anomaly and the expected percentage of questioned costs is somewhere closer to six percent instead of double-digit values.

And speaking of questioned costs, the SAR (Appendix G) provides a discussion (by individual audit report) of just what types of costs DCAA auditors are questioning these days.

For example, Audit Report No. 06211-2007C10100004-R1 reported on audit findings associated with a contractor’s Incurred Cost Proposal for its FY 2007. DCAA questioned $75.5 Million, which included $62.4 Million associated with “claimed labor for employees who did not possess the contract required education or experience.”

Not to be outdone, Audit Report No. 03221-2007T10100001 reported on another contractor’s FY 2007 ICP, and questioned $162.3 Million, which included:

$61.2 million of legal costs primarily related to various cases for alleged breach of contract or for which sufficient supporting evidence was not provided to allow evaluation of the costs; $29.2 million of expenses incurred at international offices which were not supported by evidence of the nature of the activities performed at the offices; $15.9 million of professional services costs primarily due to duplicate invoices or lack of adequate supporting documentation; a $15.8 million self-insurance premium because the contractor did not demonstrate that actual loss history was used to determine the premium; $9.6 million of unallowable labor and related fringe benefits primarily for lobbying effort or other unallowable activities; $3.7 million of executive compensation in excess of the Federal Acquisition Regulation ceiling; and $2.5 million of insurance costs for ineligible dependents.

Finally, Audit Report No. 06811-2005U10100001 reported on a contractor’s FY 2005 ICP, with no explanation as to why DCAA thought that its audit findings were within the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations. Nonetheless, DCAA questioned $108.9 Million, which included:

$24.6 million of indirect costs and $84.3 million of direct costs. Significant questioned indirect costs relate to bonuses not supported by the basis for award; payouts for a profit sharing plan that are unreasonable to charge to Government contracts; costs for stock distributions that were not adequately supported; and Independent research and development/bid and proposal costs that were unallowable per Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 31 or were for effort that related to a specific subcontract. The majority of questioned direct costs are the result of (i) lack of adequate supporting documentation; (ii) claimed costs that were not allocable to the contract or cost objective on which they were claimed or the contractor’s inability to demonstrate that the costs were allocable to the contracts on which claimed; (iii) costs related to a prior fiscal year; (iv) costs claimed that represented a significant deviation from the contractor’s policies; and (v) claimed costs that were unallowable per Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 31 and contract terms

Audit Report No. 06271-2003A10100103 reported on a contractor’s FY 2003 ICP; it was issued on December 24, 2013 — which is likely more than nine years after the proposal was submitted. We don’t know the story, but we know that DCAA had “scope restrictions” and had to disclaim its opinion. That disclaimed opinion didn’t stop the auditors from questioning $104.4 Million in “noncompliant costs,” primarily related to “material costs for which adequate supporting documentation … was not provided.” We are surprised that DCAA would be surprised that such documents would not have survived such a long burial. Indeed, the fact that documents disappear and memories fade is why there is a CDA Statute of Limitations in the first place.

We could continue but we trust you get the point. There is little if any acknowledgement by DCAA that the CDA Statute of Limitations moots its findings and leads to a conclusion that the auditors are wasting their time. There is little if any acknowledgement that a disclaimed opinion means that the auditor cannot then express an unmodified opinion or conclusion on the audit objective. The end result is that more contracting officers will have to deal with negotiating positions that are very far apart indeed; and if negotiations are not successful then it’s likely there will be litigation.

And so the circle of submission/audit/litigation will continue, in large part because DCAA continues to operate as if it’s 1990 instead of 2014.

We hope you have had fun with our statistical analyses of the latest DOD Inspector General’s Semi-Annual Report to Congress. May your audits go smoothly!

 

DOD IG Criticizes DCMA for Failing to Breach Contracts

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Time_Travel
Rarely have we had more difficult time coming up with an appropriate title for an article. Believe us, this one has it all: A DOD Hotline allegation, arguments about the adequacy of a contractor's business systems, untimely DCAA follow-up audits, interference from a DCMA Review Board, untimely Contracting Officer action, the Christian Doctrine … it was truly hard to come up with a unifying theme for the piece.

So we shall just dive in and see where the currents take us.

If you have been reading this blog for any length of time, you will understand that we pay special attention to the administration of the DOD Business Systems oversight regime. In one of the lasting impacts from the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC), the DFARS was revised significantly (via interim rule) on May 18, 2011 to address six (6) contractor "Business Systems." Formerly there had been 10 Internal Control Systems; but as of that date the 10 became six, the criteria for system adequacy were codified and revised, and a requirement was added that mandated payment withholds from "covered contracts" for systems deemed "inadequate" or "disapproved" (when the appropriate clause was present). We expect this is old news to most of you; but if it's not then you can search this site and find many articles delving into different aspects of the new oversight regime.

Remember, readers, this all came into effect on May 18, 2011 and it only applied to contracts awarded after that date-and only if those contracts contained the requisite clause(s). As the DOD Inspector General noted, "With minor changes, the interim rule was adopted as a final rule on February 24, 2012." Thus, the rule has been around in final state for about three years.

Let's see what the DOD IG has to say about administration of the Business Systems oversight regime on one "major contractor" in the DCAA's Western Region, by way of an audit report issued June 20, 2014.

According to the audit report, DCAA issued four reports in 2010 and 2011 that identified "significant system deficiencies." The cognizant DCMA Contracting Officer received the reports and requested that the contractor "provide a written response to the reported deficiencies." The contractor "disagreed in principle with some of the reported findings, but agreed to take several corrective actions." Subsequently, "the contractor eventually notified the contracting officer … that it had completed the corrective actions for each system." Within "approximately 8 months" after receiving the contractor's notifications, the CO approved the contractor's billing and accounting systems. It took "nearly 19 months" for the CO to approve the contractor's estimating system; and that approval was issued only after DCAA issued a memo "informing the contracting officer that the contractor appeared to have implemented internal controls to address the remaining deficiencies."

That covers three out of the four systems with significant deficiencies. What about the fourth business system? Well, according to the DOD IG-

Even though the contracting officer has also proposed to approve the compensation system, the contracting officer has not yet received the necessary authorization to do so by the DCMA's Board of Review Committee. … The Committee advised the contracting officer that additional testing of the contractor's corrective actions needs to take place before it could authorize the proposed determination.

And then somebody called the DOD IG Hotline to complain that the DCMA Contracting Officer "did not take timely or appropriate action on several [DCAA] audit reports …."

The table below shows the key dates.

Business System

Date of DCAA Audit Report

Date of Contractor Response

Date CAP was Completed

Date of CO Final Determination

Number of Days to Issue a COFD

Compensation

5/18/2010

6/21/2010

11/03/2010

NEVER

1,373

Billing

11/18/2010

5/23/2011

5/23/2011

2/01/2012

256

Accounting

11/24/2010

2/03/2011

7/20/2011

10/04/2011

243

Estimating

2/15/2011

7/21/2011

1/09/2012

8/06/2013

747

According to the DOD IG, "the contracting officer did not make timely final determinations on the contractor's business systems." The DOD IG is careful to note that the DFARS PGI (at 242.7502(d)) requires that CO Final Determinations must be made within 30 days, but does not take the opportunity to determine the root cause(s) for the CO's failure to comply.

According to the DOD IG, "the contracting officer needed to promptly make a determination that significant deficiencies existed and implement withholdings on contracts containing the business system clause in order to protect the Government's interests." The DOD IG asserted this even though "the contracting officer documented … that the business systems clause does not apply because none of the contractor's contracts contain the clause." However, the DOD IG found several contracts that it believed "should include the business systems clause because they were executed after May 18, 2011, and subject to the Cost Accounting Standards." The audit report noted that the IG had requested a ruling from DCMA as to whether "these contracts actually contain the clause as required," but DCMA had not gotten back to the IG nearly a year later.

Obviously the only way the clause could be read into the contract is by operation of The Christian Doctrine. Color us skeptical.

Moreover, the IG's opinion that "if the business systems clause was omitted in error, the DCMA contracting officer should have instructed the contracting officials who executed the contracts to add the clause" strikes us as disingenuous at best and a violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing at worst. The DOD IG's position elides any discussion as to whether the solicitation contained (or should have contained) the requisite clause and it elides any discussion as to whether the contract that is entered into is the contract that must be enforced.

Vern Edwards tackled that subject in his own blog and unequivocally stated-

Once the government and a contractor enter into a contract a deal is a deal, and the government and the contractor are bound by the clauses in the awarded contracts until the contracts are completed. Nothing in FAR and no standard FAR clause authorizes a CO to unilaterally update, add, or delete clauses in a contract after award. None of the five Changes clauses, FAR 52.243-1 through -5, empower a CO to do that. … Purchase orders and solicitations must include the contract clauses that are applicable on the date the solicitation is issued, and they may include any clauses that become applicable after that date as long as they are expected to be applicable on or after the date of contract award. … Absent express language in the contract to the contrary, a CO may not unilaterally change the clauses in a contract when funding the contract or exercising an option. He or she may change clauses only with the assent of the contractor and with consideration for the change.

[Emphasis in original.]

So the DOD IG essentially criticized the DCMA Contracting Officer for failing to breach the contracts the government had entered into. Suffice to say: we disagree with the IG's position.

Further, the DOD IG did not address whether DCAA audit reports issued before implementation of the new DFARS clauses (in some cases a year before) would subject a Contracting Officer to the same disposition timeline as those issued after the new rule. The new rule also revised (in some cases significantly) the individual system adequacy criteria. The DOD IG skipped over that little nuance. It would be literally impossible for the DCAA audit reports to identify significant deficiencies in the contractor's Business Systems that would be subject to the new rule, a year before that rule was promulgated.

Time machines don't exist in Government Contracting; or if they do they are restricted to use only on classified contracts. Accordingly, it's tough to see how an audit report issued before the Business Systems clauses were effective would be subject to their requirements. It would have been nice if the IG had addressed that implicit timewarp logic; but of course doing so would have undercut its position.

But that's not all.

The DOD IG failed to address why the Compensation System, in particular, would be subject to the DFARS requirements or the DFARS PGI requirements, since it was eliminated as a stand-alone Business System effective May 18, 2011. If we were advising the contractor in question, we would have laughed out loud (and called the attorneys) if the CO tried to implement payment withholds on a Business System that didn't exist. Perhaps that logic problem contributed to the CO's alleged lack of diligence? We don't know the answer, because the IG never addressed the question.

But the DCMA Contracting Officer was not the only entity in the DOD IG crosshairs. As has become the norm, the IG took an opportunity to criticize DCAA for not performing timely follow-up audits on the contractor's four Business Systems. According to the IG audit report, "the FAO told us that the follow-up audits were delayed in part because of other priority work and staffing constraints." In other words, if DCAA wants to play in the Business Systems oversight regime, it needs to jump in and own its responsibilities; otherwise, it should get out of the way.

All in all, this DOD IG audit report is a great illustration of what's so broken in today's defense acquisition system. We've got oversight upon oversight upon oversight, and still it's not working to the level written into the rules. It's almost like the rules were drafted and implemented by clueless political appointees, advised by clueless career bureaucrats-neither group of which had much in the way of real-world, roll-up-your-shirtsleeves-and-dig-into-the-situation, actual experience.

We are loathe to defend DCMA and DCAA from the political predations of the DOD Inspector General. Lord knows we have had our differences with employees of those two entities-especially in regard to the DFARS Business Systems oversight and administration regime. But in this case we believe the DOD IG audit report missed the mark completely and revealed just how superficial the IG can be, when its targets are government civil servants mired in a bureaucratic, Kafkaesque, and damn near unworkable, system.

 

Conclusions from the Annual Report on the Performance of the Defense Acquisition System

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Conclusions
The Hon. Frank Kendall (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) recently issued the second annual Report on the Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, focusing on data for Government Fiscal Years 1984 through 2013. Here’s your link.

The 126 page-long report is simply chock-full of data. Graphs and regression analyses and charts and lots and lots of information. But we want to ignore the data (which you are perfectly welcome to read for yourself) and focus on the conclusions that we noted as we skimmed through the report.

  • The percentage of obligated dollars awarded through competition has actually decreased since 2010. This is a counter-intuitive result, given the emphasis placed on competitive awards via Mr. Assad’s direction as well as the Better Buying Power initiative. The high-water mark was achieved in GFY 2008 and it’s fallen ever since. In 2008 about 64% of all obligations were awarded via competition; in 2010 that value was 62.5% and in 2013 the value was 57%, which was the lowest percentage on the chart. The Service with the lowest percentage of competitively awarded obligations was the Air Force, at 41% (which was actually higher than its goal of 38%), but the Navy/Marine Corps were right there at 41% as well (which was lower than their combined goal of 47%).

  • Acquisition of vehicles had the lowest rate of competition (16%) and weapons/ammo were not much better (22%). Everything else was higher, much higher.

  • Contractor profits/fees did not correlate with performance. That is to say, final contract margin/markup “was not predicted by cost, price, or schedule performance.”

  • There was no correlation between cost/schedule performance and contract type. That is to say, whether the contract was Firm, Fixed-Price or Cost-Reimbursable did not control how well the contractor performed. This is a significant finding that we will discuss below.

  • Fixed-price contracts exhibit lower cost growth because they are used primarily in lower-risk situations—not because they inherently lead to lower cost growth.

  • Fixed-price contracts are only fixed if the contractual work content and deliverables are fixed; they can be (and often are) modified to handle realized risks, leading to cost growth.

  • When cost control is predetermined and formulaically incentivized in the contract, vendors respond. The key is predictable incentives, not fixed pricing.

  • Competition leads to better contract outcomes. That is to say, cost and price growth are statistically lower on competed contracts.

The most interesting finding in the report was the commentary on contract type. We have discussed contract type before. We were pleased to see that our assertions were confirmed by the report—i.e., that a FFP contract placed before requirements are fixed is no better than placing a cost-type contract, at least in terms of cost or schedule control. It’s a notion we wish would become more popular.

It was also interesting to see that competition—long the hallmark of public contract policy—was confirmed as leading to better acquisition outcomes. The report doesn’t say why that would be the case, but we assume (without evidentiary support) that the efforts involved in responding to a well-written RFP and it going through the detailed planning associated with preparing a good cost, technical and/or management proposal establish a solid foundation for program execution, once the contract is awarded.

At the end of the day, what strikes us is the rigor of the analyses. Apparently after decades of collection, there is sufficient contractual data for the statisticians to dig into, and so we are finally seeing some “common wisdom” myths being busted while others are confirmed. We don’t pretend to know who will use the information, or if the conclusions will actually affect public policy, but knowledge is generally held to be a good thing. And so this report would seem to be a good thing as well.

 

The Best Navy Contractors, According to the Pentagon

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Fair_Winds
In what is going to be an ongoing thing, in mid-June the Pentagon released a list of “Superior Suppliers” to the U.S. Navy. This is the first list; there will be other lists for suppliers of the other military services. The ranking of Pentagon suppliers was announced a year ago, as part of Better Buying Power 2.1. We noted it right here.

Those contractors on the lists are (theoretically) going to be rewarded, while those not on the list … not so much. It is unclear what rewards are in store for the top tier of Navy suppliers but, in the original announcement, Mr. Kendall stated, “DCAA has agreed to coordinate the results of the low-risk sampling initiative as a potential incentive element of DoD plans to implement a SSIP [Superior Supplier Incentive Program]. DCAA has agreed to work with the Navy to incorporate low-risk sampling into the SSIP and will provide a recommendation on incorporating low-risk sampling into the DoD SSIP incentives for presentation to the BSIG [Business Senior Integration Group] by October 1, 2013.” We do not know the actual content of DCAA’s input to the BSIG, or if they met the deadline.

Government Executive speculated that the intent of the ranking is to “spark competition” – as if those contractors didn’t already compete with cutthroat ruthlessness over the few MDAP opportunities available to them in these sequestered times. The GovExec article is worth reading.

So who are the top Navy suppliers? According to the article, the cream of the cream is as follows:

  • General Dynamics Combat Systems

  • General Dynamics Marine Systems

  • General Electric Aviation

  • Lockheed Mission Systems and Training

  • MHSCo Sikorsky Lockheed Partnership

  • Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems

  • Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems

  • Raytheon Intelligence, Information and Services

  • Rolls-Royce Defence Aerospace

Following in the next tier are:

  • BAE Electronic Systems

  • BAE Systems Land and Armaments

  • Bell Helicopter

  • Boeing Military Aircraft

  • General Dynamics Information Systems and Technology

  • Ingalls Shipbuilding

  • Exelis

  • L-3 Communication Electronic Systems

  • Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems

  • Raytheon Missile Systems

  • Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems

  • Rockwell Collins Simulation

And finally, the third tranche is:

  • ATK Defense

  • Austal USA

  • Bell Boeing Joint Project Office

  • Lockheed Martin Aeronautics

  • Lockheed Martin Space Systems

  • Navistar Defense

  • Newport News Shipbuilding

  • Sikorsky

  • UTC Propulsion and Aerospace Systems

Those not on the list are not “top Navy suppliers” and, really, it is only those in the first tier that would seem to have any ability to capitalize on their status. Importantly, Mr. Kendall promised nothing and it would seem to be more about branding than anything else. If there is a tangible benefit to being the crème de la crème, it remains to be seen.

In the meantime, congratulations to the Top Navy Suppliers. Fair winds and following seas.

 

DOD Inspector General Tells DCMA To Make it Harder to Settle Litigation with Contractors

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DOD_IG_HotlineWhen we wrote about the UTC/Pratt & Whitney litigation that addressed (among other issues) the definition of "cost" for the purpose of CAS compliance and government contract cost accounting, we thought we were writing about relatively ancient history. After all, the Federal Circuit decision we vivisected was issued in 2003-more than a decade ago. Many folks had forgotten all about it.

So why was the final settlement between Pratt & Whitney and the U.S. Government the subject of a May, 2014, Department of Defense Inspector General Hotline Investigation Report?

But before we answer that question, remember that we are on record as asserting that contract-related litigation is on the rise, that apparently the DCMA has forgotten the FAR 33.204 statement that "The Government's policy is to try to resolve all contractual issues in controversy by mutual agreement at the contracting officer's level;" and as a result, the lawyers are very busy indeed. See, for example, this two-part article from August, 2012, in which we opined-

COs don't resolve complex issues any more. They don't negotiate DCAA audit findings (such as cost disallowances or CAS noncompliances). They don't look to 'split the baby' because getting an assured half a loaf now is no longer better than litigating for an entire loaf (plus interest), even when the probability of getting that entire loaf in a judicial award approaches zero.

Well, according to that recent DOD IG report, DCMA shouldn't really ever try to settle complex issues unless that settlement adheres to strict FAR and CAS rules. Any negotiated settlement that contemplates accepting less than the full amounts allegedly due the Government will be second-guessed and criticized. And that criticism may come from an unlikely source.

Let's start with a chronology of events, courtesy of Appendix B of the DOD IG report.

The issue began in 1991, when "DCAA reported that Pratt had not complied with CAS 410, 418, and 420 when accounting for the cost of material obtained through the use of collaboration agreements." In December, 1996, DCMA agreed with the DCAA assertion and issued a $260 Million demand for payment associated with the CAS noncompliances. In July, 2001, Pratt appealed to the ASBCA. As we know from the prior blog article on the case, the ASBCA found in Pratt's favor. The Government appealed to the Federal Circuit and, in January, 2003, Judge Dyk (writing for the Court) vacated the ASBCA decision and remanded the case back to the ASBCA to determine damages.

And that's where we lost interest; honestly, we thought it was routine from there. But apparently we were wrong. One of the items we missed was Footnote 19 in the Appellate decision. It stated:

To the extent that Pratt may argue that some portion of the revenue shares represented payments for items other than parts, Pratt may provide that evidence on remand. The burden is upon Pratt, however, to show that the revenue share payments included payments beyond that for the collaboration parts.

That innocuous footnote turned out to be important in the later chronology of events, which continued to unfold as follows:

In November, 2003, "DCMA issued an updated demand to Pratt in the amount of $754.7 Million," based on DCAA's "Rough Order of Magnitude" calculation "produced as a nonaudit service." (Readers may recall we have discussed DCAA's issuance of ROMs before.)

Throughout 2004, DCMA leadership and Pratt discussed the matter and attempted to resolve it through negotiation. In December, 2004, Pratt offered to pay $125 Million and DCMA countered with a settlement offer of $605 Million. Pratt rejected the DCMA counteroffer.

Discussions continued and in March, 2005, "DCAA Northeastern Regional Director e-mailed the DCAA Director a briefing sheet that identified a range of settlement positions calculated by DCAA as a nonaudit service." In particular, DCAA asserted that "$200 million was a reasonable recovery considering Pratt's explanation that some portion of the revenue shares represented payments for items other than parts."

In April, 2005, Pratt upped its offer to $175 Million. Internal DCAA briefings stated that "$334 million is a reasonable estimate of the cost impact (based on estimate of cost to Pratt to manufacture)" and "$234 million is a reasonable settlement, recognizing certain litigative risks associated with this issue." However, the DCMA Senior Trial Attorney disagreed with that assessment, asserting that a recovery between $417 and $814 million was expected if the litigation proceeded to conclusion; settlement was expected to be at $420 Million with a minimum of $375 million.

By June, 2005, the Government team "had splintered" with each part of the team expecting a different recovery value. But while the various parties had their own notions of how much the Government had been damaged, the DCMA Divisional Administrative Contracting Officer (DACO) still had to hammer out a prospective agreement on how the CAS noncompliances would be resolved and how Pratt would be permitted to do its cost accounting. The DACO proposed letting Pratt use an estimate of the cost of manufacturing its parts in-house in lieu of obtaining the parts (at cost) from the suppliers, in order to calculate its indirect cost allocation bases. The Senior Trial Attorney stated that proposed go-forward methodology could not be supported by him.

Negotiations continued through 2006. Importantly, while discussions continued, personnel were transferred and promoted. Notably, an employee of Sikorsky Aircraft (another UTC subsidiary) became a member of the DCMA leadership team at Pratt & Whitney. DCMA decided to continue settlement discussions without the participation of the DCMA Senior Trial Attorney.

In April, 2006, the parties were close (Pratt offered $270M and the Government wanted $291M). Finally, the Government accepted Pratt's offer of $283 Million on April 29, 2006, which settled the matter for the CAS noncompliances between 1984 and 2004, and established that Pratt could use a collaboration part cost estimate for its indirect cost calculations, which was termed by DOD IG "a noncompliant practice." Regardless of whether the cost accounting practice was compliant with CAS, the parties agreed that Pratt could use it.

At that point, things seemed to be (finally) wrapped-up.

Then somebody called the DOD IG Hotline and made two allegations:

  1. There was pressure from the highest levels of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to settle this litigation for an amount that-was agreeable to the contractor rather than an amount that was fair to the taxpayer.

  1. The litigation of Pratt's cost accounting for engine parts on commercial engine collaboration programs from 1984 through 2004 was settled for an amount about $500 million less than an amount consistent with Government procurement regulations, including the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS).

The DOD IG found no evidence to support the first allegation. There was no evidence of undue pressure to settle at an amount favorable to the contractor.

However, with respect to the second allegation, the DOD IG found that the cognizant DCMA Contract Management Office (CMO) had "failed to protect the Government's interest" when "determining a reasonable basis for the $283 million settlement amount." The DOD IG found that-

It was the trial attorney's litigation position that all the revenue share payments should be deemed the cost of collaboration parts unless shown to be otherwise by Pratt. The decision by DCMA management to reach a negotiated settlement instead of pursuing a court decision on the amount of damages owed by Pratt to the U.S. Government left the DACO and her team with data insufficient to support a negotiated settlement position that was consistent with FAR and CAS.

(Proving once again that one key purpose of an IG audit is to enter the battlefield after the fight and bayonet the wounded.)

The DOD IG report went on to discuss a fairly recent DCMA creation, the use of Boards of Review to review proposed Contracting Officers' negotiations. The DOD IG asserted that, if the Board of Review DCMA Instruction had been in place at the time of the settlement, then "the Board would have disagreed with the basis of the DACO's prenegotiation position." Regardless, the DOD IG noted that the current Boards of Review "would not have ensured that the DACO and her team had data sufficient to support a negotiated settlement position that was consistent with FAR and CAS." Accordingly, the DOD IG recommended establishing a new Review Board policy "that requires a management official oversee an evaluation determining the extent to which data obtained from the trial attorney supporting litigation is sufficient to support and justify a settlement negotiated consistent with the [FAR}."

The DCMA Director "partially concurred" with the above. One action taken was to update and reissue DCMA-GC Operating Instruction 2 ("Resolution of Intra-General Counsel Differences"). The Boards of Review Instruction 134 would also be revised to (among other things) ensure that a GS-1102-15 Supervisory Team Leader review and approve all Contracting Officers' litigation settlement actions. As for the rest of the DOD IG's recommendations, the DCMA Director found them to be no longer necessary, given the recent reorganization and creation of the CACO/DACO group at the DCMA Cost and Pricing Center.

The DOD IG report also had a third finding. It found that "DCAA assistance had negatively impacted the settlement amount." According to the DOD IG, DCAA's analysis that $234 Million would be a reasonable settlement amount "resulted in a substantial reduction in the settlement expectation anticipated by DCMA" and "inappropriately provided advance on litigative risk." The DCAA Director did not concur with that DOD IG finding.

At the end of a 23-year odyssey involving complex CAS and GAAP interpretations, a favorable ASBCA decision and an unfavorable Federal Circuit decision, we remain convinced that too many individuals within the U.S. Government want to ignore the official policy to engage in negotiation in lieu of litigation. We remain convinced that the authority given to Contracting Officers is being eroded, and that the Warrant (or Certificate of Appointment) held by Contracting Officers is worth less and less each day. As a result, we expect it will become harder and harder to resolve such issues, even when entitlement has been decided and what's being negotiated is simply quantum.

Please notice, readers, the elephant in the room, the one issue not addressed by the DOD IG report: the accuracy of the original $754.7 Million ROM created by DCAA and initially used to establish the Government's estimate of damages. Somehow, between November, 2003, and April, 2005, that ROM estimate was more than halved and became $334 Million. What happened to that number over eighteen months? We will never know because the DOD IG chose not to evaluate the DCAA methodology used to determine the initial ROM value.

We remain convinced that using DCAA as a stalking horse, and having auditors calculate ROMs without implementing rigorous oversight designed to ensure the accuracy of the ROM values, is a bad idea. In this particular instance, it may have been an inaccurate ROM value that led to the protracted litigation, the difficult negotiations, and the subsequent DOD IG Hotline complaint. We hope DCAA auditors will think twice or three times before throwing out ROMs they know to be suspect; and we hope DCMA Contracting Officers will think twice before accepting DCAA ROMs at face value.

And we hope DCMA Boards of Review will take into consideration DCAA's methodology used to calculate ROMs before rejecting a Contracting Officer's use of independent business judgment to resolve complex disputes.

Oh, one final comment:

Remember that DCMA/Pratt settlement agreement? The one that permitted Pratt to use an estimate of collaborator part costs (based on what it would have cost the company to manufacture the parts in-house)? The one that was going to settle the dispute prospectively?


About that.

On September 22, 2011, DCAA reported that the ongoing Pratt cost accounting practice "may be resulting in an estimated cost impact of $15.2 million" with respect to one year (FY 2009). A week later, DCMA issued a "notice of potential noncompliance with CAS 418" to Pratt. Pratt's response pointed out that the issue was more than six years old (hello Statute of Limitations!) and, in any case, the cost impact was immaterial in amount. DCMA has taken no action since then … subjecting the individuals involved to yet another round of DOD IG criticism.

And so it goes ….

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.