Bank Fraud at the Federal Level
The usual disclaimer applies: We are not attorneys. We are not giving legal advice. Our legal analyses are those of a layperson, and we are probably getting it wrong. If you rely on our legal analyses, instead of hiring your own competent attorney to give you counsel, you are making a really big mistake.
We get daily emails from the U.S. Department of Justice.
We are signed-up for a number of email distributions and nearly every day the DoJ sends us an email with a list of things that may interest us. Most of them do not actually interest us. We tend to ignore the remarks of the Attorney General or his team. We tend to ignore the healthcare frauds and the common frauds and the prosecution of tax preparers for tax fraud. And lately we have been ignoring the common government contract fraud notices, because we’re tired of those stories.
But two stories recently caught our eye and they seem to only tangentially involve government contracting. Indeed, though each press release carefully noted that Federal funds were involved, we are not actually sure what impact the use of Federal funds had on the prosecution. Our cursory research seemed to indicate that bank fraud is a Federal crime regardless of whether Federal funds were involved. (NOTE: See disclaimer at the top of this article.)
The United States Code at 18 U.S.C. § 1344, which is known as the Bank Fraud Statute, states—
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice—
(1) to defraud a financial institution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises;
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
We also found a statement that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) “bolstered” the Bank Fraud Statute, but we don’t know how.
Anyway, the first DoJ press release announced that one Los Angeles executive had been arrested while another was being pursued and remained at large. The DoJ announced that –
Chung Yu ‘Louis’ Yeung, 37, of San Dimas, California, was indicted on Oct. 22, 2014, in the Central District of California for one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and five counts of bank fraud. The indictment was under seal until his arrest today. Guo Xiang ‘David’ Fan, 52, was also indicted for conspiracy to commit bank fraud and bank fraud, as well as money laundering, and remains at large.
The DoJ press release continued with the following description of the alleged crimes:
According to the indictment, Yeung was Vice President and Fan was President of Eastern Tools and Equipment, an Ontario, California company that sold portable generators and other equipment. The indictment charges Yeung and Fan with defrauding United Commercial Bank (UCB) and East West Bank, which took over UCB’s accounts, of more than $9 million.
Specifically, the indictment alleges that Yeung, Fan, and others overstated Eastern Tools’ accounts receivable to increase its line of credit with UCB and later East West. To support the inflated accounts receivable submitted to the banks, Yeung, Fan, and others allegedly opened approximately 20 shell companies, backstopped with fictitious business name statements, post office boxes, bank accounts, and telephone numbers. They then allegedly moved money from Eastern Tools’ bank accounts into the shell companies’ bank accounts to create the false appearance of substantial commercial activity. Finally, Yeung, Fan, and others allegedly siphoned those funds into their own personal accounts.
East West Bank allegedly sustained a loss of approximately $9,157,172 as a result of the fraud scheme.
The foregoing story highlights the need for auditors and compliance practitioners to scrutinize accounts receivable (and accounts payable), paying strict attention to those entities that have P.O. Boxes as business addresses. Having a P.O. Box doesn’t mean that the entity is a shell company; indeed, Apogee Consulting, Inc.’s business address is a P.O. Box, and we are very much a real small business providing bona fide services to our clientele. But when you see a P.O. Box as a business address, you should take a second look at the purchase orders, invoices and payments to see if anything looks suspicious.
As we noted above, the DoJ press release was careful to state that the bank had received nearly $300 million in TARP funds, none of which had been repaid. The bank had failed despite the infusion of Federal funds. Apparently, we are to infer that this particular alleged scheme led to the bank’s failure and loss of Federal funds. We have no idea how that inferred "fact" may have affected the investigation and charging.
The second DoJ press release involved a former Bank of America (BOA) Senior Vice President who pleaded guilty to one count of “misapplication of bank funds in a scheme that led to over $6.4 million in losses … on two business-related loans.” According to the press release –
Brough admitted to misapplying bank funds in connection with two business loans: a $6.3 million short-term construction loan, and a $600,000 line of credit in connection with the acquisition of a business. Brough admitted that neither borrower qualified for the loans, because they did not meet the bank’s underwriting requirements. Brough further admitted that he falsified documents in order to help both borrowers get the loans, including forging signatures on loan papers.
According to Brough’s admissions, when the borrowers had difficulty making payments on the loans, Brough misused the bank’s general ledger fund to make a total of $436,676 in payments on the loans for the borrowers. Brough admitted that he disguised those payments, among other ways, as ‘goodwill,’ ‘miscellaneous adjustments’ and refunds of various fees. He also admitted that he kept each of the individual payments under $10,000 so he would not need additional approval within BOA.
Both borrowers ultimately defaulted on the loans. According to Brough’s plea agreement, the aggregate loss to BOA was $6,468,767: $5,291,000 on the first loan, and $1,177,167 on the second loan.
So two LA executives are facing multiple serious Federal criminal charges while one Las Vegas bank officer has pleaded to one count of “misapplication” of bank funds (a violation of 18 U.S. C. §656). Our reading of the U.S. Code is that both offenses carry roughly the same penalty, so it’s not clear to us what the difference may be. Certainly, one possible difference between the two cases may involve the loss of Federal funds. While the first case noted that the TARP funds were not repaid, the second case noted that Bank of America had repaid its TARP funds in full by December, 2009.
In any case, as we government contract cost accountants, auditors, and compliance practitioners review transactions recorded by the entities with which we are involved, it is a good idea to keep in mind the “garden variety” commercial frauds described in these two stories.
Pessimism About Acquisition Reform
Few people doubt the Federal acquisition system is broken. The only real question is whether it can be fixed. Opinions vary.
Leaders at the OFPP and DoD believe they have some bandaids to staunch the hemorrhaging of taxpayer funds, the waste associated with cancelled programs, and the ridiculously long development timeframes. They don’t promise a 180 degree flip-turn in the current bureaucratic swamp that impedes efficient innovation and execution. But they hope for some incremental improvements.
They are the optimistic ones.
Others say the problems in the defense acquisition environment are endemic and that they are too intractable to be fixed by anybody. Recent reports seem to telegraph that the current version of “acquisition reform” is dead on arrival, even as Ash Carter takes the helm at the Pentagon and Frank Kendall dishes about “Better Buying Power 3.0”.
We’ve offered opinions regarding Obama-era acquisition reform efforts, which have been mostly negative and probably more than a little cynical regarding the notion that more and/or better processes were going to fix the problems that contractors face when trying to perform Federal contracts. As we gain first-hand experience with entities that are agile and flexible and innovative we are learning how the CAS and FAR rules act to stifle and impede the very traits the DoD leadership says it wants in its contractors. We see, for example, how “high speed, low drag” contractors have to slow down and add overhead just to respond to the auditors, and how they are penalized and forced into litigation for failing to properly comply with the smallest regulatory nuance. We spend our professional lives trying to help contractors find a balance between the demands of the programs and the demands of the bureaucrats; and too often it seems more profitable to make the bureaucrats happy—and to hell with efficient program execution.
But we are not the only pessimists around.
Sanda Erwin, writing in National Defense magazine, reports that Gordon England, former Deputy Secretary of Defense (under Donald Rumsfeld), is one of the pessimists. Ms. Erwin quotes England as follows –
‘It's our form of government,’ England said during a panel discussion last week at a Naval Institute conference. ‘How can we be innovative?’ he asked, when it takes years to get budgets approved and move programs through the Pentagon bureaucracy. ‘That's the reality. How do we deal with this? It is a real issue.’
When he was Donald Rumsfeld's deputy secretary during the George W. Bush administration, England and his boss scratched their heads over this issue. ‘We've done 128 studies on acquisition. The bottom line is that I don't think it's going to get better,’ England said. ‘I don't believe commercial companies are going to jump into this environment because it hurts their commercial business.’
England was not the only pessimist to be quoted by Ms. Erwin. One panelist stated “The Pentagon's $180 billion a year research, development and procurement budget is not enough to entice new suppliers because of the regulatory burdens. From a commercial player standpoint, it's a very high cost proposition."
Ellen Lord, CEO of Textron Systems, was quoted as follows—
The Pentagon insists it wants faster and leaner programs, but the rhetoric is divorced from reality, Lord said. ‘We have layer upon layer upon layer of oversight that is putting so much cost into the system,’ she said. ‘Small companies cannot afford to play. Even big companies are opting out.’
Better buying power 3.0 encourages program managers to seek new products from commercial suppliers that fund their own research and development. But Pentagon requirements for internal company cost data deter commercial companies from doing business with the government, she added.
Another participant, Tom Captain of Deloitte Consulting, was quoted at length. We have paraphrased his quotes as follows—
Many in industry are a bit suspicious. Contractors get the feeling that current efforts to fix defense acquisitions are another ‘initiative du jour’ that will generate lots of reports and media coverage but will not break through the institutional inertia. It doesn't mean that the Defense Department doesn't have good ideas, but there is little reason to believe that any new round of reforms will reverse trends that keep weapon systems over budget and behind schedule.
The tenets promoted by ‘better buying power,’ or BBP, have been helpful… But not much real progress has been made. We haven't gotten the results we were looking for. Programs are getting more expensive and more complicated.
In the same magazine, Yasmine Tadjdeh wrote that CEOs of defense contractors are calling for a more business-friendly approach out of the Pentagon. For example, she wrote—
Jerry Demuro, CEO of BAE Systems, said industry is being stifled by odious acquisition red tape. Contractors must navigate layers upon layers of bureaucracy before it can develop systems. Contractors are also dealing with exhaustive audits that tie up personnel.
Extensive audits and bureaucracy are not ‘improving the affordability [or] the quality of these products and certainly the time to get that delivered to the soldier,’ he said. ‘Industry has demonstrated that it can be very agile, ... but we have organizations ... where we have one third of the revenues, half of the employees and now three times the number of auditors resident in the facility,’ he said. Dealing with audits and regulatory hurdles are expensive and labor intensive. That is money that is not going toward the development of ‘the next whiz bang application,’ he said.
To some extent, the foregoing are examples of time-honored complaints. But on the other hand, it seems clear that many (if not most) knowledgeable insiders think the current problems can only be solved by a cultural shift at the Pentagon, as well as a change in approach by Congress. We are sadly pessimistic that such dramatic changes are going to develop in the near future.
Let’s put it another way. BBP and its spawn are evidence that DoD leaders are looking for a gradual change from the status quo, an evolution if you will. From where we sit, what’s required is a fundamental revolution. A complete dismantling of the current system in favor of a more streamlined and rational approach, where buyer and seller agree on terms and then hold each other accountable for fulfilling those terms. The likelihood of such a revolution happening anytime soon is about the same as you winning the next Lottery you enter.
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Good DCAA Audit Guidance or Bad DCAA Audit Guidance?
Recently DCAA issued two pieces of guidance to its auditors aimed at assisting them in distinguishing between “expressly” unallowable costs and the normal, run-of-the-mill, unallowable costs. It matters and there are financial implications involved. As we noted in our first article (on the first piece of audit guidance)—
… it is important for contractors to ‘scrub’ their proposals to establish final billing rates (also known as ‘incurred cost proposals’) to ensure that they are not claiming expressly unallowable costs. They are required to certify that they have excluded such costs and, if the Contracting Officer determines that the proposal contained expressly unallowable costs despite that certification, then penalties and interest may be imposed.
In the first piece of DCAA audit guidance, DCAA issued a list of 103 individual costs it asserted were expressly unallowable pursuant to the FAR Part 31 Cost Principles, plus another seven costs it asserted were expressly unallowable pursuant to the DFARS Supplementary Cost Principles.
We unequivocally stated in that first article that we expressed no opinion as to whether we agreed with DCAA’s position on the nature of the listed costs. However, we did note that we thought it was a step in the right direction. In particular we applauded the clear DCAA position that costs asserted to be unreasonable in accordance with FAR 31.201-3 (“Determining Reasonableness”) could not be expressly unallowable. That was a good thing, in our view.
With respect to the second piece of audit guidance, we wrote (in the subsequent article) that there were a number of positive aspects and we generally liked it a lot. Among the positive aspects, we noted the following statements with approval—
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The Government should not assess a penalty where there are reasonable differences of opinion about the allowability of costs and that the Government must show that it was ‘unreasonable under all the circumstances for a person in the contractor’s position to conclude that the costs were allowable.’ In situations where it is not directly stated in a cost principle, in order for a cost or type of cost to be expressly unallowable, the cost principle must identify it clearly enough that there is little room for difference of opinion as to whether a particular cost meets the criteria.
But while we were busy congratulating DCAA on a couple of pieces of audit guidance that we thought would be helpful and which we expected would reduce disputes between government and contractor, the respected and knowledgeable government contract attorneys at the firm of Crowell & Moring didn’t quite see it the way we did. They published a client alert expressing the opinion that the DCAA audit guidance was “troubling” and “will likely lead to confusion in the audit process and undoubtedly result in DCAA auditors assessing more penalties against contractors on dubious grounds.”
The crux of the attorneys’ concerns seems to be that DCAA is misinterpreting the CAS 405 definition of “expressly unallowable cost” (which we quoted in our first article, link above). If we can paraphrase the learned practitioners at Crowell & Moring, their beef is that CAS 405 says that an “expressly unallowable cost” is just that – a cost that is expressly named in the regulations as being unallowable. In contrast, DCAA’s audit guidance says “In order for a cost to be expressly unallowable, the Government must show that it was unreasonable under all the circumstances for a person in the contractor’s position to conclude that the costs were allowable.”
That’s an interesting nuance and we agree that DCAA’s definition expands the CAS 405 definition. Continuing that thought a bit, it’s certainly not the first time that DCAA and the FAR Councils have reinterpreted the CAS regulations to their advantage. (Anybody else remember the rewrite of FAR 30.6?) We have opined on more than one occasion that interpretation of the CAS regulations is, by statute, reserved exclusively for the CAS Board. So in that light, DCAA’s interpretation is an unlawful action because the audit agency is interpreting CAS 405 when it lacks the statutory authority to do so.
The line of thought expressed above does not address the authority to interpret FAR 31.201-6 (“Accounting for Unallowable Costs”). That Cost Principle discusses expressly unallowable costs—though it carefully does not define them. It seems to us that it would be tough to argue that the FAR Councils and/or DCAA lack authority to interpret FAR 31.201-6. However, should their interpretation conflict with the CAS definition, then of course the CAS definition would control.
In sum, while we thought the two pieces of DCAA audit guidance were good things that would tend to reduce disputes over what is and what is not an expressly unallowable cost, the attorneys at Crowell & Moring thought they were fatally flawed and would tend to lead to more disputes.
Only time will tell which outcome will come to pass.
Resources for Fighting Fraud
We’ve not been shy about publicizing fraud and corruption in the defense acquisition environment. We’ve called out passive leadership, negligent leadership, and even actively corrupt leadership. We’ve called on public company senior leadership and Boards of Directors to invest in effective internal controls. We’ve called on the Secretary of Defense and the ranks of senior military officers to fight fraud and corruption. All in all, we’ve written nearly 50 articles that have something to do with internal controls, effective or otherwise.
Government auditors are taught to look for fraud and to report it when they find evidence of it. Indeed, they are taught to look for “fraud indicators” and are taught various fraud scenarios. While at times the training results in an attitude that goes a bit past “professional skepticism” and starts to look more like prejudgment, in point of fact there is enough wrongdoing by enough government contractors to justify an auditor’s sensitivity to fraud. The bottom line is that while some auditors take skepticism into the realm of adversarial bias, we as taxpayers very much want auditors to be looking for wrongdoing and to report it when they have evidence of it.
But more than that, we should want to create a culture of ethical decision-making and compliance. We should not wait for auditors to ferret out wrongdoing. We should not rely on after-the-fact audits to detect instances of fraud and corruption. We need to be fighting fraud on a regular basis, so that the auditors have nothing to find.
Another Apogee Axiom: You can’t audit an entity into compliance.
You cannot create a compliant state via audit.
The most an auditor can do is to detect instances of wrongdoing after they’ve occurred. When an auditor finds an instance of noncompliance, that means some individual or group of individuals chose not to comply. The organization created an environment where that person or those people felt it was okay to cut a corner or to do a little “gaming of the system.” Either the expectations weren’t made clear or the individuals didn’t receive appropriate training – or they ignored what they were told. In many cases, we suspect the individuals simply mimicked the behaviors they saw around them. Leadership set the example and the ranks mirrored it.
A study by the U.S. War College found that U.S. Army officers routinely lie. The study found “in the routine performance of their duties as leaders and commanders, U.S. Army officers lie.” That’s not us saying so; that’s the U.S. War College saying so in an official publication. CNN discussed the report, and wrote—
The study describes a ‘culture where deceptive information is both accepted and commonplace’ and where senior officials don't trust the information and data receive -- such as compliance with certain Army training requirements or forms outlining how a mission was carried out. But Army officers are faced with an increasing number of requirements and bureaucratic hoops, according to the study, and rather than work with a rigid military brass to reform a burdensome bureaucracy, officers will simply sidestep those requirements, lying on forms and often rationalizing their answers.
The result? ‘Officers become ethically numb,’ explains the study … ‘Eventually, their signature and word become tools to maneuver through the Army bureaucracy rather than symbols of integrity and honesty,’ the researchers wrote. ‘This desensitization dilutes the seriousness of an officer's word and allows what should be an ethical decision to fade into just another way the Army does business.’
And if military officers routinely engage in lies and deception, should we be surprised at the number of instances of bribery and corruption in the enlisted ranks being reported by the DoD Inspector General? And should we be surprised if the contractors start to mimic the behavior of their military customers, if only to survive?
Well, yes. We should be surprised. We should be surprised and appalled. But we’re not. Not really. We’re numb and a bit blasé to the notion of corruption within the Department of Defense and its contractors. It’s become the norm, hasn’t it? We have become so used to DoD IG auditors and DCAA Auditors and fraud investigators finding instances of fraud and corruption that we no longer question the source.
But you can’t audit an entity into compliance.
You can’t make employees accurately report time by conducting frequent timesheet audits and reporting instances of noncompliance. You can’t make buyers conduct a good source evaluation and selection by reviewing purchasing files months after the fact. You can’t detect bribes and kickbacks by making people fill out a form once a year.
You want an ethical cultural where compliance with expected standards is the norm? You’ve got to work for it. You’ve got to communicate expectations and train people. You’ve got to deploy rigorous internal controls. And most importantly, you’ve got to hold people of all ranks accountable for their decisions.
Creating an ethical culture is not the province of auditors; it’s the province of leadership. And academics studying leadership also study ethical cultures.
In one academic article, we read the following –
Individuals' intentions to report the ethical violations of others are also related to moral agency. If unethical behavior is to be addressed in organizations, authority figures must know about it and therefore must set conditions to promote follower reporting. Followers tend to keep their knowledge of ethical problems to themselves for a number of reasons, including fear of retaliation, a sense that nothing will be done, or habituation to silence in authority situations (Detert & Edmondson, 2011;Kish-Gephart, Detert, Treviño, & Edmondson, 2010). Ethical leadership and a strong ethical culture can be expected to enhance followers' willingness to speak up because they are more likely to feel protected from retaliation and to believe that positive actions will be taken to address their concern.
In sum, there are resources and people who can help guide cultures toward a state of compliance, but it won’t be the auditors leading the journey. Auditors exist to detect instances of noncompliance that the culture created, either through action or inaction. But until an entity, organization or culture reaches the desired state of ethical decision-making and compliance, auditors are all we’ve got.
And thus the need for resources to help auditors detect fraud, such as this great site hosted by the DoD Inspector General. The DoD IG site contains lots of resources for fighting fraud, including “Red Flags and Indicators,” “Contract Audit Fraud Scenarios and Resources,” and “Other Fraud Scenarios and Indicators.” Granted, some of the scenarios and indicators are intended for governmental use but they can be easily tailored for use by contractors.
There is even a set of quizzes to test one’s “Fraud IQ”. Go on, take the quizzes. You take all those quizzes on Facebook, don’t you?
But that’s not all.
We also found an Air Force Procurement Fraud Indicators Handbook, written in 2008. We located a 2012 PowerPoint slide deck from a presentation made by Jim Ratley (ACFE) to the Institute of Internal Auditors entitled Corporate Fraud Awareness in Today’s Global Regulated Environment. And we also dug up a book by the OIG of the National Science Foundation called Possible Grant Fraud Indicators.
And those were all returned within the first ten hits of a Google search using the phrase “fraud indicators.” We did not even look at the other 60 million hits Google returned.
The point is that there are many, many resources available for fighting fraud and corruption. And such resources need not be used only by auditors. They can – they must be – used by organizational leadership to drive behavior and decision-making toward a state where ethics and compliance is simply a part of the entity’s culture.
The resources to fight fraud and corruption are readily available.
But is the willingness?
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