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Apogee Consulting Inc

Cost and Price Analysis and the Contracting Officer

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Normally our perspective is that of the contractor, the commercial entity that enters into a contract with the Federal government and then has to figure out how to comply with a myriad of rules and regulations while at the same time delivering a product or service on time, on budget, and with the expected quality. It’s a tough job and not every company can navigate those rough waters, and so those companies often turn to consultants—such as Apogee Consulting, Inc.!—to assist them. Since that’s what we do, we naturally bias toward the contractor’s viewpoint. But not always.

Today we want to explore things from the perspective of a Navy Contracting Officer, a seasoned veteran nearing the end of a long civil service career, who was tasked with negotiating a $1 Billion contract for spare parts. It could have—and it should have—been the crowning moment of his career; yet events did not turn out that way. Instead of retiring on a high note, covered in glory, the Navy CO retreated under fire and faded away into obscurity.

The Naval Supply System Command Weapon Systems Support (WSS) was formerly known as the Naval Inventory Control Point. What does WSS do?

WSS provides Joint, Allied, Navy, and Marine Corps Forces program and supply support for Naval Weapons Systems. WSS maintains centralized control over more than 400,000 different line items of repair parts, components, and assemblies that keep ships, aircraft, and weapons operating, while also providing logistics and supply assistance. WSS is responsible for negotiating and procuring these parts from DoD contractors. It operates two primary sites in Mechanicsburg and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The Contracting Officer in question was located at the WSS site in Philadelphia, PA. He was tasked with negotiating a $1 Billion aircraft spare part contract with an unnamed prime contractor. As part of the process, the CO requested “field pricing assistance” from the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and, accordingly, DCAA issued Audit Report No. 02151-2010B27000001 on July 6, 2010. In that report, DCAA found that “the contractor’s proposal was not an adequate basis for establishing a fair and reasonable price.” In particular, DCAA found that $240 million of the proposed costs were “unsupported” because the prime contractor failed to obtain the required cost or pricing data from its subcontractors. In addition, DCAA questioned $17 million of proposed material costs, asserting that they were overstated because the contractor used “inflated escalation factors” and failed to decrement costs by the amount of vendor discounts. (We assume those discounts were related to payment terms but it’s not especially clear.)

Despite DCAA’s findings and recommendations, the WSS CO negotiated a firm, fixed-price contract for the spare parts. As part of the negotiations, the period of performance was reduced from 5 years to 3 years. The 40 percent reduction in duration resulted in a 42.4 percent reduction in price, such that the negotiated contract value was $576 million not $1 Billion as initially proposed. Apparently, the CO did not negotiate much if any other reductions to the proposed price. In particular, the CO never obtained the missing subcontractor cost or pricing data, and did not obtain price reductions for DCAA’s “questioned” costs. One might say that the CO simply ignored DCAA’s audit findings and negotiated the best deal he could.

What was the CO thinking? Were there schedule pressures on him, such that he couldn’t afford to wait for subcontractor cost or pricing data to be obtained and analyzed? Did he simply disagree with DCAA’s findings?

We do know that the CO wrote that he relied on the prime contractor’s “adequate” estimating system to justify his acceptance of the proposed subcontractor costs. “The contracting officer reasoned that the prime contractor’s [adequate] estimating system eliminated the need to comply with the cost or pricing data requirements.” That doesn’t sound right, even to us. Even though we keep hearing and reading that contractor business systems are the “first line of defense against fraud, waste, and abuse,” we’re pretty sure that having approved and adequate business systems don’t relieve anybody from having to comply with FAR requirements. It would be nice if they did; but they don’t. We expect a seasoned CO would have known that.

As is the case with so many actions in these centrally controlled days, the CO’s file was “peer reviewed” prior to contract award. Apparently, the peer review raised concerns as to whether the CO had adequately responded to the DCAA audit findings; however, those concerns didn’t stop the CO from finalizing the contract award, and those concerns didn’t stop the CO’s supervisor from approving the contract award. So much for peer reviews.

The CO’s approach must have ticked somebody off, because a complaint was filed on the DoD Inspector General Hotline—which is how we learned about this story.

As one might well expect, the DoD IG “substantiated the compliant.” The IG excoriated the CO for failing to obtain the required subcontractor cost or pricing data. The IG also criticized the CO for failing to follow DoD PGI 215.406(B)(1), which requires that disagreements over “significant” amounts of questions costs be resolved, or escalated for resolution. As we know, that didn’t happen in this case. The IG wrote—

The contracting officer had a responsibility to comply with regulatory requirements and appropriately consider the DCAA audit findings. By not fulfilling his responsibility, WSS was unable to adequately demonstrate that the resulting contract price of $576 million was fair and reasonable. The contracting officer could have potentially negotiated a lower contract value and achieved significant savings for the Government if he had appropriately considered DCAA’s findings.

The DoD IG made several recommendations aimed at preventing a recurrence of the situation. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition and Procurement) concurred with each of them. Among the recommendations was to “consider appropriate administrative action” to apply to the CO. The response to that recommendation was a concurrence with the notation that it would be impossible to do so, because the CO had retired before the IG’s report was issued.

And so we are reminded, once again, that this is a tough environment and nobody wins any awards for failing to comply with the complex web of statutes, rules and regulations. As tough as the contractors have it, sometimes the government employees have it just as tough, if not tougher.

 

End of an Era

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We weren’t there, but we are reliably informed that the modern era of Government Contract-related law started in 1958, when Gilbert A. Cuneo, Vice Chair of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) joined the law firm of Cummings & Sellers, establishing “the modern day practice of government contracts law.”

Mr. Cuneo must have done something right, because the firm eventually became known as Sellers, Conner & Cuneo. In 1980, that firm merged with McKenna & Fitting to become McKenna, Conner & Cuneo. Ten years later the firm was known as McKenna & Cuneo.

In 2002, McKenna & Cuneo merged with Long, Aldridge & Norman to form McKenna, Long & Aldridge LLP. By 2008 the MLA Government Contracts practice billed itself as “the largest” such practice in the United States. Besides the traditional Washington, D.C., location, MLA government contract attorneys could be found in Denver and Los Angeles, New York and San Diego. By 2015 there were 70 attorneys associated with the government contract practice.

On April 8, 2015, MLA merged with Dentons to become the world’s largest law firm.

But not everybody was happy with the merger. In particular, it seems that a number of MLA's Washington, D.C., government contract attorneys thought the merger was unhappy news.

According to this news story –

It now appears that McKenna will face a string of high-profile departures: In addition to Tosta, Big Law Business has learned from multiple sources that a group of up to 20 government contract, white collar defense and other lawyers primarily from its Washington, D.C. office plan to join Covington & Burling, and the former managing partner of the Los Angeles office, whose practice is focused on entertainment, plans to join Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman.

…

The lawyers joining Covington & Burling include Fred Levy, McKenna Long’s recent government contracts chairman, and Michael Scheininger, head of the firm’s white collar practice. A handful of the lawyers who are joining had voice messages that acknowledged their move to Covington, including Scheininger, and Ray Biagini, the head of McKenna’s product liability defense practice.

A press release on the Covington & Burlington website has this to say on the matter –

Covington is significantly expanding its government contracts practice with 20 lawyers from one of the nation’s top government contracts groups, including its former chair and leaders in contractor tort liability, bid protests, procurement fraud, trade secrets and employment.

The group of five partners and 15 other lawyers from McKenna, Long & Aldridge expands and deepens Covington’s capabilities across a range of government contracts matters. Frederic Levy, until recently the chair of McKenna’s government contracts practice, will serve as co-chair of Covington’s government contracts group with Alan Pemberton and Jennifer Plitsch.

These additions double the size of Covington’s government contracts group and place it among the nation’s largest. The work of the new lawyers runs the gamut from contract formation to bid protests to claims and internal investigations to tort litigation to False Claims Act litigation. Chambers has consistently ranked McKenna’s government contracts practice in its highest band, and the group that joined Covington includes most of that firm’s Chambers-rated lawyers in government contracts.

In addition to the other attorneys named, the press release noted that Herb Fenster, who had been with MLA (and prodecessor firms) for 55 years, was moving to Covington. Moreover, Sandy Hoe will be moving as well. In many ways, these names represent the heart and soul of the practice that Gil Cuneo created in 1958. That's not to say the remaining MLA government contract attorneys (which include, e.g., the illustrious Tom Lemmer in Denver and James Gallagher in Los Angeles) won't carry on the proud tradition; but we suspect it won't be the same.

We wish those attorneys moving to Covington well, of course. Still there is some sadness as well. It may well be the end of an era, an era where expertise in public contract law could jumpstart a large law firm and keep it going through difficult times.

 

The Quest for Innovation

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The_Quest_for_the_Holy_GrailInnovation is the in-vogue buzz-word these days, especially at the Department of Defense.

Dr. Ash Carter, Secretary of Defense, recently visited Silicon Valley in search of innovation.

The Hon. Frank Kendall, USD (AT&L) has announced a new initiative – Better Buying Power 3.0 – in order to mandate innovation.

The Pentagon announced it’s entering the venture capital business (via a company called In-Q-Tel) in order to invest in innovation.

We’ve written several articles on the topic, and we just finished speaking about it at the annual BDO/Public Contracting Institute Executive Seminar.

The concept of innovation is pervasive across not only the defense industrial base but also across the commercial industrial base. It’s a focal point in policy memos and on everybody’s lips in policy speeches.

It’s everywhere.

So let’s all agree that innovation (and the related notion of agile development) is the current end-goal in the minds of DoD policy-makers, as elusive as it may be for them to achieve.

We’ve written several articles about innovation and now we’ve publicly spoken about it. (In our biased viewpoint, the speech was very well received and generated lots of interest.) It’s not that we claim any special expertise; it’s that we have now seen (first-hand) what innovation and agility looks and feels like. And thus our experience informs our opinion on the topic. Unlike many others searching for innovation, we know whereof we speak. So there’s a sense of a moral imperative to point out the challenges inherent in obtaining what the DoD policy-makers say they want.

In our articles and in our remarks we’ve mostly expressed skepticism and doubt that innovation actually can be achieved by the Pentagon bureaucrats and policy wonks. Fundamentally, we don’t think you remove process barriers by adding more processes. Looking at the various stakeholders, we don’t think the stars are aligned (as they were in the mid-1990’s) such that Congress is ready to willingly repeal statutory requirements it has imposed on defense contractors. Similarly, we don’t think there’s much appetite in Fort Belvoir and Fort Lee for fundamental reform of DCMA and DCAA—even though pretty much every DCAA and DCMA employee we speak with one-on-one acknowledges the real need for such fundamental reform.

And there are other barriers to achieving innovation that would need to be removed, fundamental barriers that go to the heart of Federal civil service. For example, there is a huge generation gap between the buyers at DCMA and the would-be sellers in Silicon Valley. Depending on which article you read, something like 55% of the DoD civilian workforce is over the age of 50 and eyeing retirement. In contrast, the vast majority of Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and cyber-coders is about half that age. How does one overcome that generational gap? That’s just one of the barriers between Northern Virginia and Silicon Valley. There are many more that we could list, if we were of a mind to do so (and if you had the patience to read them all). Indeed, we listed many of those barriers in our public remarks, and heard near-unanimous agreement from the audience—which included at least one senior DCMA employee.

But let’s assume for the sake of argument that those barriers can be overcome. Let’s assume that the Pentagon and Congress and OFPP and DCMA and DCAA all agree that doing business with Silicon Valley and accessing all that beautiful innovation and agility is worth the price of admission. As a result of that agreement, in our hypothetical scenario the stars align and special exemptions are carved-out for Silicon Valley companies that are willing to do business with the Pentagon.

Let’s discuss what the “price of admission” might be. Let’s discuss what statutory and regulatory exemptions might be waived for those innovative Silicon Valley companies the Pentagon has been wooing.

For those special companies—

  • No requirement to submit cost or pricing data

  • In fact, no proposal is required whatsoever because we’re talking partnership here

  • No requirement to have an adequate accounting system

  • No requirement to submit a proposal to establish final billing rates

  • No business system requirements

  • No cost allowability requirements

  • No audits by DCAA whatsoever; instead, the external audit by an independent CPA firm will be acceptable

  • Full funding obligated at time of award, even if the effort is expected to take more than one year

  • No contracts awarded; instead, grants of money will be made with no contractual requirement to deliver anything in return. It will be “best efforts” only.

  • No termination for default clauses, because failure is always an option

And that’s just for starters. As we see it, the foregoing list would be the bare minimum necessary to get the next Apple or Facebook or Google to starting playing ball with DoD.

But put all that aside for a minute and let’s just assume it all happens and there is now a beautiful win/win relationship between the entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley and the buying commands of DoD. Let’s just dream for a few moments.

In that dream, where and when does the innovation happen?

Does the innovation happen before award, where an amazingly agile Silicon Valley company comes to In-Q-Tel (or its equivalent) with an innovative idea? In this scenario, somebody pitches somebody else and the pitch is a story where a future capability is created. That capability sounds amazingly useful and so the Pentagon throws some money at the company, knowing all the while that the money may be wasted if the company can’t make its uber-cool innovative vision a reality.

Or does the Pentagon instead send its pitchpeople to Cupertino and environs with a need, a requirement, a notion of what might be amazingly cool and useful for the warfighters? Do they take a half-baked requirement or need from somebody, one that hasn’t been fully vetted or approved by an official Decision Authority (because obtaining that approval would take too long and involve too many bureaucrats), and try to sell it to a Silicon Valley company—any willing company—that might be in position to actualize the vision?

And do those pitchpeople then go from company to company, trying to interest somebody in spending taxpayer funds—knowing all the while that just to make each pitch requires the Silicon Valley company to execute a Non-Disclosure Agreement with the teeth of a raptor, since National Security is involved? In this scenario, the DoD folks schlep from business park to business park, from incubator to incubator, from office to office, until at long last they find the right people with the right skills—and the need for funds—to make it happen.

Is that how it works?

Because if that’s how it works, it’s going to take a lot more than market research and Requests for Information. Finding that marriage between need and capability, between requirement and willingness, is going to be a challenge. It can be done, of course, but it won’t be by any means currently found in the FAR.

We remain skeptical.

But if the innovation isn’t identified before award, maybe it happens during performance of planned work scope. Maybe the DoD awards a grant or a CRADA or a TAA to a company with a firm goal in mind, an SOW that specifically identifies the innovative item to be created. Let’s call this “planned innovation,” if you will. If that’s how it works, then the innovation is really found in the requirements planning phase, not performance, because in order to achieve innovation the end-users first need to know what they want, so they can put it under contract. We don’t really see that working out for anybody.

Moreover, if that’s how innovation works then you might as well issue solicitations and obtain competition, because if you can describe what you want to achieve, there’s a good chance multiple companies can design it for you. And there will be many companies willing to spend your taxpayer funds, even if they’re not located in Silicon Valley.

Is that how it works?

Because if that’s how it works, it looks and feels just like DoD development contracts today. And it will take just as long to achieve, and cost just as much. That can’t be the plan, can it?

But if the innovation isn’t identified before award and it’s not planned in the SOW, then maybe it happens unexpectedly during performance on a traditional development contract effort. Maybe DoD awards a grant or a CRADA or a TAA to a company with a firm goal in mind, but then sometime thereafter the company innovates: it invents the quintessential “better mousetrap” while performing against that contract vehicle. Then the company tells the DoD technical folks about it, and the technical folks tell the buyers and contracting folks. And then whatever the original Pentagon goal was is now history because an innovative idea has been found, one that makes the original goal less valuable and less worthy. So the original goal is jettisoned and the new goal is substituted in its place. Somebody writes a report and sends it up the line (to a central DoD Innovation Office, we presume).

And now everybody is happy. Innovation has been achieved and officially acknowledged!

And no other company protests that what just happened is a cardinal change that should have (by law) required a new procurement, with a new solicitation and a new source selection decision—and that failure to do all that violated the Competition on Contracting Act (CICA).

And of course, in this scenario, the Silicon Valley company (the innovator) willingly signs over its Intellectual Property because patriotism (and because of the original DoD funding). No lawyers get involved at this point. Nope.

And the Pentagon folks then take that IP and hand it over to a traditional defense contractor (after a solicitation, source evaluation, and source selection, of course) to productionize it. Or maybe the Pentagon says “urgent and compelling circumstances” or “national security” and foregoes the traditional competition, and just hands the IP over to Lockheed Martin or Boeing or Northrop Grumman (or any of the other big dogs) and says, “Make that.” And lo and behold, it is done.

Without complaint from Congress or the news media or the watchdog organizations.

Without complaint from the original innovator that their IP was just handed-over to somebody else, so that another company could make a profit from its original idea.

Um, yeah. Sure. Why not? Maybe it would work like that. Since we’re dreaming and all.

And in our dream nobody in the military service says, “Wait a minute. Our doctrine calls for ‘X’ and you stopped working on ‘X’ and now you’re working on ‘Y’—which is great in theory but we haven’t trained for it and we don’t know how to use it and, besides, that’s an initiative of that other branch of the military, which is not our branch, and so we don’t like it. And we won’t use it.”

Because this is all a dream, that won’t happen. No inter-service rivalry or focus on last year’s training and doctrine will impact the decision-making to adopt the new widget or cyber-weapon or whatever the “better mousetrap” turns out to be. (See our article on the DCGS vs. Paladin controversy, here.)

Yeah, none of that will happen.

Because, you know, innovation. It’s like a magic word that unlocks all doors and crosses all barriers.

Yeah, sure. In our dreams.

So as you can plainly see, we foresee lots of problems ahead. They are not insoluble problems, mind you. They can be solved with sufficient will and sufficient leadership. But make no mistake: they are tough challenges that will require fundamental changes to the current defense acquisition environment. Really fundamental changes that we don’t think the current bureaucrats and policy wonks have the will or the political capital to pull-off, no matter how lofty and desirable the prize.

Before any of those tough challenges can be tackled, before any of those fundamental changes can be enacted, we think the first step is to think through this whole innovation and agile development thingee—given that the word itself carries no magic and opens no doors and crosses no barriers. Before engaging in the quest for innovation, one should have a pretty firm idea as what it will look like when it’s achieved.

We think the first step is to answer some key questions, such as: What does innovation look like, and where does it show up in the acquisition lifecycle? We have attempted a thought experiment in this article in order to explore those questions. But we’re not the ones who have to answer them: the leaders in the Office of the Secretary of Defense have to provide the answers, and the strategic guidance that goes along with those answers.

Until those questions (and others) are answered, we strongly suspect the quest for Silicon Valley innovation is just another mythical quest, like searching for the Holy Grail. In this modern-day quest, the Pentagon bureaucrats and policy wonks will be starting their quest with no idea what the Holy Grail looks like. They’ll be looking for a needle in a haystack with no notion what a needle looks like, or what they would do with that needle, were they to be fortunate enough to find it.

And starting a quest with no notion as to how it will be achieved, and where and when the Holy Grail will be found, and no idea what the goal even looks like is fine. It’s just dandy. That’s what makes it a quest!

Unless you are using taxpayer funds. In which case, that quest starts to look and feel much like a boondoggle.

In our next article on innovation, instead of complaining all the time we will venture some ideas of our own as to how Silicon Valley innovation might be fostered. We will publish some notions as to how statutory and regulatory exemptions might be carved-out, and where in the acquisition process those carve-outs might occur.

Until then: innovate.

 

Achievable Innovation

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I_Think_I_CanWhy do we care about innovation?

It’s not contract compliance; it’s not cost accounting. It’s not a legal case.

So why do we care, other than it’s something that the Pentagon’s leadership obviously cares about?

Well, it’s like this: First, the CAS Board has gone silent and the DCAA hasn’t updated its website in a while. And the DCAA hasn’t gotten around to publishing its GFY 2014 Report to Congress yet, and the DoD OIG Semi-Annual Report to Congress is still a few weeks away. And we’re tired of writing about banal fraud stories.

So we’ll write about innovation.

Again.

Now, if you’re tired of reading about innovation—or perhaps just tired of reading about our thoughts about innovation—then you can feel free to click away right now. Go on. We understand. No guilt here.

Buh-bye.

If you are still with us then we assume you are also interested in this rather faddish notion that the Pentagon will, somehow, avail itself of Silicon Valley innovation and agility. Somehow, in some manner, the Pentagon and Silicon Valley will come to an agreement; meet halfway, as it were. And in that middle ground will be a roll-back or carve-out of all the burdensome business rules that the traditional defense contractors have come to accept. (It won’t even have to be all of those business rules; but let’s assume it will be most of them.)

As we wrote previously, we believe some of the fundamental rules associated with selling to DoD will need to be significantly revised or eliminated altogether, if those Silicon Valley companies are going to be willing to do business with the Pentagon bureaucrats. For instance—

  • No competition. And no cost analysis either.

  • Because there will be no price or cost analysis the notion of “price reasonableness” is going to be hard to achieve. We suspect “price reasonableness” will be an irrelevant concept in our hypothetical middle ground.

  • Basically, we envision a grant of money in order to research some idea or to achieve some poorly defined goal. The money gets handed over and the Pentagon gets whatever it gets in return. Maybe. Assuming the company achieves some success. Failure is always an option.

  • That funding can be increased, or not. But no Limitation of Cost/Limitation of Funds nonsense. You want more efforts? Great, then pay more. Otherwise no.

  • No Business System nonsense. You want adequate business systems? Go hire Raytheon or General Dynamics.

  • No DCAA audit nonsense. The companies already have independent CPA auditors and those will have to be sufficient.

  • Periodic progress reports, but not too many and nothing burdensome.

  • The Intellectual Property problem gets solved. Somehow.

In our view, such carve-outs or roll-backs or exemptions can happen in one of two ways: (1) certain businesses are exempted based on what they do, or (2) certain phases of the acquisition are exempted, with exemptions falling away (and being replaced by compliance requirements) based on the project’s current position on the DoD Directive 5000.1/DoD Instruction 5000.02 acquisition lifecycle.

In the first scenario, certain companies are exempted as a class. The rules simply don’t apply to them. Think FAR deviation, but the deviation covers statutory rules as well. Companies designated as being “innovative” or “agile developers” have special CAGE Codes, and those CAGE Codes work like a “get out of jail free” card with respect to all the stuff identified above. Or else those CAGE Codes get to access a special funding source that works the same way in terms of relaxed requirements.

For instance, contractors in the SBIR (Small Business Innovative Research) Program are exempted. Forget that nonsense about Phase 2 awards being cost-type and thus requiring an adequate accounting system and an incurred cost proposal and lots of DCAA interaction. SBIR contractors are simply exempted from that stuff. And not just SBIR contractors, but any Silicon Valley company, of any size, is similarly exempted. That’s just how the rules work now. Or maybe companies with the special CAGE Codes get to apply for certain funding (a new or improved “color of money”), and with those new funds come fewer strings—a lot fewer strings.

And how might a company with that special CAGE Code submit an application to access the special funds? The application would be simple and the evaluation process would be streamlined. Basically, answer two questions: who are you and what do you want to do? Then a high-powered committee reviews the application and makes an award decision in 5 working days; a decision that is not subject to protest. Boom! Done.

Just to be fair to the traditional defense contractors, they can apply for special CAGE Codes and/or special exempted funding as well. But in order to qualify, they have to spin-off their R&D shops. For example, the Skunk Works and the Phantom Works need to spin-off from their motherships. Anybody who wants to apply needs to be an independent (or semi-independent) R&D shop. Back in the 1960’s every aerospace/defense company worth its salt had an independent R&D outfit that was both geographically and managerially separate from Corporate HQ. If those traditional defense companies want access to the magic funding, they need to go back to their roots.

And because those independent R&D outfits now have access to “magic funds” they will be subject to a whole lot less administrative requirements. Consequently, they won’t have to staff up in areas that are non-value-added to the R&D efforts. Thus: the funding provided will go further because there will be less overhead to eat it up.

Sounds good to us!

The second possible approach is to start out with almost no administrative requirements and layer them on as the project/program progresses along the DoD acquisition life-cycle. That life-cycle is defined in DoD Instruction Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.02, and (from the contractor’s perspective) basically includes the following—

  1. Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)

  2. Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) or Limited Deployment

  3. Full-Rate Production or Full Deployment

There’s more to it, of course. In fact, DoD Instruction 5000.02 is 154 pages long. Here’s a link for the masochists among our readership.

Our point being, DoD could focus on the EMD phase of the program and decide that companies performing in that phase wouldn’t be burdened with the same requirements that would be applied to contractors in the later phases of the acquisition lifecycle. DoD could decide that companies in the LRIP phase would have a few more regulatory burdens, but not as many as those in the FRP phase. It could be done.

The idea behind that approach would be that innovation occurs in the earlier stages, such that by the time you get to Full-Rate Production you have a solid design with a mature technological approach. Any innovation is behind you, so now you have to comply with the full panoply of rules and regulations.

That could work, we think.

So here are two approaches that we believe could foster innovation. Both approaches are practical and feasible, and either one would create an environment where innovation and agile development could flourish, unmolested by DCMA functional specialists and DCAA auditors and all the other rules primarily intended to combat fraud, waste, and abuse, but whose unintended consequences have been that programs subject to them cost more, take longer, and generally fail to achieve meaningful innovation.

 

Accounting System Course Registration Ending Soon

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If you were perhaps considering attending the upcoming GCTII-sponsored 2-day immersion in the requirements of an “adequate” Accounting System, but hadn’t yet made up your mind …

If you were perhaps “on the bubble” as to whether to visit San Diego, California, in late May or else stay in your cubicle under the fluorescent lights and work on your filing …

If you were hesitant to request the funds from your boss, who keeps complaining about lack of budget …

… well, you need to make a decision. You need to make a call. Registration is ending soon.

The cost -- $1,095 for two days’ of discussion and knowledge-sharing, is right in line with what other popular seminars charge; and it’s significantly less than some charge participants.

Plus: Nick Sanders will be doing the instructing, with his latest “war stories” about business system audits gone wrong, and what to do to keep that from happening to your company—all delivered with maximum sarcasm and snark.

Get out of your cubicle and get to San Diego for some SoCal sun; you won’t regret it

Details are available here.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.