• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

Considering Fraud as a Function of Executive Leadership

E-mail Print PDF

Normally, when we discuss fraud and/or internal controls designed to detect (if not also prevent) corrupt activities, we point out that establishing effective internal controls is the responsibility of the executive leadership function. Two notable examples of our viewpoint on this matter come to mind. In the first example, we discussed how a Vice President of Finance was able to embezzle more than $30 million from headphone-maker Koss. We noted that the SEC had much to say (in its complaint and proposed settlement agreement) regarding the lack of diligence found at the top of that corporation. In the second example, we discussed how the Treasurer and Comptroller of the city of Dixon, Illinois (a town with an annual budget of roughly $8 million), was able to embezzle more than $30 million over six years. In that case, a long-time trusted city employee was not well monitored by her superiors at the City Council, and the annual audit failed to detect the sizable illegitimate transactions.

Where are we going with this? Well, we’re thinking that an organization devoted to integrity and ethical behavior needs to hold its top leadership accountable for any transgressions by its employees. Leadership needs to be held accountable – especially when root cause analysis indicates that a significant causal factor in the fraud was a lack of oversight or other form of gross negligence.

It’s not enough to simply blame the employee and point a finger at the auditor. Those at the top of the pyramid need to be held accountable for any poor decision-making and for any lack of diligence in performing their duties.

We assert it is management’s duty and obligation to establish an effective set of internal controls designed to detect and prevent employee corruption. We assert is it the responsibility of the leadership team to exercise diligence in ensuring an appropriate segregation of duties. We assert the executives are responsible for investigating allegations of wrong-doing and for ensuring that documents they sign (such as SOX 302 Certifications) are accurate in all respects.

We assert that when the executive leadership team fails to invest in an effective internal control system, they are negligent and should be held accountable for that negligence. We assert that when the senior leaders of an organization delegate their oversight responsibilities to subordinates, they are negligent. We assert that that when upper management rubber-stamps documents and certifications, or when they white-wash allegations of internal corruption, or when they hire the lowest-price external auditor and refuse to permit that auditor an adequate budget to conduct a rigorous audit, then they should be held accountable for those poor decisions.

We are saying, basically, that not only does “tone at the top” matter – but that the top must be held accountable for their actions (or inactions) in addition to the tone they set. Not only the words, but the actions. An organization that does not hold its leadership accountable is living on borrowed time.

But what happens when it is the senior leadership team who is the source of corruption?

We were inspired to think about these things by a recent Department of Justice press release, announcing that –

The former chief executive officer (CEO) of ArthroCare Corporation was sentenced to serve 20 years in prison, and the former chief financial officer (CFO) was sentenced to serve 10 years in prison today for their leading roles in a $750 million securities fraud scheme. Two other former senior vice presidents of ArthroCare were also sentenced to prison terms for their roles in the scheme.

What happened? According to the press release –

At sentencing, the court found that investors lost approximately $756 million as a result of the defendants’ scheme to artificially inflate the share price of ArthroCare stock through sham transactions. According to court documents, between 2005 and 2009, Baker, Gluk, Raffle and Applegate executed a scheme to artificially inflate sales and revenue through a series of end-of-quarter transactions involving several of ArthroCare’s distributors. Products were shipped to distributors at quarter end based on ArthroCare’s need to meet Wall Street analyst forecasts, rather than distributors’ actual orders. ArthroCare then fraudulently reported these shipments as sales in its quarterly and annual filings at the time of the shipment, enabling the company to appear to meet or exceed internal and external earnings forecasts. ArthroCare’s distributors agreed to accept these shipments of millions of dollars of excess inventory in exchange for lucrative concessions from ArthroCare, such as upfront cash commissions, extended payment terms, and the ability to return products. In some cases, like that of ArthroCare’s largest distributor, DiscoCare, the defendants agreed ArthroCare would acquire the distributor and the inventory so that the distributor would not have to pay ArthroCare for the products at all. … On July 21, 2008, after ArthroCare announced publicly that it would be restating its previously reported financial results to reflect the results of an internal investigation and account for the defendants’ fraud, the price of ArthroCare shares dropped from $40.03 to $23.21 per share. On Dec.19, 2008, ArthroCare again announced publicly that it had identified more accounting errors and possible irregularities related to the defendants’ fraud. That day, the price of ArthroCare shares dropped from approximately $16.23 to approximately $5.92 per share.

More details regarding the fraud can be found here.

What happened to ArthroCare’s external auditor (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP)?

Although shareholders sued PwC, seeking to hold the audit firm accountable for not detecting the fraud, in 2010, that suit was tossed. According to one report, “The court further held that Pricewaterhouse-Coopers did not intend to mislead investors and was itself misled by ArthroCare's executives about the company's questionable accounting practices.” But that was not the end of the story. In July, 2014, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) announced that the PwC audit partner (Mr. Randall Stone) was being held accountable for the botched audit. The press release stated –

The Board found that Stone ignored or failed to properly evaluate numerous indicators that should have alerted him to the possibility that ArthroCare was improperly recognizing revenue on its 2007 sales of medical devices to DiscoCare, Inc. Such indicators included unusual pricing and payment terms, quarter-end sales spikes, and evidence that ArthroCare may have funded DiscoCare's purchases through monthly service fee payments. Sales to DiscoCare helped ArthroCare meet its revenue forecasts for 2007. …

Stone failed to exercise due professional care and skepticism when, among other things, he agreed with the company's proposed accounting for the acquisition without adequately assessing whether such accounting treatment complied with generally accepted accounting principles.

In addition, the Board found that Stone violated PCAOB rules and standards in authorizing PwC's consent to incorporate its previously issued 2007 audit report in ArthroCare's June 2008 Form S-8 registration statement without first completing a reasonable subsequent events investigation. The Board found that when Stone authorized PwC's consent, he was aware of new allegations of impropriety concerning ArthroCare's relationship with DiscoCare in 2007, and he knew that ArthroCare and PwC were continuing to assess those allegations.

Mr. Stone, a CPA who is now an ex-partner at PwC, was assessed a $50,000 civil penalty and barred from associating with a registered public accounting firm for a minimum of three years. It is doubtful if he will be able to perform significant audits for any large accounting firm ever again. So he was certainly held accountable.

When fraud and employee corruption occur, we need to perform a rigorous root cause analysis to understand what and why – and most especially how. Should we determine there was negligence at the upper levels of management, we need to hold those leaders accountable

Conversely, when you find an entity where senior leadership is not being held accountable for its actions (or inactions) then you can be fairly certain you are going to find corruption and fraud somewhere lower in the organization.

 

Why DCAA is Having Problems: A Conversation with a DCAA Auditor

E-mail Print PDF

DCAA_Logo
Sometimes we wish we were making this stuff up.

But no, reality is strange enough without having to resort to fiction writing.

We recently had a conversation with a DCAA auditor. It was a professional conversation, not at all any sort of “off-the-record” discussion that you can sometimes have if you are lucky enough to develop a rapport with your auditor. Nope. This one was official and formal, and the tone was serious. This one was for real.

And we think it illustrates all-too-precisely what in the hell has happened to the audit agency that was once held up as the gold standard for all governmental audit agencies.

We think it illustrates, quite accurately, why audits take so much longer than they used to take, and why so many more hours are necessary to push an audit report out the door. We assert that it illustrates, quite accurately, why GAO has expressed concerns with the quality of the DCAA audit reports. We suggest that it evidences the current preoccupation with working paper documentation in lieu of actual audit procedures, and why that preoccupation is a fatal flaw for the agency. We feel it is an indicator that auditor training is seriously lacking and, as a result, professional judgment is seriously flawed.

It was a short conversation, really. But it confirmed so much.

Perhaps we are biased and lack objectivity. Perhaps we are reading too much into a simple conversation between a junior level DCAA auditor and an entity being audited.

So we’ll ask you to judge for yourself. What do you make of the following conversation?

Email from Auditor: Hello. I have been requested by your ACO to perform a 19100 review of your client’s recent Disclosure Statement revisions for compliance.

Apogee Consulting: Hi there! How can we help you?

Auditor: Before we have our walk-through, I need you to fill out this list of individual Cost Accounting Standards. For each Standard, please tell me the date the Standard was effective, as well as the date the Standard was applicable, for your entity.

Apogee: [WTF?] We’re not sure what you mean. Our client is a large business that has been fully CAS-covered for many years. At this point, all Standards are applicable. Perhaps we are misunderstanding your request? Let’s have a telephone call to clarify what you need. Perhaps if you tell us why you need it, we can give you what you really need, since it can’t be what you asked for in writing.

(Now switching from email to phone conversation.)

Auditor: I need what I asked for in writing.

Apogee: As we told you, our client is a large business. It has been doing business with DOD for many years. It is fully CAS-covered. All Standards are both effective and applicable for the entity.

Auditor: I understand what you are saying. But even so, I need what I requested.

Apogee: Isn’t that effort just a waste of time? Look, how about we stipulate in writing that the entity is fully CAS-covered? How about we put in an email that all Standards are applicable to the entity?

Auditor: No good. That’s not what the audit program calls for.

Apogee: You mean the new audit program that just went into effect? The one that focuses on Disclosure Statement compliance instead of adequacy?

Auditor: Yes, that’s the one. I’m required by the new audit program to obtain a list showing the effective date and applicability date for each individual Cost Accounting Standard.

Apogee: You can’t be serious, right?

Auditor: Don’t believe me? Check for yourself. See Section C-1, Step 1, found on page 5 of 7, of the new audit program.

Apogee: [Stunned silence.] Yeah. We see it. It says “ Prepare a list detailing CAS applicability dates for each standard used to evaluate compliance of the contractor’s disclosed cost accounting practices (CAM 8-301.c.). Note: Use the list to determine if the Cost Accounting Standard is applicable, based on the date of applicability, before citing a CAS noncompliance .” So basically, you need to make sure a Standard is applicable to our client before you assert a CAS noncompliance?

Auditor: Yes.

Apogee: Well, that makes sense, we guess. But as we previously mentioned, all Standards are applicable to this client. We’ll be happy to put that in writing, if you like. A management “representation” or “assertion,” if you will.

Auditor: Nope. I need a list for my working papers. That’s what the audit program calls for, and that’s what I need to prepare. And you will prepare it for me.

Apogee: But there’s no information in that list! All we are going to do is just read the CAS and tell you what the regulations say the applicability date and effectivity dates are. It’s meaningless.

Auditor: I need what I need. Did you read the CAM reference?

Apogee: You mean the part that says –

c. To facilitate the implementation process, each promulgated standard contains in subparagraph .63 an effective date and an applicability date. The CASB defers the applicability date beyond the effective date in order to provide contractors adequate time to prepare for compliance and make any required accounting changes. Under the regulation, a contractor becomes subject to a new standard only after receiving the first CAS-covered contract following the effective date.

(1) The distinction between the effective and applicability dates is important. The effective date designates when the pricing of future CAS-covered contracts must reflect the new standard. It also identifies those CAS-covered contracts eligible for an equitable adjustment, since only contracts in existence on the effective date can be equitably adjusted to reflect the prospective application of a new or revised standard.

(2) The applicability date marks the beginning of the period when the contractor's accounting and reporting systems must comply with a new or revised standard. Proposals for contracts to be awarded after the effective date of a standard should be evaluated carefully for compliance with the new or revised standard. The proposal need only reflect compliance with the standard from the applicability date forward. Therefore, it is important that the auditor determine the applicability date of the particular Standard (including any revisions) under audit. Any change resulting from early implementation by the contractor is to be administered as a unilateral change. It will result in an equitable adjustment under FAR 52.230-2(a)(4)(iii) for the period prior to the applicability if the CFAO determines that the unilateral change is a desirable change.

Auditor: Exactly. So please fill out the list I sent you, identifying the applicability date and effective date for each of the nineteen individual Cost Accounting Standards.

Apogee: (Oh, dear Lord.) Um, sure. Will do. Should take about an hour. First, we’ll need to find our CAS book.

Auditor: Thank you for your timely cooperation.

And that, dear readers, is exactly what in the hell is wrong with DCAA these days.

EDITOR’S NOTE: For those readers who may not be familiar with the Cost Accounting Standards, there hasn’t been a new Standard promulgated since 1980. Since then, a couple of Standards have been revised (notably CAS 412 and 413), but by 2014 any given contractor is either (a) exempt from CAS altogether; (b) subject only to CAS 401, 402, 405, and 406; or (c) subject to all 19 Standards.

ANOTHER EDITOR’S NOTE: Wouldn’t it make way more sense to tell an auditor: “Hey, before you assert a noncompliance with CAS, make sure the contractor is actually, y’know, subject to that particular Standard? Have the contractor confirm in writing that the Standard is applicable to it before asserting a noncompliance.” You betcha. It sure would make way more sense to do it that way. But if you did it that way, you wouldn’t get such a pretty working paper for the audit file.

A THIRD EDITOR’S NOTE: When the auditor requests that the contractor complete the list, identifying both CAS applicability and effective date for the entity being audited, what in the hell does that even mean from an audit perspective? What if we lied and said something like “CAS 403 is not yet applicable to this entity, so you cannot assert a noncompliance with CAS 403?” How would the auditor know if we were lying or telling the truth? How would the auditor test the accuracy of the dates on the list? When the audit program calls for the auditor to determine the applicability of the Standards to the entity being audited, and then the auditors asks the entity to prepare the actual working paper demonstrating the applicability without testing the validity of the assertions, how does that lead to a quality audit?

A FOURTH AND FINAL EDITOR’S NOTE: Mike Steen, Technical Director at Redstone Consulting, who is quite knowledgeable about DCAA, thinks we are perhaps overreacting a tad. (As is our wont.) In response to our whining post about the new 19100 audit program on LinkedIn, he wrote, “I interpret this as nothing more than DCAA not wanting to express an opinion on actual practices as compliant with CAS and/or with the CAS DS. Stat[ed] differently, DCAA is once again narrowly defining its audit objective, otherwise this would be one more perpetual audit involving hundreds of transactions to provide sufficient evidential matter supporting a conclusion that actual practices were or were not compliant.” He may have a point.

 

Thinking About Fraud

E-mail Print PDF

Fraud_Triangle
Recently we noted that the venerable DOD Inspector General Handbook of Fraud Indicators was retired. While its replacement (the DOD IG Contract Audit Fraud Scenarios and Resources website) is being populated, auditors have been forced to consider fraud in innovative ways, so as to comply with GAGAS 5.07.

We came across some DCAA training slides, which we posted in our Knowledge Resources page. The DCAA training stated, “Responsible contractors should already be assessing the risks of fraud, illegal acts, and noncompliances with applicable laws affecting Government contracts and be prepared to discuss the identified risks with DCAA.” Auditors are encouraged to “exchange ideas” or “brainstorm” about “how and where they believe the subject matter under audit might be susceptible to material noncompliances due to error or fraud, and how management could perpetrate and conceal fraud.” (Emphasis in original.)

DCAA is changing the methods its auditors use to consider the impact of fraud in audit procedures. But DCAA is not alone in that regard. Indeed, many DOD activities consider fraud risk in their procedures. The DOD Inspector General recently released a survey of 33 DOD organizations, in which the IG found that “13 were conducting entity-wide risk assessments, 26 were conducting fraud risk assessments when performing audit-related work, 23 were providing fraud awareness training, and 3 were concentrating on internal control evaluations.”

We think the DOD IG report is an excellent resource, and we encourage readers to go to the link provided above and check it out. It contained a review of individual DOD components’ approaches to fraud assessments as well as “best practices” in several related areas. The Army Audit Agency’s approach was discussed, as was the approach used by the Army and Air Force Exchange Service. The approaches used by DCMA’s Contract Integrity Center and DCMA’s Internal Review function were reviewed. Many external organizations were also reviewed to provide a good benchmark.

All in all, a very useful resource – one to keep. The report was distributed to many DOD activities and we trust it will be put to good use.

But there was one telling omission.

DCAA’s fraud assessment approach was not reviewed.

The report was not distributed to the Director, DCAA.

Interesting, no?

 

Effective Subcontractor Risk Management

E-mail Print PDF

Risks_1
One of the truisms we have learned about creating an effective program management culture is that effective subcontractor management may be the most important single factor driving program outcomes. The success or failure of your program very likely hinges on how well you are managing performance that you have pushed outside your factory to external suppliers. We have observed this axiom over and over, whether discussing the Boeing 787 program or the Airbus A380 program or major defense acquisition programs. We have also observed that program execution risks found in the supply chain are, as a rule, under-managed.

Program risk identification, to the extent it takes place, generally focuses on historical or known risks within the prime contractor’s four walls. Such risks often include lack of sufficient headcount with the right skills/experience to accomplish the work as scheduled, lack of sufficient budgets, lack of availability of test equipment, etc. Moreover, both the probability of a risk materializing and then evaluation of its probable impact to the program (consequence) tend to be more accurate with respect to internal risks than with respect to external (supply chain) risks, simply because internal risks are better understood. Consequently, risks found in the supply chain – notably risks found in the performance of major subcontractors – tend to be under-managed.

The end result of the foregoing situation is, we assert, that programs generally devote less management resources to addressing supply chain risks, and therefore are too often surprised – and ill-prepared – to address those risks when they materialize. And in our experience they will materialize, if only because program management tends to ignore them. Inflection points in the risk probabilities are missed; early warning indicators are missed; and so problems materialize as if out of thin air … and the programmatic impacts are catastrophic.

Additional risks are introduced when the subcontract types are “flexibly priced” (to use a neologism we detest). Cost-type and T&M type subcontracts present additional compliance risks that need to be managed by the prime contractor, since it will be the prime contractor who bears the brunt of any Government customer allegations of noncompliance (due to privity of contract issues). We discussed risks associated with T&M contracts (and subcontracts) in a past article. And it’s not just “flexibly priced” subcontract types: even FFP subcontract types introduce compliance risks when contract financing payments are involved.

Too often prime contractors are unwilling even to discuss supply chain compliance risks, let alone develop effective risk management strategies for them. We are reminded of one Top 5 defense contractor’s subcontract management team’s response when we tried to raise product substitution, mischarging, and other subcontractor noncompliance risks in a cross-functional risk identification “brainstorming” session. The subcontractor management team responded, “Oh, our suppliers would never do that!”

Yeah, right.

The bottom-line is that effective program management relies on effective subcontractor management, and effective subcontractor management includes managing noncompliance risks. Prime contractors ignore those risks at their own peril, as Northrop Grumman recently learned, courtesy of the DOD Inspector General.

The DOD IG released an audit report highly critical of Northrop Grumman and its subcontractor, DynCorp. Unfortunately, the report was classified “For Official Use Only,” and thus it would take a FOIA request to obtain the FOUO report. Fortunately for taxpayers, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) obtained the audit report (entitled “Northrop Grumman Improperly Charged Labor for the Counter Narco-terrorism Technology Program”) and published it for all to see.

The DOD IG found that—

For nearly 6 years, Northrop Grumman did not properly charge labor rates for the Counter Narco-terrorism Technology Program. Specifically, Northrop Grumman submitted labor charges performed by 360 of 460 DynCorp employees … that did not meet the qualifications specified in the contract. Northrop Grumman officials submitted labor charges for an additional 33 DynCorp employees that may not have met the qualifications specified in the contract. Additionally, Northrop Grumman charged Army Contracting Command–Redstone Arsenal (ACC-RSA) 215,298 labor hours in excess of 8 hours per day. …

As a result, ACC-RSA authorized questionable costs of $91.4 million for labor performed by unqualified contractor employees. ACC-RSA may have authorized additional questionable costs of $10 million for 33 DynCorp employees that were not reviewed. Additionally, ACC-RSA authorized questionable costs of $21.7 million for labor performed in excess of 8 hours per day …

According to the background section of the audit report, a DOD IG Hotline complaint alleged that DynCorp had “incorrectly and knowingly” misapplied labor rates and billing rate categories to its subcontract with Northrop Grumman. The report stated that “DynCorp management ignored the incorrect billings because they believed that Northrop Grumman had previously accepted DynCorp’s pricing and they had no obligation to change it.”

The audit report found that—

  • Northrop Grumman officials submitted labor charges performed by 360 of 460 DynCorp employees that did not meet the labor qualifications specified in contract W9113M-07-D-0007.

  • Northrop Grumman officials submitted labor charges for key employees that not meet the labor qualifications specified in contract W9113M-07-D-0007. … Northrop Grumman identified a DynCorp employee as a program manager and billed 5,729 labor hours over a 1 ½ -year period, totaling almost $1.2 million. However, the employee did not meet the program manager qualifications because he did not have a bachelor’s degree.

  • Northrop Grumman charged ACC-RSA for 215,298 labor hours in excess of 8 per day from October 2007 through March 2013. The task orders defined the workweek as 40-hours per week from Saturday through Thursday. While minimizing overtime, the task orders also stated that weekly hours may exceed 40 hours based upon operations and exercises. ACC-RSA representatives were unable to identify a typical Northrop Grumman workweek in Afghanistan. However, Northrop Grumman billed 215,298 hours in excess of 8 hours per day. Specifically, Northrop Grumman charged 29,401 hours in excess of 24 hours per day. For example, one employee billed 1,208 labor hours during a 12-day period, resulting in overpayments totaling $176,900.

The DOD IG audit report did not comment upon Northrop Grumman’s review of invoices submitted by its subcontractor, DynCorp. However, given the other findings, it is not difficult to conclude that Northrop Grumman’s invoice reviews were insufficiently rigorous, to the extent they were performed at all.

It didn’t take long for the POGO-obtained DOD IG audit report to hit the news media headlines. For example, the Washington Post’s story carried the headline “Northrop Grumman Improperly Charged Government More than $100 Million, IG Says.” Note that DynCorp was not mentioned in the WaPo story until the fourth paragraph.

Which proves our point that prime contractors are responsible for the actions of their subcontractors, and that program risk management needs to extend well into the supply chain, and that the risk of noncompliance with contract terms needs to be considered and mitigated. Simply saying that “our subcontractors would never do that,” is not a realistic approach to managing risks in the program supply chain.

 

Unmitigated OCI Leads to FCA Settlement

E-mail Print PDF

Government contractors settle False Claims Act (FCA) lawsuits nearly every single day. Government contractors settle FCA suits routinely; but it is exceedingly rare for a Government entity to settle an FCA suit via payment of a multi-million dollar amount. It is rare for such an entity to be sued in the first place, let alone to settle such a suit.

Think about it for a second. In order to be accused of violating the False Claims Act, an entity must have (allegedly) knowingly submitted false or fictitious claims for money to a Federal agency. In order for a Government entity to be accused of violating the FCA, it must have (allegedly) knowingly submitted false or fictitious claims to another Government entity. How does that work?

But before we get into the whys and wherefores, let’s discuss organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs).

We have discussed OCIs before, notably in this article. We discussed the three “flavors” of OCI – “biased ground rules,” “impaired objectivity,” and “unequal access to information.” When OCIs are alleged to have occurred, the allegations must be investigated by the awarding Contracting Officer. OCIs can be waived by the Contracting Officer, or else they can be mitigated by the bidder (with the efficacy of that mitigation being reviewed by the Contracting Officer). But the allegations must be investigated and the resulting actions, and rationale, must be documented. The facts and circumstances are subject to legal review for the reasonableness of the resulting actions.

Hang on to that thought. We’ll get back to OCIs in a minute.

Now we are on the same page, and we are ready to discuss United States, Virginia and the District of Columbia, ex rel. Shahiq Khwaja v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, et al., Case No. 1:12-cv-00268-RJL (D.D.C.).

In this case, a Government entity was sued under the FCA by a qui tam relator, a former employee of that very same entity, who alleged that the entity misused Federal Transit Administration (FTA) grant funds by inappropriately awarding work under other than “full and open competition” procedures, in violation of certifications to the FTA that the entity would comply with statutes and regulations covering awards of work when using the FTA funds.

Would you like to know more?

The entity in question is the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA or “Metro”), which is (according to Wikipedia) a Government agency created by an interstate compact between the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The compact, which was approved by Congress, provides that WMATA is legally incorporated in the District of Columbia. In addition (according to Wikipedia), the compact grants WMATA “sovereign immunity by all three jurisdictions in which it operates, and except for certain limited exceptions, the authority cannot be successfully sued unless it waives immunity.”

Well, one of those “limited exceptions” must be in the case of alleged fraud, because WMATA’s former employee, Shahiq Khwaja, filed suit under the FCA. Apparently, his suit was complex, because the WMATA settlement only addresses the Federal allegations related to alleged misuse of FTA grant funds. Khwaja’s suit also included allegations on behalf of Virginia and the District of Columbia, which were not resolved. In addition, Khwaja also sued WMATA for “violating the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s (ARRA) provisions protecting whistleblowers [by alleging] that WMATA terminated him from his position as an information technology functional manager because he expressed concerns about the manner in which WMATA was financially and technically administering the integration project which was funded, in part, with ARRA funds.”

Regardless of the complexity and multiple issues involved, the allegations can be expressed in a couple of paragraphs. As usual, we quote from the DOJ press release announcing the settlement.

In or around August 2009, WMATA awarded Metaformers, using full and open competition procedures, a relatively modest contract valued at approximately $256,000 to assess WMATA’s financial system. Less than one year later, in July 2010, WMATA awarded Metaformers the $14 million contract to integrate the Authority’s financial and business systems. WMATA awarded the contract non-competitively and allegedly without legitimate justification for doing so, foreclosing an opportunity for other contractors and companies to submit proposals for the lucrative project. WMATA’s conduct was allegedly in violation of its certification – and commitment - to administer the FTA grant funds using full and open competition.

In awarding the $14 million integration contract, WMATA also allegedly violated ‘conflict of interest rules’ governing use of FTA grant funds. WMATA’s noncompetitive award to Metaformers was based, in part, on the work completed by Metaformers under the assessment contract. By competitively awarding the smaller assessment contract and then non-competitively awarding the far more lucrative integration project both to the same contractor, WMATA violated federal procurement conflict of interest rules by giving one contractor an advantage over others who might have been interested in competing for the integration project.

Because of WMATA’s conduct, contractors who might have been interested in submitting proposals or bids for the integration project never had the opportunity to do so. Thus, WMATA’s conduct was allegedly in violation of its certification and commitment to administer the FTA grant funds avoiding conflicts of interest in procurements.

WMATA agreed to pay $4,240,341 to resolve the allegations with respect to the FTA funds it allegedly misused. According to the press release, Mr. Khwaja will receive approximately $996,480 as his share of the recovery. In addition, “WMATA negotiated with Mr. Khwaja’s counsel to resolve Mr. Khwaja’s wrongful termination claim for $390,000.”

  • Possible problems with procurement awards? Check.

  • Employee who reported concerns with procurement awards? Check.

  • Employee who is subsequently terminated? Check.

  • Now disgruntled employee who contacts attorney? Check.

  • Multimillion dollar settlement? Check.

  • Unfavorable news stories? Check.

Yep. Same old story.

Happens nearly every single day.

When will we learn?

 


Page 127 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.