• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

Manipulating Revenue Numbers

E-mail Print PDF

Accounting_FraudRevenue recognition can be a difficult task for the accounting departments of government contractors. Measuring revenue for a single period requires the exercise of a considerable amount of management judgment. That management judgment is spread out across the organization, such that accurate revenue recognition relies on input from any number of functions—ranging from program managers to engineers to financial analysts to procurement practitioners. Often those functions operate in remote geographic regions where English is not the native language, making it difficult to assure that the judgments are well-founded. The bigger and more complex the organization, the more challenging accurate revenue recognition can be.

Measuring revenue is a challenge, but it’s an important task, especially for a publicly traded company. The share price of a company can rise or fall based on its reported revenue numbers. The tension between accuracy and hitting the targets can be intense. Investment analysts and shareholders demand “good” quarterly numbers, and thus corporate executives demand “good” quarterly numbers from their subordinates. Companies that miss their quarterly numbers see their stock price fall. Thus, there is considerable pressure throughout the organization to make the projections and hit the targets, and there may be unpleasant consequences for a consistent failure to do so.

But the consequences associated with an intentional manipulation of the numbers—an intentional manipulation of measured revenue and/or profit in order to make the quarterly projections—are even more dire. A little less than a year ago, we reported on the consequences for one company – L-3 Corporation – that was alleged to have violated revenue recognition requirements. And now we have another company facing similar consequences, Computer Science Corporation or CSC.

According to this story, CSC agreed to pay the SEC $190 million in order to settle charges that it manipulated its financial results and concealed “significant problems about the company’s largest and most high-profile contract, as well as ignoring basic accounting standards to increase reported profits.” In addition to the complaint filed against the company, the SEC also filed charges against eight former executives, including the former CEO and the former CFO. Five of the eight executives have agreed to their own individual settlements, while three of the eight are currently contesting the charges.

CSC, of course, is a U.S. government contractor. It sells technology services to the Federal government via a number of different contract vehicles, from the GSA Schedules to NETCENTS 2 to a NAVSEA MAC. According to its annual report, in 2014 CSC generated 32 percent of its nearly $13 billion in annual sales (or $4.1 billion) from its North American Public Sector sales. The Department of Defense (DoD) was CSC’s largest single Federal customer, accounting for $2.4 billion in sales, or more than half of its total public sector revenue. As a large Federal (and defense) contractor, CSC’s revenue recognition methodology had to take into account some difficult government contracting issues—such has how to deal with change orders, disputes, and claims. That situation made an already challenging revenue recognition environment even more challenging. When you take into account that CSC had huge operations spread throughout the world, it becomes clear that accurate revenue recognition was an incredibly difficult task.

It was a task at which CSC failed.

In its 2014 annual report, CSC disclosed “certain accounting errors” and “certain aspects of [CSC’s] accounting practices that involve the percentage-of-completion accounting method.” The annual report told readers that “In the course of In the course of the … investigation [which was completed in 2012], accounting errors and irregularities were identified. As a result, certain personnel have been reprimanded, suspended, terminated and/or have resigned.” The investigation resulted in approximately $88 million worth of adjustments, the vast majority of which related to FY 2012. The accounting errors and irregularities generally fell into three categories: (1) Nordic region operations, (2) Australian operations, and (3) contract adjustments for the contract awarded by the United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS).

What did CSC do wrong? According to the story (link above)—

The SEC alleges that CSC’s accounting and disclosure fraud began after the company learned it would lose money on the NHS contract because it was unable to meet certain deadlines. To avoid the large hit to its earnings that CSC was required to record, [CSC Finance executive] Sutcliffe allegedly added items to CSC’s accounting models that artificially increased its profits but had no basis in reality. CSC, with [CSC CEO] Laphen’s approval, then continued to avoid the financial impact of its delays by basing its models on contract amendments it was proposing to the NHS rather than the actual contract. In reality, NHS officials repeatedly rejected CSC’s requests that the NHS pay the company higher prices for less work. By basing its models on the [rejected change order] proposals, CSC artificially avoided recording significant reductions in its earnings in 2010 and 2011.

The SEC’s investigation found that Laphen and [CSC CFO] Mancuso repeatedly failed to comply with multiple rules requiring them to disclose these issues to investors, and they made public statements about the NHS contract that misled investors about CSC’s performance. Mancuso also concealed from investors a prepayment arrangement that allowed CSC to meet its cash flow targets by effectively borrowing large sums of money from the NHS at a high interest rate. Mancuso merely told investors that CSC was hitting its targets ‘the old fashioned hard way.’

The “old fashioned hard way,” hmm?

But that’s not all that was rotten in the state of Denmark, according to the SEC. The story also reported that –

… the SEC’s investigation found that CSC and finance executives in Australia and Denmark fraudulently manipulated the financial results of the company’s businesses in those regions.

The SEC alleges that Parker, who served as controller in Australia, along with regional CFO Wayne Banks overstated the company’s earnings by using ‘cookie jar’ reserves and failing to record expenses as required. …

In CSC’s Nordic region, the SEC alleges a variety of accounting manipulations to fraudulently inflate operating results as finance executives there struggled to achieve budgets set by CSC management in the U.S. Among the misconduct was improperly accounting for client disputes, overstating assets, and capitalizing expenses. For example, Edwards, who was a finance manager, allegedly recorded and maintained large amounts of ‘prepaid assets’ that CSC was required to actually record as expenses. This tactic guaranteed these expenses would not reduce CSC’s earnings.

So, yeah. The global technology company had accounting problems around the world. To some extent, those problems stemmed from local management “struggles to achieve budgets set by CSC management in the U.S.” Those folks did what they had to do to meet the projections and budgets given to them by Corporate – even if “what they had to do” involved violating accounting rules and breaching ethical guidelines.

We want to focus on the NHS contract problems. According to the story, those problems included “basing” financial analyses models of the contract’s at-completion costs on rejected change orders. By including rejected/disputed change orders in its models, the analysts also included the funding from those change orders into at-completion funding. Had those change orders not been included, the at-completion costs would have been the same, but the at-completion revenue would have been lower. And thus the at-completion negative variance between contract costs and contract revenue was reduced or even eliminated.

Now, a UK NHS contract is not a contract with the U.S. Federal government. But we bet the GAAP accounting requirements are pretty much the same. So we’ll take a few minutes of your time and discuss them in some detail.

To help understand the requirements we need to go back to the ancient GAAP guidance, SOP 81-1. Of course, that guidance has been superseded a couple of times and nobody is supposed to use it anymore; but we’re not professional accountants and we can use what we want. To our knowledge, nothing that we are going to use in SOP 81-1 has been contradicted in the several superseding guidance documents.

SOP 81-1 discusses change orders at paragraphs .61 through .63. Some snippets of the guidance include—

Change orders are modifications of an original contract that effectively change the provisions of the contract without adding new provisions. … Many change orders are unpriced; that is, the work to be performed is defined, but the adjustment to the contract price is to be negotiated later. For some change orders, both scope and price may be unapproved or in dispute. Accounting for change orders depends on the underlying circumstances, which may differ for each change order depending on the customer, the contract, and the nature of the change. Change orders should therefore be evaluated according to their characteristics and the circumstances in which they occur. In some circumstances, change orders as a normal element of a contract may be numerous, and separate identification may be impractical. …

For all unpriced change orders, recovery should be deemed probable if the future event or events necessary for recovery are likely to occur. Some of the factors to consider in evaluating whether recovery is probable are the customer’s written approval of the scope of the change order, separate documentation for change order costs that are identifiable and reasonable, and the entity’s favorable experience in negotiating change orders, especially as it relates to the specific type of contract and change order being evaluated. …

If it is probable that the contract price will be adjusted by an amount that exceeds the costs attributable to the change order and the amount of the excess can be reliably estimated, the original contract price should also be adjusted for that amount when the costs are recognized as costs of contract performance if its realization is probable. However, since the substantiation of the amount of future revenue is difficult, revenue in excess of the costs attributable to unpriced change orders should only be recorded in circumstances in which realization is assured beyond a reasonable doubt, such as circumstances in which an entity’s historical experience provides such assurance or in which an entity has received a bona fide pricing offer from a customer and records only the amount of the offer as revenue.

If change orders are in dispute or are unapproved in regard to both scope and price, they should be evaluated as claims (see paragraphs .65–.67).

Over in paragraphs .65 to .67, accounting for disputed change orders – or claims – is discussed. Those paragraphs state (in part) –

Claims are amounts in excess of the agreed contract price (or amounts not included in the original contract price) that a contractor seeks to collect from customers or others for customer-caused delays, errors in specifications and designs, contract terminations, change orders in dispute or unapproved as to both scope and price, or other causes of unanticipated additional costs. Recognition of amounts of additional contract revenue relating to claims is appropriate only if it is probable that the claim will result in additional contract revenue and if the amount can be reliably estimated. …

If the requirements in paragraph .65 are not met or if those requirements are met but the claim exceeds the recorded contract costs, a contingent asset should be disclosed in accordance with FASB Statement No. 5, paragraph 17.

As can be clearly seen from the foregoing, CSC could recognize the at-completion revenue from its pending change orders only if it were probable that they would be agreed-upon and would result in additional funds. If that was not the case—and apparently it was not the case—then CSC was not permitted to recognize that at-completion revenue and, instead, was required to follow the requirements of FASB Statement No. 5. (We will not delve into those requirements here.)

The foregoing accounting problems cost CSC $190 million. They cost the former CEO $3.7 million worth of bonuses that were “clawed back,” as well as a $750,000 penalty. The problems cost the former CFO $369,100 in claw back bonuses and a penalty of $175,000. They cost the Australian regional CFO $11,000 worth of claw back bonuses and interest on that amount of $2,400, plus a four year ban as acting as an accountant, officer, or director for SEC-regulated entities. The problems cost CSC’s former Nordic finance director a similar ban of three years’ duration.

Importantly, none of the accounting errors and irregularities involved CSC’s contracts with the U.S. Federal government. They all stemmed from geographic areas on the other side of the world. But we believe the disclosed errors and irregularities are instructive for all companies, including those that sell to the Federal government. They point to a truism that the ability of a corporate HQ to ensure the integrity of its books and records is limited by its ability to monitor the activities of far-flung operations, and its willingness to get into the field and “kick the tires” from time to time.

In related news, on May 19, 2015, CSC announced that it was splitting into two publicly traded companies. According to the announcement, one company will focus on global services to commercial and government clients, while the other company will focus solely on public sector clients in the United States.

 

CH2M Rebrands and Prepares to Move Forward

E-mail Print PDF

CH2MThe architect/engineering/construction/management industry is going through some tough times right now, as the energy sector tries to deal with falling oil prices and the Federal government tries to deal with its sequestration-fueled budget cuts. One of the industry leaders for the past couple of decades has been CH2M Hill, headquartered in Denver, Colorado. We’ve written about CH2M Hill a few times and, although we’ve found aspects of the company’s management decisions to criticize, we have never lost our admiration for such a respected firm.

We noticed the company is making some changes which we suspect are designed to better position it to survive the current industry downdrafts and move forward. How the company adapts and changes, and moves forward, presents a story we find fairly interesting. We hope you’ll agree.

First, CH2M Hill announced in April that it was rebranding and changing its name to CH2M. According to the quotes in the linked article, the rebranding is in recognition of the company’s growth – now approaching annual revenues of $6 billion – and its new business strategy. We were unable to discover much about the new “refreshed” strategy after some fruitless Google searches, but it may have something to do with the decision to retain the company’s Alaskan oil and gas business. CH2M had announced an interest in selling the business in late 2014, so as to focus on “core infrastructure services and functions including water, transportation and environment.” But in mid-January decided not to sell it after all—foregoing the cash infusion the sale would have brought in to the employee-owned company.

Instead, CH2M just sold a minority interest to Apollo Global Management, LLC—bringing in $300 million. According to the linked article—

Apollo also will be awarded additional shares each year as annual dividends …

CH2M says that Apollo will buy $200 million in convertible preferred stock when the deal closes in the second quarter and $100 million within a year. The deal values CH2M at about $2 billion. [CH2M] plans to use the investment for growth and to pay down debt.

So things are looking up for CH2M. As this article/advertisement claims--

‘CH2M had one of its best first quarters ever, pushing us into a major growth mode,’ said CH2M Global Business Groups President Greg McIntyre. ‘With our global reputation for being a best place to work and a most ethical company, this is an excellent opportunity to join an amazing company. I have spent my entire 33-year career at CH2M and have never seen our future look brighter. We have several great opportunities for staff to work on exciting projects with our valued clients, in all our sectors.’

CH2M seeks to hire professionals who meet each day with integrity and are motivated to bring fresh energy and enterprise into every community we touch.

But while the future looks bright, CH2M has to let go of the past in order to move forward. And speaking of ethics and integrity, we are compelled to note that on June 3, 2015, the last of 12 “admitted criminal conspirators” in a widespread timecard falsification scheme was sentenced to two years’ of probation and a fine. For another take on the timecard debacle, here’s a link to a different article. In addition, we’ve written about that little fiasco on this site in a couple of articles. You can find the articles using the site’s keyword search but, really, why bother? It’s all history now and CH2M is moving forward.

 

The 2014 Annual DCAA Report to Congress

E-mail Print PDF

Meh.

That’s not just our opinion. For example, in this article at The National Law Review, two attorneys from Covington & Burling write that this year’s version of the annual report “will look familiar to many” and that DCAA’s recommendations to Congress to address perceived audit impediments “will be familiar to readers of previous reports.”

Yep. There is not much novelty in this year’s version. Trends noted in prior reports continue. Areas of weakness remain, and recommendations for improvement continue.

See for yourself.

There’s not much meat to chew on in this year’s Report to Congress. The meat will be found in the DoD Inspector General Semi-Annual Report to Congress, which should be published next month. We’ll have more to say about the state of the DoD’s once-premier audit agency at that time.

In the meantime, consider this—

  • DCAA auditor staffing levels reached 4,556 in GFY 2014, an increase of nearly eight percent from GFY 2011 levels. Despite that staffing increase (which came in the midst of sequestration and other budget pressures), DCAA managed to issue only 5,688 audit reports in GFY 2014, a decrease of 23 percent from GFY 2011 levels.
  • In GFY 2011, DCAA issued 1.75 audit reports per auditor. In GFY 2014, DCAA issued 1.25 audit reports per auditor.

We consider that to be a problem.

Another problematic statistic is that DCAA reported that it still takes the audit agency more than 1,000 days to perform an incurred cost assignment and to issue an audit report to a cognizant Federal agency official (CFAO) for negotiation with a contractor. That means it still takes DCAA nearly three full years to perform an audit on one year’s worth of contractor costs. That’s not good.

Despite those problematic numbers, DCAA reported that it had managed to “close” 11,101 incurred cost assignments during the year, leading it to report that the agency had worked down its backlog of incurred cost audits to a year-end balance of 18,185 – for a reported reduction of 21 percent during GFY 2014.

Given that it takes nearly three years to audit one year and that the agency issued a total of 5,688 audit reports for all assignments (of which incurred cost assignments are merely a subpart), the obvious conclusion is that DCAA is “closing” incurred cost assignments by means other than performing audits. Perhaps those closed, non-audited, incurred costs assignments are for contractors deemed to be “low-risk,” or perhaps they are related to final billing rate proposals deemed to be inadequate for audit. In that latter case, DCAA simply throws up its hands, recommends a Draconian decrement of 16.2%, and then passes the buck to the CFAO for action.

Which is nice for DCAA’s statistics, but does little to actually finalize indirect rates and close-out contracts.

But none of those numbers or statistics—or our opinion of them—is new. It’s all a rehash of previous numbers, statistics, and commentary. You can find our analysis of prior years’ Reports to Congress on this site.

You can also find our opinions on this site about DCAA’s hollow recommendations that Congress do something to help out the poor audit agency. We’ve not been reticent about expressing them.

To conclude: for this year’s version of the annual Report to Congress, we rate it “meh” and look forward to digging into the more meaty statistics soon to be published by the DoD OIG.

 

 

Small Business Compensation Challenges

E-mail Print PDF

“The failure mode of ‘clever’ is ‘asshole.’” – John Scalzi

Several general points of discussion, before diving into the article:

First of all, if you are a small business looking for sales growth, the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is a sweet way to get some funding for your projects. No doubt about it. But working the SBIR program entails some risk. As we’ve noted on this blog many times, the primary risk lies in the transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2, as your small business moves from firm, fixed-price contract awards to cost-reimbursement contract awards. With that transition comes a host of new compliance requirements. If you aren’t prepared for them, they will bite you squarely in the … pocketbook.

Second, if you are an innovative, entrepreneurial, technology-focused small business, it’s more than likely you have some very smart people running the company. Perhaps a couple of Ph.D.’s; almost certainly a few engineers with deep expertise in some important areas. Smart people; well trained in the scientific method. Rigorously logical. Able to identify inconsistencies and exploit them. Excellent!

Just keep them the hell away from the government auditors.

The rules of government contracting, including government contract cost accounting and government contract compliance, are not logical. They are not internally consistent. You cannot smart your way through them. You cannot bulldoze the auditors with your otherwise formidable intellect. That ain’t the way that works—not at all.

You master the rules of government contracting by memorizing them, by reading legal cases that interpret them, by working with them and negotiating them. You don’t master that body of knowledge by being smarter than the next guy (though that helps); you master it by persevering through it. You accept the logical inconsistencies and the ridiculously complex compliance rules as part of the fabric, and you realize that it’s not business: it’s government.

Third, many small businesses struggle with how to record compensation for the owner—particularly if the owner is also working on the company’s projects. In those circumstances, some of the owner’s labor is for the management of the company as a whole – G&A expense labor – but some of the labor is also directly allocable to the project(s) on which s/he is working – direct labor. Direct labor is burdened with other costs, such as G&A expenses. It’s a complicated situation often made even more difficult by a simplistic bookkeeping system, or a decision to stick to “cash basis” accounting when “accrual basis” accounting is really the better choice.

When you wrap up the three discussion points above into one government contractor, you have an environment in which the government auditors are going to be looking for things you did wrong … and they are almost certain to find them. You’re going to have an accounting system that is ill-suited to your new contracts, coupled with accounting entries that are likely to be non-compliant with requirements you didn’t know you had. And your engineers and smart technical folks are going to argue with the auditors, secure in the knowledge that they are the smartest ones in the room … which is going to come across as arrogance (whether justified or not) and is going to cause those auditors to dig in their heels and, perhaps, call in the big guns of the U.S. Government. It ain’t gonna be pretty, but it will be expensive.

Finally, thanks to Darrell Oyer for pointing out this latest example of SBIR failure in his newsletter. It slipped under our radar screen, but it’s got too many lessons in it to ignore. So we’ll talk about some of the lessons here.

We will be talking about the April, 2015, decision by Judge Thrasher at the ASBCA in the appeal of Accurate Automation Corporation (AAC).

AAC, located in Chattanooga, Tennessee, is the kind of innovative small business the Department of Defense says it wants to foster, one that “specializes in advanced Unmanned Vehicles, Transient Voltage Suppression devices, and other supporting technologies.” AAC is a closely held corporation; its President was Mr. Robert Pap. The company employees engineers, scientists and physicists. In the mid-2000’s, AAC received two SBIR awards from the U.S. Navy—both of them via cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts.

Mr. Pap was a salaried management employee, but he also worked on at least one of AAC’s projects. As we noted above, that situation presents challenges; and those challenges were exacerbated when the company chose not to pay Mr. Pap his full salary because of working capital constraints. AAC claimed those unpaid costs as salary (including the direct labor portion). Apparently there was some notion that Mr. Pap received additional stock in lieu of the unpaid salary, but that part is kind of hazy.

What’s not hazy is that DCAA questioned the unpaid claimed costs and Mr. Pap attempted to argue the auditors off their position. The arguments were of no avail and DCAA issued a Form 1, which questioned $53,788, an amount calculated as the sum of $20,430 in direct labor dollars, $22,398 in allocated overhead costs on those wages, and $10,960 in allocated G&A expenses. The situation was actually a bit worse than that. As the ASBCA decision noted, “The DCAA audit actually reviewed three AAC contracts questioning $95,863 in direct labor costs that were not paid. However, $75,433 of the questioned costs was related to Contract No. N00039-0l-C-2206 which was closed by the time of the audit.” The Contracting Officer upheld the disallowance and AAC appealed to the ASBCA.

The primary argument raised by AAC’s attorneys was that Mr. Pap had a deferred compensation agreement with his company and thus AAC was allowed to accrue for the salary expenses even though they had not been paid. As Judge Thrasher noted in his decision, the compensation Cost Principle at FAR 31.205-6 contemplates deferred compensation, but puts some conditions in place before such costs can be claimed as allowable. The two conditions for allowability are—

  1. The costs shall be measured, assigned and allocated in accordance with 48 CFR 9904.415, Accounting for the Cost of Deferred Compensation.

  2. The costs of deferred compensation awards are unallowable if the awards are made in periods subsequent to the period when the work being remunerated was performed.

Right away the small business seeking to implement an allowable deferred compensation plan has a challenge, because the Cost Principle invokes Cost Accounting Standard 415. That’s a fairly complex and tricky Standard. Suffice to say that the amount of deferred compensation to be recorded in this year’s books is the present value of the future compensation to be paid. Good luck with that calculation.

But AAC didn’t record the present value of the future compensation; it recorded the full amount. In fact, there was some doubt that AAC even had a deferred compensation plan. The company’s attorney’s arguments to that effect were undercut by Mr. Pap’s audit responses to DCAA, which unequivocally stated that AAC did not have a deferred compensation plan. In another audit rebuttal, Mr. Pap stated that the salary costs had not been paid, even though the company’s position was that the salary costs had been paid in stock (or, in the alternative, forgiven by Mr. Pap). Judge Thrasher wrote—

… Mr. Pap's own statements contradict his declarations. DCAA noted and raised this same issue as a result of their review of AAC's 2005 cost proposal. Mr. Pap responded by letter in June 2008 specifically addressing the existence of a deferred compensation plan and unequivocally stated there was no deferred compensation plan in place in 2005, 2006 or 2007 … When DCAA provided him an opportunity to provide proof of payment of the costs questioned for the same reasons in AAC's CFY 2007 proposal, his first response in January 2014 was that he had not been paid yet … Appellant would now have us believe, contrary to his prior statements, that a plan did exist in 2007 and he was paid in 2008. I do not find this credible.

Mr. Pap’s words, reprinted by the Court in Finding 3 of the decision, were unfortunate in both content and tone. The content was bad enough, but the tone seemed more than a little condescending. (See our second discussion point, above.)

Do we need to tell you that AAC lost its appeal?

 

Commercial Item Contracts: Terminations for Convenience

E-mail Print PDF

For the past 20 years the Federal government – in particular the Department of Defense – has focused on buying as many “commercial items” as possible. The focus has been driven both by statute and by regulation. As the DoD’s Commercial Item Handbook (Version 2.0) states—

Title VIII of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (Public Law 103-355) established the statutory requirements for acquiring commercial items. Section 8104 of the Act specifies a preference for commercial item acquisitions. Section 8105 specifies that certain provisions of law do not apply to acquisitions of items that meet the definition of a commercial item when acquired by the Government. Further, Section 8002 limits the types of clauses that may be included in a contract for an item meeting the statutory commercial item definition and acquired under 48 CFR, Chapter 1, Part 12 (Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) part 12). FAR implementation of the Act provided acquisition officials with wide latitude to use judgment in deciding whether a Government need can be met by an item that meets the commercial item definition. However, neither the Act itself nor the FAR implementation specifies how this decision is to be made or at what level within an organization it is to be made. These are established in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and the DFARS Procedures, Guidance and Information (PGI). Consistency in the use of established approaches to acquire commercial supplies and services should exist across the Department.

Thus, for the past 20 years Federal buyers have been seeking commercial items to acquire, albeit with mixed success. While the Federal government spends literally billions of dollars each year on “commercial items,” most of those items are of the paper clip and pencil variety. In other words, several commenters have asserted that there has not been enough effort made to qualify contractor-provided goods as “commercial items” – especially within the DoD. They have asserted that Contracting Officers are too slow in making their commerciality determinations, that they are too quick to reject items as being non-qualifying, and that both DCMA and DCAA have a propensity to second-guess prime contractors’ commerciality determinations with respect to their lower-tier suppliers, leading to questioned and disallowed costs.

Recently, the DoD has moved to centralize commerciality determinations and has established a goal of making those determinations in 10 days or less. That plan has not gone over well with contractors, according to this story at GovExec.com. The story quoted from a letter sent by the Professional Services Council (PSC) to Rep. Mac Thornberry, the sponsor of acquisition reform legislation. The letter said—

There are thousands of commercial items determinations made each year and requiring that they all be conducted by one office, disconnected from the customer base and the acquisition offices, will almost certainly result in procurement delays … Since commercial items determinations are among the core responsibilities of a contracting officer, rather than negat[ing] that training and removing that authority from contracting officers, we would recommend that the training continue and Congress direct an assessment of such efforts to see if the training has been effective and where additional focus may be necessary.

As a matter of fact, there is a solid basis for Contracting Officers to be skeptical – or even suspicious – of contractors’ claims of commerciality. Most of us should remember the Boeing tanker fiasco, which at one point involved the claim of commerciality for “green” aircraft that were significantly modified to meet military requirements, such that there was little likelihood they could be sold to the general public. (Unless the general public suddenly found a need to refuel the jet fighters parked in their garages.) Given the history (and political finger-pointing) associated with problematic claims of commerciality, it’s rational for Contracting Officers (and auditors) to take a second look at such claims to ensure there is a valid basis for them. But the difference between a second look and an automatic rejection is huge, and there is no legitimate statutory, regulatory, or policy basis for failing to support an otherwise valid commerciality claim.

Notwithstanding the problems associated with commerciality determinations, the Federal government and the Department of Defense manage to award quite a few of commercial item contracts, using the procedures found at FAR Part 12.

Some of those commercial contracts will be terminated for convenience.

How does that work?

The first thing to know is that the “normal” termination protocols of FAR Part 49 and the Cost Principle at FAR 31.205-42 don’t operate for terminations for convenience (T4Cs) associated with commercial item contracts awarded under FAR Part 12 procedures. Instead, the requirements of the contract clause 52.212-4 (“Contract Terms and Conditions – Commercial Items”, May 2015) establish termination procedures for commercial item contracts. That being said, Contracting Officers may use the Part 49 T4C procedures as “guidance” to the extent there is no conflict with the termination procedures established by 52.212-4.

According to the termination procedures of 52.212-4, in a T4C the contractor will be paid as follows:

  • The percentage of the contract price reflecting the percentage of the work performed prior to the notice of the termination, plus

  • Any charges the contractor can demonstrate directly resulted from the termination.

With respect to the termination charges, the standard clause language provides that those charges must be “reasonable” in amount and must be demonstrated “to the satisfaction of the Government” using the contractor’s “standard record keeping system.” The clause expressly states that “The Contractor shall not be required to comply with the cost accounting standards or contract cost principles for this purpose. This paragraph does not give the Government any right to audit the Contractor’s records.” However, “The Contractor shall not be paid for any work performed or costs incurred which reasonably could have been avoided.”

Seems clear enough.

But appearances can be deceiving.

Recently, the ASBCA heard an appeal from Dellew Corporation in which Dellew sought to recover $279,558 in “unrecovered amounts and settlement and proposal preparation costs” following the T4C of its firm, fixed-priced FAR Part 12 commercial item contract. The kicker here is that the government, in its wisdom, decided to incrementally fund the commercial item contract. The contract was modified to incorporate the DFARS contract clause 252.232-7007 (“Limitation of Government’s Obligation,” May 2006) which established a notification requirement: the contractor was required to notify the Contracting Officer is writing “at least ninety days prior to the date when … the work will reach a point in which the total amount payable by the Government, including any cost for termination for convenience, will approximate 85 percent of the total amount then allotted to the contract….”

Which is ridiculous on its face and possibly tantamount to a violation of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.

The ability to track spending and project spending against incremental funds is not an attribute of the average commercial “standard record keeping system.” Instead, that is an attribute of a sophisticated accounting system, one used by experienced contractors to account for project costs charged to cost-reimbursement and other complex contracts awarded pursuant to FAR Part 15 procedures. It is an attribute of an “adequate accounting system” and is a requirement found in the Standard Form 1408, which is used to evaluate the adequacy of a contractor’s accounting system prior to award of a FAR Part 15 contract. There is no way poor Dellew was ever going to be able to comply with the onerous requirements associated with that DFARS contract clause.

Moreover, the clause requires the contractor to track a termination liability, since the T4C costs must be included in the required cost projections. It’s doubtful that any commercial business even knows what a termination liability is, let alone knows how to account for it and project it in calculations of future project costs.

In sum, we assert (as non-lawyers) that there is a decent argument here that Dellew was induced into a commercial item contract, a contract into which the Government insidiously inserted, after award and with no prior notice, non-commercial item requirements, requirements with which it knew (or should have known) that Dellew could never comply. But so what? Dellew signed the bilateral contract modification, very likely without much in the way of thought or trepidation. We’re guessing Dellew never knew what it was signing. As we’ve opined before, contractors need to be careful what they sign—and Dellew learned its lesson the hard way.

And then the government terminated Dellew’s contract for convenience.

The other kicker here is the government, in its wisdom, did not terminate the contract effective on the day of the T4C notice. Nope. Instead, it submitted the T4C notice on April 2, 2012, to be effective October 1, 2012, almost exactly six months in the future. And the government expected Dellew to know how to handle that strange situation, which would flummox many sophisticated defense contractors.

The actual termination language in the standard 52.212-4 clause is quite clear. It says –

The Government reserves the right to terminate this contract, or any part hereof, for its sole convenience. In the event of such termination, the Contractor shall immediately stop all work hereunder and shall immediately cause any and all of its suppliers and subcontractors to cease work.

Nothing in that language hints at a government right to terminate at a future date. Indeed, how would a commercial contractor “immediately stop all work hereunder” and “immediately cause any and all of its suppliers and subcontractors to cease work” when the termination date is in the future? How would that work and we assert that not even the best contract minds at Lockheed Martin could figure that out with certitude, let alone the contract minds at Dellew. Again, to our ill-educated minds, such actions hint at a violation of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing at best, or to an inducement at worst. Yet Dellow persevered and attempted to perform its contract to the best of its ability.

A month after receiving its T4C notice, Dellew submitted its required 85% notification letter. In that letter, Dellew stated it would hit its funding limit on July 31, 2012. It stated it needed an additional increment of funds (“$250,000 to $300,000”) in order to perform through September 30, 2012, In addition, Dellew stated that it needed an additional $250,000 to $300,000 for “settlement expenses and termination costs,” including “overhead costs continuing after the termination … employee paid time off and vacation pay accumulated at the date of termination, settlement expenses and proposal preparation costs, and profit on those costs consistent with the margin on the terminated contract.”

The Contracting Officer did not respond to that notification. However, on June 28, 2012, the contract was terminated for convenience via contract modification.

Note that, consistent with our inducement theory, the contract was not terminated on the date stated in the April 2, 2012, T4C notification letter. Instead, the contract was terminated three months earlier than the date the contractor was led to expect. None of the requested additional funds had been provided. Instead, the government paid Dellew $1,119,096.72—which was the amount of funds that had been incrementally provided.

Thus, should we be surprised that when Dellew submitted a Termination Settlement Proposal (TSP) in the amount of $279,641 it was rejected by the Contracting Officer? Instead, the CO offered Dellew $26,011, which was the amount of Dellew’s “settlement expenses” plus G&A (without any fee). Dellew submitted a properly certified claim for the full amount it believe it was entitled to receive. The CO granted the $26,011 and denied the remainder of the claim. Dellew appealed to the ASBCA.

Dellew argued that the inclusion of DFARS 252.232-7007 changed the deal. Instead of following the standard termination language in the 52.212-4 clause, both clauses had to be read together in harmony. Administrative Judge Page rejected that theory. Writing for the Board, she stated—

None of the language in DFARS 252.232-7007 indicates that it is a remedy granting clause of the contract that would entitle a contractor to recovery of particular items in the event of a convenience termination. Ultimately, any entitlement to termination settlement expenses due appellant must be established through the process prescribed by FAR 52.212-4(1).

Judge Page then proceeded to analyze the three prongs of contractor recovery established by 52.212-4. In her analysis, the three prongs are:

  1. The price of work performed under the contract prior to the termination

  2. Settlement expenses

  3. Costs resulting from the termination

Judge Page confirmed what we noted above, which is that the price of work performed prior to termination is determined via a calculation based on the percentage of work completed times the contract price. (We note she did not address the unique facts of this case, where Dellew's contract was incrementally funded at at amount less than the full FFP contract price awarded.)

With respect to Item 2, settlement expenses, Judge Page wrote—

Settlement expenses include those expenses incurred by the contractor for the preparation and presentation of settlement claims to the CO. … It is well established that settlement expenses, including legal expenses, are generally allowable. … However, a contractor is only entitled to those settlement expenses that are reasonably necessary for the preparation and presentation of the termination settlement proposal.

Judge Page also wrote that the third item is for costs incurred by the contractor that were incurred only because the contract had been terminated. These costs “do not relate to work completed” but, instead, are reimbursed “to fairly compensate the contractor whose contract has been terminated.” She referenced FAR 31.205-42(b) for a list of examples of such costs. That's an interesting approach to take, given that the 52.212-4 clause language (which we quoted earlier in this article) expressly states that the Cost Principles do not apply to commercial item terminations for convenience.

While Judge Page’s analysis provides good information for contractors with Part 12 commercial item contracts that get terminated for convenience, her analysis was of little help to Dellew. Judge Page rejected both Dellew’s and the Government’s Motions for Summary Judgment, and we expect the parties will either settle their dispute or proceed to trial. Should there be a trial, we look forward to hearing the Government’s explanation for its seemingly abnormal treatment of this contractor.

 


Page 111 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.