Tone at the Top
You know we don’t like to post and repost and repost again the litany of fraud and corruption stories that flush down the sewer pipes of the internet like polluted storm runoff spills into the local lakes and beaches. The ones who might benefit from reading those stories don’t look for them, or don’t believe they apply. Fraudsters don’t think they can get caught, or they don’t think they have any other options available. So it doesn’t matter what we post to the ones who need to change.
And our passionate pleas for action and accountability at the top of the pyramid, for the “tone at the top” to be more than merely a tone, to be a full orchestrated symphony of internal control and monitoring, similarly falls on deaf ears. The ones who need to lead their organizations don’t look for them, or don’t believe they apply. Negligent leaders don’t believe they need to do any more, or think they have other, more pressing, priorities. So it doesn’t matter what we post to the leaders who need to change.
In one of our screeds (link above), we wrote –
“When you find an entity where senior leadership is not being held accountable for its actions (or inactions) then you can be fairly certain you are going to find corruption and fraud somewhere lower in the organization.”
With those depressing thoughts in mind, consider this recent news story published by The Washington Post. Written by Craig Whitlock, the story discusses gratuities accepted by three Admirals and how, as a consequence, they were censured. According to the story –
Navy officials said the three admirals improperly accepted ‘extravagant dinners’ and other gifts from Leonard Glenn Francis, a Malaysian defense contractor who made a fortune by supplying Navy vessels at Asian ports until his arrest in 2013. The three officers — Rear Adm. Michael Miller, Rear Adm. Terry Kraft and Rear Adm. David Pimpo — were sanctioned for misconduct committed in 2006 and 2007, when they were assigned to the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier strike group.
The three Admirals did not act alone. As Mr. Whitlock reported—
Francis, known as ‘Fat Leonard’ in Navy circles for his girth, pleaded guilty in federal court last month and could face up to 25 years in prison. He admitted to bribing 'scores' of Navy officials with prostitutes, envelopes stuffed with cash, luxury travel and other enticements in exchange for classified information that he used to cinch federal contracts.
Five current and former Navy officials have also pleaded guilty in the case; two others are facing federal criminal charges. Prosecutors say more indictments are likely, especially now that Francis has agreed to cooperate with investigators. The Navy has said it expects to mete out discipline in the coming months to still more officers whose misconduct was not criminal in nature but who may have violated ethics rules.
Now, it’s not like this situation sprung up suddenly like Venus arose from the waves. We’ve been following it for some time. And we’ve clearly noted that this is not just a Navy problem; it’s a DoD-wide problem. For example, we reported that one Major General was called on the carpet for ethics violations. Meanwhile, a former US Air Force Lieutenant General just agreed to pay $125,000 to settle claims that he engaged in prohibited a conflict of interest after he left military service and became the CEO of Mav6, LLC, a privately owned defense contractor.
And while all this is going on, the lower ranks have their own stories of bribery and corruption. For example, here and also here.
As we asserted long ago, when you find an entity where senior leadership is not being held accountable for its actions (or inactions) then you can be fairly certain you are going to find corruption and fraud somewhere lower in the organization. We offer this blog article as evidence in support of that assertion.
Let’s put this into perspective, shall we?
While Contracting Officers and Contracting Specialists and contractor compliance folks are arguing over complex FAR and DFARS rules, while smart people with experience and training are arguing over the interpretation of a FAR clause or arguing over the interpretation of a recent legal decision, these military officers (who have risen to the top echelons of their professions) are wantonly and blatantly ignoring the most fundamental ethical precepts. While acquisition professionals publicly debate the authority granted to a Contracting Officer’s Representative or whether a Task Order can be modified after the expiration of the underlying ID/IQ Period of Performance, these leaders are accepting gratuities and proffering “classified information.”
Or, as Vern Edwards recently posted on WIFCON after a lengthy debate by seriously competent people about an arcane point —
… I'm leaving this petty crap topic behind me and moving on to more important topics in acquisition -- like the sources of workforce competence, the nature of services, the nature and principles of acquisition strategy, and the effectiveness of competition policy. I'll be damned if I'll spend my last years in this business arguing about COR authority rules when we don't know how to buy IT in a world in which IT is crucial to our national security and public well-being. … We've got serious problems in acquisition, what with Supply Corps admirals being admonished and relieved for accepting the services of prostitutes provided by ship husbanding contractors and a workforce that is losing respect, trust, self-esteem, and control of its own professional destiny.
Mr. Edwards was correct, as is usually the case. It’s human nature to focus on the little risks and to ignore the bigger problems. And make no mistake, the Department of Defense has some really big problems that desperately need to be solved.
It’s time for some acquisition leaders to emerge and to be listened-to. It’s time for the new SECDEF to shake things up, to up-end the status quo, and to implement some serious internal controls that act to detect and deter wrongdoing by the military and the acquisition folks that support them.
The Allowability of Defense Base Act Insurance
A couple of themes seem to recur in the annals of Apogee Consulting, Inc.’s blog. That’s not really surprising, since we’ve been publishing the blog for more than 6 years now. It should be expected that certain topics pop up from time to time and thus allow us to look back on how they have evolved (or not) over time.
One recurring theme has been the Contracting Officer’s Final Decision (COFD). The Contracts Dispute Act requires that there first be a COFD—i.e., a decision from which to appeal to the courts. A COFD can be attacked on two grounds: either it was issued untimely, or it was not valid, because it was biased or otherwise lacked independence. We’ve written about the CDA’s 6-year Statute of Limitations many times on this blog. At this point, we don’t know if the 6-year Statute of Limitations is even enforceable any more, since Judge Dyk eviscerated previous case law in his Sikorsky ruling. We’ve also written about the required independence standard applied to the COFD before, though that second prong does not seem to be much addressed in the current decisions issued by the CDA fora.
Another theme that has shown itself from time to time is the use of questionable math in the “ROMs” issued by DCAA to Contracting Officers who need to issue a COFD with respect to a complex CAS-related matter. We have taken issue with DCAA’s use of such tactics to support Contracting Officers and the resolution of CAS-related disputes. Candid conversations with DCAA auditors reveal the pressures to issue a calculation – any calculation, no matter how flawed – so that the CAFU database can be updated to show progress on long-standing, thorny issues where it is thought that money can be recovered from contractors. The pressure on Contracting Officers to accept the DCAA ROMs and to do something is similarly intense – never mind the requirement to fairly and impartially weigh the facts and circumstances before issuing a Final Decision. In our view, the line between the DCMA Contract Recovery Initiative (as supported by DCAA) and outright asset forfeiture is uncomfortably blurred.
And yet another recurring theme is found in our series of discussions of questionable DCAA audit findings. Obviously, contractors are going to disagree with a certain percentage of DCAA audit findings. Indeed, DCAA auditors must ignore any contractor disagreements if they believe their audit findings are correct. (But note that DCAA auditors cannot simply ignore contractor rebuttals to draft findings; they must look at any additional evidence provided. The preliminary audit findings must change if the evidence indicates the original conclusion was wrong.) Notwithstanding the natural tendency between auditor and auditee to disagree, problems arise when DCAA auditors question costs without a solid basis, and when the Contracting Officer “rubber stamps” those findings when issuing a COFD. In certain extreme cases, contractors have been known to file suit against DCAA, accusing the auditors of professional malpractice. The DoD OIG asserted that as many as 81 percent of all DCAA audits contained GAGAS noncompliances, so should we be surprised if the majority of contractors think that too many DCAA audit findings are flagrantly wrong?
And our final recurring theme for this article is the Federal contractor known simply as KBR (formerly Kellogg Brown & Root) (formerly a subsidiary of Halliburton). A keyword search on this site returns 35 individual blog articles in which KBR is mentioned in some way or another. We write so often about KBR because the company is involved in a myriad number of issues. Without meaning to disparage KBR, we think that one can obtain a fairly decent idea of the current slate of Federal contract compliance issues by following the allegations, counter-allegations, disputes, and litigation involving KBR. For example, recently, KBR became the first contractor in a great long while to file suit against DCAA, alleging professional malpractice, regarding auditor disallowances of Private Security Contractor (PSC) costs the company paid to protect its employees when the local United States military forces proved unable (or unwilling) to do so. KBR is apparently at the forefront of the war being waged between Defense Department auditors and defense contractors.
Which brings us to a recent ASBCA decision on a Motion for Summary Judgment issued by Judge O’Sullivan in the matter of Kellogg Brown & Root Services v. United States (ASBCA No. 59557, January 22, 2015).
As is the case with so much of the litigation involving KBR, this dispute started with the LOGCAP contract, in which KBR provided logistics support to the United States Army in various far-flung and dangerous places including Iraq. This particular issue involved the requirement that KBR provide “Defense Base Act” insurance for its staff working on the LOGCAP Task Orders. Not only did KBR cover its own employees through DBA insurance, but it also covered the employees of its subcontractors. Judge O’Sullivan found that “Through 2005, KBR had provided insurance coverage to 94,405 subcontractor employees who were Third Country Nationals and 81,239 subcontractor employees who were Host Country Nationals.” That’s a lot of insurance coverage.
The way KBR obtained insurance coverage worked like this: “subcontractors provide[d] KBR with estimated payroll for each subcontract enrolled into the program. A separate DBA policy [was] issued for each subcontract under the master policy.” Importantly, KBR paid the premiums on behalf of its subcontractors. That eliminated any pyramiding of indirect costs and/or profit, and created economies of scale that might tend to lower the insurance premiums. Judge O’Sullivan noted: “The subcontractors [did] not reimburse KBR for the premiums and [did] not include DBA insurance costs in their billings.”
The key aspect of the DBA insurance program was that the premiums were based on estimated payrolls, not actual payrolls. The premiums were set based on the subcontractor estimates and did not change unless the estimated payrolls changed. KBR evaluated estimated subcontractor payrolls on a quarterly basis, and adjusted them for new Task Orders, change orders to Task Orders, and/or completed or terminated Task Orders (among other circumstances). But the one thing that KBR did not do was to adjust the DBA insurance premiums to reflect actual subcontractor payrolls if they should happen to differ from estimated payrolls. One reason given by KBR for the lack of true-up was a lack of visibility into the actual payrolls of its subcontractors. Another reason might have been that there was no need to adjust for actual payrolls – because premiums were established based on estimated payrolls and actual payrolls had no impact on premiums. Regardless, KBR was quite open with its DCAA auditors that it did not “true-up” DBA insurance premiums to account for any differences between estimated and actual subcontractor payrolls.
DCAA had a problem with that.
DCAA issued an audit report asserting that KBR’s method resulted in unallowable costs. The audit report stated—
KBRSI asserts it does not have visibility of the subcontractors' actual payroll records. However, based on KBRSI's subcontractor DBA insurance policy, the insurance company had the rights [sic] to verify the subcontractors' remuneration. KBRSI was unable to confirm the insurance company (AIG) or insurance broker (Aon) verified the subcontractors' remuneration.
The contractor is in noncompliance with FAR 31.201-2(d) -Determining Allowability which states:
‘A contractor is responsible for accounting for costs appropriately and for maintaining records, including supporting documentation, adequate to demonstrate that costs claimed have been incurred, are allocable to the contract, and comply with applicable cost principles in this subpart and agency supplements. The contracting officer may disallow all or part of a claimed cost that is inadequately supported.’
In addition, the contractor is in noncompliance with (i) FAR 31.205-19(d)(l) because it did not measure, assign, and allocate costs in accordance with 48 CFR 9904.416, and (ii) CAS 416-40(b) because it did not allocate insurance costs to cost objectives based on the beneficial or causal relationship between the insurance costs and the benefiting or causing cost objectives.
To determine how much of KBR’s DBA insurance premiums were unallowable, DCAA examined—
… one of KBR's subcontract Master Agreements and compar[ed] the ‘estimated DBA premium’ per the Master Agreement (a premium amount calculated by multiplying the labor hours invoiced under the Agreement for the period October 2006 to September 2007 by the Iraq/Kuwait premium rate) to the DBA premium amounts invoiced by the insurer and paid by KBR.
DCAA used that analysis to question 43 percent of KBR’s claimed FY 2007 DBA insurance premiums – some $33.9 million. In addition, DCAA issued a ROM to the Contracting Officer asserting that KBR’s alleged practice of immediately expensing DBA insurance premiums was noncompliant with CAS 416 and resulted in a cost impact to the Government of $34.4 million. All in all, KBR was on the hook for roughly $68 million plus interest. Plus attorney fees.
One problem KBR faced in its litigation to fight the government’s asset forfeiture (or perhaps “claim” if you prefer) is that it wanted the government to file a claim for the funds at the ASBCA so it could fight the claim. The government didn’t want to file a claim. The upshot of that particular dispute was that Judge O’Sullivan directed the government to file a claim.
In her decision, she noted that the government should file its claim first because of the paucity of information in the COFD. She wrote—
In this case, the government has asserted that $33.9 million in subcontractor DBA insurance premium costs incurred by KBR in performing the LOGCAP contract are unallowable, yet it has not articulated a basis for its claim. The Board has examined the ACO's decision which does not explain the rationale for finding these costs unallowable. The final decision includes the summary sentence: ‘The cost billed was not based on actual subcontractor labor incurred during FY 2007’ but does not explain why that fact, in the contracting officer's opinion, renders the costs unallowable. It is important to note the costs billed were KBR's actual incurred premium costs, as confirmed by the DCAA audit.
The final decision also states that it references and relies on the DCAA audit report and KBR's response to that report. The Board has examined the audit report, which states that it is disallowing the costs based on KBR's failure to ‘true up’ its subcontractor DBA insurance costs based on actual subcontractor payroll, and that this failure to ‘true-up’ is a noncompliance with FAR 31.201-2(d), which requires contractors to maintain records sufficient to demonstrate that claimed costs have been incurred, are allocable to the contract, and comply with applicable cost principles.
However, the audit report does not explain what significance, if any, actual subcontractor labor costs (even if such information were available to KBR) would have to the issue of the allowability of KBR's subcontractor DBA insurance costs, which were based on estimated subcontractor payroll and not subject to adjustment based on actual subcontractor payroll.
Now you see how the themes we mentioned at the beginning of this article weave together in this particular decision. Once again, KBR is forced to litigate a silly DCAA finding that was clearly rubber-stamped by the cognizant Administrative Contracting Officer who either did not understand the issues or chose not to understand the issues. As a result of the silly audit finding, a COFD was issued that failed to articulate the rationale for the government’s attempt to take nearly $34 million from KBR.
And this particular decision does not even address the DCAA “ROM” related to the alleged CAS 416 noncompliance.
Obviously the matter will be litigated on the merits, but from where we sit in our non-attorney couches, it seems to be very much a foregone conclusion. The DBA insurance premiums were based on estimated payrolls and actual payrolls were simply irrelevant to the matter. It’s a no-brainer, in our view. If KBR needed another cause of action related to DCAA professional malpractice, they may well have found it here.
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DOE IG Concerned About Lack of DCAA Audits
DCAA can’t catch a break.
First, NASA’s Office of Inspector General voiced concerns about DCAA’s decision to use a “risk-based” approach to determining which contractor annual proposals to establish final billing rates it chooses to audit. Those annual proposals – also known as “incurred cost proposals” – are used by Contracting Officers to determine final contract prices for cost-type contracts (and some other types such as Time & Materials). The audit of those annual proposals, historically performed by DCAA, is the primary means by which the NASA Contracting Officers ensure that NASA is paying only allowable, allocable and reasonable direct and indirect costs.
Did we say primary means? We meant to say only means. Only. As in, the NASA IG found that “NASA contracting officers relied almost exclusively on DCAA’s incurred cost audit process to identify unallowable, unreasonable, and unallocable costs. Contracting officers we spoke with pointed to these audits as their only means of identifying questioned costs.” Only. That’s what we meant to say.
Without DCAA performing audits of the annual proposals submitted by NASA contractors, the NASA COs were simply not going to have the means to identify any unallowable costs. That was not a great position in which to find the Space Agency, according to its Inspector General.
The NASA OIG was concerned that DCAA’s new risk-based approach to audit triage was going to create more risk for the Space Agency. We agree with that assessment and, indeed, voiced similar concerns about 36 months ago. And we were not alone in noting some concerns. As we wrote in another blog article, GAO issued a report that rang some alarm bells. We noted that “… there are many parties—both within and outside of government—who think the current DCAA approach to managing its audits has left the Defense Department in an untenable position.”
So to recap the past 36 months of history, DCAA changed its audit approach such that certain contractor annual proposals to establish final billing rates would no longer be reviewed. The GAO issued a report voicing some concerns about that new approach. The DoD Inspector General issued a report voicing some concerns about that new approach. The NASA Inspector General issued a report voicing some concerns about that new approach. We wrote some blog article voicing some concerns about the new approach.
And now the Department of Energy Inspector General has issued a report voicing some concerns about the new approach.
Readers not familiar with DOE’s contracting environment should know that there are basically two types of DOE contracts. There are the humongous Management & Operating contracts and then there’s everything else. There are 28 M&O contracts, all of which are cost-reimbursable, and all of which are really, really large. The M&O prime contractors engage hosts of subcontractors to perform the required work. According to the DOE IG, the DEARS 970 regulations state that those M&O primes are responsible for auditing those subcontractors when the subcontract prices are dependent on costs incurred. In the words of the DOE IG –
When these subcontracts are structured as cost-type, including time and materials, and cost reimbursable subcontracts, M&O contractors are contractually required to ensure that associated costs incurred are audited to provide assurance that the costs are allowable. The M&O contractors may use their internal audit staff, engage contract auditors, or use the services of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to audit the subcontractors. Internally performed audits must, at a minimum, meet professional standards prescribed by the Institute of Internal Auditors. M&O contractors presumably rely on audits of subcontractors when completing required annual certifications that all of their incurred costs are allowable.
The DOE IG had concerns with the M&O primes’ lack of procedures to assure that their subs were being audited. But that’s not what we’re going to discuss in this article. Instead, we are going to discuss the rest of the DOE contract environment – the non-M&O contracts. Just to put things into perspective, the universe of non-M&O contracts includes (but is not limited to) “more than 40 prime contracts valued at more than $90 billion” which involves “annual expenditures of about $5 billion” within the DOE’s Office of Environmental Management. In addition, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has “several” non-M&O contracts, “including the nearly $5 billion contract to construct the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.” So while the M&O contracts may get a lot of management (and Congressional) attention, the fact of the matter is that the non-M&O contracts are a non-trivial part of the DOE’s spending.
In its report on the non-M&O contract universe, the DOE IG stated –
Historically, the Department has met its non-M&O contract cost audit requirements through an agreement with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). … However, over the past several years, as responsible Department officials confirmed, DCAA has been unable to perform many of its audits on a timely basis. In fact, DCAA itself reported delays from 1 year to more than 8 years for audits of the Department's non-M&O contracts and related Department-funded subcontracts. These delays resulted in a backlog of audits of contracts and subcontracts with incurred costs valued at billions of dollars per year.
DCAA has been unable to meet the non-M&O contract audit needs of the Department and has asserted that it simply does not have the resources to meet all Department of Defense and civilian agency audit requests. As it pertains to the Department, this situation was exacerbated by the fact that the Department lacked a comprehensive strategy to ensure that non-M&O contractor costs were subjected to necessary audits.
Looking inside the audit report, the DOE IG found that –
To illustrate the magnitude of this problem, as of the date of our review, of the 16 largest Environmental Management non-M&O contractors:
- Seven had never had an incurred cost audit;
- Six had only received audits of costs incurred in 2010 or earlier
- Only three had received relatively current audits of costs incurred in 2012 or later
As the DOE IG noted, the Contract Dispute Act has a 6-year Statute of Limitations, the expiration of which makes recovery of improperly billed costs difficult, if not impossible. (We’ve written extensively on the CDA SoL.) The DOE IG found that DCAA’s inability to support the DOE’s audit needs with respect to non-M&O contractors impeded its ability to administer those contracts effectively. The DOE IG wrote –
Thus, significant delays in the contract audit process, such as the delays the Department has already experienced, would likely make it impossible to recover contractor incurred costs even if they are ultimately found to be unallowable. A recent Department contracting officer decision illustrates the impact of the statute of limitation issue: the Contracting Officer for the nearly $5 billion Shaw AREVA MOX Services, LLC (Shaw AREVA) contract recently suspended DCAA’s work on the 2005 Shaw AREVA incurred cost audit because she concluded that the statute of limitations had expired, rendering it impossible to recoup any questioned costs. Although DCAA is currently working on Shaw AREVA's 2006 incurred costs, the risks associated with exceeding the statute of limitations on this and other contracts remains.
The DOE IG discussed DCAA’s “risk-based” approach to choosing which contractors’ submissions to audit. It stated –
DCAA has initiated action to reduce its backlog of audits, but its actions to date have primarily targeted the Department of Defense and have not directly benefited the Department [of Energy]. … While DCAA's Low-Risk Incurred Cost Initiative has reduced the backlog of contract audits at the Department of Defense, its implementation at the Department in its current format would result in the failure to audit a majority of the Department's non-M&O contracts. Specifically, only about 20 percent of the Department's non-M&O contractors' incurred cost submissions would be subject to mandatory audit, with the other 80 percent identified as low risk and only subject to being randomly selected for audit. Thus, over time, as additional contracts are awarded, the Department's backlog of unaudited contracts would likely grow more severe. The practical impact of such action is to limit the Department's access to an important tool that helps detect and prevent contractor claims for questionable costs. In our view, this is an unacceptable risk going forward
The audit report discussed means by which DOE had “supplemented” the audit gaps left by DCAA’s inability to perform timely incurred cost audits. Those supplemental approaches included hiring a public accounting firm and hiring non-M&O contractors’ internal auditors to audit the submissions of other contractors. The IG also reported that “the Environmental Management Consolidated Business Center, which provides Environmental Management customers with business and technical support services, including contracting support, has explored the possibility of standing up its own audit function or utilizing independent public accounting firms to conduct incurred costs audits.” The DOE IG found those supplemental approaches “laudable.”
Nonetheless, the DOE IG made a couple of recommendations to address the gap in audit coverage of the non-M&O contractors. It recommended that the DOE –
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Coordinate with DCAA to develop and implement an acceptable version of the risk-based audit approach to incurred cost audits.
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Develop a comprehensive strategy to supplement DCAA’s [lack of] audit coverage until the backlog of unaudited contractor submissions is eliminated.
The DOE IG found management receptive to its recommendations. It reported –
Department and NNSA management concurred with each of the report's recommendations and indicated that corrective actions had been taken or were planned to address the identified issues. Specifically, Department management noted that it has stated its expectation that required audits must be obtained, whether from DCAA or KPMG; has issued guidance to that effect; has put a contract in place for audit services to ensure Contracting Officers have an alternative to DCAA to obtain quality audits; is coordinating closely with DCAA on its audits; and is following up with contracting activities to ensure they understand what is expected and have the appropriate support. Department management also noted that they believe it is important to recognize that whatever good intentions DCAA has, its track record makes it prudent to avoid assuming a marked change in DCAA's support. Additionally, they stated that all stakeholders, not just the report's addressees, have a role in ensuring required audit support is obtained.
To sum up, the Department of Energy seems to have recognized that it can no longer count on DCAA to provide the level of incurred cost audit support that it needs. It has developed alternatives, including awarding an audit support contract to KPMG. That’s all well and good.
But what is not being addressed is how DOE will implement its recent management decision to embrace the DFARS business systems administration regime. As we reported, “DOE has adopted a similar, yet subtly different, approach to contractor business system administration [than that used by DoD].” Though there are differences, the concept is much the same: non-M&O DOE contractors may be subject to payment withholds if their business systems are found to be inadequate.
Readers may recall that the DoD has experienced growing pains with its approach to administering the business systems rules – so much so that it has proposed to dramatically reduce DCAA’s role in the processes. Given the risks and concerns regarding DCAA’s audits of DOE contractors’ proposals to establish final billing rates, we wonder if DOE management is second-guessing its decision to embrace the DoD’s approach to administering contractor business systems, which at present is heavily reliant on DCAA’s participation.
The Downside of Confidentiality Agreements
Recently we discussed the use of employee confidentiality agreements in internal investigations of wrongdoing. In that article we cited a Washington Times story about KBR (who is certainly no stranger to employee wrongdoing, whistleblowers, or government-initiated litigation). According to that story, KBR was requiring employees “to get prior approval from a corporate lawyer before reporting wrongdoing.” In other words, as part of their participation in internal investigations, KBR employees were required to sign a confidentiality agreement (signed and witnessed by two other individuals). According to the story, lawmakers were concerned that this tactic could have a chilling effect on the ability and/or willingness of whistleblowers to report waste, fraud, and abuse.
We opined that KBR may have gone a bit too far. Well, we don’t know about that. But what we do know is that the DoD just issued a Class Deviation that prohibits contracting with entities that use confidentiality agreements to restrict the ability of employees to report waste, fraud, or abuse to the Federal government.
To that end, Contracting Officers are now required to incorporate solicitation provision 252.203-7998 (“Prohibition on Contracting with Entities that Require Certain Internal Confidentiality Agreements – Representation”). That provision states –
By submission of its offer, the Offeror represents that it does not require employees or subcontractors of such entity seeking to report fraud, waste, or abuse to sign or comply with internal confidentiality agreements or statements prohibiting or otherwise restricting such employees or contactors from lawfully reporting such waste, fraud, or abuse to a designated investigative or law enforcement representative of a Federal department or agency authorized to receive such information.
In addition, there is now a similar contract clause that is required to be inserted in contracts of all sizes and types that will use FY 2015 funds (including Part 12 acquisitions). The new clause states (in part) –
The Contractor shall not require employees or subcontractors seeking to report fraud, waste, or abuse to sign or comply with internal confidentiality agreements or statements prohibiting or otherwise restricting such employees or contactors from lawfully reporting such waste, fraud, or abuse to a designated investigative or law enforcement representative of a Federal department or agency authorized to receive such information.
The Contractor shall notify employees that the prohibitions and restrictions of any internal confidentiality agreements covered by this clause are no longer in effect.
We believe that the requirements imposed by this Class Deviation effectively end KBR’s reported practices in this area. We’ll see if any contractor wants to contest it.
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