The DFARS Forward Pricing Rate Proposal (FPRP) Checklist
The hard part of any accounting system implementation – especially implementation of an ERP or large-scale accounting system at an entity running a complex business – is not actually implementing the new software. Running the new software may actually be the easiest part of the implementation. The conversion of legacy data is also not likely to be the hard part. Same thing with respect to mapping the old organizational structure to the new org structure. Those tasks are not particularly challenging.
What’s the hardest part of a complex ERP implementation? Just ask anybody who’s been through one of those multi-month wire brush sessions. They’ll almost certainly tell you that the hardest part of their job was change management. We bet they’ll tell you that the hardest part of the accounting system implementation was identifying how the entity would operate in its post-implementation “future state” and then selling those changed practices to affected employees.
Change is hard, which is why meeting the CAS-mandated requirement to disclose changes to cost accounting practice 60 days in advance of their effectivity date is such a challenge.1 For example, say you want to make a prospective voluntary change to cost accounting practice – or what the kids today call a “unilateral change” – and that you want that changed practice to be effective on January 1, which is the start of your new fiscal year. That desired timing means you have to have your revised Disclosure Statement out the door and in the hands of your cognizant Federal Agency Official (CFAO) by not later than November 1.2 Which means, generally, that you have to have your changed practices identified, and the impacts quantified (at a high level), before then—often well before then.
You can’t disclose what you can’t describe, and you can’t describe what hasn’t been identified and approved. Thus, as a general rule of them you need to have the cost accounting practices you will be using next year decisively determined before the end of this year’s Q3. That gives you a month to go from management decision to Disclosure Statement revision and submission.
The problem with the foregoing is that decisions to change cost accounting practices often go hand-in-hand with other budgetary decisions. Frequently, it is an entity’s budgetary constraints that drive the need to make changes to the methods used to measure, assign and/or allocate costs.
From where do an entity’s changed cost accounting practices originate? The notions almost always originate from the top of the entity. Management gets a bright idea to make the changes, either to align with the strategic needs of the business or to adapt to changed business conditions … or (more likely) because somebody’s budget got cut. Although we would like to be charitable and tell you that these high-level strategic and tactical decisions are made throughout the year -- based on monthly variance analyses and dynamic changes to the business environment -- experience forces us to be honest and to write that these types of decisions are very often made at the last-minute in the heat of budgetary battles. That is to say, typically these issues are raised and decided in late November/early December, and not in Q3.
Because the decisions that lead to changes in cost accounting practice are very often made at the last minute, it is unfortunately too often impossible to meet the 60 day advance notification requirement. The regulations assume you have all your financial and accounting ducks in a row, lined up with precision, ready to disclose, on November 1st. But the reality is that, far too often, November 1st comes and goes, and management still hasn’t come to an agreement on how the entity will operate on January 1st. Asking the management team to agree, in advance, on future state run rules, often before any budgets have been discussed (let alone issued) or any financial impacts to the entity from the changes have been calculated, is a very difficult task indeed.
And that’s just the “business as usual” fiscal planning environment; the typical tension between leadership and compliance that exists in “normal” transitions from one fiscal year to the next. The regulations expect and require a 60 day advance notification of all changes to cost accounting practice, whereas the reality of the business environment is that reaching an internal agreement 60 days in advance of the changes is an extremely difficult undertaking and, in some circumstances, damn near impossible.
Which brings us (perhaps by rather circuitous means) to the discussion of the new DFARS FPRP Adequacy Checklist. Let us start by linking to the Federal Register notice. Next, let us remind you that we told you this new Checklist was coming, and we invited you to offer comments to the DAR Council regarding its implementation. In that previous article, we offered some mild criticisms of the proposed DFARS rule. We wrote –
This is another example of bureaucrats fixing a problematic process by adding more processes. We discussed that unfortunate phenomenon right here. DCMA would be better off, in our view, by training up its contracting workforce to restore the lost expertise, and then giving the trained personnel discretion to enter into FPRAs without the burdensome and time-consuming oversight of the current process. DCAA would be better off, in our view, by admitting that contractor FPRPs are not the same as cost proposals submitted to enter into a priced contract, and permitting auditors more flexibility in audit approach. (Establishing firm deadlines wouldn’t hurt either.) Taking an incurred cost audit approach to a SWAG is never going to work out well for either DCAA or the contractor.
The proposed rule is now a final rule and, effective immediately, cognizant DoD Administrative Contracting Officers “shall require contractors to comply with the submission items in Table 215.403-1 in order to ensure that their forward pricing rate proposal is submitted in an acceptable form in accordance with FAR 15.403-5(b)(3).” Moreover, the ACO “should request that the proposal be submitted to the Government at least 90 days prior to the proposed effective date of the rates.” The ACO “shall request that the contractor complete the Contractor Forward Pricing Rate Proposal Adequacy Checklist at Table 215.403-1 and submit it with the forward pricing rate proposal.”
Perhaps some of you read our invitation to offer comments to the DAR Council. Certainly, the rulemakers received public input and discussed it amongst themselves. It seems as if the comments might have actually impacted the final rule in at least one respect, which is always nice even if we believe the final rule is still problematic in some very significant respects that might have been resolved had the Council listened to the imput it received.
As is our wont in such matters, we want to focus less on the final rule and the final Adequacy Checklist and, instead, focus more on the rulemakers’ comments about the public comments. Why? Because you can read the FPRP Adequacy Checklist for yourself – we provided a link for you – but a year from now too many readers are going to forget about the comments. Our approach memorializes the rulemakers’ comments. (It also provides a better opportunity for us to write snarky stuff about their comments, which is more fun for us!)
As you might have guessed from the long-winded introductory paragraphs, our fundamental issue with the new DFARS requirement is the timing. Indeed, according to the promulgating comments—
… respondents claimed that the proposed rule creates unintended and harmful liabilities for contractors. … Requiring companies to submit forward pricing rates at least 90 days in advance of their effective date directly conflicts with TINA and the False Claims Act. … key bases for estimates such as budgets or sales projections may simply not be available 90 days prior to submission of rate proposals. [Ed. Note: We think the DAR Council meant 90 days prior to the effective date.] Beyond that, the budgetary and factual data upon which FPRPs are based (1) may simply not be available 90 days in advance, (2) may be subject to more current data, or (3) may be affected by certain large proposals that may require a resubmission of rates when a contract award would have a significant impact on bases/rates.
The DAR Council pondered those concerns and, with a blasé air typical of those who don’t actually have to live with the rules they write, responded as follows –
Submitting FPRPs 90 days in advance of their effective date is reasonable. The parties (Government and contractor) need time to negotiate forward pricing rates prior to their effective date, which is often the start of the contractor’s fiscal year. Prior to the start of their fiscal year, contractors have established strategic plans and put budgets in place to manage their business. [With respect to concerns about TINA and FCA compliance] [i]t should be understood by the parties that the proposed rates are based on forecasts and contractors must provide updates whenever the validity of the agreement may be affected.
The DAR Council’s position, as expressed in the foregoing paragraph, is ignorant. We don’t mean to be unnecessarily disparaging; we mean that the position is literally based on ignorance. The individuals espousing the position likely have not ever investigated how the FPRP process works from a contractor’s perspective (or, if they did, they have ignored what they learned). As a result, the DAR Council’s position is based on ignorance of the challenges inherent in the contractor’s process of establishing budgets and it is based on ignorance of the timing of how budgets are turned into forward pricing rates. The position is based on ignorance of the number of iterations and the number of management reviews and the input of the Business Development Marketeers and the impact of forward pricing rates on provisional billing rates and the impact of forward pricing rates on contract Estimates-at-Completion (which impacts revenue recognition). Because the DAR Council members are ignorant of all those things (or seem to be), they have espoused a position in which “submitting FPRPs 90 days in advance of their effective date is reasonable.”
No, it is not reasonable. In many cases it is going to be impossible.
And now you may see why we started this article the way we did. We wanted to share just a hint of the challenges involved. Just the tip of the iceberg, so to speak. We didn’t even talk about DCAA audits of forward pricing rates and DCMA reviews of next year’s Disclosure Statement. Those are governmental processes and, as we’ve written before, we believe they are broken. No FPRP Adequacy Checklist is going to fix those broken governmental processes.
While we are on the topic of timing, consider this info-nugget: The CAS regulations and the FAR regulations and the CAS clauses require that voluntary/unilateral changes to cost accounting practice must be disclosed at least 60 days in advance of their effectivity date.3 The intent of that requirement is to give the government sufficient time to review the changed practices and determine whether a cost impact is required. (Let’s be clear that nobody really expect the government folks to actually make that determination within 60 days, but that’s what the regulations say.) Sixty days is deemed to be sufficient time for DCMA to review, for a DCAA audit to be requested if judged necessary, for DCAA to complete its audit and report back to the CFAO, and for the CFAO to make his/her determination regarding how to proceed.
Sixty days.
Yet, the DAR Council wants the contractor to submit its FPRP 90 days in advance.
Ninety days.
Let’s be clear: If the contractor is going to make changes to its cost accounting practices, this new DFARS rule requires the contractor to understand the impact of those changes on its indirect rates at least 30 days before it has to disclose them to the CFAO. It has to know the impact of its management decisions on its cost structure and calculate the resulting indirect cost rates 30 days before it tells the CFAO about them.
And this process seems “reasonable” to the DAR Council.
That’s the big one, at least in our minds. There was some other stuff as well.
To the commenter who “stated the rule does not address the issues associated with the DCAA’s inability to audit industry submissions in a timely fashion,” the DAR Council replied: “Establishment of comment expectations … will promote adequate initial submissions … which will shorten the acquisition cycle making for more efficient negotiations for both contractors and Government.”
Way to respond to the comment directly, DAR Council.
To the commenter who “suggested DCAA should begin auditing the most recent incurred cost submission to gain a thorough understanding of the contractor’s operations necessary to best opine on contractor forward pricing estimates,” the DAR Council replied—
… The Government employs multiple avenues to obtain an appropriate understanding about the contractor’s operations. The Government has a responsibility to perform appropriate review of contractor proposals to establish well-supported negotiation positions and to negotiate effectively to wisely use taxpayer money and to ensure that contract prices are fair and reasonable to both the contractor and the Government. Taxpayers receive a direct tangible benefit from the auditing of FPRPs. Meanwhile, DCAA is working to reduce the inventory of incurred costs audits to become current.
We have so many comments about that paragraph – all of them sarcastic and snarky – that we are literally unable to choose which ones to type. So we’ll just leave that turd of a response here for posterity. Feel free to make your own sarcastic and snarky comments to yourself.
One commenter stated that “DCAA should conduct better and more accurate transaction testing. … Unable to rely on contractor business systems and coupled with not having audited recent contractor incurred cost submissions, DCAA has made detailed testing of large samples of recent incurred cost transactions a part of their FPRP audit program.” Apparently, the thrust of the comment was that, if the DAR Council wanted to make the FPRP negotiation process more efficient and timely, one good place to start would be to have DCAA auditors do “better and more accurate transaction testing” so that the audit cycle time could be reduced. To that cogent suggestion, the DAR Council replied, “… the purpose of the rule is to provide guidance to contractors for the submittal of FPRPs. DCAA’s audit approach is to design cost audits within FPRP audits. DCAA is working to reduce its backlog of incurred cost audits so that the agency can conduct the audits more promptly.”
We swear we are not making this stuff up. They really published that in the Federal Register. Go check and see for yourself if you don’t believe us.
The problem with the response (or at least the most obvious problem) is that it utterly ignores the role played by DCAA in delaying FPRP negotiations. The problem is not that contractors lack guidance regarding how to prepare nicely formatted SWAGs of future years’ costs and indirect rates. No, the problem is that “DCAA’s audit approach is to design cost audits within FPRP audits.” If you fix DCAA’s audit approach instead of worrying about the contractor, you will have gone a long way to solving the problems inherent in the process. Check out the plank in your own eye, DoD, before you worry about the speck in the contractor’s eye.
To the commenter who “suggested” that the DCAA audit process could be made more efficient by relying on “relevant auditing and analysis by others,” such as “the contractor’s internal audit department, other Government oversight organizations … or even other DCAA auditors,” the DAR Council replied, “In order to comply with [GAGAS], DCAA’s audit opinion must be derived from the results of sufficient audit procedures performed on the underlying contractor data.” Again, the response ignored the elephant in the room, which is that somebody in authority needs to be asking whether or not DCAA audits of FPPRs should even be subject to GAGAS. DoD could take the reasonable and supportable position that such reviews will not be performed in accordance with GAGAS requirements, which would be a significant improvement.
On the positive side, the references to FAR Table 15-2 were deleted in the final rule. That’s one nice thing to balance out the negatives we have listed herein.
Other comments received and published by the DAR Council addressed concerns with adding more administrative burdens. The DAR Council was not swayed by those comments. We know that Executive Branch leadership is concerned about the complexity of government contracting and how that complexity acts as a barrier to keep out contractors and thus reduce competition. We wrote about efforts to reverse the situation here. The new OFPP Administrator called for “opportunities for contractors to provide ‘frank, open assessment feedback’ to agencies regarding the agencies’ acquisition practices.”
Meanwhile, the DAR Council continues to add more complexity to existing processes, to add more administrative burdens to an already burdensome process. The DAR Council continues to ignore the real drivers in the process and, instead, continues to focus on the contractor’s role as if that were the sole – or the most impactful – problem.
And while the OFPP calls for “frank, open assessment feedback,” the DAR Council continues to cavalierly dismiss public input, to ignore astute suggestions for process improvement, and to engage in hand-waving instead of pursuing the fundamental and quite necessary job of improving the defense acquisition system. If the Executive Branch leadership really desires a “frank” and “open” dialog with industry, one important step to take might be to make sure public comments are listened to and dealt with in a forthright manner. The DAR Council’s comments on this final rule are a good – but by no means the only – example of why industry is rightfully cynical of the value of that dialog.
1 Okay. We admittedly kind of fudged that for the general readership. We know that you know that the actual requirement, as found in contract clause 52.230-6, is “not less than 60 days (or such other date as may be mutually agreed to) before the effective date of the proposed change.” We just thought that was too much detail for the article.
2 Unless you are not a CAS-covered contractor -- in which case, you have a lot more freedom to choose your timing.
3 Yeah, we know. See Note 1, above.
Innovating in Government Contracts
Recently the Federal government has awakened to the notion that it has many opportunities available to it to more efficiently and effectively acquire the goods and services it needs to execute its mission. It has awakened like Smaug the Magnificent opened his eyes in the second Hobbit movie: slowly, languidly, and almost lazily. The eyes opened before the vast body moved, searching for an invisible thief who had come for the treasure trove. The eyes opened reluctantly, but open they did. The dragon awoke.
The Federal government has awakened to the notion that acquisition practices can be “strengthened” to “improve efficiency, reduce red-tape, and provide greater benefit for taxpayer dollars.” Indeed, according to a recent memo from the Office of Management and Budget, steps to strengthen those practices have already been taken, and improvements have already been noticed. (We suspect the author of the memo, Ms. Anne Rung, Administrator, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, has confused correlation with causation, but whatever.) (As a side note, if you are interested in the official duties of the OFPP: Administrator, click here.)
Ms. Rung’s memo called for continued improvements in acquisition practices. According to the memo, a primary goal is to reduce complexity; to simplify to drive “greater innovation and creativity and improved performance.” The memo stated –
The overwhelming feedback from industry and other stakeholders is that the complexity of the Federal contracting space leads to higher costs, slower procurements, and less innovation. Stakeholders cited as problems, among other things, 100 page request[s] for proposals with overly prescriptive, Government-unique requirements, significant contract duplication across Government, and very little sharing of pricing and other contract information between agencies and industry
The OMB memo establishes several areas of emphasis that (it asserts) should lead to improvements. These areas include:
-
Centralizing purchases of common goods and services under the rubric of “category management.”
-
Train buyers of IT products and other digital systems to be more creative and agile, by employing such methods as cross-functional training, rotational development and assignments, and private sector training ideas.
-
Building stronger relationships between Government buyers and contractors. This effort includes “removing regulatory barriers to innovation,” especially in the areas of commercial item acquisitions. Also included will be opportunities for contractors to provide “frank, open assessment feedback” to agencies regarding the agencies’ acquisition practices.
We here at Apogee Consulting, Inc., are all about acquisition reform. In fact, we have in the past suggested certain opportunities for the Federal government and its agencies to reform acquisition practices. Not that anybody ever listened to this minor blog bleating its suggestions.
Another group offering suggestions about acquisition reform, particularly with respect to how the Department of Defense acquires goods and services, is the National Defense Industrial Association. The NDIA recently released “Pathway to Transformation,” which is approximately 70 pages of innovative suggestions for DoD acquisition improvement. Here’s a link.
As with the OFPP memo, the NDIA report groups its suggestions into three categories:
-
Authority and accountability
-
Matching requirements to resources
-
Evidence-based decision-making
Knowing its audience, the NDIA also provided a one-page executive summary of its lengthy report, which you can find here. We won’t repeat it in this article.
But we will discuss some of the suggested innovations that fell under the heading of “matching requirements to resources.” The summary of that section stated—
NDIA strongly supports limiting the requirements levied on the acquisition system to the resources provided to it, and likewise making sure that any remaining essential requirements are properly resourced. To that end, the report recommends a process for sunsetting new and existing acquisition requirements in statute, or alternatively convening an expert panel to review and reduce the requirements in the current body of acquisition law. The report recommends several approaches to improving the management of both the civilian and military acquisition workforces by making workforce management more strategic, fully funding the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund on a stable basis, and making the acquisition profession more attractive to capable and talented military personnel. The report recommends more collaboration between Government auditors and the vendors they audit and close oversight of that process by Congress. And it recommends taking advantage of the low administrative costs of small businesses by raising their reserve under the Simplified Acquisition Threshold to $250,000 and raising the Threshold to $500,000 for all businesses
[Emphasis added.]
See that sentence in the above paragraph, the one we italicized? That one about auditors and auditees? That sentence caught our attention and we researched it in the formal report. Here’s what we learned. First, although the sentence in the foregoing paragraph was diplomatically worded, it’s worded a bit differently on page 53 of the report, where it carries the following header: “Reducing Inefficient Audit Practices.” That phrasing works for us!
The report states the “root cause” of the problem thusly –
… current audit requirements exceed Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) capabilities and resources. Recent statements by DCAA leaders indicate that 40 percent of DCAA personnel have five or fewer years or less experience in government auditing, which, when combined with vigorous assertions of audit independence, can lead to wastefully expensive audit practices. Decentralized DCAA management allows variation in practice and culture among its auditors which can also be unhelpful.
The NDIA report doesn’t offer any panaceas for solving that problem, but it does offer a couple of suggestions for improvement. The report recommends –
-
Establishing a “risk-based approach to auditing that focuses on materiality”
-
Creating an “advisory approach to auditing that focuses on helping vendors come into full compliance” instead of “an adversarial approach that seeks to identify every possible error in vendor reporting and documentation and penalize them for it.”
To its credit, the NDIA report recognized that changing DCAA’s culture will be a difficult challenge. To that end, it recommended a first step of amending the annual DCAA reporting requirement (10 U.S.C. §2313a) to include reporting on “DCAA’s efforts to align its audit policies and practices across its various regions.” The NDIA report also stated—
Because most audit issues are unique to the company in question, the congressional defense committees should encourage DCAA to create outreach opportunities through meetings with companies, industry trade associations, and other contractor groups, to identify vendor complaints, review the facts, and resolve them effectively for both the vendor and auditors involved. Just as companies should not be treated as adversaries by auditors, neither should auditors be treated as adversaries by companies, and both should approach the audit process with a desire to learn and improve outcomes.
We’re okay with that.
To sum this all up, we need to talk about acquisition reform as a cyclic thing. Every decade or so, somebody decides the Federal acquisition system is rife with waste, fraud, and abuse—and then they make some speeches and issue some memos and make some improvement recommendations. More often than not, all that effort goes to waste because the people on whom the system depends are already overworked and undertrained. Just as importantly, their supervisors and managers are also overworked and undertrained. The only people not overworked and undertrained seem to be the ones giving the speeches and issuing the memos and making the improvement recommendations. The people at the top do their thing while the people at the bottom do their thing, and they don’t seem to talk to each other very much. And then the people at the top depart for jobs in law firms and think tanks and institutions of higher education, leaving the people at the bottom with the same workload they had before all the improvement recommendations were issued. And so it goes.
We wrote an article in 2011 about the Obama Administration’s acquisition reform efforts, comparing those efforts to those of the Clinton era. It was not accepted for publication. One of the less insightful comments we received as feedback was “the Obama Administration is not engaged in Acquisition Reform,” and therefore the fundamental premise of the article was flawed. That was the last time we ever submitted an article to anybody at NCMA. In point of fact, it doesn’t matter whether it was called “Acquisition Reform” with capital letters or “acquisition improvements” or “better buying power” or “acquisition tradecraft improvements” or “transforming the marketplace.” It’s all the same thing. A rose is a rose is a rose.
The Federal government has awakened, once again and after its usual slumber, and has realized once again that its acquisition practices might be improved. Memos will be issued. Speeches will be made. And the people at the bottom of the pyramid will receive more top-down driven help, as they always do. This cycle would seem to be endemic to the overall process.
|
A Supremely Large False Claims Settlement
As we recently mentioned, we don’t care for posting articles about routine FCA settlements. It seems that nearly every day some poor government contractor is settling with the Department of Justice for some alleged false claim or inflated contract price or failure to adhere to the GSA Price Reductions Clause … or something similar. Some less-than-fully-gruntled former employee has filed a qui tam suit and is looking to get paid, or to right a wrong … or something similar. We got bored. So many FCA settlements, all so very much the same. If we were bored with the continuous litany of FCA violation stories, we figured our readers must be bored as well. We stopped writing articles about such allegations and settlements.
The only time we get motivated to write about another FCA settlement is when the story offers something novel or interesting … or perhaps offers a lesson for our small (yet deeply disturbed) readership. Such is the case with today’s story about a Defense Logistics Agency contractor, named Supreme Group B.V., that, along with several subsidiaries each bearing the moniker Supreme somewhere in their corporate names, have entered into such a massive fraud settlement that we deemed the situation worthy of note. So here you go.
First, the link. It takes you to the DoJ press release. If one were simply to read the title (“Defense Contractor Pleads Guilty to Major Fraud in Provision of Supplies to U.S. Troops in Afghanistan”) it would not seem especially newsworthy. Well, maybe the “Major Fraud” part, because routine FCA allegations rarely reach that level.
According to the DoJ announcement –
-
Supreme Foodservice GmbH (formerly known as Supreme Foodservice AG), a privately held Swiss company related to Supreme Group B.V., pleaded guilty to a “major fraud” against the United States (as well as conspiracy to commit major fraud and wire fraud.
-
Supreme Foodservice FZE (formerly known as Supreme Foodservice KG), a privately held UAE company, pleaded guilty to major fraud against the United States.
-
Together, the two Supreme Foodservice companies agreed to pay US$48 million in restitution, US$10 million in criminal forefeiture, US$96 million in criminal fines, plus an additional US$38.3 million in refunds related to overpayments. That’s a total of US$192.3 million to resolve the criminal fraud allegations.
The DoJ announcement told the story of how these two Supreme Foodservice companies were awarded a contract to provide food and bottled water to US troops serving in Afghanistan, and how these two companies “devised and implemented a scheme to overcharge the United States in order to make profits over and above those provided in the $8.8 billion subsistence prime vendor (SPV) contract.” They did this by using a third UAE company (JAFCO)—which they controlled—as a false middleman subcontractor to fraudulently mark-up costs for local market ready (LMR) food and bottled water that were then sold to the two Supreme Foodservice companies for resale to the US Government.
According to the DoJ press release –
[The owners of the two Supreme Foodservice companies] made concentrated efforts to conceal Supreme’s true relationship with JAFCO, and to make JAFCO appear to be an independent company. They also took steps to make JAFCO’s mark-up on LMR look legitimate, and persisted in the fraudulent mark-ups even in the face of questions … about the pricing of LMR.
Even though the SPV contract stated that the Supreme food companies should charge the government the supplier’s price for the goods, emails between executives at the companies … reveal the companies’ deliberate decision to inflate the prices. … On or about Feb. 16, 2006, during a discussion about supplying a new product to the U.S. government, one Supreme executive wrote to another, ‘I am very sure the best option is to buy it from Germany and mark up via [JAFCO], like [non-alcoholic] beer.’
In early March 2006, after a … contracting officer told the Supreme food companies that she wanted to see a manufacturer’s invoice for specific frozen products, Supreme Foodservice GmbH lowered its prices for those products to prices that did not include a JAFCO mark-up. On March 14, 2006, instead of disclosing that the initial pricing had included a mark-up, a Supreme executive misled the [contracting officer] by saying, ‘Based on more realistic quantities, we have been able to negotiate a better price,’ to explain the change in pricing.
In June 2006, when a … contracting officer raised questions about pricing focusing on four specific items, Supreme executives again misled the DSCP, claiming that the high prices were for a high quality of product, and offering to sell lower quality products for lower prices. Supreme Foodservice GmbH did this even after analyzing its JAFCO margin on the four items in question and finding its profit margins were between 41 and 56 percent.
So that little scheme cost the two companies nearly US$200 million. But that’s not the end of the story.
In addition to the foregoing criminal settlement, the DoJ also reported that Supreme Group “agreed to pay another $101 million to settle a whistleblower lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the EDPA by a former executive, which alleged that Supreme Group, and its food subsidiaries, violated the False Claims Act by knowingly overcharging for supplying food and water under the SPV contract.” Apparently, the qui tam relater alleged that the company failed to pass on “rebates and discounts it obtained from suppliers,” which as we know would be a problem. But that’s not the end of the story.
The DoJ also reported that –
Supreme Site Services GmbH, a Supreme Group subsidiary, agreed to pay $20 million to settle allegations that they overbilled for fuel purchased by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for Kandahar Air Field (KAF) in Afghanistan under a NATO Basic Ordering Agreement. The government alleged that Supreme Site Services’ drivers were stealing fuel destined for KAF generators while en route for which the company falsely billed DLA.
But that’s not the end of the story. The DoJ also reported that –
Supreme Group’s subsidiary Supreme Logistics FZE also has agreed to pay $25 million to resolve alleged false billings by Supreme Logistics in connection with shipping contracts between the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), located at Scott Air Force Base in Illinois, and various shipping carriers to transport food to U.S. troops in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. The shipping carriers transported cargo destined for U.S. troops from the United States to Latvia or other intermediate ports, and then arranged with logistics vendors, including Supreme Logistics, to carry the cargo the rest of the way to Afghanistan. The United States alleged that Supreme Logistics falsely billed USTRANSCOM for higher-priced refrigerated trucks when it actually used lower-priced non-refrigerated trucks to transport the cargo.
And now we have reached the end of the reported story. To sum it all up:
-
$192.3 million criminal settlement
-
$101 million civil FCA settlement
-
$20 million overbilling settlement
-
$25 million false billings settlement
For a grand total of US$338.3 million in settlement expenses. Of course, that value does not include attorneys’ fees, which we suspect were considerable. All in all, a very large haul for the Federal government. And we suspect a fairly painful lesson for the companies involved.
More on False Claims Suits
A couple of updates on contractors facing FCA suits.
First update concerns CH2M Hill and its work at Hanford. We’ve written before about CH2M’s challenges at that contentious DOE environmental remediation site. In this article, we report that the Department of Justice has declined to intervene in a FCA suit filed against the CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Co., in which the company was accused by Savage Logistics (a women-owned business) of “knowingly awarding subcontracts set aside for small and HUBZone businesses to companies that did not qualify for the work”—according to this article at The Tri-City Herald.
Apparently, the allegations involve some complex nuances of the small business reporting requirements. The Tri-City Herald reported it thusly—
The Small Business Administration determined that Phoenix Enterprises did not qualify as a small business when it was awarded a Washington Closure subcontract because it was too closely linked with Federal Engineers and Constructors, according to the most recent lawsuit.
Salina Savage of Savage Logistics informed CH2M Hill that the Small Business Administration determined that Phoenix Enterprises was not an independent business, but CH2M Hill awarded Phoenix Enterprises a contract worth $795,500, according to the lawsuit.
Federal Engineers and Constructors strongly denied that it was too closely aligned with Phoenix Enterprises or other subcontractors. It said that teaming arrangements among businesses for Hanford work is common and even encouraged.
CH2M Hill also awarded almost $1.5 million to the joint venture of Phoenix Enterprises and Acquisition Business Consultants under HUBZone subcontracts, according to the lawsuit. HUBZone subcontracts are reserved for small businesses in areas designated at Historically Underutilized Business Zones.
The lawsuit contends that both of the businesses in the joint venture would need to qualify as HUBZone businesses for the subcontracts to be valid, and Phoenix Enterprises was not considered a HUBZone business by the Small Business Administration, the lawsuit said. Acquisition Business Consultants had headquarters at the time in Wasilla, Alaska, and did not meet a requirement to have employees in Washington, the lawsuit said.
In related news, The Tri-City Herald also reported that “a month before, the federal government filed a civil lawsuit against another Hanford contractor, Washington Closure Hanford, which accused it of falsely claiming credit for awarding small-business subcontracts in certain categories. The claims of improper subcontracting in that lawsuit also were originally made by Savage Logistics.”
The interesting aspect of the Savage Logistics allegations, in our view, is that the gravamen of the suit would seem to be whether CH2M reasonably interpreted the small business rules in its subcontracting, or perhaps whether CH2M recklessly ignored a reasonable interpretation of those rules in making its subcontract awards. Good luck explaining those complex rules to a jury.
Meanwhile, The Tri-City Herald also reported that CH2M Hill Plateau Remediation Co. was recently awarded $4.9 million in award fees, equal to a 95 percent award. The article reported, “DOE gave CH2M Hill a rating of “excellent” and said the company had met specific goals for contracting out work to subcontractors and had exceeded all small business subcontracting requirements.”
Moving on, the second story doesn’t concern a specific False Claim Act lawsuit, exactly; it concerns the practice of KBR of having its employees sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) during interviews in internal corporate investigations. According to a Washington Times article, the NDAs “required [the employees] to get prior approval from a corporate lawyer before reporting wrongdoing.” That requirement “could violate defense acquisition rules and the Federal False Claims Act,” according to several Democratic Congresspersons, who wrote a letter to the President of KBR expressing their concerns.
Readers of this blog will recognize that KBR is no stranger to litigation, FCA-related and otherwise. It is no surprise that the company would have built-up internal defenses, processes, and protocols to aid in its legal defense efforts. That being said, this is the first we have heard of having employees execute NDAs as a part of participating in internal investigations.
The Washington Times article reported that KBR told the Congressfolk that “the company had never invoked the non-disclosure agreement to prevent whistleblower disclosures.” The article reported that the lawmakers were not swayed by KBR’s response. It said—
Still, lawmakers said they were concerned. ‘The personalized nature of this non-disclosure agreement — signed and witnessed by two individuals during an in-person interview — combined with the coercive, explicit threat for failing to comply could chill potential whistleblowers who might report fraud, waste, or abuse involving U.S. taxpayer dollars,’ the[y] wrote.
More on this issue as it develops.
To sum this article up, we are frequently reminded of the exposure faced by Government contractors to allegations of FCA violations. In our experience, far too many contractors fail to recognize their exposure, and they fail to properly factor that exposure into their risk analyses when evaluating their internal controls. Here, we report on one contractor facing allegations that its subcontract awards led to FCA violations; and even though the DOJ declined to intervene (always a good sign), the company still has to defend against the relator’s allegations. Another contractor has faced so much litigation it has (apparently) developed internal defenses to minimize future exposure—internal defenses that may have gone too far.
Government contractors must realize that their actions will be strictly scrutinized for compliance with contract terms and conditions. The scrutiny will come from current and former employees, or perhaps from competitors, or perhaps from disappointed bidders. If the company’s actions seem questionable, then it is very likely those actions will be questioned—and that questioning could very well take the form of a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act. Defending against those lawsuits is going to be expensive, and the defense costs may be unallowable in many circumstances --meaning the costs will come out of profit dollars.
Something to think about.
|