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Apogee Consulting Inc

Fuel Fiasco Costs Lockheed Martin $2 Million

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On March 27, 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that Lockheed Martin had agreed to pay $2 million to settle allegations that it overbilled the government for fuel.

According to the DoJ press release—

Between 2006 and 2013, Lockheed manufactured C-130s for the U.S. Air Force at its Marietta facility. Pursuant to the underlying contracts, the Government provided Lockheed with up to 22,000 gallons of fuel (characterized as government furnished property or ‘GFP’) per aircraft, which could be used for the engine runs, fuel operations and test flights necessary to manufacture C-130s. Once Lockheed exhausted its 22,000 gallon allotment on a particular aircraft, Lockheed, not the Government, was financially responsible for any additional fuel.

However, the Government’s investigation indicated that between 2006 and 2013, Lockheed routinely used fuel in excess of the 22,000 gallons, but failed to reimburse the government for the excess. Additionally, the evidence suggests that Lockheed used the fuel on other unrelated projects, where the government was either not a party, or had not agreed to furnish fuel.

Two million dollars is not a large settlement, as these things go. Two million dollars is a small settlement compared, for instance, to the $27.5 million settlement between Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems and the U.S. Government announced on December 19, 2014. In fact, a settlement of $2 million is rather trivial and hardly compensates the taxpayers for the “tireless investigative efforts of DCIS agents working closely with our Air Force OSI partners,” who “sifted through and unwound dense and complicated data to reveal the overcharges.” We suspect that the executives at Lockheed Martin consider the settlement a victory rather than a loss.

So if it’s so trivial, why are we writing about it?

Well, we were interested in the cost accounting aspects of such a fungible commodity as fuel.

Think about it.

The Department of Defense gives Lockheed Martin 22,000 gallons of fuel per aircraft. That is to say, Lockheed agrees not to include fuel prices into the cost of its aircraft and the Pentagon agrees to provide Lockheed with the fuel it needs, up to 22,000 gallons per aircraft under contract. Some aircraft will need more fuel; others will need less. But any needs beyond 22,000 would be on Lockheed’s dime.

How would you account for that?

First thing would be to account for the incoming fuel. Fuel, of course, is a fungible commodity in that each gallon is indistinguishable from every other gallon. So we assume Lockheed has a great big fuel tank where the fuel is stored. The government “deposits” 22,000 gallons of fuel into that tank each time a new aircraft is ordered.

But Lockheed has fuel needs beyond just the 22,000 per C-130 aircraft. It has commercial sales and IR&D projects and who knows what else going on. It might need more fuel because, in some circumstances, 22,000 gallons will be insufficient for its C-130 needs. What should it do? Does it set up a separate fuel tank for each project, or does it do the smart thing and just put all the fuel in one big tank, knowing that so much is GFP fuel and the rest is its fuel.

We would hope that all the fuel would be commingled together and used as necessary. That’s what makes the most business sense, and it avoids the need to build separate fuel tanks for each need—the cost of which would be allowable overhead to be passed on to government customers. If we were Lockheed, we would put all the fuel into one big tank.The tank would have both GFP fuel and fuel we purchased on our own dime. Then when we fueled-up our aircraft, the C-130s would get whatever amount they needed and any "extra" fuel above the planned 22,000 gallon amount would have been paid for by us. Similarly, as we drew fuel for IR&D and commercial needs, that would be our fuel as well. We'd buy the fuel on overhead since we could get a volume discount (versus buying fuel one program at a time) and because it would be very difficult to estimate how much fuel might be used (and by whom) ahead of time. Much easier to buy the fuel on overhead and simply make it a cost of production.

But apparently somebody had a problem with that approach (assuming that’s what Lockheed did). We suspect the argument went something like this:

When Lockheed Martin commingled all its fuel together, it lost accountability for the GFP fuel. It drew fuel as needed, so that nobody knows whether it used more, or less, fuel than was provided to it by the DoD. Nobody knows whether there is left-over fuel that is still the property of DoD, so DoD cannot value any fuel for purposes of getting clean financial statements. More to the point, Lockheed has been accepting 22,000 gallons of fuel for each C-130 aircraft, but there is no way to tell if that was the correct amount. Maybe Lockheed only needed 20,000 gallons of fuel, and it used the extra 2,000 for its own nefarious purposes. How can we tell? And how can Lockheed Martin prove it didn’t divert the GFP fuel since it’s all commingled together?

If a single C-130 aircraft needed more fuel than its allotment of 22,000 gallons, shouldn’t Lockheed have charged the cost of the additional fuel directly to the benefitting contract? Did it do so, or did it just charge its fuel needs to overhead? Because if you think the excess fuel costs should have been direct-charged and that those direct charges would have been non-reimbursable by contract terms, then shifting those costs to overhead would have looked like an attempt to avoid a contract loss by shifting unallowable direct costs into an allowable overhead charge.

Which might have been perceived as being fraud and resulted in a tireless investigation that tried to distinguish fungible fuel costs by cost object, a difficult undertaking in the best of circumstances.

Now the foregoing is quite a lot of suppositions and assumptions, and it’s probably presumptuous of us to create such a hypothetical from such a paltry lack of information. Nevertheless …

The lesson here is that, sometimes, what makes good business sense does not work out well in government contract cost accounting. The lesson is true even if we’ve gotten our facts mixed up and built a chain of suppositions into a completely wrong hypothetical. Regardless of the validity of the facts which we've essentially created out of nothing, it would make good business sense – and result in cost avoidance – to commingle fuel. But when that fuel was drawn and used, it would require a certain degree of diligence in identifying where that fuel was being used. Failure to maintain an accurate usage log, and appropriately allocate fuel costs to the users based on that log, could lead to downstream problems.

When business people encounter government contract cost accounting rules for the first time, they tend to react poorly. The rules are not logical. They are not self-consistent. And they can sometimes penalize, instead of reward, innovation and cost avoidance. Thus, the real lesson here is that management decisions need to be first vetted with subject matter experts in relevant areas. In this case, before Lockheed Martin decided to commingle fuel, government accountants and property administrators should have been consulted to see if there were any risks or additional steps that needed to be taken. It might have seemed like an obviously smart move to save money by commingling fuel, but it ended-up costing Lockheed Martin $2 million plus an unknown amount of legal fees.

 

The CAS Board Has Gone Missing

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Back_SoonSome of the most difficult compliance requirements in government contract cost accounting are found in the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). The CAS not only include 19 individual Standards but also include specific regulations, implemented by contract clauses. Moreover, many of the Standards are invoked by the FAR Part 31 Cost Principles, such that in order for costs to be allowable, the contractor must have accounted for them in accordance with the applicable Standard.

CAS is a big deal. It is an onerous set of requirements, requirements that are both difficult to understand and difficult to implement well. In theory, CAS compliance is reserved for the largest of government contractors, since a “trigger contract” valued at a minimum of $7.5 million must be awarded before CAS kicks-in. In addition, contractors that qualify as small businesses are, by regulation, exempt from CAS. However, as noted above the Cost Principles invoke CAS compliance as a condition of allowability, so a contractor of any size that has a cost-type contract must contend with some aspects of CAS.

Further, DCAA (and by extension DCMA) tends to take a “conservative” approach to contract valuation, leading to situations where award of an ID/IQ contract with a high-dollar ceiling may be sufficient to trigger CAS. (We wrote about the valuation of ID/IQ-type contracts here.)

Given the importance of CAS to government contractors, you’d think that the governance group that oversees the CAS regulations would be active, seeking to address contractor concerns with the complex and onerous rules. You would be wrong.

We visited the CAS site recently and we were dismayed at what we found.

The first thing we noticed is that you can’t find the CAS site on the front page of the OFPP website. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy is the group that manages the CAS Board; the OFPP Administrator is Chair of the CAS Board. But OFPP’s lack of focus on CAS matters is evidenced by the fact that there is no link on the OFPP site that mentions CAS. Instead, you need to click on “Policy Information by Topical Areas” in order to find a link to the CAS site.

When you get to the CAS site, you get to see the current members of the CAS Board. According to the CAS site (as of 3/29/2015), members of the CAS Board include:

  • Joseph Jordan, Chair

  • Patrick Fitzgerald, DCAA

  • Laurie Schmidgall, Boeing

  • Kathleen Turco, GSA

  • Richard Wall, former Partner, Ernst & Young

The foregoing list of members is obviously out of date. Joe Jordan resigned from OFPP in December of 2013, nearly 18 months ago. His replacement, Ms. Anne Rung, was confirmed in December of 2014—a full 90 days ago. Yet there is no mention of Ms. Rung as the new CAS Board Chair to be found on the CAS site.

Patrick Fitzgerald left DCAA in August of 2014, nearly nine month ago. His replacement, Ms. Anita Bales, was named shortly thereafter. Yet there is no mention of Ms. Bales as the new DCAA representative to the CAS Board to be found on the CAS site.

Kathleen Turco left GSA in May, 2013. She now works at the Veteran’s Administration. There is no indication who replaced her as GSA representative to the CAS Board.

If three out of five CAS Board members are wrong, and the list of CAS Board members has been wrong for many months, what does that say about the importance of the CAS Board to the OFPP and to the Obama Administration?

Similarly, the list of CAS Board meetings indicates that the last meeting took place in October, 2011. According to the official CAS site, the CAS Board has not met in nearly 4 years.

According to the CAS site, the last time the CAS Board issued a Federal Register notice was in July, 2013, when they called for public input into potential revisions to CAS 413. Indeed, the site indicates that public input was received on that issue. The site does not indicate what was done with that input.

This could all be the result of a lack of updating, we presume. Maybe there are no funds to pay a contractor to take 15 minutes and post recent meeting minutes or to take another 15 minutes to update the list of CAS Board members. That’s certainly a possibility.

Yet websites get updated all the time. The OFPP website gets updated frequently, Ms. Rung is certainly active, as we’ve noted before. Ms. Bales is certainly active and the DCAA website has published new MRDs since her ascension to Directorship (though to be candid we wish the DCAA website would be updated more frequently than it is). So even if the root cause of lack of currency is an inability to update the website, that inability would seem to be itself a symptom of a lack of focus on the CAS Board.

And that’s our thing in this article. The CAS Board needs to be active. The CAS Board needs to be soliciting input. There are real challenges that need to be addressed. For instance, we need a definition of “increased costs in the aggregate” and we need to know whether the CAS Board accepts that the FAR Council took on the role of defining CAS rules, regulations and terms with respect to the 2005 revisions to FAR Part 30.6 and related CAS clauses. Does the CAS Board agree that concurrent changes in cost accounting practice must be calculated independently, without any offsets?

We need a workable approach to determining the value of an ID/IQ-type contract for CAS purposes. We need to take a look at the $700,000 floor for CAS coverage to see whether imposing the CAS requirements on such tiny contracts is in the best interests of the taxpayers.

There are a lot of things the CAS Board could be doing, but we’re not hearing about any of it, nor does the CAS site indicate that anything is happening. And that’s a real problem, in our view.

The other side of the coin, of course, is that maybe we shouldn’t want an active CAS Board. Maybe we should let the sleeping dogs lie where they are asleep, because the last time the CAS Board got active we got some disturbing results. Indeed, there is a strong position that is based on the notion that anytime the CAS Board does anything, it results in bad news for contractors. Under that theory, we should be careful what we ask for, because we may just get it.

If what you want is a do-nothing CAS Board Chaired by an OFPP Administrator whose focus is elsewhere, you should be very happy with the status quo. Because that’s exactly what it looks like to us.

 

Sanders Teaching “Accounting System Compliance” Course in May 2015

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Those of you who know Nick also know that for many years he taught courses for Federal Publications Seminars (FedPubs). Notably, he not only taught various courses (including the Masters Institute in Government Contract Accounting), but also coordinated and managed the course content for the very popular “Government Contract Accounting” course, which is a two-day immersion into cost accounting, proposal pricing, and regulatory compliance. Nick has also taught for Public Contracting Institute, UCLA Extension, and other government contracting related institutions.

For those interested, Nick has accepted an offer to join the staff of Government Contracts Training Institute, Inc. (GCTII) to instruct the course “Accounting System Compliance for Federal Contractors”. The two-day course will be held in downtown San Diego, May 20-21, 2015. A link to the seminar description is provided here. “The seminar will not only cover the detailed DFARS accounting system criteria and DCAA's audit approach, it will also cover compliance methodologies and tools“.

Nick’s first-hand experience with DCAA audits of contractor accounting systems is nearly unparalleled. He has provided advice and assistance to contractors of all sizes, in diverse industries, in dealing with DCAA accounting system reviews and in turning-around adverse findings. He participated in the very first “pilot project” accounting system review performed by DCAA under the new audit approach. He has organized internal review teams to map practices to DFARS business system adequacy criteria to proactively assure compliance. He continues to work business system adequacy issues to this day. There are few practitioners who have as much experience with business system adequacy—including accounting system adequacy—as Nick does.

The cost of the two-day course is $1,095, with a discount being offered (for two or more registrants from the same entity who register at the same time). A link to the registration page is provided here.

So here’s the deal. There are more than 800 articles on this blog, almost all of which were written personally by Nick Sanders. If you think that breadth and depth of understanding might lead to a good transfer of knowledge, you may want to check out GCTII and the upcoming course, and see if you can put your backside into a sunny San Diego seat.

If you like what you read in this blog—the sarcasm, the humor, the pointed calling out of Those In Charge for their lack of accountability, you might also like Nick’s approach to teaching, which includes all of that stuff and more. If you’ve disagreed with what you’ve read in this blog and wanted to bring your counter-arguments to the table, you might want to avail yourself of this opportunity. Nick does not teach as much as he used to (or as much as he would wish to). Accordingly, this is going to be one of the few opportunities in 2015 to engage with Nick face-to-face (or mano a mano, if you will).

On behalf of Apogee Consulting, Inc. and Government Contracts Training Institute, Inc., we very much hope to see you there.

 

GAO Issues Report Card on Better Buying Power

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Report_CardRecently we have expressed some doubts about the ultimate ability of the DoD’s acquisition reform efforts – dubbed “Better Buying Power” – to change the defense acquisition marketplace in a fundamental and long-lasting manner. Rather than a gradual evolution towards more efficient practices, we think a radical revolution is called for. But that’s just an opinion. What might be more helpful is a more objective analysis of how well BBP has accomplished its stated goals in the four years since its inception. GAO recently issued such a report card.

But before we get into the GAO report card, let’s first recall how we got here.

It all started in May, 2010, with then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates calling for reforms to DoD in order to increase affordability. He called for trimming $101 billion from the Pentagon’s budget, based on those reforms. Notably, SECDEF Gates did not focus on acquisition reforms, nor did he focus on trimming contractor costs. Instead, he called out the Department of Defense itself.

He stated, “The changes we have made in the procurement arena represent an important start. But only a start. More is needed – much more. The Defense Department must take a hard look at every aspect of how it is organized, staffed, and operated – indeed, every aspect of how it does business.”

SECDEF Gates called for reforms to the Pentagon’s budget practices. He said “no real progress toward savings will be possible without reforming our budgeting practices and assumptions. Too often budgets are divied up and doled out every year as a straight line projection of what was spent the year before. Very rarely is the activity funded in these areas ever fundamentally re-examined – either in terms of quantity, type, or whether it should be conducted at all. That needs to change.”

SECDEF Gates called for significant reductions to Pentagon overhead and middle management. He said “Another category ripe for scrutiny should be overhead – all the activity and bureaucracy that supports the military mission. According to an estimate by the Defense Business Board, overhead, broadly defined, makes up roughly 40 percent of the Department’s budget. … Almost a decade ago, Secretary Rumsfeld lamented that there were 17 levels of staff between him and a line officer. The Defense Business Board recently estimated that in some cases the gap between me and an action officer may be as high as 30 layers.”

SECDEF Gates called for changes to how the DoD identifies requirements. He said “this Department’s approach to requirements must change. Before making claims of requirements not being met or alleged ‘gaps’ – in ships, tactical fighters, personnel, or anything else – we need to evaluate the criteria upon which requirements are based and the wider real world context. For example, should we really be up in arms over a temporary projected shortfall of about 100 Navy and Marine strike fighters relative to the number of carrier wings, when America’s military possesses more than 3,200 tactical combat aircraft of all kinds? Does the number of warships we have and are building really put America at risk when the U.S. battle fleet is larger than the next 13 navies combined, 11 of which belong to allies and partners? Is it a dire threat that by 2020 the United States will have only 20 times more advanced stealth fighters than China?”

Finally, SECDEF Gates issued this order to the team that reported to him: “I am directing the military services, the joint staff, the major functional and regional commands, and the civilian side of the Pentagon to take a hard, unsparing look at how they operate – in substance and style alike. The goal is to cut our overhead costs and to transfer those savings to force structure and modernization within the programmed budget. In other words, to convert sufficient ‘tail’ to ‘tooth’ to provide the equivalent of the roughly two to three percent real growth – resources needed to sustain our combat power at a time of war and make investments to prepare for an uncertain future. Simply taking a few percent off the top of everything on a one-time basis will not do. These savings must stem from root-and-branch changes that can be sustained and added to over time.”

He memorialized his direction in an August 2010 memo (which you can find in the Knowledge portion of our website). That memo contained roughly 20 individual initiatives, ranging from “Freeze the number of senior executive positions in the defense intelligence organizations” to “Freeze the overall number of DoD-required oversight reports” to “Reduce by 10 percent per year … funding for support service contractors.”

So naturally, the first order of business was to focus on the contractors.

Then-Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn told industry leaders that he expected two-thirds of the cuts ($66 billion) to come from support programs. Meanwhile, then-USD (AT&L) Dr. Ash Carter (now SECDEF Ash Carter) met with industry leaders “to discuss policy, process and workforce changes that will help the Defense Department buy things more efficiently.” Dr. Carter released the first “Better Buying Power” memo during that same timeframe.

It’s worth remembering the full title of Dr. Carter’s first BBP memo – “Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending.” The first BBP (BBP 1.0) was entirely focused on acquisition. It included the following initiatives:

  • Phase-out award-fee contracts and favor fixed-price or cost-type incentive contracts …

  • Phase-out Time and Material and sole-source ID/IQ contracts wherever possible.

  • Identify and eliminate non-value-added overhead and G&A charged to contracts.

  • Limit B&P allowable costs in sole source contracts and encourage effective use of IRAD.

  • Adopt ‘should-cost’ and ‘will-cost’ management to inform managing of programs to cost objectives.

  • Improve consistency and quality of government audits, and focus them on value-added content.

  • Mandate affordability as a [contract award] requirement by having cost considerations shape requirements and design.

But it quickly became clear that the Gates-directed initiatives were actually two initiatives. One was focused on the Pentagon and the other was focused on the Pentagon’s contractors. Over time, the internal initiative seems to have faded away, but the contractor-focused initiative is still around—though it has gone through several reincarnations since 2010.

The first BBP incarnation focused solely on contractors was described in a guidance “roadmap” issued by Dr. Carter in September, 2010. It included five lines of attack intended to reduce Defense acquisition costs. The five vectors were—

  • Target Affordability and Control Cost Growth

  • Incentivize Productivity & Innovation in Industry

  • Promote Real Competition

  • Improve Tradecraft in Services Acquisition

  • Reduce Non-Productive Processes and Bureaucracy

Dr. Carter issued another 17 page BBP memo entitled “Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending” that accompanied his roadmap. It contained 23 principal actions designed to accomplish his goals of increasing both efficiency and productivity.

About a year after all this went down, Mr. Shay Assad departed his role as Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) for a new position called Director, Defense Pricing. As was reported at the time by Federal Computer Week—

David Berteau, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, said Assad's new position will help reverse 15 years or more of a decline in managing defense contracts and controlling prices. Such a position is long overdue and will have lasting value for DOD. ‘It is central to the success of Carter's initiatives,’ he said.‘ But more importantly, it will have benefits across all $360 billion of DOD contract dollars.’

DefenseNews reported—

The creation of the new position is part of the Pentagon's quest to drive down the cost of weapons at a time when defense budgets are constricting. In his new role, Assad will help program managers hit these should-cost targets, which will be set at levels less than official budget estimates.

In addition, he will spend more time improving the contracting and pricing work forces in ‘improving their skills on what it is we pay on the goods and services we buy.’

Assad’s first focus, according to all reports, was on increasing the affordability of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, the most expensive defense acquisition in history.

Flash-forward another year or so, to November, 2012. That was when BBP 2.0 was released by the new USD (AT&L), Mr. Frank Kendall. BBP 2.0 encompassed “36 initiatives that are organized into seven focus areas.” The seven focus areas included—

  • Achieve affordable programs

  • Control costs throughout the product lifecycle

  • Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in industry and government

  • Eliminate unproductive processes and bureaucracy

  • Promote effective competition

  • Improve tradecraft in acquisition of services

  • Improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce

Note that the primary focus was, once again, on acquisition. Notably, BBP 2.0 added a focus on the acquisition workforce itself. In addition, USD (AT&L) Kendall noted a focus on helping DCAA reduce its audit backlogs.

About six months later, USD (A&TL) Kendall issued additional implementing guidance, which we quickly dubbed BBP 2.1. The guidance focused on implementing “should-cost” and on identifying Low-Value Added (LVA) activities. It also noted that contractor profit could be used to motivate contractor performance. It said “Traditionally, the Government’s objective position for contract profitability has been a function of perceived risk and the anticipated value to be achieved by successful contract performance. DoD profit policy and our acquisition strategies should provide effective incentives to industry to deliver cost-effective solutions in which realized profitability is aligned and consistent with contract outcomes.”

The guidance also announced that “have worked with DCAA and we agreed upon goals for the Agency to reduce the current incurred cost backlog by the end of FY2014 and achieve a steady state on all incurred cost audits (defined as 2 years’ worth of incurred cost inventory) by the end of FY2016.”

The guidance also announced the creation of the “Superior Supplier Incentive Program,” in which top-performing suppliers would “receive more favorable contract terms and conditions” in their contracts. DCAA also agreed to implement low-risk sampling plans for those top-performers.

Now, as SECDEF Dr. Ash Carter and his team are about to unveil BBP 3.0, the Government Accountability Office has issued a report card on the results to date.

In the words of the GAO –

The size and cost of the portfolio is currently the lowest in a decade. The decrease in current portfolio cost is due primarily to significant quantity decreases on two programs—most other programs actually experienced a cost increase over the past year. The average time to deliver initial capability to the warfighter also increased by over 1 month. Forty-one programs in the portfolio lost buying power during the past year resulting in $5.3 billion in additional costs, a contrast to the buying power gains seen in GAO’s prior assessments. The F-35, the costliest program in the portfolio, epitomizes this loss in buying power as its costs have risen over the past year without any change in quantity, meaning it is paying more for the same amount of capability

GAO reviewed 78 DoD programs. 41 of the 78 lost buying power and four had no changes to buying power. (Buying power being defined as the cost for the same quantity. Programs that paid more for the same quantity lost buying power, while programs that paid less for the same quantity gained buying power.) Remember, we linked to the GAO report in the first paragraph of this article.)

Let us add to the GAO’s report.

Shay Assad’s focus on the F-35 program over the past two years has not resulted in an increased buying power, though we admit his focus may have improved results from what they otherwise would have been.

DCAA backlog has improved, though the result was obtained by resorting to bureaucratic tricks such as declaring contractor proposals inadequate and then closing out assignments.

The Superior Supplier Incentive program identified the top-performing contractors – who were also the largest contractors – but granted them no preferential treatment. DCAA did not implement low-risk sampling audit plans as the result of being so designated.

Innovation continues to lag and everybody is very, very concerned.

All those back-office Pentagon positions that SECDEF Gates froze? Yeah, the Pentagon added 15% new positions.

In a nutshell, BBP has proven to be a bust. As we’ve reported more than once, adding more processes to fix processes is not really ever going to work. It’s a bureaucrat’s approach.

We don’t need more bureaucrats.

We need demolition specialists.

 

Saboteurs of Innovation

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SaboteursFederal contracting is all about statutes, regulations, and contract terms. We’re talking about public laws, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (and other agency supplements), Schedule H, Schedule I, and Schedule K Reps and Certs, just to name a few. These are complex and often ambiguous rules that tell a contractor what to do and how to do it. They set the expectations. Importantly, they tell contractors what may not be done. They are behavioral constraints.

If you are a Federal employee working in the defense acquisition arena, there are even more prescriptions to follow. There are public laws that apply to Federal acquisitions but not to contractors (e.g., the Competition in Contracting Act). There are agency policies and procedures and guidance to worry about. There are local office rules to follow. Legal input must be solicited and followed. For auditors, there is GAGAS and the Contract Audit Manual and the latest Memorandum for Regional Directors—all of which must be complied with. Failure to adhere to any of these prescriptive rules subjects an individual to career-threatening criticism and, in extreme cases, to personal liability.

There are cadres of auditors, investigators, and reviewers that monitor actions at every step in the Federal procurement process. We are talking about the Government Accountability Office, the agency Inspectors General, the GAO bid protest forum, the Boards of Contract Appeals, and the Court of Federal Claims. There are auditors to audit the auditors, and hordes of lawyers eager to file suit on behalf of any company (or individual) who deems any action (or inaction) to have been inequitable or in noncompliance with the codified standards of behavior in the Federal marketplace.

It’s a tough environment in which to operate.

We have not been shy about pointing out the layers upon layers of bureaucracy in the modern Federal acquisition environment. We have published our opinion and the quoted the opinions of academics and learned practitioners and corporate executives, and even linked to a report by the Defense Science Board that all said the same thing: The warfighter is being ill-served by a system that is as far from agile and flexible as one can imagine in the United States. The only way to fast-track development of a new weapon system is to grant an organization extraordinary “rapid acquisition authority” powers that, in essence, gives official sanction to the flouting of the rules that everybody else is expected to follow.

It’s universally understood that the current acquisition environment is untenable. Speaking at his swearing-in ceremony, the 25th Secretary of Defense, Ash Carter, stated—

With budgets tightening and technology and globalization revolutionizing how the world works, the Pentagon has an opportunity to open itself to new ways of operating, recruiting, buying, innovating and much more. America is home to the world’s most dynamic businesses and universities. We have to think outside this five-sided box and be open to their best practices, ideas and technologies.

Innovation is the new buzzword, and the Pentagon is focusing on it more and more. The Obama Administration GFY 2016 budget request envisions spending literally billions of dollars on a “National Network for Manufacturing Innovation,” according to this article. The DoD has requested a NNMI budget increase to $137 million. For comparison purposes, the Pentagon spent $14 million on NNMI in GFY 2014 and $71 million in GFY 2015. And the DoD is not the biggest spender of NNMI funds.

Despite the emphasis on technological innovation, there are doubts whether the entrenched bureaucracy at the Pentagon, Fort Lee and Fort Belvoir will be able to support the necessary changes. We’ve written about this issue several times, including here. In this article we explored some reasons why non-traditional defense contractors are reluctant to contract with DoD, and we noted that the recent calls for “less cumbersome” procurement practices of private industry have a long and time-honored pedigree. Suffice it to say that we have our doubts.

Moving beyond our pointed and public doubts that the current acquisition workforce and its leadership are, in the main, ready to support disruptive innovation in both technology and the means by which innovative technology is acquired, we have published many articles on this site that question whether DCMA (and especially DCAA) truly have the best interests of the taxpayers at heart. In one 2012 blog article we wrote—

Make no mistake: the current government acquisition environment is broken almost beyond repair. While the finger of blame can point in many directions and at many individuals, we cannot escape our firm conviction that the biggest slice of the blame pie should be served a la mode to the Defense Contract Audit Agency, who (as an agency) seems to be actively and with malice aforethought trying to sabotage the defense acquisition machinery.

In another blog article from 2010 we discussed the “conservatism” of DCAA and DCMA, and wrote—

Ever since DCAA came under fire from nearly every stakeholder in the defense acquisition process, it has reacted by circling the wagons, battening-down the hatches, and hunkering down while waiting for the political firestorm to pass. Auditors must now document every audit step (including audit steps not taken) to a demanding level of detail. And multiple layers of management review every aspect of the audit before a draft report is issued to the contractor. … The effect of such behavior on the acquisition process is clear: DCAA is now issuing fewer audit reports, and those it does issue take dramatically longer to reach the customers. …

Not to be outdone by DCAA’s ‘conservatism,’ the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) has instituted multiple ‘Boards of Review’ (BoRs) that must be convened to review and approve key Contracting Officer decisions before they are implemented. As a result, Contracting Officers are subject to a vastly increased workload (as they must document and prepare for multiple BoRs), while being simultaneously hamstrung, since they cannot issue decisions without the required approvals. What used to take 60 or 90 days, now takes a C.O. as much as six or nine months—and that’s assuming all the required BoRs approve the proposed action. We’ve heard of one situation where three separate BoRs (meeting over many months) approved a proposed action, but that the proposed action subsequently was disapproved at the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) level and remanded back to the C.O. for a redo.

The DOD acquisition system is breaking-down, gentle readers, and we’re watching it happen in slow motion, just like a train-wreck shown on a reality TV show. But perhaps that’s getting a bit overly dramatic, so let’s get to the meat of this article. Here’s the punchline: If you thought the process was slow now, you ain’t seen nothing yet.

So the creeping bureaucracy and its impact on the acquisition environment have been subjects of conversation and blog articles almost since the inception of this site in 2009; not that anybody in power ever read those articles or, you know, actually tried the kind of acquisition revolution that most observers feel is necessary. We’ll wrap this up by quoting from a comment posted publicly on LinkedIn by a member of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in March, 2015:

Many agency acquisition offices are decimated due to retirements, budget cuts, lack of recognition by senior leadership in the importance of acquisition, and the inability to be flexible in hiring the appropriate number of trained and experienced personnel to meet workload demands. Operational resources suffer at the expense of headquarter girth and inefficient management practices and the constant drone of requests for data, reviews, and briefings. Acquisition has turned into a by-product and an after-thought. But the red tape, the bureaucracy, and the work, continues to grow. I could go on and on about inefficient IT systems; leaders in positions with little experience or the wrong experience; poor acquisition strategy; poor acquisition planning and execution; inefficient oversight; wasteful programs; the list is endless. I couldn't agree more: The system is completely broken; and there is no band-aid that is going to fix it.

As we’ve noted, there are some contractors who honestly believe that the current system has been deliberately broken by DCMA and DCAA, whom (they assert) are motivated either by an anti-contractor animus or else by a misguided attempt to “save” taxpayer budget dollars by breaking the rules in order to extort money from contractors. Is extortion too strong a term? Well, the argument goes that the post-award actions lead contractors to a choice: either they must pay back earned contract billings in the form of “questioned costs” (including penalties and interest) or else they must proceed to lengthy and expensive litigation.

In one 2012 article we quoted from a blog written by a small business mired in lengthy and expensive litigation with the DoD. Some of the “lessons learned” by that small contractor included the following advice to other small technology companies contemplating accepting Defense funds:

The biggest mistake many entrepreneurs new to the government contracting game make is to think DCAA has, or under any miraculous set of circumstances, will have even an iota of interest in your success. I promise you … that a DCAA auditor that consistently does not find ‘something wrong’ with contractor cost calculations will probably be banished to the children’s table at their annual agency picnic! Same is true, though with a twist, of DCMA staff, particularly the Administrative Contracting Officers or the ACOs. An ACO who fails to perform as a de facto employee of DCAA and follow the auditor ‘recommendations’ will probably not be invited to DCMA’s holiday party.

In retrospect, I am not sure if we should actually be surprised since the DCMA definitely and directly benefits from beating small businesses into submission and reducing their contract values. In my direct experience … most ACOs simply do not care enough about small businesses to do anything but try to get them off their ‘to do’ list as fast as possible. … In my direct experience, DCMA also intentionally fosters a defective management structure that promotes lackadaisical and inconsistent enforcement that breeds a contemptible lack of supervisory sophistication. … In short, in my direct experience, DCMA has intentionally structured a management environment that promotes and rewards incompetence by its staff, particularly the ACOs.

I would in fact venture as far as to say that you are NEVER done negotiating terms and pricing on any contract until it is closed. Up until then you should absolutely expect the government, through its duly authorized employees in DCAA and DCMA to focus on reducing your contract’s value – or the total amount you will ultimately receive on your contract regardless of what they themselves agreed to, either explicitly or implicitly. This is cheating.

… The bureaucrats you will be dealing with care only about what any bureaucrat cares about – stay under the radar, get the paycheck, and build the pension. These bureaucrats also do know that any contract dispute is likely to spend several years in the agency’s internal administrative processes before starting on a long and windy legal road. Given that it could take a decade or more before a dispute is resolved, most bureaucrats simply push it off on to the next guy. At least this has been our experience. And the guy who is stuck with you at the end of this musical ACO game is sure going to let you know just how unhappy s/he is that you do not simply submit to the bureaucrat’s will.

Throughout this ordeal, it has been my personal experience that DCMA staff are intentionally hostile and abusive – and they like it that way. It has also been my experience that there are absolutely no management controls in DCMA to rein in the type of abuse we have been subject to over the past FIVE , yes F-I-V-E years. How hard is it, we have continually wondered, to verify that ACO [Name Withheld] made an error and correct it?

There’s more where that came from, since that contractor is still litigating away, ever hopeful that the justice system will provide it with the justice it feels is its due. Did the contractor, who was an SBIR participant, come away from its interaction with DoD feeling bitter and ill-used? Of course. Did the contractor fail to comply with certain rules on cost accounting? Perhaps. We’ll have to see what the court says. But one thing is for sure: That small technology business will not be doing business with the DoD again. The warfighters have lost whatever innovative technology that SBIR contractor was going to develop. Moreover, that contractor has publicly warned other similar contractors--potential innovators all--that DoD is a bad customer.

The foregoing is obviously an extreme case, but is it really all that unusual? Nearly every defense contractor (and many contractors of other agencies) experience contract disputes at some point in the process. The larger the contractor, it seems, the more disputes are in process at any given time—and the more litigation, as well. Nearly every large government contractor spends large sums (mostly unallowable sums) on attorneys these days. It’s become just another cost of doing business with the Federal government.

That same OSD official who posted on LinkedIn also stated, “As badly as industry feels the crunch of red tape, bureaucracy and incompetence, we on the other side of the table share in the pain. The only difference is, industry gets to beef up its resources to meet the bureaucratic inefficiencies and pass the growing costs on to the taxpayer.”

We disagreed with that statement and offered the observation that “While it may be true that contractors have the ability to add to their resources … that ability is limited by the need to report a profit to the shareholders each quarter. To some extent the amount of expenses that they can incur is a zero-sum game, constrained by their sales.” Our statement is even more true in these days of “lowest-priced technically acceptable” and “reverse auction” acquisition strategies, where a small difference in price is often the difference between a win and second place. In other words, for most contractors who are struggling in this competitive sequestration-fueled budget environment, there is really very little opportunity to beef up resources to meet bureaucratic inefficiencies and onerous audit requirements. There is only a very limited opportunity to pass on such additional costs to the taxpayer, because there are no taxpayer funds to pay for them.

All bitterness aside, there is no question that DCMA and DCAA requirements drive contractors to add to their overhead costs. We’ve posted at least one article, citing an assertion from Lockheed Martin to that effect. The real question is whether contractors have the ability to pass that cost on to their customers, or if those additional costs only act to reduce shareholder profits. Others have asserted that the Pentagon could save as much as 20% of its acquisition costs, simply by being a better customer. Thus, it’s possible that additional costs may not be fully passed-on to the customers, but that any savings from improvements in business conditions would be. Something for the policy-makers to think about, perhaps?

Regardless of the foregoing, our first-hand experience is that almost all defense contractors are stuck in a quandary regarding how to spend their limited budget dollars. Do they hire more bean-counters or quality assurance inspectors? Do they hire more compliance staff to better respond to DCMA and DCAA information requests, or do they hire more engineers to think about future product improvements? Do they invest in their “business systems” to meet ambiguous and subjective DFARS requirements, or do they invest in their manufacturing systems to lower production costs? Do they spend their money litigating contract disputes or on performing R&D efforts? In a very real sense, contractors are faced with a zero-sum game and there are winners and losers at the budget table each year.

And too often, we assert, the taxpayers are the real losers here.

The more contractors have to comply with bureaucratic red tape, the less they are focusing on their real business objectives. The more they hire administrators, and back-office staff, and lawyers (both internal and external), the less they have available funds to invest in program execution and next generation technology. In a very real sense, the bureaucrats of DCMA and DCAA are choking the ability of the country to maintain its technological superiority, to invest in innovative R&D efforts, and to meet the needs of today’s and tomorrow’s warfighters.

Don’t believe us? Would you believe the testimony of Norm Augustine?

In 2011 testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Mr. Augustine warned lawmakers that “American firms spend over twice as much on litigation as on research.” As we wrote at the time—

[Augustine’s] statements identify wasteful practices that impede effective program management, and they … identify the cause of such waste—an acquisition environment that is excessively rigid, overly legalistic, and which suboptimizes almost every transaction because the interested parties are adversaries instead of partners.

That was in 2011. The same could have been written in 1916, or 2015. plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose

As the result of its prescriptive rules, bureaucracy, rigidity, and propensity to force its contractors into expensive litigation, the Department of Defense’s sponsored R&D efforts are measurably “the least efficient” among those of all Federal agencies, as measured by the number of patents filed per public research dollar, according to one study. Granted, many otherwise patentable ideas at the Pentagon and its contractors may be buried under layers of national security classification, but the study clearly shows the public good that comes from efficient taxpayer-funded R&D (including additional jobs and secondary R&D investments), and thus why freeing up contractor funds to keep innovating is good public policy. The study concludes as follows—

… if policymakers are interested in generating more high-skilled jobs, they should acknowledge the highly innovative nature and tangible returns from programs such as those at NIH, NSF, NIST, DOE and others, and place them on a predictable and sustainable budget path. That would represent an evidence-based policy to stimulate job creation for decades to come

There is one Federal agency notable for being omitted from the study’s conclusion—the Department of Defense. We assert that one significant cause for its omission is that its bureaucracy, overly prescriptive practices, and treatment of its contractors cause inefficiencies that impede innovation. We blame DCMA, DCAA, and senior policy-makers at the Pentagon. We’re quite sure those same individuals would point the finger back at Congress and its burdensome public laws and reporting requirements. We’re fairly sure we would hear about poor work environments where employees are strongly encouraged to follow the party line and the rules, and where they are not rewarded—and may even be punished—for risk-taking. We have no doubt that finger-pointing is justified.

As we’ve argued before, we don’t need any more studies of acquisition improvements. We don’t need any more bandaids on the broken system. We don’t need any more incremental improvements or any more gradual evolution using enhanced processes. We desperately need a complete shift in cultural paradigm—an acquisition revolution that throws out “the way it’s been done for the past 60 years” and replaces it with something new, something bold: something that works.

Who will lead that revolution?

Will it be you?

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.