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Apogee Consulting Inc

DCAA’s Approach to Evaluating Audit Evidence

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PCAOB Auditing Standard 15 addresses audit evidence. What is audit evidence?

Audit evidence is all the information, whether obtained from audit procedures or other sources, that is used by the auditor in arriving at the conclusions on which the auditor's opinion is based. Audit evidence consists of both information that supports and corroborates management's assertions regarding the financial statements or internal control over financial reporting and information that contradicts such assertions.

Audit evidence obtained must be sufficient to support the conclusion(s). Sufficiency is a measure of the quality of the audit evidence. Audit evidence must be appropriate, as measured by the relevance and reliability of the evidence. The reliability of evidence depends on its nature and source, as well as the circumstances under which it is obtained. Evidence obtained by the auditor is more reliable than evidence obtained indirectly. Moreover, “evidence provided by original documents is more reliable than evidence provided by photocopies or facsimiles, or documents that have been filmed, digitized, or otherwise converted into electronic form, the reliability of which depends on the controls over the conversion and maintenance of those documents.”

Audit procedures for obtaining evidence generally consist of inspection, observation, and inquiry. The audit evidence may be evaluated via recalculation or reperformance. Reperformance involves the independent execution (by the auditors) of procedures or controls that were originally performed by company personnel.

Auditing Standard 14 discusses the evaluation of audit results. It states—

If the auditor has not obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence about a relevant assertion or has substantial doubt about a relevant assertion, the auditor should perform procedures to obtain further audit evidence to address the matter. If the auditor is unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to have a reasonable basis to conclude about whether the financial statements as a whole are free of material misstatement, AU sec. 508 indicates that the auditor should express a qualified opinion or a disclaimer of opinion.

The DCAA Contract Audit Manual (April 2014), Chapter 2, states—

An examination consists of obtaining sufficient, appropriate evidence to express an opinion on whether the subject matter or assertion is based on or in conformity with the criteria in all material respects. An examination report provides a high level of assurance and the auditor’s conclusion is expressed in the form of an opinion (stated as positive assurance). Therefore, the audit objective is to gather sufficient evidence to restrict attestation risk to a level that is, in the auditor’s professional judgment, appropriately low for the high level of assurance that is imparted by the audit opinion. In such an engagement, the auditor should select a combination of procedures to assess inherent and control risk and restrict detection risk such that attestation risk is restricted to an appropriately low level. In the contract audit environment, evaluations of complete submissions (price proposals, claims, and overhead rate proposals), where the auditor establishes the scope, are performed as ‘examinations.’

That same chapter also states—

The auditor must obtain sufficient evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the conclusion expressed in the report. This requires that sufficient procedures be performed to test the contractor’s assertion to provide reasonable assurance that unallowable costs and other noncompliances with applicable Government laws and regulations are identified. The first step in obtaining sufficient evidence is to perform an adequate risk assessment to identify risk areas for the performance of substantive procedures. Substantive procedures include analytical procedures and detailed testing. The nature and extent of substantive procedures is a matter of auditor judgment based on the risk assessment. However, audit risk would never be low enough to eliminate the need for substantive procedures. Furthermore, inquiry and/or analytical procedures alone are not sufficient to support the high level of assurance provided in examination engagements. Detailed testing must be performed in all examination engagements.

Chapter 3 of the CAM basically recapitulates the PCAOB Auditing Standards we quoted at the beginning of this article. It adds some additional guidance for auditors, including—

… a controller's written statement explaining how costs are allocated to contracts by a computer program is not sufficient by itself, to use as the basis for an opinion on the reliability of the generated costs. This is the poorest quality evidence, since it is testimonial and is generated by the contractor. A written manual, even if prepared by an outside computer programmer, documenting the program's operation also alone is not sufficient. While it is better quality evidence since it was prepared by an independent source, it is still not sufficient alone to satisfy the audit objective; however, it may be used as corroborative evidence with the controller's statement. But even the two together are not sufficient evidence to base an opinion on the costs. Testing of several transactions processed through the program are necessary to assure that costs are being allocated as they should. The testing alone may be sufficient (i.e., relatively better quality evidence since it is directly obtained), but also may require further evidence to develop an opinion. These tests combined with the other two pieces of evidence may be sufficient on which to base an opinion.

In addition, Chapter 3 of the CAM states—

The chain of evidence extends from documents describing individual transactions through the books of original entry to ledger accounts and to the cost representations. The reliability of ledgers and accounts as evidence is dependent on the soundness of the principles and policies upon which the records were developed and on the adequacy of internal controls exercised in the preparation and review of the records. Auditors should constantly be alert for potential manipulation of contractor ledgers and accounts. One example would be the removal of pages containing transactions that management or others do not want the auditor to review from a computer listing. If such a listing includes many transactions, it would be difficult to manually verify the accuracy of the totals at the end of the listing.

There are discussions of physical observations and discussions of perambulations. There is a detailed discussion regarding the contractor’s use of scanned images in lieu of original documents. There’s quite a bit of audit guidance.

But there’s almost nothing regarding checking beyond the contractor’s documentation. There’s almost nothing regarding obtaining cancelled checks and/or bank statements to verify claimed costs can be traced, on a cash basis, to the source of the cash. Similarly, there’s very little to be found regarding having contractors reperform their work under the watchful eyes of the auditors, in order to ensure that the data is not being manipulated.

So why do so many DCAA auditors insist on those types of approaches?

Our experience with supporting recent DCAA 10100 audits (aka “incurred cost proposal” audits) has befuddled us. We run accounting system reports and provide the original output to an auditor, who then tells us that s/he need it provided in an Excel spreadsheet in order to run analytics. We run accounting system reports and provide the output in an Excel spreadsheet to another auditor, who tells us that s/he cannot accept that data because it is not in the original format. We run accounting system reports and provide both the original output and an Excel spreadsheet to the auditor, and then s/he tells us that we need to reperform the report queries under the watchful eyes of yet another auditor, who is supposed to witness the query and make sure nobody is manipulating the data.

Where in the CAM does it say to do all that?

We are at the point where we feel that DCAA should simply move into the contractor’s facility and live with the contractor personnel, just to save the duplication of effort. Just watch everything the employees do and then they’ll only have to do it once.

This notion that transactions have to be traced back to payroll deposits and bank statements is getting silly, in our view. If the auditors have reviewed the accounting system – as they should have – then they should have confidence that the system works. If they lack confidence in the system then they must have done a poor job in reviewing the accounting system in the first place.

It is indisputable that audits take longer – far longer – than they ever have. The most common explanation given for the delays is that the auditors are being more diligent. They are complying with GAGAS. They are doing a better job in terms of audit quality, and quality cannot be rushed. Blah, blah, blah.

We know, because the DOD Inspector General told us, that DCAA audit quality is still lacking. We know, because the DOD Inspector General told us, that DCAA still fails to comply with GAGAS in far too many audits. We know, because the DOD Inspector General told us, that too many audits still lack sufficient evidence to support the conclusions reported.

We know that DCAA still takes far too long to issue its audit reports. And we know that too many of those delayed reports are deficient in the quality department as well.

Why?

Well, perhaps one driver is the need to witness everything the contractor does, to reperform every accounting system query and see the output in as many formats as possible. Perhaps another driver is the need to trace every transaction down as far as it will go. We get that fraud risk has to be addressed, but we believe DCAA has gone too far in that regard … as it has in almost every “audit quality” initiative the audit agency has undertaken since 2008.

Too many DCAA audit reports still fail to meet GAGAS standards. Too many reports fail to deliver value to the customer that asked for them. The audit process takes too long and still fails to deliver a quality product. We suspect one big cause of the problem is a lack of professional judgment in the area of obtaining and evaluating audit evidence.

Maybe somebody should look into that?

 

Let’s Sue DCAA? Well, KBR Just Did!

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Remember that old article we wrote? The one in which we said, “Sooner or later, a contractor is going to get fed up with the situation and sue DCAA for malpractice under the FTCA. We suspect it will be sooner, rather than later.”

So that happened.

We don’t have the details, because Law360 has a paywall and the subscription is too dear for this little consultancy. But what we do know is that Law360 reported the following:

Kellogg Brown & Root Services Inc. sued the U.S. government in Delaware federal court on Tuesday, seeking to recover $12.5 million in legal fees from litigation that arose out of an allegedly defective Defense Contract Audit Agency report on its use of private security contractors during...

The lawsuit, which seeks damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, accuses the DCAA of wide-ranging professional malpractice …

Readers of this blog know about that dispute. Here’s a link to the article in which we reported—

… 35 pages of Findings of Fact that summed up a colossal Charlie Foxtrot, wherein the U.S. Military tried to perform its primary mission under difficult circumstances, a mission that (based on testimony and evidence and Findings of Fact) did not necessarily include protecting the civilian contractors, who were thus forced to protect themselves by hiring PSCs, which led to questioned, suspended, and disallowed costs. We have an opinion on the equity of the situation, but that opinion is not relevant to this article.

See that there? That was us being discreet! That part about “we have an opinion … but that opinion is not relevant to this article.” That was good, right? Seriously, how often do we do that on this blog?

Anyway our opinion is still not relevant, but we will venture one here anyway, just for the record. For the record, then, our opinion is that if you take civilian contractors into a war zone, you owe them the obligation of providing them safety and security at least equal to that provided to military service members and civilian employees of the DOD. At least that amount, if not more. And if it turns out that the military cannot provide civilian contractors with at least that level of security, those contractors will have to go look elsewhere. Or they have to abandon their posts and put the overall mission in jeopardy and probably get sued by the DOD for nonperformance. So pretty much they have to go look elsewhere for their security and safety. They have to go find their own security suppliers if they want to stay at their posts.

And if you then say, thanks for staying at your post, but we are going to make the cost of you providing your own security unallowable, because reasons, then that is manifestly unfair. If the military can’t do the job, then somebody else has to. Or else don’t bring civilian contractors into a war zone.

Don’t bring civilian contractors into a war zone, and tell them the U.S. military is going to protect them, and then have them find out later that, in fact, the U.S. military has a mission to perform—and that mission does NOT include protecting the civilian contractors. Surprise!

And don’t have them shrug their shoulders in resignation, and then go provide their own security, security that is obviously allocable to the contract at hand as a direct cost, a direct cost that is allowable since it was not made unallowable by any contract terms or conditions, and then have the auditors say “unallowable.” That situation strikes us as being more than simply unfair. It strikes us as being a bit cowardly and more than a little duplicitous. “Good faith and fair dealing” is the standard and, in this case, that standard seems to have been missed by a mile.

So there’s our opinion on that. For the record.

KBR, which was forced to spent $12.5 million in legal fees to recover its questioned, suspended, and disallowed PSC costs, and which lost the use of a roughly a hundred million dollars in cash (but still had to keep performing its contracts and pay its employees) on the basis of an allegedly flawed DCAA audit report, is now suing the audit agency.

Good for them.

Meanwhile, as readers know, the DOD IG recently found errors in 81 percent of recent DCAA audit reports it reviewed. Which leads us to wonder how many other contractors may be out there, looking to sue DCAA for similar flawed audit findings.

 

Subcontractor Risk Management, Redux

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If it weren’t so troubling it would be hilarious.

Remember when we wrote about the importance of supply chain risk management? Remember when we asserted that programs generally under manage risks in their supply chains? Yeah, we do too. We also remember that lady at the Top 5 defense contractor who pooh-poohed our attempts at risk identification by telling us that her suppliers would never do terrible things such as engage in product substitution or falsely certify test results. Oh, no. Her company would never do business with that kind of supplier, no way.

Anyway, those thoughts came to mind once again when we read that Pratt & Whitney had briefly suspended deliveries of engines for the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter because of concerns over the pedigree of the titanium used in the engines. The article reported that Pratt & Whitney was no longer accepting parts made by its supplier, A&P Alloys. (A&P Alloys denied the allegations.)

The article noted that Pratt & Whitney has faced continued challenges in managing its suppliers, writing—

The Defense Contract Management Agency wrote in a June internal assessment that Pratt & Whitney’s ‘continued poor management of suppliers is a primary driver for the increased potential problem notifications.’ The incidents ‘have resulted in delinquent deliveries of engines,’ the agency said. ‘This trend will continue until the contractor improves its management of subcontractors and suppliers.’

Bates, the Pratt & Whitney spokesman, said ‘the vast majority’ of problem notifications ‘are minor issues or no issues at all’ and ‘do not have any impact on specifications or field performance’ of engines. Only four of the 30 notifications ‘required action in the field,’ he said. The Pentagon’s F-35 program office said in a statement that Pratt & Whitney’s ‘persistent problems stem from the supply chain’ because 80 percent of the engine is produced by many different subcontractors. …

Pratt & Whitney isn’t asking the Pentagon to pay the cost associated with removal and replacement of ‘parts with the suspect titanium,’ Bates said.

One reason behind Pratt & Whitney’s decision not to pass on the cost of replacing the titanium engine parts may be because they were planning to recover the increased (and possibly unallowable) costs from the supplier, A&P Alloys. A subsequent news article reported that a lawsuit had been filed, accusing A&P Alloys of “fraud and breach of contract,” stemming from "intentionally submitted certifications falsely representing the pedigree and quality of its material."

The article reported—

Pratt is suing for damages and attorneys fees arising from fraudulent misrepresentations about the metals and attempts to impede Pratt's efforts to uncover the alleged misconduct, according to the lawsuit.

According to the lawsuit, A&P's owner denied representatives from Pratt and Lewis access to A&P's headquarters when they were seeking documents and refused to turn over requested records.

Pratt put its costs at more than $1 million thus far, the lawsuit said.

Based on the article (link above), we can tell that A&P Alloys was a lower-tier subcontractor. It was actually a supplier to Lewis Machine LLC, who was a subcontractor to Pratt & Whitney. Should the fact that it was a supplier of a supplier excuse Pratt & Whitney of responsibility for managing that supplier? In truth, was it not the responsibility of Lewis Machine LLC to properly manage its suppliers?

Well, we guess one could make that argument in court.

But the fact of the matter – the crux of the situation – is that Pratt & Whitney was responsible for delivering F-35 engines to the customer. Period. It was responsible for program execution, regardless of whether it performed all the work in-house or outsourced everything to multiple supply chain tiers and had thousands of suppliers performing the work. Pratt & Whitney was responsible, which is why it is their name in the headlines and not Lewis Machine LLC or A&P Alloys.

As previously noted, Pratt & Whitney has been on notice for some time that it has had supply chain management problems. More specifically, according to another article, Pratt & Whitney has been on notice for some time that specialty metals in the program supply chain (specifically including titanium) have been at risk. The article reported –

The court documents claim that A&P Alloys lied numerous times about the origins of the metal and, in some cases, told intermediate suppliers to withhold information from Pratt & Whitney.

Pressure built at Pratt & Whitney and appeared to spill out publicly days after the visit, when the company's head of engineering and operations, Danny Di Perna, spoke to businesses at an industry event, visibly upset about some supplier issue. ‘There are some folks out here … that do bad things with material,’ Di Perna said on May 30, not specifically citing the titanium problem but explaining that he had been dealing with an issue since 7:30 the night before. ‘I'm very upset about it. … But I'm telling you, integrity.’ Although he cited no specifics of the issue, he constantly returned to supplier honesty and quality. ‘The supply chain I don't think is ready’ for higher production, he said. ‘We are not going to put up with nonperformance anymore.’

The federal court case offers a unique glimpse into how Pratt & Whitney maintains quality and compliance among its field of suppliers for hundreds of thousands of parts. With steep production increases on the horizon, the incident shows just how much the company relies on the honesty of its suppliers and redundant testing measures to keep the operation on track. …

Last year, separate issues regarding its titanium supply resulted in Pratt & Whitney's reviewing parts in many of its engines. In that case, as in this one, the company said that the parts were found to be out of conformance with standards but safe enough to not pose a flight safety risk.

(Emphasis added.)

This situation would be hilarious if it were not so troubling.

Here we have the single most expensive fighter program in the history of the United States, and (according to news reports) the single most important program for engine-maker Pratt & Whitney. Here we have continued supply chain management problems—literally a recurrence of the same specialty metal pedigree problems. Here we have at least a million dollars wasted and millions more dollars of legal fees yet to be spent, and headlines impugning the Pratt & Whitney brand and more headlines yet to come. This is not how one would wish the Pratt & Whitney executives to be spending their time.

And what is the root cause?

Ineffective supply chain risk management.

Oh, you can gussy it up and point fingers and cry “fraud” – and no doubt that is being done and will continue to be the Pratt & Whitney party line. But the root cause, in our view from 1,500 miles away, is that Pratt & Whitney failed to engage in adequate program risk identification and failed to effectively manage its supply chain risks.

But maybe those folks in charge of program supply chain management assumed that their suppliers would never, ever, do anything wrong. They trusted the honesty, the integrity, of their suppliers. Would you say that was simply naiveté in action – or perhaps more than a bit negligent?

Bottom-line: It’s tough to manage program risks when you put on blinders and refuse even to consider them.

Now let’s try a little experiment.

You tell us you don’t have budget to spend on sending quality assurance inspectors down two and three (or maybe even four and five) tiers deep into the program supply chain. You tell us you have neither the resources nor the funding to deploy enough people to enough suppliers to ensure that everything in on the up-and-up. You tell us that you can’t inspect quality into a program supply chain, that quality has to be embedded at the cultural level. And you have no money to spend on some kind of IT-based product pedigree system.

Okay, we say. That’s your call. We agree that a quality-focused culture is more effective than an inspection-focused culture. But that assumes your supply chain is mature enough to create that culture. In the meantime, you have to decide how to manage the supply chain you have, not the one you wish to have. But we get that it is your decision to decide how to deploy the scarce resources you have. If you decide to limit supplier inspections (or not to implement a secure program supply chain product pedigree system) because of budgetary concerns, that’s clearly your call to make.

But consider this:

Because of your decision, the company will suffer adverse publicity, have an interruption in planned deliveries (which will impact sales) and you will incur at least one million dollars in additional costs plus untold millions in legal fees (most, if not all, of which will be unallowable—which will impact your profit). In addition, you will spend an inordinate number of labor hours trying to solve the problem and develop a work-around, which will divert your scarce resources to solving a problem that might well have been prevented in the first place. Plus you will also upset the customer of the company’s single biggest program, the customer who will (at a minimum) submit a performance review into a government-wide database for use on future source selection decisions.

Because of your decision not to proactively identify and manage your program supply chain risks, you will put your single biggest revenue stream at risk.

How much would you be willing to spend on supplier risk management now?

 

FCPA Violation Costs Hewlett-Packard More than $100 Million

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Hewlett-Packard recently landed in a world of hurt. The U.S. Department of Justice announced that ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O. (aka HP Russia), a Russian subsidiary of the U.S. Corporation, “pleaded guilty today to felony violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and was then sentenced for bribing Russian government officials to secure a large technology contract with the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation.”

The DOJ announcement reported—

According to the plea agreement, HP Russia executives created a multimillion dollar secret slush fund, at least part of which was used to bribe Russian government officials who awarded the company a contract valued at more than €35 million. …

According to the statement of facts filed with the plea agreement, HP Russia created excess profit margins to finance the slush fund through an elaborate buy-back deal scheme. HP subsidiaries first sold the computer hardware and other technology products called for under the contract to a Russian channel partner, then bought the same products back from an intermediary at a nearly €8 million mark-up and an additional €4.2 million in purported services, then sold the same products to the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation at the increased price. The payments to the intermediary were then largely transferred through multiple layers of shell companies, some of which were directly associated with government officials. Proceeds from the slush fund were spent on travel services, luxury automobiles, expensive jewelry, clothing, furniture and various other items.

To keep track of and conceal these corrupt payments, the conspirators inside HP Russia kept two sets of books: secret spreadsheets that detailed the categories of bribe recipients, and sanitized versions that hid the bribes from others outside of HP Russia. They also entered into off-the-books side agreements to further mask the bribes. As one example, an HP Russia executive executed a letter agreement to pay €2.8 million in purported “commission” fees to a U.K.-registered shell company, which was linked to a director of the Russian government agency responsible for managing the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation project. HP Russia never disclosed the existence of the agreement to internal or external auditors or management outside of HP Russia.

The court sentenced HP Russia to pay a $58,772,250 fine.

But that’s not all the pain HP has been feeling. The DOJ announcement also reported—

On April 9, 2014, the government also announced criminal resolutions with HP subsidiaries in Poland and Mexico which violated the FCPA in connection with contracts with Poland’s national police agency and Mexico’s state-owned petroleum company, respectively. Pursuant to a deferred prosecution agreement, the department filed a criminal information charging Hewlett-Packard Polska, Sp. Z o.o. with violating the accounting provisions of the FCPA. Hewlett-Packard Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V. entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the government pursuant to which it has agreed to forfeit proceeds and has admitted and accepted responsibility for its misconduct. In total, the three HP entities will pay $76,760,224 in criminal penalties and forfeiture.

In a related FCPA matter, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a proposed final judgment in April 2014 to which HP Co. consented. Under the terms of the proposed final judgment, HP Co. has paid $31,472,250 in disgorgement, prejudgment interest and civil penalties, bringing the total amount of U.S. criminal and regulatory penalties against HP Co. and its subsidiaries to more than $108 million.

So Hewlett-Packard has paid roughly $108 million for FCPA violations. That’s gotta hurt. But it could have been worse. In the words of the DOJ:

Court filings acknowledge HP Co.’s extensive cooperation with the department, including conducting a robust internal investigation, voluntarily making U.S. and foreign employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence for the department. Court filings also acknowledge the extensive anti-corruption remedial efforts undertaken by HP Co., including taking appropriate disciplinary action against culpable employees, and enhancing HP Co.’s internal accounting, reporting, and compliance functions.

No doubt HP’s cooperation and “remedial efforts” helped to keep the situation in the civil litigation realm, thus avoiding criminal prosecution.

And so another U.S. Corporation learns that failed controls can be costly.

 

DOD IG Delivers Good News and Bad News to DCAA

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DOG IG Auditor: I have some good news and some bad news.

DCAA Director: Please tell me the good news first, if you would.

DOD IG Auditor: Congratulations! You passed your external quality review!

DCAA Director: That’s great! Now tell me the bad news.

DOD IG Auditor: Your auditors still don’t know how to audit.

Really, the fictitious dialog posted above tells the entire story. You can stop reading right here and get back to Facebook or whatever.

Would you like to know more? Okay, we can help you with that.

First, The Good News

Good_News_and_Bad_News
On August, 21, 2014, the DOD Inspector General issued its long-overdue peer review report of DCAA’s quality assurance system. As we’ve noted in the past, DCAA has been without an externally-reviewed-and-determined-to-be-adequate quality assurance system since 2009, which is technically a violation of GAGAS. That problem was rectified when the DOD IG issued its report, and DCAA auditors will no longer have to report the expired quality assurance system in their audit reports. The DOD IG found DCAA’s quality assurance system to be adequate and it received a rating of “pass with deficiencies.”

Yay for DCAA!

Some aspects of the quality system review report caught our eye. Perhaps you will find them to be of interest as well.

  • Instead of the “usual” 1-year period from which audit reports would normally be chosen for review, the IG instead reviewed only audit reports produced in a 6-month period. The IG stated that “we believe the volume of audits at DCAA creates a reasonable sample in a shorter time.” Left unexplained was the rationale for choosing a 1-year review period in prior quality system reviews of past years, when DCAA’s production of audit reports was significantly higher than it is now.

  • The IG reviewed 92 engagements. In 11 of the 92 (12 percent of the sample universe) the IG “identified errors or a lack of sufficient documentation … that limited the reliability of the reports. … Specifically, the DCAA engagement documentation did not contain sufficient information to allow the peer review auditor to understand the judgments and conclusions drawn by the DCAA auditor based on the evidence in the work papers.” A 12 percent failure rate is not so swell, in our view. In contrast, the DOD IG judged it to be good enough. (We are tempted to say “ good enough for government work.”)

  • In addition, the IG identified 3 additional reports “for which the engagement documentation did not support information in the report.” However, for these 3 additional defective reports, “the reliability … was not affected by the errors because DCAA adequately resolved our concerns … during interviews and provided additional information outside the engagement documentation.” We think it interesting that engagement files and working papers did not have to speak for themselves, and could be augmented by discussions and additional information created after-the-fact. That would seem to be a very, very lenient audit approach and we are sure DCAA appreciated the professional courtesy involved.

To sum up, then, the external peer review of DCAA’s quality control system identified defects in 14 of 92 engagements reviewed, for an error rate of fifteen percent (15%). The DOD IG found that error rate to be within tolerance and passed the system.

Yay for DCAA!

As a side note, those of you lucky enough to have your business systems audited by DCAA may want to remember that a 15% error rate is good enough for a passing score. We mean to say that if a 15% error rate is good enough for DCAA’s quality control system, we think a 15% error rate should be good enough for your business system. Your auditors, of course, may not agree.

Now For The Bad News

On September 8, 2014 – just a couple of weeks after giving DCAA a pass on its quality control system – the DOD IG issued another review of DCAA audits issued during Government Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013. The findings were not pretty.

Readers may recall the previous DOD IG review of DCAA audit quality, issued in March, 2013. The findings in that report weren’t pretty either. We reviewed that previous report (link provided), and we concluded as follows—

We could go on and on, just like the DOD IG audit report did, listing example after example of poor audit planning, poor communication, poor documentation, lack of professional competence, lack of adequate supervision, insufficient evidence, delayed reports, and other GAGAS violations. But why bother? The report is, unfortunately for DCAA, damning.

Just as the prior DOD IG and GAO reports on DCAA audit quality have been damning.

We’re not particularly surprised by the findings in the DOD IG report; nor do we suspect our readership is particularly surprised by them. We’ve asserted for some time that the DCAA initiatives intended to increase audit quality have not worked out as planned. As this report demonstrates, DCAA audit quality is still lacking.

In other words, DCAA has implemented its revised procedures and multiple reviews and, as a result, has dramatically delayed its audit report production for no good reason. They still suck.

So we think DCAA may as well just throw the audit reports over the transom to the customer just as quickly as it can. The quality will still be as poor; but at least the reports will be more timely.

But we can hear the chorus of cries from Fort Belvoir from here—‘just wait until the next review!’ Yes, things will be so much better then. Higher quality audit reports issued faster.

Sure.

We’ll be very happy to report on the assessed quality of DCAA audit reports when that next external peer review report is issued. If things have improved significantly, we’ll be first in line to say so.

And so here we are, eighteen months later, discussing the follow-up report. It gives us little pleasure to tell you that, as we expected, the quality of DCAA’s audit reports—as measured by the DOD IG—has not improved significantly.

In the latest report, the DOD IG evaluated 16 DCAA audit reports, including 5 audits of priced proposals and 11 audits of “incurred cost proposals.” The IG identified “1 or more significant inadequacies” in 13 of the 16 audit reports evaluated, for a failure rate of 81%. Yes, that’s correct . More than 8 out of 10 recently issued DCAA audit reports failed the DOD IG review.

We bet DCAA is glad those audit reports weren’t part of the sample used for the external peer review of the audit agency’s quality control system!

Following are some quotes from the DOD IG report. Each numbered item corresponds to one of the 16 Memos the IG issued to DCAA after the review. Since we are only quoting from Memos that interest us, we have to skip around a little bit.

1. Audit Report No. 3321-2009K10180035. The IG found “that 66 percent of the invoices and 59 percent of the claimed costs audited … had already been examined in an assist audit conducted by the DCAA Iraq Branch Office, under Assignment No. 2131-2007R10180002-S1. … In addition, 91 percent of the costs questioned [in the audit report reviewed] had previously been questioned by the DCAA Iraq Branch Office. On May 30, 2008, the DCAA issued a Form 1 … on July 15, 2010, the contracting officer reached a negotiated settlement with the contractor. ... Therefore, the Resident Office’s efforts to later re-examine the same invoices and requestion the same costs did not serve a useful purpose.” Further the IG reported that “We found that the Resident Office reported $8,725,017 of questioned costs in the DCAA DMIS, even though the Iraq Branch Office had previously reported $6,128,000 of the same questioned costs in the DMIS. … The accuracy of DMIS information is important because DCAA frequently uses it as a management tool, and DCAA reports key statistics from DMIS to Congress and various federal agencies.”

3. Audit Report No. 4551-2009B1101001. The IG found that “the field audit office (FAO) spend an excessive number of hours auditing a billing system that is no longer in use, reported on transaction tests that were not current or relevant, and recommended the withholding of contractor payments without sufficient evidence.” The IG reported that “FAO auditors spent 7,416 hours to complete the audit.” Although the testing on the billing system was “comprehensive and well documented,” the IG noted that the FAO “expended an excessive amount of time testing the legacy system [that was no longer being used] and reported on the results of tests that were not current.” Looking at the delays between the performance of audit procedures and issuance of the audit report, the IG reported that “the FAO did not issue its report … until one year and six months after the last tested transaction. The oldest tested transaction was nearly four years old [by the time the report was issued].” The IG looked further, and reported “while the audited took only one month and 19 days to prepare the initial draft report, the FAO spent the remaining time (over one year and two months) performing several management/technical reviews, editing the report format, and incorporating the contractor’s response. GAO noted that the same FAO took two years to issue the 2005 report after completion of testing.”

6. Audit Report No. 2701-2006A10100002. The IG reported that “In Exhibit A (G&A), Note 6 and Exhibit G (Penalties), the auditor incorrectly identified and applied a penalty to an unreasonable training cost which is not specifically unallowable under FAR 31.205 and is therefore not subject to a penalty.”

9. Audit Report No. 4151-2005T10100004. The IG found that “The working papers did not include any support for how the FAO computed its reported penalty participation rates.” In addition, the IG asserted that the auditor had mishandled the impact of the contractor’s adjustment of two unallowable bonus costs charged as direct contract costs.

11. Audit Report No. 482102011R21000012. The IG thought this audit did not accomplish very much. It reported that “After expending 4,807 hours the DCAA Audit Report … did not meet the needs of the AMCOM contracting officer. The DCAA work papers do not establish that DCAA complied with existing DCAA policy and communicated effectively with the contracting officer.” As a result of the issues the IG identified, “the AMCOM contracting officer had to expend additional DoD resources and convene a post-audit report issuance fact-finding summit to make the DCAA audit report useable for negotiating the contract.” According to the IG report, “the contracting officer advised the OIG that the purpose of the ‘summit’ was to sit with DCAA to reconcile the gaps [between] the audit findings and the request for audit and to make the audit report useable for negotiating the contract. The contracting officer identified the omission by DCAA of the review of the proposed indirect rates as one of the reasons for convening the fact-finding summit.” Moreover, the IG again found problems with DMIS reporting and reported that “the final amount reported in DMIS for net savings, $18.9 million, was not calculated in accordance with DMIS guidance.”

16. Audit Report No. 1261-2007J10100537. The IG reported that “The FAO took 4 years to complete the assignment... The FAO manager told us [the audit] was delayed to focus on ‘higher-priority’ work. However, there was no indication in the working papers that the audit had been significantly delayed for other priority work. In fact, the auditor continued to charge the assignment intermittently over the entire 4-year period.”

To sum up the obvious, despite the recent “pass with deficiencies” rating on its quality control system, it seems quite clear that the vast majority of DCAA audits still fail. Some lack quality, some lack value to the requestor, some are late. Some audits suffer from all three attributes of failure.

According to the DOD IG, DCAA still has room for improvement. We concur in that assessment.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.