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Apogee Consulting Inc

Expressly Unallowable Costs

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The Cost Principle at FAR 31.201-6, Accounting for Unallowable Costs, requires that “Costs that are expressly unallowable or mutually agreed to be unallowable, including mutually agreed to be unallowable directly associated costs, shall be identified and excluded from any billing, claim, or proposal applicable to a Government contract.” The FAR contract clause 52.242-3 (“Penalties for Unallowable Costs,” May 2014) states that—

If the Contracting Officer determines that a cost submitted by the Contractor in its proposal [to establish final billing rates] is expressly unallowable under a cost principle in the FAR, or an executive agency supplement to the FAR, that defines the allowability of specific selected costs, the Contractor shall be assessed a penalty equal to—

(1) The amount of the disallowed cost allocated to this contract; plus

(2) Simple interest, to be computed—

(i) On the amount the Contractor was paid (whether as a progress or billing payment) in excess of the amount to which the Contractor was entitled; and

(ii) Using the applicable rate effective for each six-month interval prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to Pub.L.92-41 (85 Stat. 97).

If the Contracting Officer determines that a cost submitted by the Contractor in its proposal includes a cost previously determined to be unallowable for that Contractor, then the Contractor will be assessed a penalty in an amount equal to two times the amount of the disallowed cost allocated to this contract.

Thus, it is important for contractors to “scrub” their proposals to establish final billing rates (also known as “incurred cost proposals”) to ensure that they are not claiming expressly unallowable costs. They are required to certify that they have excluded such costs and, if the Contracting Officer determines that the proposal contained expressly unallowable costs despite that certification, then penalties and interest may be imposed.

The problem is that what costs constitute “expressly unallowable costs” has not be clearly defined in the FAR. CAS 405 has a definition of what types of costs are "expressly unallowable" but does not otherwise list those costs. The Standard states that an expressly unallowable cost is a “particular item or type of cost which, under the express provision of an applicable law, regulation, or contract, is specifically named and stated to be unallowable.”

This is an important concept because the value of the penalty and interest assessed may well exceed the value of the disputed cost itself. As Karen Manos wrote in her September 2013 article, “not all unallowable costs are expressly unallowable, not all expressly unallowable costs are subject to penalties, and even when the disallowed cost is subject to penalties, a waiver may be required.”

Ms. Manos wrote, “Expressly unallowable costs are a relatively small subset of unallowable costs.” Though she listed conditions that would create an expressly unallowable cost, she did not provide a definitive list of such costs. Nor can any such list be found in FAR or CAS. So what is a Contracting Officer to do? In her article, Ms. Manos takes both DCAA and DCMA to task for an “overbroad interpretation of expressly unallowable costs,” and for imposing penalties and interest when not warranted, and for refusing to grant waivers from penalties and interest when required. Yet guidance in this area has been singularly lacking.

So if not all unallowable costs are expressly unallowable, how can the parties easily distinguish between the two types?

In mid-December, 2014, DCAA attempted to remedy the lack of clear guidance by issuing MRD 14-PAC-021, “Audit Alert Distributing a Listing of Cost Principles That Identify Expressly Unallowable Costs.” The audit guidance is admittedly not comprehensive, but it’s a good step in the right direction. It consists of 103 individual costs that, in DCAA’s view, are expressly unallowable. In addition, there are seven additional DFARS costs that should be similarly treated by auditors.

Importantly, nowhere on the list do we see that a cost questioned as being unreasonable in amount is expressly unallowable.

We express no opinion regarding whether we agree with DCAA’s list, but we do applaud the agency for tightening the audit guidance in this area of frequent dispute.

 

 

Reporting a DCAA Auditor for Misconduct

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HotlineKids, back in my day you did not report a DCAA auditor to his/her Supervisory Auditor, even when it was obvious the auditor lacked independence or objectivity. This one time a new auditor opened our first meeting by announcing, “I have ADD.” How do you respond to that line? Nothing. You do nothing. You do not respond.

Back in my day, you did not call up a Branch Manager and complain about a Supervisory Auditor, even though that SA was letting his or her auditors run roughshod over the audit program and your people. There was no point to complaining. It was just the way it was. So deal with it. Ditto the Regional Audit Manager.

DCAA audit support seminars teach that you can appeal all the way up the chain of command, right to the Director, DCAA, located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. And you can, if you have the right connections. One time Bill Reed looked us in the eyes and said, “If you have a problem with any of my people, you call me directly. I’ll look into the situation and, if warranted, I’ll fix it.” But we knew nobody was going to call him. Not us, anyway.

First of all, the kind of service Mr. Reed was offering was reserved for the Top 5 or Top 10 defense contractors: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon. The bigs. Not only could their Corporate people call Mr. Reed and get their calls returned that same day, but they also got quarterly meetings with the top DCAA echelon and annual joint councils and that’s the way that went. First among equals, you know. No piddily SBIR contractor was going to get that level of service.

Second, to some extent having a contractor complain about an auditor was seen as a badge of honor. If the contractor was complaining, the auditor must be doing something right. So a contractor complaint didn’t lead to a change in auditor; it led to the auditor doing the same thing the contractor was complaining about, only with more energy and encouragement.

Somehow that all changed in the past few years and we’re not sure how or why or when. Did it start to change when DCAA audit guidance encouraged frustrated auditors to call the DoD Inspector General and report DCMA personnel for not sustaining the audit findings? Did it start to change when a DCAA auditor, frustrated with direction to obtain more current evidence in order to issue an audit report, called DoD IG to complain about the lack of audit guidance in that area?

We don’t know, but change it did.

Recently we reported the results of a DoD IG Hotline investigation, in which the quality of a DCAA audit was called into question. The IG sustained the allegations and found some pretty serious flaws in the auditor’s methodology and conclusions. (Note: this was basically a repeat from 2008, though in 2014 it was a targeted investigation and not a Region-wide quality review.) And we are not even counting KBR’s recent lawsuit against DCAA for professional malpractice, since that’s outside the purview of the DoD IG.

It seems fairly evident that auditors, if not also contractors, are making use of the DoD Inspector General Hotline to report issues and problems within DCAA. Those auditors are not using internal agency processes. They are not escalating and elevating to SAs and to FAO Managers, or to Tech Specialists or to RAMS. Instead, they are dropping dime and calling the DoD IG Hotline and thus initiating an IG investigation which will possibly result in the issuance of a report that makes public the audit agency’s dirty laundry. Not good for the SES leadership team.

What should be done about this situation? Well, to address concerns DCAA has taken some interesting, and perhaps innovative steps.

First, did you know there is now a DCAA Office of Inspector General? Yep. Apparently that’s a thing now, though we could not find that position listed on the CIGIE Inspector General Directory. The DCAA OIG was established on January 5, 2015 because allegedly the DoD Inspector General encouraged DCAA to do so. Formerly, internal complaints were handled by the DCAA Internal Review Directorate (IRD). Why change? According to the website’s FAQ: “Converting the IRD to an OIG will provide DCAA employees with processes, governed by law vs. internal regulatory requirements, to confidentially disclose incidents of fraud, waste, abuse or gross mismanagement without fear of reprisal or retaliation. The new organization is comprised of auditors and investigating officers, previously assigned to the IRD, who reside at locations throughout the continental United States and have worldwide responsibilities.”

So the new DCAA OIG is basically the old DCAA IRD, but it might now be subject to different standards? We’re not so sure but that’s what the executive summary seems to indicate.

The DCAA OIG has an This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it and a complaint form (DCAA Form 7648, Dec. 2014). There is even a phone number to call, if filling out the complaint form is too much effort. (That phone number is (703) 767-2012.) There are a multitude of avenues to use for reporting “allegations of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse or Gross Mismanagement as well as other wrongdoings pertaining to programs, personnel, and operations that fall under the purview of the DCAA.”

Did we mention there is now a DCAA OIG website? Yep. That’s a thing now, too.

A visit to the website revealed that “anyone may file a complaint.” Anybody—even the poor contractor who is feeling pain during an audit. However, the website cautions that “Certain matters may be better resolved through other channels, instead of the DCAA Hotline.”

Indeed, there’s a link to a FAQ that you will probably want to check out. Among other things, the FAQ clarifies the scope of allegations that will be investigated by the new OIG function. Whining about employment-related grievances and your fellow auditor’s inaccurate timesheets are not among those issues that will be accepted for investigation by the OIG.

The funny thing is, we remember when the DoD OIG complained that establishment of contractor hotlines negatively impacted the effectiveness of its own Hotline program. As a result, the DFARS was revised to make posting the DoD OIG Hotline mandatory at most defense contractors’ sites. We didn’t think very much of that initiative at the time, and said so.

So now, nearly four years later, the DoD OIG has apparently given its blessings to have DCAA stand-up its own OIG function and create its own Hotline and other complaint avenues. And we’re guessing this new function will not negatively impact the DoD OIG effectiveness in a manner similar to how the defense contractors’ hotlines were alleged to have done. That’s … interesting.

To sum this all up, if you have a complaint to make regarding DCAA’s audits, you don’t have to reach out to the DoD Inspector General. Now you have a new avenue of recourse: You can reach out to the DCAA Inspector General. Which is essentially the old IRD function staffed by the same old IRD personnel, but perhaps (maybe?) subject to different or even higher standards.

Or you can call the DoD IG Hotline. Or if you are a contractor you can file suit alleging professional malpractice. You have a lot of options now, which is more than we had back in the day, when you simply did not complain about your DCAA auditor.

 

Sperient Back at Court to Assert Breach of Contract Claim

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Return_EngagementRecently Law360 reported that Sperient Corporation was back at the US Court of Federal Claims, asserting that the Department of Defense breached its SBIR contract when it permitted DCAA to disallow certain direct and indirect costs. We’ve been following this case with some interest since we first wrote about it back in October, 2013.

Our original blog article (link above) provided details regarding Sperient’s claims. In a nutshell, Sperient asserted that DCAA inappropriately disallowed “$632,765 in for indirect costs incurred in fiscal years 2007 through 2011 and $168,750 for direct costs related to the leased radar range incurred in fiscal years 2007 through 2010, for a total of $801,515.” The original article noted that Judge Braden did not provide details regarding how DCAA might “disallow” costs. It also noted that Sperient had filed its claim at the CoFC without first obtaining a Contracting Officer Final Decision (COFD), in possible violation of the procedural requirements of the Contract Disputes Act (CDA). Although Sperient submitted caselaw that indicated a SBIR Phase II contract was not a procurement contract (and thus not subject to the CDA), Judge Braden was able to distinguish those cases from the case at hand.

Consequently, Sperient’s initial claim was dismissed without prejudice, so that it could first submit the claim to its cognizant Contracting Officer for a decision, which could then be appealed. We wrote (in our initial blog article) –

Now Sperient needs to go back to its contracting officer and get a final decision, which it must then appeal (again) before a court. Seems like a painful re-do, but if you’ve been reading our blog articles, then you know that the courts strictly construe the CDA’s requirements.

The lesson to be learned here is that it’s really not going to be possible to short-circuit the procedural requirements when you decide to take on the U.S. Government in a contracting dispute. As painfully long and expensive as the process is going to be, if you want to have your day in court, then you need to be prepared for it.

Evidently Sperion did all that and the Contracting Officer rejected the claim. We wonder how much thought and effort went into that COFD, or whether it was just another “rubber stamp” of a DCAA audit finding. (Caselaw requires the Contracting Officer to independently adjudicate the claim rather than try to protect the interests of the Government.)

We wonder whether the Contracting Officer tried to negotiate a settlement (as would be required by FAR 33.204. (“The Government’s policy is to try to resolve all contractual issues in controversy by mutual agreement at the contracting officer’s level. Reasonable efforts should be made to resolve controversies prior to the submission of a claim.”) Or perhaps the Contracting Officer, knowing that a suit had already been filed once, simply abdicated all responsibility and turned it over to Legal?

We don’t know the answers to any of those questions. But we hope the answer will emerge through litigation.

One final thought.

With a bit of hindsight, we can review Sperient’s original claim in a different light. In the original claim, Sperient asserted that DCAA “disallowed indirect costs incurred” in September, 2012. In response to the initial disallowance, Sperient provided DCAA with “additional details supporting the direct costs incurred.” But DCAA “took no action” and did not revise its preliminary audit conclusions in response to the additional information provided.

Compare Sperient’s situation with the situation described by the DoD Office of Inspector General in its report addressing a Hotline compliant, which we wrote about here. According to the DoD IG –

Our evaluation disclosed that DCAA failed to comply with Chapter 5 of GAGAS and the AICPA standard by not obtaining adequate evidence to support its conclusion that $33 million in subcontract costs were unsupported. Specifically, the auditor’s failure to obtain adequate evidence was due, at least in part, to the auditor not considering all information provided by the contractor. For each of the 70 selected transactions, the auditor documented in the working papers her reasons for concluding that the contractor did not adequately support the claimed costs. Then, according to the working papers, the contractor provided a rebuttal to each of the auditor’s conclusions and, in many cases, the rebuttal indicates the contractor provided the auditor with additional information or explanations to support the allowability of the claimed cost. However, we found no evidence suggesting that the auditor appropriately considered the additional information or explanations included in the rebuttal.

[Emphasis added.]

According to the DoD IG, if a contractor provides additional information but the auditor fails to consider that additional information and (if appropriate) modify the preliminary finding, then the auditor is in noncompliance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS). Thus (based on the sketchy information provided so far) it would seem that Sperient may have a colorable claim for professional malpractice under the Federal Tort Claims Act, similar to the suit recently filed by KBR against DCAA.1

We’ll have to wait and see what Sperient does in this situation. But as we’ve opined before, it’s a shame that a small business has to go through all these painful procedural hoops in order to recover allegedly allowable expenses it has incurred.

1 We have heard through unofficial sources that the FAO named in the DoD IG Hotline Report as being noncompliant with GAGAS is the same FAO that is being sued by KBR for professional malpractice. WE HAVE NOT CONFIRMED THAT CONNECTION. But if true, how interesting, no?

 

The Value of the Managerial Review

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A couple of stray thoughts to ponder.

A couple of loose ends to pull a little tighter.

Presented for your consideration.

Changing_the_ParadigmFirst and foremost: Leadership matters. Leadership done right provides direction, the overarching course for the ship to navigate. Leadership done wrong either leads the ship into rocks and shoals, or else requires the rest of the management team to live in perpetual crisis mode, fighting fire after fire, desperately trying to keep the ship from foundering. We talk about “tone at the top” but what we mean is leadership.

We’ve addressed this axiom before. In one article we opined that leadership needed to be held accountable when, by action or inaction, its negligence permitted corruption to flourish in the organization. We wrote –

We assert it is management’s duty and obligation to establish an effective set of internal controls designed to detect and prevent employee corruption. We assert is it the responsibility of the leadership team to exercise diligence in ensuring an appropriate segregation of duties. We assert the executives are responsible for investigating allegations of wrong-doing and for ensuring that documents they sign (such as SOX 302 Certifications) are accurate in all respects.

We assert that when the executive leadership team fails to invest in an effective internal control system, they are negligent and should be held accountable for that negligence. We assert that when the senior leaders of an organization delegate their oversight responsibilities to subordinates, they are negligent. We assert that that when upper management rubber-stamps documents and certifications, or when they white-wash allegations of internal corruption, or when they hire the lowest-price external auditor and refuse to permit that auditor an adequate budget to conduct a rigorous audit, then they should be held accountable for those poor decisions.

We are saying, basically, that not only does ‘tone at the top’ matter – but that the top must be held accountable for their actions (or inactions) in addition to the tone they set. Not only the words, but the actions. An organization that does not hold its leadership accountable is living on borrowed time.

The second thought here is that workforce management – what some term “human capital management” – is also a critical executive leadership function. It’s a well-known fact that Baby Boomers are retiring. Thousands of senior managers retire each day. That means that each day millions of work-years of knowledge and experience is being lost. This was a predictable fact and it was predicted by many. Leadership has had years (if not decades) to prepare. In most cases, they’ve done nothing.

We noted a while ago that a recent NDIA white paper on improving the defense acquisition environment asserted that more than 40% of DCAA auditors have 5 years (or less) experience. While DCAA has been busy over the past 5 years creating new FAOs (and thus promoting Senior Auditors into Branch Manager positions) it has also lost hundreds of Senior Auditors and Branch Managers (and RAMs) to retirement. It has been too slow to replace the lost expertise and experience, and it is an open question regarding how well the newer auditors have been trained and mentored. The extent to which DCAA audit quality has suffered from a lack of experienced auditors is unclear, but we suspect the workforce demographics have been a contributing factor.

DCMA has similarly been challenged with a loss of critical skillsets, stemming from “reductions in force” in the 1990’s as well as Baby Boomer retirements. We know that the Agency has been focused on rehiring and rebuilding. Recent reports suggest that DCMA is still not fully prepared to meet the increased workload that has been shifted from DCAA. Similarly, a recent NASA OIG report rings the same warning bell with respect to NASA Contracting Officers.

In a larger sense, the Executive Branch has had a difficult time figuring out how to train and develop its acquisition workforce. We wrote about a GAO report taking to task 23 Federal agencies (all civilian; DoD was not included) for lacking the ability to manage the training and development of their acquisition workforces. We quoted GAO as stating –

Given the large acquisition investments the federal government makes each year, it is essential that the people in agencies who manage these procurements day-to-day—the acquisition workforce—be well-trained to handle their responsibilities. Fundamentally, agencies need key information to manage and oversee their acquisition workforce training investments. For example, agencies need to identify their acquisition workforce members, and measure how the training benefits the agencies by providing the workforce with the knowledge and skills to do their jobs effectively.

More recently, we noted that three new leaders have an opportunity to address workforce development and training issues. These new leaders, at the helms of the OFPP, DCMA, and DCMA, can each (and collectively) have a huge influence on the acquisition workforce. We assert it is perhaps their most important challenge.

And we further assert that each and every leader is responsible for seeing that employees receive appropriate training, both for short-term needs as well as for long-term employee development. Some companies focus on “succession planning” without having a similar focus on employee development. In our view, that’s missing the boat. Succession planning is dramatically easier when you have a large pool of potential candidates, each one trained and ready for promotion. Conversely, when you fail to develop your employees, your candidate pool is very small (or non-existent), and finding the right successor becomes a tough challenge.

On LinkedIn there is a meme that is posted from time to time. It goes like this:

CFO: Training our employees is expensive. What happens if we train them and they leave?

CEO: What happens if we don’t train them, and they stay?

Leaders who fail to ensure adequate employee training and development are negligent in their responsibility to the organization as well as to their employees.

Final thought: Leaders need to be trained too. And leaders need to let the employees implement what they’ve been taught.

Here’s a scenario:

Imagine you are a young acquisition professional who’s just returned from a week of training. You’ve been told about FAR requirements and Agency procedures. A light bulb just turned on! You get it now, and you are ready to do things the right way, in accordance with statute, regulation, policy, and procedure.

And then your supervisor or manager tells you to “forget all that stuff. That’s not how we do it here.”

Imagine the impact on your morale. Imagine how you are going to react the next time you get training. Imagine how that lack of support – and active sabotaging of the proper process steps – will have on the organization’s ability to carry out its mission.

Imagine how that managerial attitude impacts the ability to innovate, to be flexible and agile.

It seems that everybody is talking about innovation these days. The USD (AT&L) wants to foster innovation in order to maintain the USA’s battlespace superiority. The OFPP is looking to “strengthen” acquisition practices in order to “improve efficiency, reduce red-tape, and provide greater benefit for taxpayer dollars.” Everybody (seemingly) is concerned and wants to take action to address an acquisition process that has been described by an official DoD study group as being “too bureaucratic to meet the needs of the warfighter."

But you cannot innovate when the existing mid-management regime refuses to support innovation, or when it activity sabotages such efforts. It won’t matter how much the leadership team talks about innovation when the next rank down is fighting to maintain the status quo.

The most fundamental attribute of disruptive innovation is that it is disruptive. It upsets the status quo. Those who have invested in existing processes and procedures are threatened by such disruption, and they will protect themselves by fighting any changes. Change creates friction, and the existing management team is often the source of that friction. Typically the mid-managers are very effective at undermining any attempts to change. That’s just human nature.

We were reminded of the inherent tension between managers (who may seek to protect the status quo) and lower-level employees, who may be more open to change because they have less invested in the status quo, when reading a recent discussion over at WIFCON. The topic was the recent OFPP call for innovation in Federal acquisition processes. Most posters thought it was a great idea, but doubted that it could be achieved.

Vern Edwards posted:

The only hope for the future lies in the possibility of the emergence of a class of working level acquisition thinkers and writers -- people who will generate, publish, assess, and publicly debate ideas at a high level of thought, expression, and discourse, and who will ruthlessly shame the policy makers by publicly calling them out for their half-baked reform initiatives. I'm talking about people who will be smart enough to see through junk like performance-based contracting and tiresome refreshes like ‘Better Buying Power.’ People who will be beyond asking, for the umpteenth time, whether you can exercise an option on a task order after the underlying contract has expired.

In other WIFCON discussion thread the quality of management reviews and support was on trial. One commenter posted –

… what good does it do an agency to provide the best training available to junior procurement personnel when they work for a GS-14 with the knowledge level (s)he obtained as a GS-7 20 years ago? I have spoken to groups of such junior personnel concerning their training and the biggest complaint they have is that when they return from training they are told to forget all that classroom theory stuff they have just learned because it is not the way things are done in the real world so now go review a contractors BAFO and prepare a D&F justifying a sole source award to X.

Another commenter posted –

I came in under FCIP and had to go through annual rotations (4 managers in 5 years). Only one manager actually had the patience to train me in anything related to acquisitions.. I'm sure all my managers had the knowledge and experience, but they considered training to be a chore. On a related note, we have far too many people in managerial positions who have absolutely no business managing people. If you want to be a GS 14 or 15 and manage people, you better be all in.

Yet another commenter agreed, and posted –

You can throw as many people and great training into the workforce, but if you can't eliminated the dead weight at the top of the flagpole, then what is the point?

I came into the 1102 world via an intern program- rotated throughout DoD and Civilian agencies. I took tons of training …. The problem that I faced was the resistance/lack of training from the dead weight at the top of the flag pole when I tried to bring my training back and implement it into what I was doing. While at DoD I had a supervisor, whom worked DoD all 20+ years of their 1102 career, tell me that we don't need to follow the DFARs, or place any DFARs clauses into our DoD contracts. ... Now what do you think happened to all that training for someone fresh to the 1102 career field with a supervisor like that? I will say that I put up a good fight on that particular issue, but at the end of the day, he was my supervisor and he was signing the contracts. The sad thing, there were 4 other interns he supervised.

While still being relatively an infant in this career, even though I'm now a KO, this is something that I face every day. The ‘dead weight’ is what is killing this career field and any training improvements thrown at it. Of all the DAU/MCI/FAI etc acquisition classes I have taken, several times the folks that were the most out of touch with the what was being taught was the 14s/15s KOs and 1102 Supervisors. In the private industry, these people would be fired on the spot.

The title of this article is “The Value of the Managerial Review.” We believe the managerial review is indeed a very powerful force in an organization. When used to support recent training and innovative approaches to the work, it can be a positive force for change. The managers can facilitate and support the leadership’s workforce development direction. Leadership sets the course, but managers keep the engines running.

But when the leaders or the managers don’t have sufficient training themselves, then the course that is being set is itself suspect. The leadership team may not actually know where to go or how to get there. That’s going to be a big problem.

And if the leadership sets the direction but the managers undercut or sabotage attempts to get there, then that’s a problem too.

An important facet of leadership is to focus on workforce development. Another important facet is to ensure that the next rank down is executing that focus. But at the end of the day, it is from the training and developing the lower tiers that true innovation, and long-term organizational growth, will come.

A couple of stray thoughts to ponder.

Presented for your consideration.

What you do with them is up to you.

 

The Apogee Consulting, Inc. Blog – 2014 Top Five Blog Articles

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Top_5We are proud that we were able to write and publish 83 articles on this blog during calendar 2014. Assuming an average of 1,000 words per article, that’s enough verbiage to fill a decently sized novel. Not too bad, if we do say so ourselves.

We wanted to publish our “Top 5” list of the 2014 articles. But the problem was how to determine the list. Our first thought was by “hit count” (i.e., the number of times the article was clicked-on. But the problem with that approach is that articles which have been published longer tend to have the higher hit counts, since there has been more time for readers to find them. So that approach was dumped.

Instead, we are simply listing the Top 5 2014 articles we think offered the most value to our readers. It’s just our opinion; nothing more.

They are:

5. Delinquent Final Billing Rate Proposals, in which we discussed how DCAA began to classify “inadequate” final billing rate proposals as “delinquent” proposals, which permitted them to drop those proposals from its embarrassing backlog of unaudited contractor submissions.

4. Musings About DCAA (Parts 1 and 2), in which we discussed how DCAA had shifted workload to DCMA without noticeably reducing its staff.

3. Effective Subcontractor Risk Management, in which we discuss why a prime contractor’s focus on managing its own risks is misplaced, and why focusing on managing risks in the supply chain is a better strategy.

2. Audit Clause Meets Attorney-Client Privilege, in which we discuss the tension between contract clauses granting government auditors (and investigators) access to contractor records and the legal doctrine of attorney-client privilege.

1. Why You Subcontractors Should NOT Let Your ACO Set Billing Rates for Your Invoices to Your Prime Contractors, in which we advance the notion that provisional and final billing rates between prime and subcontractor are a matter solely between those two contracting parties, and the ACO has very little official authority to intervene.

So that’s our Top 5 for 2014.

Looking over the full list of 83 articles and the Top 5 list above, we think it’s a pretty broad, even eclectic, list of topics. Despite what some people think, we do not engage in relentless DCAA-bashing. Indeed, there are only two DCAA-focused articles in the Top 5 list.

We think we have continued to bring our readers the latest news in the world of Federal government contracting, with an emphasis on compliance, administration, and management of government contracts. Which is exactly aligned with the consulting services we offer to our clients.

We have focused on adding perspective to the information our blog articles, with an objective of being informative, entertaining, and value-added for a minimal subscription price of absolutely free.

We trust you think the value provided is worth the investment of time.

Thank you for your continued patronage.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.