Small Business Learns Important Lessons
This is not the first time we’ve typed “A wise man learns from the mistakes of others; a fool learns from his own mistakes.” Learning from the mistakes of others, so that you don’t make those same mistakes, is one of the themes of this blog.
Come learn from the mistakes of Sand 9, Inc., a small business located in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Sand 9 is a small business that aims to “disrupt the $4+B timing market with advanced MEMS resonators.” According to its website: “Sand 9's piezoelectric MEMS devices enable semiconductor manufacturers to finally eliminate the need for external clock references, heralding a new era in electronic timing.” We don’t know much about MEMS—especially piezoelectric MEMS—but it seems to be some kind of replacement for traditional quartz timing devices. Is Sand 9’s technology truly disruptive? We don’t know that either. But if it is disruptive, then this is the kind of company the DoD wants to attract.
We’ve written an article or three about the DoD’s quest to attract the kind of companies who can innovate and create disruptive technological advances. We’ve been more than a little skeptical about the Pentagon’s chances for success.
But before we dive into Sand 9’s recent legal problems, let’s talk about implied certifications. We heard a panel discuss the topic at the recent Crowell & Moring “Ounce of Prevention Seminar” (OOPS). If you’re interested, here’s a link to a 2008 scholarly article on the topic. And here’s another link to a more recent article discussing a recent decision by the Court of Appeals (Fourth Circuit) that said –
Abandoning its prior hesitation, the Fourth Circuit then explicitly adopted the implied certification theory of liability, holding that ‘the Government pleads a false claim when it alleges that the contractors, with the requisite scienter, made a request for payment under a contract and withheld information about its noncompliance with material contractual requirements.’ As applied to this case, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the government had sufficiently pled a valid implied certification claim.
As you may gather from the foregoing, the “implied certification theory” is an argument that a contractor has committed a violation of the False Claims Act (FCA) when it submits an invoice to the government—even though that invoice is accurate in all respects—but there is a violation of the False Statements Act made somewhere during contract performance (or even perhaps prior to contract award). Basically, the argument is that each invoice being submitted contains an “implied certification” that the contractor is in compliance with contract requirements, and when it knows that it is not in compliance then each invoice is a false claim.
Or something like that. We’re not attorneys.
So back to Sand 9, Inc.
On May 14, 2015, the Department of Justice announced that Sand 9 had agreed to pay $625,000 to settle charges it had violated the FCA with respect to SBIR grants it had received from the National Science Foundation (NSF). Now we expect you know what the SBIR program is; if you don’t, then you can do a keyword search on this site or else Google it.
From the DoJ press release, we learned that Sand 9 had “misrepresented its accounting and timekeeping systems” to the NSF with respect to “the award and performance of its SBIR grants.” These were SBIR Phase II grants. We’ve discussed the risks and pitfalls associated with moving from Phase I to Phase II before. The Phase II requirements are much tougher than the typical Phase I requirements, and many small businesses stumble as they move into Phase II. Again, you can search those blog articles out on this site.
What was the issue? According to the DoJ announcement—
The United States alleged that Sand 9 misrepresented its accounting and timekeeping systems to obtain the grants, and failed to maintain complete timekeeping records for its employees while receiving grant funding for labor.
The United States further contended that Sand 9’s progress reports certified compliance with the grant terms, and that certain reports also certified that all of the funds committed to the grant had been expended as designated in the grant budget, even though Sand 9 failed to maintain its accounting system in a manner that tracked expenditures separately by grant or according to categories of the approved grant budget.ÂÂ These progress reports caused the NSF to release incremental payments to Sand 9.
Let’s unpack those two paragraphs a bit.
First, when applying for its SBIR Phase II grants Sand 9 allegedly falsely claimed (or “represented”) that it had adequate accounting and timekeeping systems. Typically, Section K of a contractor’s proposal contains a number of “Reps and Certs,” and not a lot of thought goes into ensuring that accurate statements are being made on those Representations and Certifications. Yet there is risk there, and a contractor is well advised to have a process in place to review those Reps and Certs for accuracy.
How does a contractor know if it has an adequate accounting system before DCAA performs an audit? Well, one approach is to take the government’s SF 1408 and fill it out, answering honestly. Or you can hire independent firms to evaluate your practices in light of SF 1408 requirements. There is really no excuse for not understanding what the government expects of you in terms of accounting system adequacy.
(That’s not to say that a good SF 1408 analysis guarantees that DCAA will pass your accounting system when the auditors do show up in the future. It’s DCAA: nobody can guarantee any result.)
It seems, then, that Sand 9 told the NSF through its Reps and Certs that its systems were good to go for its Phase II contracts. Then, during performance, it submitted status reports that said the grant funds were being expended. And the funds may have been expended as described in those reports, but when the auditors showed up, Sand 9 couldn’t demonstrate that to the satisfaction of the auditors. Its accounting system did not track expenditures “separately by grant”. Meaning it didn’t have a good project accounting system. In addition, Sand 9 didn’t track expenditures “according to the categories of the approved grant budget”. Meaning it didn’t have good accounting subsystems and probably lacked good General Ledger control.
So all that cost Sand 9, Inc. $625,000 plus attorney fees. We don’t know whether or not they will continue with development of their disruptive MEMS technology for the Federal government.
Meanwhile, the Small Business Administration announced a competition to design a new logo for the SBIR and STTR programs – “America’s Seed Fund.” The announcement stated that “SBIR/STTR awards enable small businesses to explore their technological potential, stimulate innovation to meet federal R&D needs, and potentially profit from private-sector commercialization of developed technologies.”
All that is true, but what is not being well-publicized is the fact that companies wishing to avail themselves of SBIR/STTR funds are subject to most of the same rules as the largest defense contractors. They will be held to the same high standards and subject to the same audit requirements. Getting some of that sweet, sweet “seed fund” money is nice; no doubt about it. But there’s a price to be paid—and that price is establishing bureaucratic systems and controls. Some companies aren’t willing to pay that price, and they should not accept government funds because of that decision.
MLA’s Diaspora Continues
Recently we noted with some sadness that the venerable Government Contract practice at the firm of McKenna, Long and Aldridge had been more than decimated by the loss of some 20 Washington, D.C., attorneys, who moved en masse to Covington & Burling. It’s reasonable to ask why we took the time to write about the exodus. After all, who really cares about which attorneys are at which firms—besides other Big Law attorneys, that is.
The thing is, those Big Law attorneys represent a tremendous amount of knowledge, experience, and smarts. The Big Law Government Contract practices contain a wealth of tips and advice for those who know how to mine for it. We subscribe to a number of newsletters, client advisories and press services from various law firms, the better to get the inside scoop on what various legal decisions, regulatory revisions, and upcoming legislation are likely to mean and how they might impact government compliance postures. We use that information to inform our consulting practice and our blog articles (always giving appropriate attribution and credit). Thus, we care about the health of the Big Law Government Contract practices, and you should care as well.
The practitioners at MLA have had a huge impact on the current state of government contract compliance. For years, they have partnered with the Public Contracting Institute to produce informative monthly webinars on topics of interest to the government contract compliance community. MLA attorneys have been a mainstay of the seminal Federal Publications Seminars courses for many years. In fact, three of the eleven attorneys scheduled to speak at Fed Pubs’ 2015 West Coast Year in Review Conference are listed as being from MLA. In addition, MLA took the lead in addressing issues associated with the DFARS Business Systems Administration and oversight regime, going so far as to publish a guidebook on the topic.
So when we say that MLA’s Government Contract practice is dispersing to other firms, it’s kind of a big deal.
In our original article on the departure of MLA’s Washington, D.C., attorneys, we wrote—
That's not to say the remaining MLA government contract attorneys (which include, e.g., the illustrious Tom Lemmer in Denver and James Gallagher in Los Angeles) won't carry on the proud tradition; but we suspect it won't be the same.
Well, we may have spoken a bit prematurely.
On May 11, 2015, the law firm of Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman announced that 13 MLA attorneys were joining its firm. Among those 13 former MLA attorneys were four government contract attorneys—including James Gallagher, Michael Rizzo, Kevin Slattum, and Todd Canni. The Pillsburylaw press release stated—
The four government contracts partners all have deep experience in government contracts, including bid protests, disputes, litigation and compliance. They constituted a substantial part of McKenna’s large national Government Contracts practice, which was Chambers USA Tier 1 ranked.
‘The addition of Jay, Mike, Kevin and Todd represents a strong opportunity for us to significantly grow both our firm-wide government contracts group and our current offerings in Los Angeles and California,’ said Nancy A. Fischer, leader of Pillsbury’s public practices and public policy sections. ‘It will make Pillsbury one of the few law firms in the country with a Government Contracts practice on both coasts, and will expand our ability to serve West Coast clients.’
Now, we don’t want to say that MLA is out of the government contract picture. Far from it: there are still some 50 attorneys listed on the MLA/Dentons website as being part of its government contract practice. Indeed, the MLA Denver government contract practice appears to be completely intact as this article is being written. So don’t count MLA out of the fight.
On the other hand, two law firms now have significant government contract weight and heft, and can go toe-to-toe with any other firm in the public contract law arena. It will be interesting to see how they develop their newly enhanced practices going forward.
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UPDATE: Louis Berger Group’s Former CEO Pays Price for Gaming Cost Allocations
In November, 2010, we wrote a piece about the Louis Berger Group’s $69 million dollar settlement with the Dept. of Justice and the guilty pleas of its former CFO and former controller. For at least 16 years, LBG “manipulated” its overhead rates by shifting costs from private, commercial, clients to state and Federal clients. Apparently DCAA missed the allocation manipulations in its audits of LBG’s annual proposals to establish final billing rates (also known as incurred cost proposals), and it took a qui tam relator’s suit under the False Claims Act to get the government involved.
But get involved the government did, as only it can when it suspects it’s been bilked out of millions of dollars. In December, 2014, the former Louis Berger Group CEO, President and Chairman of the Board (Derish Wolff) pleaded guilty to “conspiring to defraud the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) with respect to billions of dollars in contracts over a nearly 20-year period.” We noted that plea in passing but didn’t dwell on it.
Just to update the story and put some closure to it, we wanted to report that on May 8, 2015, Mr. Wolff was “sentenced today to 12 months of home confinement and fined $4.5 million.” Mr. Wolff is 79 years old.
The DOJ press release provided some more details of LBG’s scheme. It reported—
From at least 1990 through July 2009, LBG, through Wolff and other former executives, intentionally overbilled USAID in connection with these cost-reimbursable contracts. The scheme to defraud the government was carried out by numerous LBG employees at the direction of Wolff.
Wolff targeted a particular overhead rate, irrespective of what the actual rate was, and ordered his subordinates to achieve that target rate through a variety of fraudulent means. From at least as early as 1990 through 2000, Wolff ordered LBG’s assistant controller to instruct the accounting department to pad its time sheets with hours ostensibly devoted to federal government projects when it had not actually worked on such projects.
At an LBG annual meeting in September 2001, Salvatore Pepe, who was then the controller and eventually became chief financial officer (CFO), presented a USAID overhead rate that was significantly below Wolff’s target. In response, Wolff denounced Pepe, called him an ‘assassin’ of the overhead rate and ordered him to target a rate above 140 percent, meaning that for every dollar of labor devoted to a USAID contract, LBG would receive an additional $1.40 in overhead expenses supposedly incurred by LBG.
In response, Pepe and former controller Precy Pellettieri, with Wolff’s supervision, hatched a fraudulent scheme from 2003 through 2007 to systematically reclassify the work hours of LBG’s corporate employees, including high-ranking executives and employees in the general accounting division, to make it appear as if those employees worked on federal projects when they did not. At his plea hearing on Dec. 12, 2014, Wolff admitted that Pepe and Pellettieri, at Wolff’s direction, reclassified these hours without the employees’ knowledge and without investigating whether the employees had correctly accounted for their time, and at times did so over an employee’s objection.
In addition to padding employees’ work hours with fake hours supposedly devoted to USAID work, Wolff instructed his subordinates to charge all commonly shared overhead expenses, such as rent, at LBG’s Washington, D.C., office to an account created to capture USAID-related expenses, even though the D.C. office supported many projects unrelated to USAID or other federal government agencies.
The foregoing description is not as clear as we’d like. It seems that LBG had two different overhead pools: one that supported state and Federal work and another that supported commercial work. Employees may have had two different charge numbers and charged their time based on the type of work they were supporting. Then, unbeknownst to the employees, hours charged to the commercial overhead pool were shifted into the state/Federal pool.
Alternately, the employees charged time directly to all projects, and overhead was allocated to projects based on recorded labor dollars (or hours). Hours charged to commercial projects were shifted to state/Federal projects, which then attracted a higher proportion of indirect costs.
Either scenario is possible; or perhaps there’s a third scenario we didn’t think of. The point is, after many years the scheme came to light, and the company had to cough-up a whopping fine. Executives were charged. Executives were fined and sentenced. Life was made unpleasant for many.
Meanwhile, LBG keeps on winning work, performing engineering projects around the globe. Only now it does so with a 36 page Code of Business Conduct policy that helps to guide LBG employees as they make day-to-day business decisions.
The First Line of Defense
For defense contractors (and non-M&O Dept. of Energy contractors), business systems are “the first line of defense against fraud, waste, and abuse.” How many times have we heard that phrase? It’s been in the Federal Register several times, and in Agency guidance several additional times. The line has been in a Public Law. It’s been all over the place. The phrase has become conventional wisdom by this point.
We like to question conventional wisdom.
On August 11, 2009, the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) “conducted a hearing to obtain testimony from government officials and contractors on the adequacy of contractor business systems.” At that hearing—
The Commission learned that unreliable data from business systems produced billions of dollars in contingency-contract costs that government auditors often could not verify. The government’s ability to detect contract cost errors and material misstatements is seriously impeded by contractors’ inadequate internal controls over their business systems. Further, the two primary government agencies involved, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), are not effectively working together to protect government interests.
The CWC subsequently published a report in September of that year, entitled “Defense Agencies Must Improve their Oversight of Contractor Business Systems to Reduce Waste, Fraud, and Abuse”. The first line of that report was “Contractor business systems and internal controls are the first line of defense against waste, fraud, and abuse.”
And that’s how it started.
Flash-forward 5+ years and there has been a profound sea-change in the focus on contractor business systems since the CWC sounded its warnings. The landscape is entirely different. We have six business systems (not 10 internal control systems). We have deficiencies and significant deficiencies. Significant deficiencies mean disapproval (or inadequacy) and that leads, inexorably, to mandatory payment withholds. Reviewing contractor business systems has become a cottage industry, with consultants and attorneys eager to assist contractors with creating adequate business systems, or remediating those systems that failed DCAA or DCMA audit.
And now we have reenergized DCMA functional specialists and refocused DCAA auditors, with new and improved audit programs to help them evaluate business systems. We have peer reviews of ACO business system adequacy determinations, and at least two levels of Review Boards to help adjudicate disagreements between the ACO and those who performed the reviews. We have process upon process, and guidance upon guidance—all to help focus oversight on the first line of defense against fraud, waste, and abuse.
The thing of it is: it’s all nonsense. It’s pretty much a big waste of taxpayer funds.
Allow us to explain.
Let’s talk about the Maginot Line.
The Maginot Line was France’s first line of defense against German invasion. Constructed between World War I and World War II, the Maginot Line was designed to stop the Germans cold. From Wikipedia—
The Maginot Line was impervious to most forms of attack (including aerial bombings and tank fire), and had state-of-the-art living conditions for garrisoned troops, air conditioning, comfortable eating areas and underground railways.
It seemed like a really good idea at the time. Unfortunately, the Germans didn’t cooperate. They didn’t use the same strategy they had employed in World War I. As Wikipedia noted—
The French established the fortification to provide time for their army to mobilize in the event of attack, allowing French forces to move into Belgium for a decisive confrontation with Germany. The success of static, defensive combat in World War I was a key influence on French thinking. French military experts extolled the Maginot Line as a work of genius, believing it would prevent any further invasions from the east.
While the fortification system did prevent a direct attack, it was strategically ineffective, as the Germans invaded through Belgium, going around the Maginot Line. The German army came through the Ardennes forest and the Low Countries, completely sweeping by the line, causing the French army to surrender and conquering France in about six weeks
Moreover, the Wikipedia article asserted that the Maginot Line, “proved costly to maintain and subsequently led to parts of the French Armed Forces being underfunded and not provided with the troops, equipment and communications needed for the war.” Consequently, “reference to the Maginot Line is used to recall a strategy or object that people hope will prove effective but instead fails miserably, giving way to the ‘Maginot Line mentality’.”
Sound familiar?
The focus over the past 5 years on contractor business systems is the Maginot Line of today’s DoD oversight function, especially the oversight provided by the Defense Contract Management Agency. Like the French focus on their fixed fortifications, it is the wrong strategy. It is the wrong focus. And it takes funding and resources away from other, more critical, areas.
The focus on contractor business systems is not a focus on preventing fraud, waste, and abuse. Instead, it is a focus primarily on policies and procedures. Contractors can best prove the adequacy of their business systems by having really thick policies and procedures that address every one of the applicable adequacy criteria. The best way to pass a business system review is to have a lot of really good policies and procedures; the actual practices are of lesser importance. That’s not to say that certain metrics won’t be part of the review; they will be. It’s just that the corrective action plan to remediate any findings will almost certainly consist of writing better and more robust policies and procedures, and ensuring employees are trained in their contents.
The adequacy criteria themselves are largely ambiguous and subjective, and so disagreements arise easily during audit. As we’ve noted before, DCAA has taken the definition of “significant deficiency” found in the regulations and created something not envisioned by the rule-makers so that the auditors can comply with GAGAS. The irony there is that the AICPA says the adequacy criteria aren’t auditable, and so it’s tough to see how any auditor could ever comply with GAGAS no matter how terms are defined.
The focus on contractor business system adequacy is an imaginary line of defense because policies and procedures are not—nor have they ever been—the first line of defense against fraud, waste, and abuse.
The first line of defense is people. People who make good decisions when faced with conflicting priorities. People who have the training to make those decisions, and the resources to call upon when things get tough. That’s your first line of defense.
People are always the first line of defense and all the policies and procedures in the world won’t stop bad decisions from being made by poorly trained and poorly supported people.
Any approach that focuses on ambiguous, subjective, adequacy criteria, that focuses on written policies and procedures, is a Maginot Line approach.
And while DCMA and DCAA are focused on six contractor business systems, too many contractor employees continue to engage in wrongdoing, including such activities as bribery, kick-backs, and other corrupt behavior. Indeed, the adequacy of a contractor’s business systems is absolutely no guarantee that its employees are engaging in ethical decision-making. The best policies and procedures in the world don’t ensure ethical decision-making. Just ask the executives of Enron.
It’s past time for DoD policy-makers to admit that oversight of contractor business systems, in its current form, is not the first line of defense against fraud, waste, and abuse. They are not the first line of defense, nor have they ever been. In fact, the business systems adequacy criteria have very little to do with preventing waste, fraud, and/or abuse.
It’s past time for DoD to admit that the focus on contractor business systems is a mistake, one that takes resources and funding away from more important things. It’s time to get DCAA out of business systems audits altogether and, to the extent DCMA wants to review certain contractor practices and controls, it should do so in a streamlined fashion, without the multiple layers of bureaucracy and without the nuclear option of payment withholds.
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