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Apogee Consulting Inc

New SECDEF Faces Tough Challenges

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A recent analysis piece at Law360 carried the headline, “New Defense Chief Faces Tough To-Do List.” The piece starts out: “With speculation rising over who will succeed Chuck Hagel as the next defense secretary, experts say the ultimate nominee must know the Pentagon inside and out, as well as be a skillful political operator, to tackle the threats posed by both sequestration and the terrorist group the Islamic State.” And that’s all we can see because the rest of the analysis is hidden behind an expensive paywall.

The rest of the analysis may address other challenges faced by the new Secretary of Defense, or maybe it goes into more detail regarding the initial list of challenges. We don’t know because the rest of the analysis is hidden. But we think the incoming SECDEF has other challenges that lie between the two edges of extremism defined by the article (Congress and ISIS). We would like to assert that, at a minimum, the spectrum of challenges needs to be defined by a triangle instead of a line. The triangle would be defined by Congress, parastatial terrorism … and the defense industrial base. We believe the incoming SECDEF needs to be worrying about how to repair the damage caused by nearly a decade of the adversarial relationship between the Pentagon and its contractors.

We were reminded of this third dimension of challenge when we read Sanda Erwin’s recent article in the National Defense Magazine – the official publication of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA). Her article, entitled, “Despite Contracting Reforms, Pentagon Seen as Unfriendly to Business.” We would have called it, “BECAUSE OF Contracting Reforms, Pentagon Seen as Unfriendly to Business,” but maybe that’s just us. Regardless of the best choice for title, we agree with Ms. Erwin that the Pentagon is perceived as being unfriendly to business. We think that’s one of the incoming SECDEF’s biggest challenges, right up there with Congressional extremism and the threat of parastatial terrorism.

We’ve written about the adversarial nature of the relationship between the Pentagon and its industrial base before. Recently we explored a RAND study that listed reasons why non-traditional defense contractors are reluctant to do business with the DOD. In another article, we discussed another Erwin article, and explored why the Pentagon desperately needed those non-traditional defense contractors to do business with it. In yet another article we wrote: “The marriage between DOD and its contractors is, seemingly, headed for a divorce. And like every divorce we’ve ever heard about, at the end of the day, the only winners are going to be the lawyers.”

So this concern about the Pentagon and its contractors is nothing new. What is new is the growing recognition that it’s a problem that needs to be solved. And apparently, only the SECDEF can solve it.

Ms. Erwin wrote—

Pentagon officials have been emphatic about ‘lowering the barriers’ to potential vendors -- especially those on the cutting edge of technology -- in order to spur competition in a market dominated by big conglomerates. But the private sector is skeptical. Industry executives say they appreciate the Pentagon's initiatives but so far see them as empty rhetoric. … executives contend that Kendall's initiative is not enough to counter a deeply entrenched bureaucratic resistance to doing business differently. They argue that Pentagon buyers are rewarded for squeezing profits out of contractors and make unreasonable demands for companies' intellectual property. Unless conditions change, executives say, the Pentagon will continue to have trouble wooing high-tech vendors that could far more easily sell their products in mainstream commercial markets.

Ms. Erwin related a “lively” exchange between the Hon. Frank Kendall (USD, AT&L) and Dov Zakhiem (former Pentagon Controller), wherein Mr. Zakheim “accused the Defense Department of being antagonistic toward industry profits.” Mr. Kendall disagreed with the accusation, as expected. Mr. Kendall is, of course, the current cheerleader for the series of reforms and initiatives called “Better Buying Power,” which has noble aims and (we think) mixed results. As we have asserted before, the set of initiatives is based on the fundamental precept that the only way for the Pentagon to live within its diminishing budget is to squeeze more costs out of the industrial base. While doing more with less is obviously one goal that needs to be accomplished, other goals should not be forgotten. Among the other goals should be to reduce the DOD’s bloated overhead and its military service personnel costs.

Putting the primary focus on reducing contractors’ costs could lead to the other necessary goals receiving less attention than they deserve. In a similar manner, nominating a new SECDEF who is an expert on Congressional relations and understands how to deal with terrorist threats tends to miss the importance of solving the relationship issues with the DOD industrial base.

Ms. Erwin’s article cited a recent study by The Lexington Institute entitled, “Rethinking Competition in Defense Acquisition.” That study explored the Obama Administration’s belief that competition in defense acquisition is a good thing, and that competition leads to better goods and services at lower prices. As The Lexington Study asserted—

The defense department correctly asserts that competition is a powerful tool for achieving cost effective acquisition. It knows also that competition can encourage research and innovation; new services, products and uses; and increase quality, reliability and performance from suppliers. But these benefits depend on a market sufficiently appealing to attract more than one bidder.

In other words, the study asserted that increasing competition is difficult when there is only one, or perhaps two, bidders. For example, competitions to build new nuclear submarines and nuclear aircraft carriers are not going to see a lot of bidders. In fact, there is a de facto sharing agreement between the two contractors that can build new submarines, because the Pentagon needs to perpetuate the façade that the two shipyards compete with each other for new work. Thus, the notion that competition will lead to better acquisition outcomes fails with respect to many of the largest and most complex acquisitions.

But The Lexington Institute Study goes beyond that initial assertion to lay out the reasons why the Pentagon can’t achieve robust competition in many of its acquisitions. The study stated—

Kendall attributes the decline primarily to decreasing defense budgets and fewer competitive opportunities, but it is more clearly DoD’s own acquisition policies that too often fail to attract bidders. The Defense Business Board (DBB) observed that ‘DoD lacks sufficient understanding of business operating models and drivers of innovation.” DoD consistently fails to appreciate the connection between policy, DoD buyer behavior, and results. Predictably, competition rates continue to fall.

DoD’s approach continues to be self-centered – focusing on internal metrics, and establishing and enforcing policy. DoD’s mantra for competition fails to consider RAND’s conclusion that ‘In some cases (especially in the procurement of major systems where the nonrecurring cost is large), it may be less costly for the government to forgo competition and to rely on a single supplier.’ Competition takes time, and since in the defense acquisition monopsony, government is the only important buyer, and usually must fund the development of all potential entries in a competition, it is not at all clear that competition saves money when nonrecurring costs are high or production runs are low. Even so, competition can serve other objectives such as keeping critical design teams and research in place to ensure a healthy industrial base, and a viable pool for future critical acquisition needs.

[Emphasis added.]

We agree with The Lexington Institute’s assertion that there is a link between DOD acquisition policy and the willingness of non-traditional defense contractors to compete for new opportunities. Until the Pentagon rethinks its adversarial approach to managing its contractors, it is not going to see a lot of new bidders. And as a result, it is not going to see the kind of disruptive technology it says it needs to maintain the technological edge our warfighters currently enjoy.

We need a new Secretary of Defense who gets that the relationship needs to be that of a partnership, and not that of a married couple sticking together for the sake of their children, even though they’d rather be somewhere else, away from each other.

 

The CDA Statute of Limitations: Looking for a Bright Line

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As we see it, there are two types of people who help contractors comply with various FAR and CAS compliance challenges.

The first type is comprised of those folks who started in Contracts or perhaps even Law. They understand the legal ramifications of a contract: offer, acceptance, consideration, etc. They have read several Cibinic & Nash books, and they might even subscribe to the newsletter. The have read Restatement (2nd) of Contracts and have a good familiarity with the Uniform Commercial Code. They understand the legal ramifications of new judicial decisions, including when a decision is precedential and when it is not. But they tend to struggle with the accounting aspects of compliance. They don’t really like cost accounting. They don’t understand the nuances of revenue recognition. The interplay between balance sheet and income/expense statement is lost on them. They understand the legal decisions interpreting the Cost Accounting Standards – and they can probably quote from them – but how the Standards work in real life, in an accounting system or ERP system, is a mystery.

They know the theory cold, but the practical application is largely an unknown realm.

The second type of compliance people are the accountants. They are numbers people, at home inside complex spreadsheets populated with data pulled from detailed queries. Maybe they started out as auditors, at DCAA or in a public accounting firm. Maybe they started out as junior analysts in a contractor’s accounting department and graduated into audit liaison positions. At some point, they either prepared a final billing rate proposal or audited one. They understand the FAR Cost Principles cold. They’ve read the DCAA Contract Audit Manual cover-to-cover; they have a good familiarity with the audit programs as well as the latest MRD’s. They may not understand the legal decisions interpreting CAS, but they understand how the accounting system works and can demonstrate compliance. They understand the contractor’s financial statements and how cost accounting works. They have a firm grasp of details within the realm of audit and accounting, but legal decisions are far outside their purview. They take direction from above, trusting that the direction is the result of consultation with legal counsel.

They know the practical application of GAAP and FAR and CAS as those rules are actually applied in day-to-day accounting transactions, but the legal theories and judicial interpretations are largely an unknown realm.

There are a few people who straddle both worlds (Tom Lemmer of Mckenna Long & Aldridge, and Lou Rosen, formerly of Ernst & Young, come to mind). But they are few and far between.

This is a problem.

In order to be a good government contract compliance manager, you have to actually straddle both worlds. You have to have a solid grasp of the accounting transactions and the rules of GAAP, FAR and CAS. You have to understand the CAM and read the latest MRDs. In addition, you have to keep up on legal decisions that affect government contract compliance. You have to read ASBCA decisions and Court of Federal Claims decisions, and you have to keep an ear to the ground to listen for rumblings of how the Federal Circuit may have affirmed or overturned those decisions on appeal. You don’t have to be a lawyer but you have to be able to read through legal decisions – or at least subscribe to newsletters and bulletins and client alerts wherein lawyers translate those decisions into laypersons’ terms. You have to have one foot in several different camps: you have to be a little bit lawyer and a little bit accountant and a little bit auditor.

Successful compliance folks figure out how to pull-off that balancing trick. The unsuccessful ones focus on, and specialize in, one domain while remaining ignorant of the others. They may be the world’s greatest accountants or the world’s greatest internal auditors, but if they don’t at least dabble in the legal world, they don’t have all the pieces they need to put together a solid compliance system and defend that system to external auditors. Whether you are a DCAA auditor or a DCMA Contracting Officer or a contractor audit liaison, financial analyst or accountant, if all you do is worry about the accounting, you are missing a big piece of the puzzle.

Chances are, if you are ignoring the legal decisions, you are missing the most important aspect of government contract cost accounting and compliance.

It’s an unalterable fact of life that the FAR and CAS are just words, subject to multiple interpretations and disputes – until a judge or group of judges agree on a specific interpretation and meaning of those words, and that interpretation is affirmed on appeal. That interpretation, as “blessed” by an Appellate Court, creates a “bright line” that the rest of us use to establish our compliance baselines. Until we get a precedential legal decision or an affirmed decision, all we have is speculation about what the words mean. And your speculation is pretty much just as good as anybody else’s speculation.

Since we are all just guessing and speculating and making individual interpretations of what the rules require, we are likely to disagree with each other. For instance, DCAA is likely to base its audit findings and Form 1 disallowances on its agency’s interpretation of the words, which is probably not going to be super helpful to the average government contractor. DCMA Contracting Officers are going to follow their agency’s direction and their Guidebook, which are both just another interpretation. Contractors are going to interpret things as permissively as possible, focusing on creating ambiguity, so as to maximize allowability and cost recovery. Everybody’s got their interpretation of the words, and those interpretations vary. That’s just what happens when there is no “bright line” and we all have to make it up as we go along.

Multiple interpretations and differing agendas lead to disputes. And while the FAR clearly says those disputes should be resolved without resorting to litigation whenever possible, the sad truth is that it rarely happens these days—or, at least, it happens a lot less frequently than it used to. Consequently, we have a lot of disputes that require a lot of attorneys and a lot of unallowable legal fees. DCMA is jammed with Contracting Officer Final Decisions and the Courts are jammed with contractor appeals thereof.

All because we don’t have a “bright line” to guide us.

Which leads us, inexorably, to yet another discussion of the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations.

The CDA Statute of Limitations (SoL) has been a frequent topic of discussion on this website. It’s been a frequent topic of discussion because the law is “evolving” and we still don’t have a “bright line” to guide the contracting (and litigating) parties. Writing as a non-lawyer, we are still looking for clear guidance so that we can properly advise our clients. It still doesn’t exist.

Some of the problem stems from differing opinions by the Judges of the Court of Federal Claims and the Judges of the ASBCA. Some of the problem stems from the fact that the Judges of the Court of Federal Claims don’t have to follow each others’ opinions as being precedential. Some of the problem stems from the fact that the Judges of the ASBCA don’t have to follow each others’ opinions as being precedential. Some of the problem stems from the fact that the ASBCA Judges don’t need to treat CoFC decisions as being precedential, and vice versa. Some of the problem stems from the fact that few CDA SoL cases have made it to the Court of Appeals.

There’s plenty of blame to spread around but, regardless of who’s at fault, the current situation is difficult to navigate.

A great example of the lack of “bright line” comes from comparing two ASBCA decisions.

The first case is one we’ve written about before: Raytheon Missile Systems, ASBCA No. 58011, issued in January, 2013. In that decision, Judge Menick dismissed the Government’s claim for the impact of a CAS noncompliance as being “untimely and … therefore invalid.” Judge Melnick found that “The events fixing liability should have been known when they occurred unless then can be reasonably found to have been either concealed or ‘inherently unknowable’ at that time.” Notice that the Judge focused on the events themselves rather than on knowledge of damages. As we’ve written, we believe that is the proper interpretation of the FAR’s definition of claim accrual. We agree with Judge Melnick’s decision that “claim accrual does not turn upon what a party subjectively understood; it objectively turns on what facts are reasonably knowable.”

Judge Melnick wrote –

Accrual of a contracting party's claim is not suspended until it performs an audit or other financial analysis to determine the amount of its damages. … Damages need not have actually been calculated for a claim to accrue. … The fact of an injury must simply be knowable. … The fact the government waited until 2006 to declare in an audit report that these earlier materials provided that notice is irrelevant. Delay by a contracting party assessing the information available to it does not suspend the accrual of its claim.

Based on that decision, as well as the decisions in two other Raytheon appeals (ASBCA Nos. 57576 and 57679, December, 2012), we thought the ASBCA was moving toward the kind of “bright line” guidance that the contracting parties could use in resolving disputes and potential disputes, without the need to resort to litigation. We were feeling pretty good about things.

Not so fast there, bucko.

ASBCA Judge McIlmail, ruling in the appeals of Combat Support Associates (ASBCA Nos. 58945 and 58946, October, 2014), kind of bent that nascent “bright line” back into an ebon opaqueness. Key findings of fact included the following –

  • CSA submitted its FY 2006 proposal to establish final billing rates (“incurred cost submission” or “ICS”) on August 30, 2007. Well, the ICS was actually submitted earlier than that, but on May 10, 2007, DCAA requested some additional information, including Schedule T. That revised Schedule T was submitted on May 20, 2007.

  • However, on August 25, 2007, CSA submitted “revised Schedules A and B of its ICS.” We don’t know why and Judge McIlmail didn’t say.

  • Sometime after those dates, DCAA conducted its audit. We don’t know when the audit started. But we do know that on June 17, 2013, the DCAA issued its audit report. About two months later, on August 23, 2013, the ACO issued two final decisions (COFDs) – “one demanding that appellant pay the government $332,167 in disallowed direct costs … and the other disallowing indirect costs and unilaterally determining appellant's indirect cost rates for FY 2006.”

According to the Judge –

The ACO's payment demand consist[ed] of two categories of disallowed direct costs: (1) $308,889 in equipment costs, and (2) $23,278 in telephone and fax expenses. The ACO disallowed and demanded repayment of $164,008 of the equipment costs because [s/he] determined that appellant had failed to provide documentation that justified the purchase of Caterpillar equipment from Winner International Trading Company (Winner), as opposed to from whom the ACO identified as the sole authorized distributor of Caterpillar equipment in Kuwait in FY 2006, Mohamed Adulrahman Al-Bahar. The amount disallowed was the difference in price between the two suppliers. The ACO disallowed and demanded repayment of $144,881 of the equipment costs because it determined that appellant had failed to provide documentation that justified ‘the selection of Volvo Motor Road Grader rather than the lowest bidder supplier’.

[Internal citations omitted.]

CSA Moved for Summary Judgment, based on the fact that the COFD was issued more than six years after submission of its ICS. As Judge McIlmail wrote, “Given the CDA's six-year limitation, to be timely, the government's 23 August 2013 claims must have accrued on or after 23 August 2007.” The Judge ruled that the government’s claims were timely, because "the supporting data related to those costs identified in the two (2) Government contracting officer final decisions dated August 23, 2013 was not provided to the auditors until after August 23, 2007" (which was the testimony of the DCAA Supervisory Auditor).

Judge McIlmail based his decision on the fact that the information in CSA’s final billing rate proposal was insufficient to put the government on notice that CSA had incurred the costs that were eventually disallowed. He wrote –

Appellant replies that a contractor is not required to submit supporting data with an ICS. That misses the point. The issue raised by appellant's motion is when the government knew or should have known of its claims; not whether the ICS satisfied the requirements for an ICS. Upon the record currently before the Board, the government has established that it knew or had reason to know of its claims only after 23 August 2007, upon appellant's submission of the ‘supporting data’ from which the government learned, or had reason to learn, of its claims.

Well, now we seem to be back to square one.

Hey, we’re not attorneys! Our thoughts and feelings and beliefs are worthless. You should ignore them! On the other hand, we’re not practicing law here; we’re writing a blog article – one that is supposed to express a point of view.

And our point of view is that this decision is a step backwards.

According to the logic in this decision, the government cannot know of an injury until a DCAA auditor requests some magic, unidentified and nonregulatory, “supporting documentation” and reviews it. Then and only then, does the CDA SoL clock start to tick. Based on this logic, the government can delay the clock from starting, simply by delaying the start of its audit. If the auditors never request supporting data – or never get around to reviewing it – then then the clock never starts to tick.

That position, in our layperson’s mind, is ridiculous.

Regardless of our thoughts and feelings and beliefs about the decision, it does illustrate how different illustrious Judges of the same contract dispute forum reach different conclusions using different logic. And it does illustrate how frustrating it is to try to discern a “bright line” regarding when a claim accrues under the Contract Disputes Act. Because different Judges have different measuring sticks, the contracting parties are left in the dark, wondering when they can breathe easy because the CDA SoL has expired and the time for successful litigation has passed.

We need a bright line here and, so far, the contract disputes fora have failed to provide it—which is a shame, because the uncertainty leads to litigation, whereas knowledge certain would (presumably) lead to negotiated resolutions without the need to litigate.

Speaking as taxpayers first and as contract compliance practitioners second, let’s get this situation fixed, please.

 

 

Contracting for Audit Services

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A recent poster on Bob Antonio’s supremely excellent website for all things related to government contracting asked, “Can a private firm or [independent] CPA audit, and find acceptable, an accounting system of a prospective federal contractor?”

Discussion followed, in which other posters explored whether an audit of a contractor’s costs or a contractor’s “business systems” would be an inherently governmental function or, even if not inherently governmental, whether that role was reserved exclusively for DCAA to perform with respect to DOD contracts. It was noted that non-DOD agencies might ask DCAA to perform such audits on a reimbursable basis, or perhaps have the agency Inspector General perform them. In some cases, prime contractors perform audits and/or reviews of their subcontractors, and only use DCAA (or other agency auditors) as a last resort, when the subcontractor objects to opening its books to the prime’s auditors. One poster noted that, as an independent CPA, s/he had been performing contract audits “for Primes and one Agency for approximately 12 years.” Apparently there had been no objection to having an outside entity audit a contractor’s costs during that long period.

Based on the various posts, the answer to the original question posed on the website discussion forum was “YES”. There is nothing in the FAR or DFARS or DOD policy that mandates all audits of contractor costs and reviews of contractor systems must be reserved solely and exclusively for DCAA to perform. Which is a good thing because, as we’ve noted before, DCAA is in over its head and it can’t get its audit workload performed timely.

In recognition of the hole that DCAA has dug for itself (and by extension for the rest of the Defense Department acquisition workforce), the DAR Council recently proposed a significant revision to the performance of business system reviews. While many commenters criticized the proposed rule (and for excellent reasons), there was a tacit recognition that something needs to be done. The current business system management regime, which relies on DCAA reviews of three of the six contractor business systems (as well as timely follow-up audits to evaluate the efficacy of contractor corrective action plans submitted in response to DCAA audit findings) is not working. The defense acquisition system is not functioning and the situation is getting worse instead of better.

Even though DCAA has been methodically reducing its audit workload for several years, primarily by foisting the workload onto the backs of DCMA Contracting Officers, the DOD audit agency is still hobbled by a ginormous audit backlog, by ridiculously burdensome bureaucratic audit procedures, and by a largely demoralized staff.1 It is almost inarguable that, despite all reforms undertaken by DCAA in the past five years, audits are still too slow and do not give Contracting Officers much (if anything) of value to use in negotiations with contractors.

In response, the DAR Council has proposed revisions to the DFARS to address gaps in the business system oversight process, and DCMA has implemented revisions to when it requests (and how it uses) DCAA audits to support its contracting objectives. We believe it’s clear: the Defense Department is preparing to move on without DCAA. The Pentagon is preparing to conduct contract audits and business system reviews by entities other than DCAA.

In addition, as Darrell Oyer noted in his recent newsletter, the Department of Defense has already loosened the tight hold DCAA has had on contract audits, and has given Contracting Officers more discretion to use outside CPA firms to perform the audits once reserved exclusively for DCAA. On October 16, 2014, DOD Instruction 7600.02 (“Audit Policies”) was revised by the DOD Office of the Inspector General. The new DODI stated –

The DoD Components will contract for audit services when applicable expertise is unavailable within the DoD audit organization, augmentation of the DoD audit organization’s audit staff is necessary to execute the annual audit plan, or temporary audit assistance is required to meet audit reporting requirements mandated by law or a DoD issuance. Such contracts must comply with section 237.270 of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement.

The SOWs associated with procuring outside contract audit services must be reviewed by the OIG. But as we interpret the Instruction, the results of that review may not matter. In other words, our reading of the DODI is that while the OIG must review the proposed SOW, and that the OIG may make recommendations regarding that SOW, the Component does not have to accept the OIG recommendation.

In addition, the DODI stated—

The OAIG APO may give a DoD Component audit organization authorization to contract for multiple, similar audits, provided that the requesting agency presents sufficient justification. Once authorization is given for contracting for similar audits and the initial statement of work is reviewed, the requesting agency does not have to submit individual statements of work for review unless changes have been made to the statement of work. The requesting agency must report to the OAIG APO what audits were contracted for under the authorization.

We don’t want to read too much into this revised Instruction. Even so, it seems to foreshadow a greater use of outside auditors by DOD. It seems to be in response to a widespread recognition that the critical role once fulfilled by DCAA still needs to be fulfilled – just not by DCAA. Your mileage may vary, but that’s how it seems to us here at Apogee Consulting, Inc.

 

1 From a recent e-mail received by Apogee Consulting, Inc.:

“I worked at DCAA for 27 years until … I left DCAA for DCMA …. My last 4 years at DCAA were pretty bad. At times I questioned my mental sanity and health. After leaving DCAA, I realized that it was not me, DCAA was even worse than I realized ….I love my job at DCMA because I go to work everyday and actually work hard doing what DCAA did once long ago. In three months at DCMA, I have issued more reports on proposals than I did in my last 10 years at DCAA. Honestly, I pinch myself everyday that I was lucky enough to escape DCAA and keep my federal career. … The level of documentation for work papers, stat samples and audit opinions is insane. No other word for it. No one can document work to the expected GAGAS level and do timely work. It's that simple. …DCMA has taken all of DCAA's work because DCAA can't do anything. Upper DCMA management has no use for DCAA. ACO's have no use for DCAA. … DCMA is doing the job DCAA once did. DCMA is using common sense and professional judgment something that is long gone in DCAA.”

 

Internal Controls Do Their Thing: Company Escapes FCPA Liability

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We have been preaching the obvious return on investment associated with effective internal controls for years, normally in response to news of some company that failed to make an internal control investment and ended-up paying far more in settlement costs than it would have invested. It’s a nice change of pace to be able to tell the story of a company that did make an investment in internal controls and employee training, and saw a return in that investment in the form of reduced liability for violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

Good show, FLIR.

FLIR Systems, Inc. designs, develops, manufactures, markets, and distributes thermal imaging systems, visible-light imaging systems, locator systems, measurement and diagnostic systems, and advanced threat detection systems. Founded in 1978, the company (headquartered in Portland, Oregon) has grown and now has about $1.5 billion in annual revenue, generated by sales to both the U.S. Government and commercial entities around the world.

Because of its global sales, FLIR invested in employee training regarding the requirements of the FCPA. It also invested in internal reviews of its global sales offices, reviews that sought to identify potentially corrupt payments. Because of those investments, FLIR was not held liable (at least so far) when two of its employees made bribes and offered gratuities to five officials of the Saudi government.

The story is told in this SEC press release. We’ll summarize it below.

Two FLIR employees, Timms and Ramahi, negotiated sales with the Saudi government out of FLIR’s Dubai office. They provided “expensive luxury watches” reportedly worth US$7,000 to the five government officials who were negotiating a couple of deals. As the SEC press release reported—

A few months later, they arranged for key officials, including two who received watches, to embark on what Timms referred to as a ‘world tour’ of personal travel before and after they visited FLIR’s Boston facilities for a factory equipment inspection that was a key condition to fulfillment of the contract. The officials traveled for 20 nights with stops in Casablanca, Paris, Dubai, Beirut, and New York City. There was no business purpose for the stops outside of Boston, and the airfare and hotel accommodations were paid for by FLIR.

Importantly, FLIR’s Finance Department caught the expenses during a review. In response to inquiries, the two men created a fake invoice showing a lower value for the watches, and persuaded a “local third-party agent” to back-up their story about an expense report mistake. They also “falsely claimed that FLIR’s payment for the world tour had been a billing mistake by FLIR’s travel agent, and again used false documentation and FLIR’s third-party agent to bolster their cover-up efforts.”

The SEC also noted that FLIR had provided the two men with FCPA training that taught them the rules and, had they complied with their training, the violations would not have occurred. The company’s training and internal reviews, combined with the employees’ response to the company’s inquiries, apparently created the perception that the company played no role in the violations, and was more victim than perpetrator.

Thus, while Timms and Ramahi were found by the SEC to have violated the anti-bribery, and the internal controls and false records provisions, the company was not found liable. Indeed, the SEC reported that “Timms and Ramahi caused FLIR’s violations of the books and records provisions of Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the [Securities] Exchange Act.” [Emphasis added.] Each employee was fined for his role in the violations; the company was not sanctioned.

This is a good story. It’s the story of a company who tried to do the right thing. It’s the story of a company that invested in employee training and in internal controls designed to detect corrupt activity. Because it invested wisely, the company’s financial impact from the FCPA violations was minimized. As a matter of fact, the company was not even identified by name in the SEC press release. Instead, it was identified as a “defense contractor” and it took us a Google search to identify which defense contractor it was. The company’s brand remained relatively unscathed, even though its employees engaged in a doozy of an FCPA violation.

Investments in internal controls pay for themselves many times over. You might want to give that sentence a thought or two the next time budgets are discussed.

 

Prime-Subcontractor Litigation

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Litigation
The Cost Principle at 31.205-47 discusses the allowability of the costs associated with legal proceedings. Such costs include “administrative and clerical expenses; the costs of legal services, whether performed by in-house or private counsel; the costs of the services of accountants, consultants, or others retained by the contractor to assist it; costs of employees, officers, and directors; and any similar costs incurred before, during, and after commencement of a judicial or administrative proceeding which bears a direct relationship to the proceeding.”

The rules governing the allowability of the costs associated with legal proceedings are complex and we recommend you do not attempt to rely on common sense in making your determinations between allowable and unallowable costs. With that said, we would like to focus today on the costs of legal proceedings between a prime contractor and its subcontractors.

We have written fairly extensively on the topic of effective subcontractor management. We have also addressed several prime-subcontractor disputes on this site. Our most recent foray into the topic was the article on the litigation between CH2M Hill and DynCorp, where CH2M Hill (the subcontractor) was suing DynCorp (the prime contractor) for “its fair share of the profits” of the contract. In that article we noted that DynCorp had a “challenging” 2014, of which its litigation was but a small part.

Similarly, Orbital Sciences has had a “challenging” 2014, with the most obvious challenge being the recent failure of its Antares resupply mission to the International Space Station (ISS). As we understand it, the rocket failed mere seconds into its planned flight, crashing back to the ground and disintegrating into a fireball on its Wallops Island, Virginia, launch pad. Before the failure, Orbital had been planning to launch its Antares rocket again in April 2016. Now, not so much.

Meanwhile, Orbital’s dispute with one of its subcontractors has gotten ugly.

On October 21, 2014, Orbital filed suit in the District Court of Eastern Virginia, alleging that Integrated Systems and Machinery (ISM) had failed to deliver contractually required hardware. One report described the hardware being “held hostage” as—

new gimbals and cylinders for the hydraulic system used by the slow-moving, truck-like Transporter Erector vehicle that hauls Orbital’s Antares cargo rocket and Cygnus space freighter out of their Wallops Island, Virginia, hangar and raises them vertical at their Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport launch pad over a kilometer away.

Orbital claims that ISM has refused to deliver the hardware because of “unresolved contractual matters,” and further claims that it is ready to pay ISM upon delivery. According to another article –

The components Huber’s firm has been withholding were ordered by Orbital in 2012 as part of a long-planned upgrade for the Transporter Erector Launcher that Orbital uses to haul Antares out to the pad and hold it upright for liftoff. But the mobile launch platform was among the equipment damaged Oct. 28 when Antares failed 15 seconds after liftoff and came crashing back down.

In other words, the explosion may have damaged the launch pad to such an extent that the “upgrade” may no longer be feasible. What’s worse, the same article notes that Orbital is no longer planning its 2015 launch, and may not launch again at Wallops Island until 2016. That obviously puts a new spin on the value of the parts that ISM is allegedly holding hostage. Perhaps in recognition of his newly weakened bargaining position, the ISM President (Kevin Huber) offered to release “a partial shipment” to Orbital immediately. Orbital did not officially respond to the offer but ISM claimed that the offer had been “tentatively accepted” pending a formal agreement.

If Orbital has had a challenging year, so has ISM. ISM and Huber have been tangled in litigation with Huber’s former employer, Advanced Fluid Systems (AFS), which filed suit in 2013, alleging that Huber unlawfully transferred trade secrets regarding the Transporter Erector vehicle’s hydraulic systems. AFS is suing for $10 million in damages. Reportedly, AFS built the hydraulics under a 2009 contract from the Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority. AFS alleged in its suit that Huber “gave technical information about the hydraulics systems to a Charlotte, N.C., company called Livingston & Haven in September 2012.” The suit claimed that AFS found “evidence of the alleged data transfer on a corporate laptop collected from Huber after he left the company in 2012.” The AFS complaint alleged that –

Huber, who was working full time for Advanced Fluid Systems at the time of the alleged transfer, subsequently conspired to steer servicing work for the Transporter Erector’s hydraulics systems to Livingston & Haven, and to his own company, Integrated Systems and Machinery of New York … Huber provided Orbital with bids for the work on behalf of both Advanced Fluid Systems and Livingston & Haven, substantially inflating the quote from Advanced Fluid Systems….

Orbital Sciences was named in the complaint, but was later dismissed as a defendant after it settled with AFS “out of court” in May, 2014. That leaves the litigation between current and former Orbital subcontractors, while the prime stays above the fray.

But Orbital is not entirely above the fray. Just to add another level of complexity, apparently the ownership of the Transporter Erector vehicle itself is in dispute. SpaceNews reported—

Ownership of the vehicle itself is the subject of a lawsuit Orbital filed in the Richmond, Va., Circuit Court in September against the Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority.

Originally, the Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority owned the vehicle. Orbital took ownership in 2010, when it bought the Transporter Erector and other ground-support equipment in a $42 million deal to provide the state-run authority with cash to cover overruns incurred during construction of Antares’ launchpad at the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport — a corner of Wallops Flight Facility the state leased from NASA.

The state, Orbital said in its lawsuit, was supposed to buy back all of this equipment, which Orbital said could support launches of rockets besides Antares. In the case of the Transporter Erector, the state disagreed. The authority repurchased $25.5 million worth of hardware from Orbital, but balked at paying $16.5 million for the transporter and associated hardware, which the state claimed were specific to Antares, according to Orbital’s complaint.

The Aerospace Corp., a government-financed think tank focused on military engineering projects, was brought in to mediate and, in 2012, ruled in Orbital’s favor. Virginia nevertheless refused to take the transporter back, forcing orbital to sue, the company claims.

It is not clear which entity (if any) would claim ownership of the vehicle now – except perhaps to use as the basis of a multi-million dollar insurance claim.

To sum up, this situation is a quagmire of litigation. Accusations and allegations have been flying back and forth. Lawyers and litigators have been busy. Orbital Sciences is a party in some of the litigation. So is AFS. So is ISM. So is Huber. So is Livingston & Haven. And so is the Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority. It’s hard for us to guess at the amount of attorney fees that have been incurred, and which continue to be racked-up each day.

Meanwhile, the FAR Cost Principle establishes the allowability of such costs. 31.205-47(f)(5) states that the following costs are not allowable –

Costs of legal, accounting, and consultant services and directly associated costs incurred in connection with the defense or prosecution of lawsuits or appeals between contractors arising from either—

(i) An agreement or contract concerning a teaming arrangement, a joint venture, or similar arrangement of shared interest; or

(ii) Dual sourcing, coproduction, or similar programs, are unallowable, except when—

(A) Incurred as a result of compliance with specific terms and conditions of the contract or written instructions from the contracting officer, or

(B) When agreed to in writing by the contracting officer.

Based on the foregoing language, we believe that all costs incurred by all the various parties to the various lawsuits are unallowable. That’s a lot of profit dollars.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.