2015: The Year of Acquisition Revolution?
You say you want a revolution Well, you know We all want to change the world You tell me that it's evolution Well, you know We all want to change the world
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You say you got a real solution Well, you know We'd all love to see the plan You ask me for a contribution Well, you know We're all doing what we can
“Revolution” – The Beatles
This article is being written in that strange time between New Year’s Eve and the start of the new work year on January 5th. It’s a strange time when one pauses and contemplates the year that was and the year that might be. (Unless you are an accountant who’s up to your ears in the close of the fiscal year, in which case God bless you for your sacrifices.) At this pause between years, the future seems available and within reach, ready for picking like a perfectly ripe fruit.
It’s a new year, a new opportunity for change. That’s what we tell ourselves, right? We will stop what didn’t work last year and start something new.
We can make some New Year’s Resolutions: Stop smoking, lose weight, hit the gym a bit more. Maybe cut back on TV or read some good books. Maybe get back to school and finish that degree, or get that Certification we’ve been thinking about for the past couple of years. Maybe plan that trip we’ve been meaning to take because travel is educational.
Or perhaps we will resolve to spend less time in the office and more time with the family. To stop working those insane hours for people who don’t appreciate our efforts, and who have developed the unjustified idea that they are somehow entitled to those extra hours put in by their employees. We could polish the resume and go out and find a new job; we could quit this dead-end job and find something that has a future and that sparks some passion. We could find something and some place that gets us excited to go to work in the morning. That would be nice, wouldn’t it?
It can happen. Anything can happen, or so it seems right now.
It’s a new year. Change is in the air.
It feels like anything is possible. Even reform of the Federal acquisition system. Even that elusive goal seems within reach in this moment of possibility.
Let’s dedicate this article to an exploration of circumstances that might lead to fundamental change, to a real reform of the current system, in the upcoming year.
First, we have a new Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. The new Administrator, the Honorable Anne Rung, replaced Joe Jordan. From what we can tell, she seems focused on making real changes to the Federal acquisition environment. She testified at her nomination hearings that she would have three main priorities at the OFPP—
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To improve federal acquisition spending, with a focus on strategic sourcing;
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To drive greater innovations in the acquisition processes;
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To improve the training and development of the acquisition workforce.
In addition, she testified –
There are a few areas where I think we can move forward more aggressively. I would like to look, if confirmed, at new and innovative ways we can train our workforce. I'd like to get industry input on the ways they think there are smart practices out there and we can do it better … FAI has recently created a new specialized COR-plus training, where they take the acquisition workforce and focus their skills on IT project management. This is an area where we can do more in. I like the idea of creating specialized areas within the acquisition workforce. You gain a real expertise in that area.
Ms. Rung mentioned the important role filled by the Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI) in training the Federal acquisition workforce. We have some doubts that that FAI is going to be much of a change catalyst. For one thing, the FAI has been without a permanent Director for the past six months. That kind of tells us that workforce training is not as high a priority as one would think it should be. In addition, more than a dozen FAI contracting classes (“CON” series) were cancelled in GFY 2014 because of a lack of attendance; there were insufficient registered students to justify holding the classes. If training is so important to the workforce, why aren’t all the classes full with a long waiting list? It’s difficult to reconcile the important role envisioned for FAI with the reality. But perhaps Ms. Rung will drive change “more aggressively” in that area.
Let’s not get bogged down in negativity. There are more potential drivers of change to discuss.
For instance, there is a new Director at the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). Lt. General Wendy Masiello replaced Mr. Charlie Williams in mid-2014. She seems very aware of the relationship between the quality of her workforce and achievement of acquisition outcomes for the Department of Defense. General Masiello recently told her team –
… we are at a critical time at DCMA. Budget uncertainty, staffing reductions, officer relocations and consolidations, and large numbers of employee retirements are taking their toll. In order for the agency to continue successfully and to exceed customer expectations, we needed to take a close look at our mission, our vision and the strategic goals we had set for ourselves. …
General Masiello identified four strategic goals to guide her leadership team’s decision-making. They were –
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Inform and contribute to affordability decisions.
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Optimize mission execution to support the acquisition enterprise through agile business practices.
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Create an agile learning organization and culture to support future customer requirements.
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Achieve and sustain audit readiness for ourselves and our customers.
We noticed that the word “agile” was listed twice so we presume it has some level of importance to General Masiello. We’re not sure what she means in the context of her strategic goals, but “agile” can mean “nimble” or “flexible” or even “quick” in some definitions – so perhaps she is looking to develop an organization that can respond quickly to changing conditions, an organization that is not based on rigid prescriptive rules but, instead, on application of independent business judgment. That would be an awesome environment in which to work, and quite a sea change from what we understand to be the current environment at DCMA.
We have oft opined that the current DCMA business environment is far too bureaucratic and that there are far too many levels of management review. Every significant decision made by a warranted Contracting Officer must be reviewed by an independent Board, it seems. We were told that those Boards exist to protect COs from unwarranted allegations and phone calls to the IG Hotline, but it seems that those Boards serve another purpose: to protect the Agency from criticism. Reducing the role of the Review Boards and increasing the discretion of the warranted COs would be an amazing, courageous, leadership decision. We hope General Masiello pushes for that change as well as others that would lead to her desired “agile” future state.
But there is another vector of potential change to be discussed: there is a new Director at the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) – Ms. Anita Bales. Ms. Bales has been with the audit agency since 2011. Prior to that date, she was with the Army Audit Agency, as was the man she replaced, Pat Fitzgerald. Together they are the first two DCAA Directors not to be promoted from within the audit agency to its highest leadership position.
Ms. Bales will have an opportunity to continue the initiatives started by Mr. Fitzgerald, or perhaps to start a few new ones of her own. We’ll have to see. But we do know that Ms. Bales has represented DCAA on the Defense Acquisition Workforce Senior Steering Board, whose stated goal is to create a “high-quality, high-performing Defense acquisition workforce.” Thus, we expect she is well aware of the impact that human capital decisions have on the Defense acquisition system.
Together, these three new leaders (Ms. Rung, General Masiello, and Ms. Bales) will have enormous influence on the shape of the Federal acquisition workforce and the processes that support individual decision-making. They will have an opportunity to create real change in 2015, or to perpetuate the status quo. It will be up to them to drive change, to create an acquisition revolution that will lead to a better functioning environment.
The sky’s the limit, or so it seems at this point in time.
We’ll see what they do with the opportunity they’ve been given.
A Banner Year for Corruption-Related Settlements
During 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice collected almost $2.4 Billion dollars in criminal and civil actions, according to a recent DOJ press release. And that was just within the purview of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania – that was not the entirety of the DOJ haul, just one piece of it.
You know it’s going to be a good year for the DOJ as a whole. We know: we’ve seen the daily enforcement summaries.
It gotten to the point that we decided to simply stop reporting on the repetitive stories. We were bored, and we assumed our readers were bored as well. Why continue to make a point about the cost of corruption when there is no apparent deterrence from the story? Why continue to argue for investing in effective internal controls when so few companies seem to listen?
Fraud and corruption are endemic, it seems. Bribery and kickbacks are simply part of how business is done. How else can we explain the same story, repeated over and over, ad nauseum, about corporate wrongdoing?
You think we exaggerate? Deal with the following list:
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December 10, 2014 – A Dallas, Texas, aircraft maintenance company admits to FCPA violations and agrees to pay $14 million to resolve the bribery charges.
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December 12, 2014 – The former President, CEO, and Chairman of the Board of the Louis Berger Group pleaded guilty to “conspiring to defraud the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) with respect to billions of dollars in contracts over a nearly 20-year period.” Readers may recall our original story on the questionable cost allocation practices of that contractor. Those who wish closure can read the DOJ press release here.
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December 15, 2014 – An employee of Day & Zimmerman, International – a large engineering contractor – is found guilty of 8 counts of wire fraud related to his attempts to fraudulently obtain $650,000 by creating fictitious subcontractors. This is actually a fairly humorous story (as these things go). The DOJ press release can be found at this link.
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December 15, 2014 – Contractor agrees to pay $2.5 million (and to relinquish rights to additional withheld contract funds) to resolve allegations related to violations of The False Claims Act. Apparently the contractor’s employee, the Director of Contracts, accepted kickbacks from potential subcontractors in return for awarding them subcontracts. The contractor submitted invoices on its prime contracts for work that was never performed by the subcontractors. Oops!
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December 16, 2014 – Former employee of contractor is indicted for bribery related to award of contracts to local Afghan firms. Again, the employee under indictment is the former Director of Contracts. What is it with these people? You would think they would have a good clue about the cost of corruption, wouldn’t you?
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December 18, 2014 – A former employee of Wackenhut Security is indicted for alleged theft of U.S. Government property and money laundering, related to her work at the East Tennessee Technology Park. According to the allegations, the employee received checks as part of her job and converted more than $214,000 of funds she received to personal use.
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December 19, 2014 – A subcontractor on a federally funded construction project in New York agrees to pay $1,750,000 to resolve allegations that it fraudulently claimed that a disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE) performed work on the project.
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December 19, 2014 – A jury finds a civilian Navy employee guilty of obstructing a NCIS investigation and making false statements. According to the DOJ press release, “The evidence at trial showed that the NCIS was investigating Ashton for conflicts of interest and using inside government information to advance his business. When Ashton learned about the investigation, he created fraudulent documentation purporting to show that he had fully disclosed his business to Navy authorities and received approval.”
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December 19, 2014 – Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems agrees to pay $27.5 million “to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by knowingly overbilling the government for work performed by LMIS employees who lacked required job qualifications.”LMIS allegedly used “under-qualified employees” who were billed “at the rates of more qualified employees.”
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December 22, 2014 – The former owner of a defense contractor is sentenced to 6 months in prison for defective aircraft parts. “In 2013, the [DoD] discovered that the wing pins … might be defective.…Based on this discovery, auditors were dispatched to Phoenix to interview Markson and inspect Action Machine’s books and records.… Markson supplied auditors with a document that appeared to show that a third-party testing company had conducted all of the necessary safety testing on the wing pins. In fact, this document was a forgery created by Markson.”
When fraud and bribery and product substitution and other corruption become the routine, boring norm for a blog such as this one … well, then you know we are all in trouble from an ethics perspective.
Happy New Year.
May the New Year be less ethically challenged than 2014 was.
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DCAA Audit Quality Under Fire from DoD OIG (Again)
Recently we wrote yet another article about management decisions made by the leadership of DCAA and how those decisions spawned adverse consequences for the audit agency. We also wrote recently about at least one call from an industry group to rethink those decisions, to address the unfortunately adversarial relationship between the Pentagon and its suppliers—starting with reducing the “inefficient” and “wastefully expensive” audit practices of the DCAA. That industry call for audit reform noted that “40 percent of DCAA personnel have five or fewer years or less experience in government auditing.” It also noted a “decentralized” audit agency management structure that “allows variation in practice and culture among its auditors” as a contributing cause of the poor audit practices found at DCAA.
Since 2008, DCAA has been under fire from a variety of sources. Each volley has taken aim at poor audit practices that (allegedly) contribute to a host of problems, from lack of timeliness and quality to a lack of usefulness by requesters. The audit agency has taken a number of steps to try to fix its problems (both real and perceived) but the problems persist. A recent review by the DoD Office of Inspector General found that 81 percent of DCAA audit reports reviewed had one or more significant GAGAS deficiencies.
Fundamentally, both industry and reviewers want to see the same thing in a DCAA audit report. They both want to see conclusions adequately supported by evidence. Unfortunately, that turns out not to be the case in far too many audits.
On December 23, 2014, the DoD OIG issued another report finding fault with the quality of a DCAA audit report. The DoD OIG found that “the DCAA field audit office did not comply with generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS) or agency policy when it questioned $6.6 million in contractor-claimed subcontract costs.” Moreover, the OIG reported that “The auditor did not obtain sufficient evidence to conclude that the subcontract costs were unsupported … [and] the field audit office applied an arbitrary and unsupported 20-percent decrement factor to calculate the questioned costs.” In addition, the OIG noted that “the auditor made significant errors on the DCAA Form 1” that was provided to the cognizant Contracting Officer.
In May, 2012, the DCAA FAO No. 3311, located in the Central Region, issued Audit Report No. 3311-2009W10170001, opining on the allowability, allocability, and reasonableness of a contractor’s claimed subcontractor costs in its FY 2008 proposal to establish final billing rates (popularly known as the annual “incurred cost proposal”). According to the OIG—
DCAA concluded that the contractor could not adequately support its claimed subcontract costs of approximately $33 million … DCAA based its conclusion on a statistical sample of 70 subcontract invoices, which comprised $13.5 million of the $33 million in claimed subcontract costs. DCAA found that the contractor did not provide documentation to support the allowability of any of the 70 invoices.
DCAA found that zero costs in its sample were adequately supported, but decided not to question 100 percent of the $33 million in claimed costs. Instead, “the FAO elected to question 20 percent (about $6.6 million) of those costs based on its consideration of contractor performance and product delivery.”
In the foregoing are the makings of a quotidian DCAA audit story, where a contractor performs work and expects to be paid for its incurred costs, yet DCAA finds a way to question those costs and the Contracting Officer is expected to exercise the wisdom of Solomon in negotiating a settlement, which the contractor must then accept or else incur a large amount of attorney fees pursuing justice in court—where there is little guarantee that justice will be found.
We don’t know the contractor or the auditor or the details of the story but, if the story were similar to the ones with which we deal every single day, the most infuriating aspect of the story would be found in the following details reported by the OIG—
Our evaluation disclosed that DCAA failed to comply with Chapter 5 of GAGAS and the AICPA standard by not obtaining adequate evidence to support its conclusion that $33 million in subcontract costs were unsupported. Specifically, the auditor’s failure to obtain adequate evidence was due, at least in part, to the auditor not considering all information provided by the contractor. For each of the 70 selected transactions, the auditor documented in the working papers her reasons for concluding that the contractor did not adequately support the claimed costs. Then, according to the working papers, the contractor provided a rebuttal to each of the auditor’s conclusions and, in many cases, the rebuttal indicates the contractor provided the auditor with additional information or explanations to support the allowability of the claimed cost. However, we found no evidence suggesting that the auditor appropriately considered the additional information or explanations included in the rebuttal.
[Emphasis added.]
In our experience, it is not that the contractor objects to a legitimate audit finding; it is that the contractor objects to the DCAA auditor ignoring the evidence provided in order to reach an inequitable conclusion that is actually contradicted by the facts.
That’s not to say that there was much (if any) legitimacy to these particular audit findings. For instance, the auditor questioned 12 of the 70 sample invoices because “the contractor could not provide any support for the subcontractor’s invoice costs.” We take that to mean that the contractor could not show how the subcontractors’ costs were supported by the subcontractors’ books and records. We don’t mean to disparage anybody’s professional judgment, but that is a stupid audit finding. According to the OIG—
The auditor’s notes … indicated that the auditor would request that the Government audit the invoice costs as the result of [the contractor] not having access to the subcontractor’s books and records. The auditor did request an assist audit … However, the working papers did not indicate if the auditor had appropriately considered the contractor’s explanation, or why the auditor questioned the invoiced costs before receiving the assist audit results.
Indeed.
The appropriate course of action is to request assist audits because the contractor does not have access to the subcontractor’s financial records and cannot (as a rule) be expected to support the subcontractor’s invoiced costs to the same level of detail as the subcontractor can. Yet in this case, the auditor decided to question the subcontractor’s costs for lack of support even though assist audits had been requested and another DCAA auditor would conclude on the allowability, allocability and reasonableness of those costs. That’s not the best professional judgment we’ve ever seen displayed by a DCAA auditor.
Perhaps in recognition that the audit conclusion that zero percent of the claimed costs had been adequately supported was somewhat questionable (pun intended), the FAO ultimately decided to question only 20 percent of claimed costs, instead of 100 percent. It was a merciful gesture but one that the OIG found to lack merit. The OIG found several reasons that use of the 20 percent factor was inappropriate but we liked this one:
… the 20-percent decrement is arbitrary because DCAA lacked a legal, regulatory, or other appropriate basis for establishing the amount of questioned costs it reported and included in the accompanying Form 1. The decrement also failed to provide the contracting officer a rational or otherwise justifiable basis for limiting the potential disallowance to only 20 percent of what DCAA considered to be inadequately supported costs. Thus, the FAO should not have used the decrement to either question the subcontract costs or recommend that the contracting officer disallow them in accordance with FAR. Questioning costs in this manner did not serve a useful purpose to the contracting officer in negotiating a fair and reasonable settlement on the claimed subcontract costs.
Fortunately for the contractor, the Contracting Officer did not sustain the questioned costs. The end result of the audit was favorable, as painful as it must have been for the contractor. All’s well that ends well, we suppose.
So how did this quotidian DCAA audit report of a contractor’s claimed FY 2008 incurred costs come to the attention of the DoD OIG?
Somebody called the DoD Hotline and complained. Somebody alleged that the DCAA did not comply with professional auditing standards, or DCAA policy, when it questioned the subcontractor costs claimed by the contractor. We don’t know who made the complaint.
In the meantime, the auditor has left DCAA. However, there are still thousands of auditors left at DCAA with less than 5 years of experience and with training under questionable management policies. This particular little audit issue was resolved, but other contractors continue to experience similar audit issues every day. One contractor has even filed suit against DCAA, alleging negligence and professional malpractice.
Audit quality starts with use of professional judgment in evaluating audit evidence. Audit quality continues with issuance of conclusions that are supported by evidence. Audit quality includes reviewing all relevant evidence and, perhaps, audit quality includes revising preliminary conclusions when the audit evidence indicates that the preliminary conclusions were wrong.
Until DCAA focuses on audit quality as its number one mission and until DCAA measures and tracks audit quality as its number one metric, meaningful reform at the audit agency will never be achieved. And if no meaningful reform is ever achieved, the defense acquisition stakeholders will find other players to perform the role once held exclusively by the Defense Contract Audit Agency.
In Which NASA Prepares to Jettison DCAA Out the Nearest Airlock
 Kind of a smug headline, we suppose. It’s an exaggeration of course; hyperbole that probably doesn’t accurately reflect the true reality of the situation. And yet it may not be all that far off the mark either. The signs are all pointing that way.
Do you read them the way we read them?
For some time now we have been telling readers that choices made by DCAA’s leadership were going to have consequences. We told readers that DCAA’s new approach to “risk-based” audit selection was going to generate repercussions. We’ve been pointing out that Executive Branch agencies such as the United States Postal Service have deemphasized use of DCAA on a reimbursement basis because of concerns over timeliness and audit quality. We’ve noted that the Department of Defense has started to look for ways to finalize contractors’ billing rates and close-out contracts without waiting for an official DCAA audit report. We’ve reported that the DoD Inspector General has recommended that the Defense Contract Management Agency learn to manage DCAA in a more tailored fashion, with respect to audits of contractors’ Forward Pricing Rate Proposals. We’ve reported that the DoD IG has recommended that DCMA enhance processes and staff training with respect to negotiating new contract awards, because DCAA doesn’t audit as many of those as it used to audit. And we’ve also told readers that the DAR Council is seeking to reduce DCAA’s role in reviews of contractor business systems because reducing DCAA’s role will lead to increased “efficiency and effectiveness” of those reviews.
But that’s not all. We’ve also reported that DCMA has taken on reviews of contractors’ CASB Disclosure Statements for adequacy. We’ve also reported that DCMA Contracting Officers will issue Forward Pricing Recommended Rates on their own if DCAA cannot issue an audit report in time to support the analysis of contractors’ FPRPs. In short, we’ve fairly well documented the diminishment of the universe as measured by DCAA audit scope, and we’ve opined that the tide will continue to ebb in that respect. We’ve even gone so far as to suggest it’s time to let the 50 year-old audit agency go, and replace it with something better.
Thus: this opinion of ours, this reading of the signs and portents, this belief that DCAA is going the way of the dinosaurs and the Dodo Bird—it is really nothing new. It’s been our position on the matter for several years. Sometimes we rant and rave about DCAA ineptitude, and other times we shake our heads and mutter in despair as the state of the Pentagon’s contract audit agency. But we’ve been convinced for some time that the only thing that’s going to save DCAA is a complete regime change.
So when we tell our readers that the NASA Office of Inspector General has issued a report in which it found that “NASA is at increased risk of paying unallowable, unreasonable, and unallocable incurred costs and of losing the opportunity to recoup improper costs because Agency contracting officers rely too heavily on DCAA’s incurred cost audit process,” you may simply mark it up to more of the same ranting and raving in which we’ve been engaging for some time. Or you can read our summary and thoughts of the NASA OIG report and, perhaps, conclude that we may be on to something. Or you can read the report yourself and ignore our thoughts.
It’s all good.
The OIG reported that NASA spends more than $8 Billion each year reimbursing contractors via cost-type contracts. The report noted that contractors with such contracts are required to submit, annually, “an incurred cost proposal outlining their direct and indirect costs.” It noted that “Under the FAR, NASA generally has 6 years to recover unallowable costs from the date the contractor’s adequate incurred cost proposal is submitted.” Since 1969 DCAA has audited NASA contractors’ “incurred cost proposals” and DCMA has provided contract administration services for NASA on a reimbursable basis.
The support DoD provides to NASA does not come cheaply. The OIG reported that “From FYs 2009 through 2013, NASA paid DCMA approximately $204.8 million for contract administration and support services and DCAA approximately $77.5 million for audit services. For FY 2014, NASA anticipates paying DCAA $17.7 million for 150,000 hours of work. Based on DCAA’s 2013 work, we estimate approximately 71 percent of this figure, or $12.6 million, will pay for incurred cost audits.”
What does NASA get from DCAA? According to the OIG: “Between FYs 2009 and 2013, DCAA performed 337 incurred cost audits of proposals submitted by NASA contractors and identified $313.5 million in questioned costs. … Since 2009, the rate of sustainment for questioned costs in NASA contracts has fluctuated between 6 and 71 percent.’
Well, that seems like a good deal, doesn’t it? NASA is paying DCAA roughly $18 million a year and, in return, DCAA is questioning roughly $60 million in contractor costs, of which somewhere between 6 and 71 percent end up as bona fide cost reductions and taxpayer savings. (Even if the average sustainment rate was 40 percent, that would still be a good return on investment for NASA.) So what’s the problem, then?
The problem, according to the NASA OIG, is that “NASA contracting officers relied almost exclusively on DCAA’s incurred cost audit process to identify unallowable, unreasonable, and unallocable costs. Contracting officers we spoke with pointed to these audits as their only means of identifying questioned costs.” And the problem with that reliance, according to the OIG, is that DCAA’s new “risk-based” audit approach “substantially decreases” the number of contractor “incurred cost proposals” that are audited. Many contractor annual proposals to establish final billing rates are never audited because DCAA deems them to be “low risk.”
Because the NASA Contracting Officers rely on DCAA, and because DCAA is letting a substantial number of contractor proposals through unaudited, that means that nobody is looking for unallowable costs. The OIG is (rightfully) concerned that millions of dollars of contractor costs that would previously have been audited and questioned by DCAA are getting through with zero scrutiny, and that NASA will be in the position of reimbursing contractors for costs for which they are not entitled to reimbursement.
Here is the conclusion from the NASA OIG audit report:
NASA contracting officers place an unhealthy reliance on DCAA audits to identify unreasonable, allocable, and unallowable costs charged on NASA’s cost-type contracts, performing little to no additional oversight of costs on the 20 contracts in our sample. In addition, this reliance on DCAA – which has an approximately 6-year backlog in conducting incurred cost audits – has delayed NASA’s ability to timely close contracts and deobligate funds. Moreover, the delays and 6-year time limit to recover funds may affect NASA’s ability to recoup funds improperly charged by contractors. DCAA’s revised incurred cost audit methodology reduced the number of incurred cost audits performed on NASA contracts and under the new procedures only a sample of vouchers submitted for payment on NASA’s cost-type contracts receive a high-level review. Accordingly, NASA cannot afford to rely solely on DCAA to determine whether incurred costs are allowable, allocable, and reasonable and should revise its current processes or develop additional procedures and oversight mechanisms to better safeguard the billions of dollars it spends annually in contract funding.
The NASA OIG made five recommendations intended to help address the foregoing situation. Among those recommendations, we noted the following –
Revise the NASA FAR Supplement 1815.404-2(a)(1)(F)(1) to allow independent public accounting firms to provide supplemental audit coverage for NASA contracts where DCAA currently conducts any contract audit services but cannot be responsive to NASA’s need for an audit.
In other words, revise the regulations to permit auditors other than DCAA to do the job that DCAA has been performing for NASA since 1969.
Are we reading too much into this audit report? Perhaps. Or perhaps we are correctly seeing this audit report as being yet one more indication that DCAA’s management decisions are putting it out of business.
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