• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

DOD IG Criticizes DCMA’s Forward Pricing Rate Process

E-mail Print PDF

There are many reasons to criticize the process by which the Defense Contract Management Agency establishes what it considers to be acceptable Forward Pricing Rates for defense contractors to use in bidding contract awards. There are many reasons to use as the basis of criticism, and we’ve not been shy about offering them on this blog.

The process is too bureaucratic. It has too many layers of oversight and review. It takes too long. By the time the government’s position is issued, the contractor has often already submitted a new set of Forward Pricing Rates. The process often results in rates that are arbitrarily – some might say punitively – low, with insufficient justification for the ACO’s position. The differences between the contractor’s position and the government’s position often leads to protracted and adversarial negotiations between the contractor and the buying activity.

As you can see, there are many reasons to criticize DCMA’s existing process. And now the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General has found a couple more reasons to criticize the process.

The thing is, we believe the DOD IG’s criticisms are inapt. We believe that the IG’s recommended process improvements, if implemented by DCMA, would tend to exacerbate the existing issues in the problematic process rather than improve the process. The DOD IG’s recommendations will neither streamline the process nor result in issuance of more timely Forward Pricing Rates. The DOD IG’s recommendations will neither reduce costs nor increase efficiency. Quite the contrary, actually.

As we see it, the DOD IG would like to take the existing process with all its problems, and make those problems worse. The DOD IG would like to slow down the process and make it more bureaucratic. The DOD IG would like the ACO’s to “paper the file” more so as to aid in more management oversight and review.

What are we talking about?

Allow is to quote from the DOD IG summary of findings, pulled from the audit report summary—

[Current] DCMA policy does not adequately address Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requirements to (1) perform cost analysis to establish fair and reasonable forward pricing rates, (2) tailor the requests for audit services, and (3) document a contract case file.

Let’s take those three findings (and concomitant recommendations) one at a time, shall we?

  1. Current DCMA Forward Pricing Rate policy does not adequately address the FAR requirement to perform cost analysis so as to ensure that the indirect rates established are “fair and reasonable.” We do agree that “fair and reasonable” is the goal, though of course we rarely experience achieving that goal. Instead, we too often see Forward Pricing Rates established lower than the contractor would like, so as to “protect the Government’s interest.” Regardless, the IG would like DCMA ACO’s to perform cost analysis on the contractor’s Forward Pricing Rate Proposal (FPRP) because performing that cost analysis is better than not performing it.

The DOD IG provides a beautiful example of circular logic in its rationale. According to the IG, FAR 42.1701(b) “requires that the ACO shall obtain the contractor’s forward pricing rate proposal and require that it includes cost or pricing data that are accurate, complete, and current as of the date of submission.” Because the contractor is submitting cost or pricing data, FAR 15.404-1(a)(3) “requires that ‘cost analysis shall be used to evaluate the reasonableness of individual cost elements when certified cost or pricing data are required.’”

Basically, the IG said that because the DCMA required contractors to provide cost or pricing data in support of their FPRPs that meant that DCMA was required to use cost analysis to evaluate the contractors’ submissions. Had the DCMA not required cost or pricing data, then no cost analysis would have been required. Had the DCMA not required cost or pricing data then it would have been free to evaluate the FPRPs in any which way it chose to do so. Forget the purpose of Forward Pricing Rates; forget why cost analysis is to be used: if you have cost or pricing data then you are negligent unless you use cost analysis to evaluate the data. That was the DOD IG’s position on the matter.

Now the first problem we have with the IG’s position is that FAR Part 15 does not apply to contractors’ FPRPs. The scope of FAR Part 15 (which is established at 48 CFR § 15.000) clearly states that “This part prescribes policies and procedures governing competitive and noncompetitive negotiated acquisitions. A contract awarded using other than sealed bidding procedures is a negotiated contract (see 14.101).” A proposal to establish a Forward Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA) is not an acquisition.

It’s not an acquisition because the FAR defines the term “acquisition” at 2.101.

‘Acquisition’ means the acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or services (including construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government through purchase or lease, whether the supplies or services are already in existence or must be created, developed, demonstrated, and evaluated. Acquisition begins at the point when agency needs are established and includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency needs, solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contract financing, contract performance, contract administration, and those technical and management functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency needs by contract.

Since no appropriated funds are being used to acquire goods or services when an FPRP is being evaluated and negotiated, the process is not an “acquisition” as that term is used in the FAR. And since the process by which an FPRP is turned into a FPRA (or FPRR) is not an acquisition, you can’t apply the policies and procedures for evaluation of an acquisition to that process.

It doesn’t matter what FAR 15.404-1(a)(3) says because FAR 15.000 says it’s not applicable. The DOD IG’s position is illogical. It doesn’t parse. So right off the bat, we have a problem with the IG’s findings and recommendations.

Because the DOD IG starts off from an inapposite premise, its further discussions of the analysis of detailed “elements of cost” are worthless.

That didn’t stop the Director, DCMA, from concurring with them.

That’s right. Instead of pushing back, the Director of the Defense Contract Management Agency agreed with the DOD IG’s inapt reading of the FAR and the circular reasoning it used. According to the IG report, DCMA revised Instruction 130 to “address the requirement to perform cost analysis.” In addition, the revised Instruction “also includes the mandatory use of two checklists that were developed in order to incorporate the DoDIG findings: the FPRP Adequacy Checklist and the FPRA Review Checklist.”

2. According to the DOD IG, if DCMA ACOs would only “tailor” their requests for DCAA field pricing assistance, then DCAA could provide more timely and better input into the FPR negotiation process.

As the DOD IG noted, current DCMA policy establishes that FPRRs are to be established within 30 days of receipt of a contractor’s FPRP, and that FPRAs are to be established within 60 days of receipt. Those deadlines are—shall we say?—difficult to meet. Extremely difficult. When DCAA performs an audit of a contractor’s FPRP, those deadlines become impossible to meet.

According to the IG report, DCAA takes at least 163 days (5 months) to perform an audit of a FPRP, and its average turn-around time is 189 days (more than six months). (We note that the 2013 average of 189 days is up from the 2012 average of 177 days). Basically, any ACO that relies on DCAA for input into the FPRP evaluation process has just guaranteed that the agency deadlines will not be met. As a result—and as we’ve reported—DCMA has decided to move on without DCAA and has directed its ACOs to evaluate and negotiate Forward Pricing Rates without waiting for DCAA. That sounded like a pretty good decision to us.

Not so fast, according to the DOD IG.

According to the IG, the problem is not DCAA. The problem is DCMA ACOs. The ACOs are not “tailoring” their audit requests so as to permit DCAA to issue their audit reports in time to meet the DCMA deadlines. Use of tailored requests for field pricing assistance can also “help the ACO conduct cost analyses while obtaining the minimum essential supplementary information required for the job.”

We have long thought DCMA and, indeed, the DFARS and PGI, needed more guidance in the area of field pricing assistance. We told the DAR Council as much in the early days of the Proposal Adequacy Checklist. They didn’t listen to us. Accordingly, we can hardly take issue with a recommendation that guidance in that area is lacking.

Moreover, we tend to agree that ACOs should figure out where they want DCAA to help them out, and then ask for help in those areas and nowhere else. We don’t think “tailoring” the audit request will lead to audits being issued in 30 or even 60 days, but it couldn’t hurt.

The foundational premise is that DCAA will listen to the DCMA ACO and scope their audits just to the areas requested. We believe that’s a fairly large assumption. In our experience, DCAA auditors are very sensitive (or should be) to having their audit scopes “limited” or interfered with in any way. We are not optimistic that DCAA will accept the audit “tailoring” that the DOD IG advocates. This may well be a paper recommendation with little if any teeth.

In all honesty, we don’t think this recommendation is going to help, but we don’t think it’s going to hurt either. So why not go with it?

And that is the tack chosen by the Director, DCMA, in the response to the IG audit report. The report stated—

The Director, DCMA, concurred in principle. DCMA identified two obstacles that, in its opinion, could prevent implementation of FAR 15.404-2(a)(1) at this time. First, DCMA stated it cannot dictate or restrict the DCAA auditor’s scope and procedures. Second, the Director stated that DCAA will currently not agree to a tailored request if it needs to rely on work performed by DCMA. DCMA pointed out that it is conducting a pilot project involving the DCMA cost monitoring program to in part evaluate the feasibility of DCAA accepting a tailored audit request. DCMA stated it will amend its policy, as appropriate, based on the results of the pilot.

As we read the foregoing, it seems to say that DCAA cannot (or will not) rely on any cost analysis performed by DCMA. Consequently, DCAA has to perform the entirety of the audit steps its audit program calls for. As a result, DCAA will do what it wants and take as long as it needs. Until DCAA changes its policy, DCMA is stuck. DCMA needs to either wait for DCAA’s audit report or move ahead without DCAA.

Makes sense to us.

3. According to the DOD IG, the current DCMA record management policy does not require the ACO to document and include the cost analysis of contractor FPRPs in a “case file”. Similarly, the ACO is not required to retain information related to “the determination of fair and reasonable prices.” The standard Pre-Negotiation Memorandum (PNOM) does not require a reference to the cost analysis techniques and procedures performed by the ACO. And other similar stuff.

Well, assuming that a cost analysis had to be performed, it would obviously be nice to document and discuss the analytical techniques performed. Unfortunately for the DOD IG, the FAR does not require such cost analysis. So this is pretty much a very big moot point.

Regardless of our position, the Director, DCMA, concurred. DCMA Instruction 130 was revised to address the DOD IG’s concerns.

Why did the Director, DCMA, concur instead of pointing out what we pointed out?

It was probably the path of least resistance.

And so now DCMA ACOs have more work to do, work that is not required by the FAR, but is now required by DCMA Instruction 130.

Good luck with that.

 

Another Day in the Life: Federal Contract Fraud

E-mail Print PDF

Investigator
You may not have noticed, but we went through a period in which we chose not to report allegations of fraud by Federal contractors. They had gotten to be routine and we had become jaded.

Allegations were made; allegations were denied. Lawsuits were filed; lawsuits were settled. You could count on some new story coming out like clockwork. It had gotten passé. It had gotten boring. At least, we were bored with typing the same ol’ same ol’ song-and-dance routine—the by-now traditional Kabuki dance of defense attorneys and news reporters.

So we stopped for a while. We stopped reporting on such stories, unless there was something of interest or a larger lesson to be learned.

For instance, we did not report on the most recent allegations involving Northrop Grumman. You know, the ones where a 25-year company veteran alleged that test technicians “were instructed to manually type in ‘pass’ so [that finding] appear[ed] on [test] results after seeing that the navigation units typically failed the required tests.” As a result of the alleged direction to fake test results, Northrop Grumman allegedly supplied faulty LN-100 INS/GPS units to the military. The qui tam relator alleged that, by providing such faulty equipment at $60,000 to $100,000 per unit, Northrop Grumman violated the False Claims Act. The relator further alleged that he was demoted and retaliated against, because he complained about the falsified test results.

Ho hum. Just another allegation from another relator.

Which is not to say that the allegations don’t have merit. As we’ve written before, it is foolish to simply dismiss every allegation as lacking merit and coming from disgruntled employees. In this case, we don’t know. The validity of the allegations may be determined (at least roughly) based on any settlement the company enters into with the DOJ. The bigger the settlement, the more we can say there was merit to the initial allegations.

Why? Because companies are for-profit businesses. They settle when it makes business sense to settle; otherwise, they lawyer-up and litigate. When you see a double-digit million dollar settlement, you can say (generally) that the company did the cost/benefit/risk analysis and decided to cut its losses.

With that rule of thumb in mind, what do you make of this DOJ press release?

It reported that DRS Technical Services had agreed to a $13.7 million FCA settlement related to allegations that it “knowingly overbilling the government for work performed by DRS personnel who lacked the job qualifications required by the contract.” The allegations concerned a couple of T&M type contracts received by DRS and its subsidiaries.

As you know, we’ve preached the risks associated with T&M contracts before. It’s no surprise that auditors are looking into employee qualifications to see whether they are being billed at appropriate contractual hourly rates. DRS was willing to settle its case for $13.7 million.

We will have to see what Northrop Grumman does.

And while those two cases were being reported, the DOJ also announced that The Boeing Company had agreed to pay $23 million to resolve FCA allegations that the company “knowingly and improperly billed a variety of labor costs in violation of applicable contract requirements, including for time its mechanics spent at meetings not directly related to the contracts.” The DOJ press release reported that “The government alleged that Boeing improperly charged labor costs under contracts with the Air Force for the maintenance and repair of C-17 Globemaster aircraft at Boeing’s Aerospace Support Center in San Antonio, Texas.”

So in one week we have two FCA settlements to resolve allegations, and another set of FCA allegations that may or may not lead to a settlement.

In the meantime, just another day in the life of government contracting.

 

Why Companies are Reluctant to Contract with the Defense Department

E-mail Print PDF

Competition is good, and so is innovation. Having more contractors willing to sell to the Pentagon addresses both of those goods. Having more “non-traditional” contractors willing to sell to the Pentagon is even better. Consequently, most policymakers want to see what can be done to attract those non-traditional companies to the defense industrial base.

DOD leadership has been focusing on innovation in order to “maintain military superiority,” according to this story by The Washington Post. In fact, Mr. Frank Kendall, USD (AT&L) has announced that he is dedicating “Better Buying Power 3.0” to “innovation, technical excellence, and speed,” according to the story. Readers may recall that previous incarnations of BBP focused on reducing DOD bureaucracy and increasing supplier efficiency. Previous BBP initiatives focused on reducing suppliers’ costs, among other things. (It’s not like this blog hasn’t provided detail upon detail of those previous BBP foci. The site’s keyword search feature is your friend.) Today’s BBP is about innovation, because (according to Kendall’s quoted speech) “We cannot assume, as we did in the 1950s and ’70s, that the Department of Defense will be the sole source of key breakthrough technologies.”

So innovation is the current area of focus, and it is believed that innovation can best be found in the non-traditional technology companies. It is felt that the DOD is too bureaucratic, too moribund, to drive disruptive technology breakthroughs. (We’ve written about that before, as well.)

The RAND Corporation tackled the subject via one of its Federally-funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs). As part of its analysis, it interviewed representatives from 16 non-traditional suppliers in three industries “where DoD indicated that it wants to seek substantial innovation from nontraditional suppliers.” It also interviewed three DoD staff members who dealt with such companies.

It recently published its results.

It cited four commonly heard complaints with the DOD business environment. Those were—

  • a lack of access to and communication from DoD

  • an extensive, complex, and inefficient bid and selection process

  • administration and management of contracts that created extra work and delays

  • a lengthy funding time line and final payments that often also involved delays and gaps.

With respect to management and administration of contracts, the RAND study reported—

Our interviewees noted particular problems with contract management by the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) or the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). Correcting errors, whether by DoD or the contractor, could be extremely difficult, and critical errors affecting the scope of work or payment could take months or even years to fix if contract management had shifted from the original contracting officer to DCMA. Similarly, final contract payments could reportedly be stalled for years because of large DCAA backlogs.

(Emphasis added.)

To address those perceived barriers, the RAND authors recommended (among other actions), “reducing backlogs at DCMA and DCAA, noting the chances of project cancellation, and adopting best commercial procurement practices or even those used in state and local governments, which tend to be far less cumbersome.”

Sure.

You might want to call those recommendations “innovation in contract management.” Except there’s nothing at all innovative about them. We’ve heard it all before, haven’t we?

Whether it’s Mr. Kendall pleading for tech companies to invest their own funds to create disruptive technologies that can be transferred to the U.S. military, or it’s the RAND folks recommending the adoption of “best commercial practices,” we’ve heard all this before.

Remember “acquisition reform” under President Clinton? Remember the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) and FARA and IMTRA? Remember Kelman’s acquisition revolution? Remember “reinventing government” and “a government that works better and costs less”? Remember all that?

Because we do.

We remember it was driven by a perception that DOD had fallen behind Silicon Valley, that this newfangled Internet thingee was going to revolutionize the way the Federal government did business—if only we could convince the Federal government employees to use it.

Yeah. Mr. Kendall? Sir? Been there; done that.

In fact, the notion of abandoning bureaucratic and moribund Pentagon acquisition practices in favor of “best commercial practices’ has a long, honored pedigree. For example, the Manhattan Project used it in World War II (“Operation Silverplate”). You can go back farther than that, if you’d like to.

Allow us to quote—

Three points stand out prominently … The first is that the established system of doing business in the War and Navy Departments broke down early in the war. The second is that the civilians, expert and inexpert, who attempted to carry on business which properly belonged to the departments, where they succeeded at all in doing better than the departments themselves, did so usually by violation of the law—the very law which, in large measure, prevented the departments from doing as well as the civilians did. The third is that it was found necessary to replace a bureaucratic order with the more elastic and freer methods of private business.

We quote, of course from the Editor’s Preface to Preliminary Economic Studies of the War: Government War Contracts, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It was published in 1920. That was very close to one hundred years ago.

It’s actually a very interesting book. It explained the advantages of using Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee contracts instead of CPFF types. It discussed how the Supply Bureau perpetuated and enhanced competition during wartime. It discussed how contract changes and modifications were handled. And tt shows just how little has changed in the past 95 years of defense acquisition, despite initiative after initiative, study after study, and at least three separate incarnations of Better Buying Power.

We particularly like this quote summarizing the Navy’s approach to cost-control in a cost-reimbursement manufacturing environment: “The accounting organization has been imbued with the idea that a way must always be found to prevent the waste of the government’s money without interfering with the expeditious prosecution of the work.” That was the approach taken in World War I.

Where did the Pentagon fall away from that foundational principle and, instead, let the auditors take control?

How did we reach a point where companies with something to offer the Defense Department would rather not sell to the DOD because they don’t want to deal with audit backlogs and stalled final delivery payments?

We learned lessons in World War I. We learned them again in World War II. We learned them in Korea, in Vietnam, and in the first Gulf War.

Now, apparently, we are learning them again.

 

CH2M Hill Sues DynCorp

E-mail Print PDF

Readers know that DynCorp has had a number of recent challenges. As The Washington Post reported, “The McLean-based defense contractor has been cited for labor violations by the Defense Department inspector general, seen sales drop by more than 30 percent and replaced its chief executive twice in one month.” As we have reported here, it has been alleged that DynCorp overcharged its prime contractor, Northrop Grumman, as much as $100 million. Recently, the company lost its recompetes for two large Defense Intelligence Agency support contracts estimated to be worth as much as $71 million.

It’s been a “challenging” year for DynCorp.

On top of the other challenges faced by the contractor, it is now being reported that one of its subcontractors, CH2M Hill, has filed suit against it. The CH2M Hill suit “claims that DynCorp did not pay CH2M Hill its fair share of profits on the contract over the last two years, a total of $26 million, according to the company.” According to WaPo,”The two companies have been partners on the Army contract [in Afghanistan] since 2007.” We suspect that unnamed Army contract is LOGCAP IV. The LOGCAP contracts are generally to provide logistical support to military services stationed around the world.

Apparently, DynCorp and CH2M Hill have some sort of contractual arrangement that included profit-sharing, since WaPo reported that CH2M wanted “its fair share of profits”—profits which, presumably would be calculated on a basis other than costs incurred by CH2M Hill.

For its part, DynCorp disputes the claim.

WaPo reported, “DynCorp says it owes the company only $12 million, and made one payment of $6.3 million toward that end earlier this year.” Hmm. That seems kind of strange. If CH2M was owed $12 million, then why would only a partial payment have been made? And if DynCorp admits that it owes CH2M some amount of money, then why did WaPo report that “in June, DynCorp sent CH2M a letter saying it did not owe the company any money, according to the suit.” Either DynCorp did not owe CH2M any money, in which case no payment would have been made at all, or else DynCorp did owe CH2M Hill, in which case why would a letter have been sent denying that any money was owed? Strange ….

Effective subcontractor management is, fundamentally, relationship management. It is seeking to align the potentially disparate interests of two individual firms. It is attempting to defuse what can too easily be an adversarial relationship by finding common ground and an alignment of interests.

Unfortunately too many attorneys, and too many program managers, and too many contract managers, believe their job is to solely represent the interests of their own company at the expense of the other company. They see a zero-sum game in which they can “win” by forcing the other guy to “lose”. We see this bias emerge when metrics such as “savings through negotiation” are reported, as if saving money at the expense of program execution was an acceptable trade-off.

It’s not an acceptable trade-off.

Focus on self-interest at the expense of the group interest leads to strained relationships; it leads to sub-optimal decision-making; it harms program execution and impacts contractual outcomes. Self-interest creates an adversarial relationship instead of an aligned relationship. We have seen self-interest scuttle the best interests of the program, over and over and over again. So think about that the next time you want to force your key subcontractor to accept something it really doesn’t want to accept.

For CH2M Hill and DynCorp, it is too late to fix the relationship. The lawyers are now running the show, at (let us guess) $750 per hour. Who knows who’s right and who’s in the wrong? At this point, all we know is that the two parties are now mired in the lengthy, resource-consuming, expensive, adversarial legal process.

The situation has to be difficult. It has to be hard to execute well when you are in court. We suspect the situation is much more than a distraction. It’s probably more in the nature of a pre-divorce argument. You know, the kind in which the two parties retire to separate rooms in which to cry and sulk, and meanwhile the injury just festers and grows. Nobody is happy … except the lawyers.

Meanwhile, in the midst of these distractions, we have to ask: Are the service men and women of the US Army receiving the best efforts of their LOGCAP IV contractors?

 

Did Taxpayers Fund Climate Research Institute’s Christmas Party?

E-mail Print PDF

Climate_Change_Conspiracy
From the Fort Wayne Journal Gazette comes a story about NEON (National Ecological Observatory Network), a Colorado-based not-for-profit (NFP) who may have used grant funds received from the National Science Foundation (NSF) to fund unallowable expenses. According to the story, the alleged unallowable expenses included “$112,000 for lobbying, $25,000 for an office Christmas party and $11,000 for ‘premium coffee services’ and an unspecific amount on French hotels.”

Interesting. We did not realize that French hotels were unallowable.

For that matter, we did not see the Cost Principle that made coffee service unallowable. Perhaps regular coffee service is allowable, whereas “premium” coffee service (whatever that may be) is unallowable?

As we said: Interesting.

The story of how this alleged newstory came to national attention is also interesting

About NEON. “NEON is a continental-scale observatory that measures the causes and effects of climate change, land use change and invasive species on U.S. ecosystems.” Some people – notably some U.S. politicians who have conservative points of view – tend to look askance at scientists and entities that may be spending taxpayer funds pushing an agenda that promotes the notion that global warming is caused in significant part by the impacts of humanity on the ecosystem. In this case, two Republican U.S. Senators, (Grassley and Rand) wrote a letter to NEON in early September, 2014, expressing their concerns with the NFP’s use of taxpayer dollars to fund “meals, entertainment and travel that is not part of official business, which is paid from or attributable to a federal grant.” The Senators expressed concerns about the NSF’s management of its grant funds, “since documents show that the foundation was aware of the expenses and paid them.”

The Washington Post also reported the story as well. WaPo noted, “The [two] senators are now asking NEON and the foundation for correspondence between them related to the reimbursed expenditures, the justification for using taxpayer funds for the expenses and details about the nonprofit group’s lobbying efforts.”

But how did the two Senators come across this story? According to the sources (links above), a DCAA auditor brought the matter to the Senators’ attention because he was concerned that his management was going to engage in a “whitewash” by overriding his findings and approving the costs. Indeed, the DCAA confirmed that intention. The articles reported –

From 2009 to 2013, NEON classified all the expenses that Grassley and Paul are questioning as a ‘management fee.’ Internal documents show that the NSF was told by NEON that it was having a difficult time covering the costs because it had little in the way of private funds. …

‘Government regulations put no restrictions on the company’s use of this fee,’ [DCAA] said in its prepared statement. ‘Because Government regulations put no restrictions on management fee expenditures, it is inappropriate for DCAA to disallow those costs.’ A fee is supposed to cover the costs of managing a contract or a cooperative agreement with a government agency, and it is typically is less than 1 percent of an organization’s budget, records show.

So NEON needed to use some of the NSF grant funds to cover its operating expenses. The auditor objected to some of those operating expenses, because they were either expressly unallowable or because they were unrelated to the purpose of the grant. For its part, NSF was aware that NEON priced in a “management fee” (aka profit or fee) into its grant requests in order to cover such expenses, and NSF knew and approved of the practice.

Note that this is yet another case of a draft, unissued, DCAA audit report ending-up in the hands of politicians. KBR knows of this unfortunate and possibly unlawful practice all too well, having been the victim of it more than once.

For its part, NEON disputed the audit findings and issued its own statement, in which its Chairman stated, NEON “has spent all funding in strict compliance with our understanding of the guidelines provided” and that the records requested by the two Senators would be provided.

The basic question, as we see it, is whether a grant recipient can add an additional cost to its grant request in order to cover certain unallowable operating expenses. (Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the expenses cited by the Senators were unallowable.) In the commercial world, entities are expect to cover their unallowable expenses from the fee or profit they add to their total costs. So the question is whether NEON’s “management fee” adder accomplished the same thing.

Apparently, according to the NSF (who issued the grant) and to DCAA (which audited expenditures associated with the grant), the answer to the question is “yes.” The two Senators believe they know better, and apparently believe there is some kind of conspiracy going on to ignore how NSF grant recipients spend the management fee adder.

Kind of like the conspiracy that many believe is involved with climate change. A column in USA Today (link in previous sentence) asserted that –

… the idea that climate scientists are using global warming alarmism as a means to feather their own nests is common among climate change denialists. This view seems to be based on the idea that there is an immense amount of grant money available to scientists who perpetuate the ‘hoax,’ that this grant money makes these scientists rich, and that this incredibly corrupt and dishonest group of people has decided that this is a more lucrative path than, say, convincing the billionaire Koch brothers, who have spent a lot of money supporting climate change denialism, to put them on their payroll to take the opposite position.

The author of that column asserted that “This is an unlikely scenario.” Your mileage may vary. But regardless of your position on the conspiracy (or on the science) involved in climate change and global warming, it seems clear that the (inherent) conspiracy between NSF, DCAA and NEON to misuse grant funds intended to measure climate change would fit nicely into the point of view that already sees a conspiracy in place. It just means the conspiracy would include a few more conspirators.

Unfortunately for those who see a conspiracy intended to hide misuse of taxpayer funds, the OMB Circulars and NSF grant rules and applicable Cost Principles will provide a more black-and-white answer. Indeed, the official position of the Defense Contract Audit Agency seems to already have provided that black-and-white answer, despite the protestations of a couple of Republican Senators.

Government contract cost accounting and compliance with applicable statutes, regulations, and rules ain’t rocket science.

 


Page 125 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.