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Apogee Consulting Inc

The Allowability of Airfare

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The allowability of contractor travel costs has long been a source of dispute between the Federal government and the contractors it hires to perform work. This issue often stems from the fact that the travel rules differ between Federal employees and employees of private sector contractors. That’s not the entirety of the situation, of course, but those differences seem to spark feelings of … envy or jealousy (for lack of better terms). Government employees have so many difficult and complex rules that govern their reimbursable travel costs, and they so often lose money when in TDY travel status, that they seem to feel private sector employees should suffer as they do. Misery seems to love company.

And thus the rules governing the allowability of contractor travel costs are similarly complex and difficult, and what should be relatively straightforward rules become somewhat Byzantine and even self-defeating to a large extent—where the cost of compliance outweighs any potential travel savings. Yet regardless of compliance (or not), the perception that contractors are living large while billing the government persists: Contractors’ travel-related costs receive extraordinary scrutiny from Contracting Officers, Contracting Officer Representatives, and from auditors.

The cost of airfare is one of the areas of extraordinary scrutiny.

Now in truth contractors do often seek to obtain upgrades to business or first class seats. Why that should be a problem goes to the heart of the differences in travel philosophy between the Feds and their contractors. Most Federal employees don’t make a distinction between contractor executives and run-of-the-mill contractor employees. But contractors see a vast difference between those hierarchical levels, in terms of compensation and other perquisites. For example, most contractor executives expect to fly in first class, if they are not flying in the corporate jet. But because just about all government employees have to travel coach, they don’t understand why any contractor employee, regardless of rank, should do otherwise. Consequently, both modes of air travel (first class and use of corporate jets) are heavily regulated and, as a result of the regulation, both generate a healthy share of unallowable costs.

But the equivalence is false. Not all contractor employees are the same, just as not all employees of the Federal government are the same. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, for example, flies around the world in a large airplane owned by the Federal government. Military executives (e.g., generals and admirals) fly around in aircraft owned by the Department of Defense. Why can’t contractor executives be extended the same courtesies?

Regardless of the lack of logic involved, the fact of the matter is that the rules governing the allowability of contractor airfare do not distinguish between contractor employees and contractor executives. They don’t distinguish between direct-charged travel costs and the travel costs incurred by indirect employees. They make little distinction between casual TDY travel and the constant travel of salespeople and business development folks. It’s a one-size-fits-all approach, and it’s designed to put contractor employees on a general par with employees of the Federal government. Contractors who want to upgrade (at cost) or fly corporate jets do so at the cost of generating unallowable costs. See the Cost Principle at FAR 31.205-46, especially (b) and (c).

The Federal government’s concern with contractor airfare costs soared to new heights (or fell to new lows) in late 2009, when the cost allowability rules were changed to limit allowable airfare costs to the lowest fare available to the contractor (instead of the standard coach fare offered to the public). We wrote about the rule change here. In that article, we said—

In addition, the rule seems to create a new class of unallowable air fare, which is fares paid in excess of that elusive ‘lowest priced airfare’ that was available at the time of booking.  If the FAR Councils did not mean to create this new unallowable air fare, then the rule was crafted poorly.  As written, each air fare incurred for each trip must be compared to the platonic ideal of a ‘lowest priced airfare’—as that ambiguous term is interpreted by the contractor and its auditors.

While the FAR rule-makers were adding complexity to the airfare cost allowability criteria, the Department of Defense was asking for the rules to be relaxed for its employees on TDY travel, as we reported in this article. Remember that false equivalency in the travel rules we noted earlier? Yeah, it didn’t get any better no matter how much pain the Federal government tried to put its contractors through. Indeed, the complex rules of contractor airfare cost allowability continue to generate questions, disputes, and litigation five years later.

One example of the issues generated by the rule change is the litigation between the Department of Defense and the giant defense contractor, The Raytheon Company. Now, we’ve known about this litigation for a while, but were unable to discuss it until there was something publicly available to discuss. And now there is, courtesy of the ASBCA in a ruling on dueling motions for summary judgment.

It’s important to note that the decision linked to above is not precedential; it’s merely a ruling on the motions before the Board. Indeed, Judge Dickinson’s ruling is such that there will need to be a trial on the merits. But we want to explore the Judge’s ruling because it provides such a great example of how the FAR Council’s 2009 rule-change mucked-up the waters for defense contractors such as Raytheon.

The issue at hand is certain airfare costs incurred by Raytheon in 2005. In 2009, the DCAA questioned “certain of Raytheon’s airfare costs” and, in 2012, the DCMA Corporate Administrative Contracting Officer (CACO) issued a Contracting Officer’s Final Decision (COFD) found those costs to be expressly unallowable, and demanded penalties and interest on those unallowable airfare expenses. According to the CACO, there were four types of unallowable airfare costs. Judge Dickinson quoted the COFD at length to describe two of the four types, and so will we.

In the first category, based upon the review of the selected sample items, it was found that Raytheon did not always use the negotiated corporate discounts with airlines. There were a number of flights on which the traveler was on coach and that fare was incurred and charged by Raytheon, instead of the negotiated discounted airfare amount. When there was a discount airfare available and not used for those flights, the difference between the discount fare and coach fare is unallowable under FAR 31.205-46(b), 31.201-5 and 3l.201-2(d). The difference between the discount and coach fares is also unallowable under FAR 31.201-3, Determining Reasonableness. Fares charged in excess of those available to Raytheon through its negotiated corporate discounts are unreasonable. They exceed that which would be incurred by a prudent person in the conduct of competitive business.

In the second category, based upon the review of the selected sample items, Raytheon did not remove as unallowable additional amounts when premium airfares, for first class or business class seats, were not justified by the FAR travel cost principle. For the airfare costs which did not meet the requirements of the cost principle cited above, the unallowable cost is the difference between the premium airfare incurred and the standard coach fare based upon FAR 31.205-46(b). Raytheon incurred and included in its claimed costs airfare in excess of standard coach costs without meeting the requirements of the exception in FAR 31.205-46(b). Since the exception in FAR 31.205-46(b) is not applicable, the claimed costs are unallowable.

Obviously, one important issue is whether the 2009/2010 FAR revisions to 31.205-46 were, in fact, revisions—of if they were merely clarifications. If they were clarifications, then Raytheon (and all other government contractors) were limited to the airfares they had negotiated, and not by the standard coach fares available to the general public. Judge Dickinson found there was ambiguity in the differing interpretations of the regulations, and declined to rule on the matter (motions for partial summary judgment denied).

Raytheon also argued that the government had not provided any evidence that it had failed to apply (to its contract costs) all airline discounts to which it had been entitled, and that “DCMA improperly relied on a misstatement of Raytheon policy” in disallowing otherwise allowable airfare costs. Judge Dickinson similarly declined to rule on those matters (motions for partial summary judgment denied).

The one victory for Raytheon was an uncontested motion for partial summary judgment on the issue that “Raytheon's airfare costs for commercial business are allocable to the Department of Defense contracts.” The Government did not oppose Raytheon’s partial motion for summary judgment on that issue, and Judge Dickinson granted it.

In conclusion, this case presents an outstanding illustration of the complexity involved in determining a contractor’s allowable airfare costs. It also illustrates the lengths to which the auditors, contracting officers, and government attorneys will go when they believe a contractor has treated its employees (of whatever rank) better than the rank-and-file Federal employees.

Regardless of your feelings on the merits of the parties’ positions, we suspect you’ll agree with us that it seems difficult to understand how the parties can be litigating costs incurred in 2005 ten years after the fact. Hopefully, Judge Dickinson’s future rulings in this case will put these issues to bed for other contractors, so that they don’t have to make similar arguments on airfare costs ten years from now.

 

Authority to Acquire

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The phrase “authority to acquire” is not particularly well-known to most government contracting, accounting, and compliance professionals. You really can’t find it in a solicitation provision or in a contract clause. There’s no particular FAR section or subsection that addresses it. Yet the more we work with government contractors, the more we think it’s a phrase that everybody should have familiarity with. It’s a concept that crosses functions and impacts the adequacy of multiple business systems.

So let’s start with the basics. What the heck does it mean?

We’ll start by quoting from the DoD Guidebook for Contract Property Administration (Draft, dated July 28, 2011) –

Contractors acquire property through various means, including purchase, transfer, and fabrication. A contract might call for new property to be purchased by the contractor for use under the contract. The Government might transfer its own property to the contractor for use under the contract. Or, the contract might call for the contractor to produce—or fabricate—property for the Government. The contractor’s acquisition of property is regulated by FAR 52.245-1, Government Property; the applicable Cost Accounting Standards; and FAR 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment.

Most contractors acquire property through an established purchasing system. Material control organizations initiate purchase requisitions (PRs), which are then submitted to the contractor’s purchasing function. Source documents include Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) requisitions, purchase orders, transfer documents, petty cash documents, and fabrication orders. Supporting documents include purchase requisitions and engineering change proposals (ECPs).

In that Guidebook, the Government Property Administrator (PA) is told to “examine requisition and fabrication procedures,” and is directed to test to ensure that the contractor “has contractual authority for the acquisition of property, including property obtained from Government supply sources.” Thus, we will henceforth call that contractual authority for acquisition of property the “authority to acquire,” meaning that the terms of the prime contract (or higher tier subcontract) gives the entity performing the contract the authority to procure the stuff necessary to execute the contract’s (or subcontract’s) Statement of Work (SOW).

In other words, “authority to acquire” means that what is acquired—and what is charged as a direct contract cost—is within the ambit of the contract’s SOW. Goods and services charged to a contract as direct contract costs must be related to the SOW, as it is the contract SOW that gives the receiving contractor the authority to acquire those goods and services. There must be a clear nexus between the requirements of the contract SOW and the goods or services being acquired and direct-charged to that contract. Conversely, direct-charged goods and services that are unrelated to the SOW thus have been obtained without the requisite “authority to acquire” and, as such, are probably unallowable costs. At least, that’s what we suspect a DCAA auditor would assert.

Goods and services obtained without the authority to acquire are problematic from several different viewpoints. First, they are likely unnecessary costs (in terms of executing the SOW) and drive up costs that might be used as the basis for estimating future costs. In that sense, costs charged to a contract without the authority to acquire could lead to Estimating System deficiencies and/or allegations of defective pricing.

From a financial viewpoint, direct costs that lack authority to acquire can cause significant problems. On fixed-price contracts, such costs erode margin. On cost-type contracts, such costs may (in extreme cases) constitute the basis for an allegation that the False Claims Act has been violated. For either contract type, inappropriately charging direct costs to a government contract creates certain property tax concerns. And we are not even going to mention the cash flow problems.

Acquisitions of goods and services without requisite authority to acquire can also impact other DFARS business systems, including Purchasing and Property Control. For contractors subject to Earned Value Management System requirements, such costs can impact cost and schedule variances as well as estimates-at-complete. To the extent such items were not included in the original program Bill of Materials (BOM), they may create a deficiency in the Material Management and Accounting System.

In sum, goods and services obtained and direct-charged without the requisite authority to acquire can impact every one of the six DFARS business systems. They can impact financial results. They can impact tax reporting. They can, in extreme cases, lead to disputes and litigation. So we think this is kind of a big deal.

Despite the known problems and risks associated with obtaining goods and services without the requisite authority to acquire them, contractors (and their program managers) keep right on doing it. The rationale for continuing the poor behavior ranges from “it’s my program and I’ll buy what I want” to “the customer told me to buy it.” With respect to that latter reason, it’s truly amazing to see the wide variety of items that the customer “told” the contractor to buy. (The direction is rarely, if ever, committed to writing.)

Typically, the customer asks the contractor to buy goods and deliver them because the customer lacks the funding to otherwise acquire them. Or the paperwork is too bureaucratic and the easier solution is to just ask the contractor to take care of it. Computers and cell phones are two items that come immediately come to mind. The customer can’t get the computer he wants when he needs it, so he specs it and tells the contractor to buy it and deliver it. Problem solved! And really, when one is looking at a $10 million (or $100 million) contract, what’s a couple of thousands of dollars more? It’s barely a drop in the bucket; it probably won’t even show up in the variance analysis. So: no harm, no foul. That’s the normal way of such things – even though many rules and regulations exist to prevent just that type of transaction from taking place.


From the contractor’s perspective, the number one job is to keep the customer happy. Is there a contract clause that expressly prohibits providing an extra computer or cell phone? Is there a statute? Does doing so constitute a false claim? If nobody can point to a statute or rule that expressly prohibits doing what the customer requests, the contractor is almost certainly going to say “yes” and acquire the requested computer or cell phone, even though the goods are not strictly required in order to perform the SOW. Again: no harm, no foul. And it may even lead to a better CPARS rating!

But sometimes things go wrong.

We want to tell you an illustrative story of what happens when the contractor goes too far in trying to make the customer happy, when the customer goes too far in requesting goods that never should have been requested. In this particular case, there was harm so there was a foul.

We know there was harm because the Department of Justice told us so.

The DoJ announcement told us that “Two Men Plead Guilty in U.S. Department of State Contracting Fraud Scheme and Contractor Cover-Up.” Now, that headline is not particularly unusual these days; we got so tired of writing about procurement fraud that we stopped doing so, except for the very few instances were there may be a lesson to be learned. This is one of those rare instances.

According to the DoJ press release, Tony was a Department of State Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR). In addition to his day job of being a COR, Tony was also an authorized representative for a nutritional supplement company—one of those multi-level marketing companies where people can earn commissions from their sales as well as the sales of others they have enrolled into the pyramid. That wasn’t necessarily a problem for Tony, but he created a problem for himself when he involved one of the Department of State contractors in his sales pyramid. That situation created a prohibited conflict of interest for Tony.

With respect to the contractor, Marvin was a supervisor whose employees purchased the nutritional supplement. Marvin’s problem was that he got his employees reimbursed by his company for the cost they incurred in purchasing the nutritional supplement. The employees were reimbursed and the reimbursed costs were claimed as being allowable direct costs of the Department of State contract, even though there was no authority to acquire and even though the nutritional supplements were obviously unallowable personal expenses. To make matters worse, Marvin “caused false invoices to be made and submitted to the State Department for the cost of the nutritional supplements.” That created a problem for the company.

Getting back to Tony, his conflict of interest became a bigger problem when he “approved the majority of the false invoices” in his official capacity as COR. The value of the false invoices was more than $170,000. Tony “earned commissions in excess of $25,000“ from the purchases made by Marvin’s employees.

To the contractor’s credit, an internal investigation uncovered the foregoing scheme and the company reported it pursuant to the Mandatory Disclosure Program. However, a further problem arose when the company (former) President, Curtis, allegedly decided to edit the disclosure made to the State Department so as to “omit facts related to the fraud,” such as Tony’s role in approving the false invoices. Allegedly, Curtis did not timely disclose all relevant facts and that created a problem for him.

To sum this story up, the COR requested that the contractor obtain goods for which there was no authority to acquire. Indeed, these goods were not only unnecessary for contract performance, they were unallowable personal items. The company supervisor approved reimbursement for the employees’ expenses and direct-charged the costs to the contract, and then submitting invoices to the Government that included the unallowable costs. The Government COR approved the invoices, knowing they included the unallowable costs, and personally profited by doing so. When the company discovered the scheme, the company President allegedly edited the disclosure letter to omit facts that would have pointed to the COR’s role, presumably in the name of maintaining good customer relationships.

What happened to Tony, Curtis and Marvin?

Tony pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and a conflict of interest. He is facing a maximum of 25 years in Federal prison.

Curtis also pleaded guilty and faces a maximum of 5 years in Federal prison.

Marvin pleaded not guilty to charges of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and is awaiting trial.

Any charges and/or settlements pertaining to the contractor were not disclosed in the DoJ press release.

This is not a good story. But it is an illustrative story. It’s an extreme example of the slippery slope a contractor is on, when it elects to obtain goods and/or services, and treat the costs of those goods and/or services as direct contract costs, when the contractor (or subcontractor) lacks “authority to acquire.”

 

Stealing Government Property

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Government Property rules are complex and it takes a specialist to ensure that a contractor is in compliance with them. We don’t claim to be specialists in that particular area, but we do have more than a passing familiarity with the applicable requirements.

For example, we understand that when a contractor is awarded a cost-reimbursable contract, then costs charged directly to that contract for tangible equipment and other material items convey title to the government customer. If you buy a piece of test equipment and decide to charge it directly to a cost-type contract, then you no longer own that piece of equipment. It now belongs to your government customer. Thus, while equipment provided by the customer for your use may be deemed “Government Furnished Property,” equipment acquired for contract use and direct-charged to the contract is deemed “Contractor-Acquired Government Property”. In both cases, the equipment must be controlled and maintained. In both cases, you cannot just dispose of the equipment as if it were yours do to with as you please—because it is no longer yours.

Contractors that want to retain title to equipment and other tangible assets need to avoid charging the acquisition cost of those items to the contract as direct costs and, instead, capitalize them and put them on the balance sheet for depreciation/amortization over time. In that way, you retain title. The equipment is yours to do with as you please. The downside of that course of action is the cash flow hit. If you direct charge the cost to the contract, you get to bill 100 percent in your next billing cycle. You may even get fee on top of the acquisition cost! But if you capitalize and depreciate, you only recover a small piece of the cost in the current year. Indeed, you may charge the depreciation to your indirect cost pools and have to recover the current year depreciation as part of your overhead or G&A expense rate. That’s not nearly as good for your cash flow as a direct-charge-and-bill scenario.

Clearly, the trade-off is between title and cash flow. If you give up title, you get the cash now. If you defer recovery of the cost, you get the title and you can use the equipment on this contract and any others you may want to support. You can even sell the equipment.

But if you direct-charge the costs and title passes, and the equipment becomes owned by your government customer, then you cannot use the equipment for other contracts without permission. You cannot sell the equipment without permission. You can’t do anything other than support the current contract without permission.

This one time we worked on an environmental cleanup contract at a military base. It was a cost-plus contract. As part of our efforts, we had to acquire a large commercial trash container. Because we charged the cost of that trash container as a direct contract cost, title passed to the government customer. We knew this and clearly identified the trash container as being owned by the U.S. Government. (We did that by spray painting “PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT” on two sides of the container.) We parked that container at a remote part of the military base.

One day we went to the base and the trash container was gone. By “gone” we mean to say it had been moved about 300 yards and was sitting over the fence line in the field of the farm next door. Our property person, Deborah, went to visit the farmer and calmly asked for the trash container to be returned. The farmer refused in a not-nice manner. Deborah nodded, returned to the office, and made a call.

The next day the FBI showed up to ask the farmer why he had stolen government property—a violation of Title 18 of the United States Code.

The trash container was returned to the military base 12 hours later.

The moral of the lesson, dear readers, is that the government may waste millions or even billions of taxpayer dollars each year, but they don’t take kindly to people taking things that belong to the taxpayers. It’s not a big deal, until it’s a big deal. Then it’s a big deal indeed. Even for trash containers.

So with that story in mind, let’s take a look at a recent ASBCA decision in the matter of Snowdon, Inc. According to the ruling by Judge McIlMail, Snowdon had a “research and development” contract with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The Judge didn’t say, but we presume it was a cost-reimbursement contract, since Snowdon was “reimbursed” for the cost of acquiring two pieces of the equipment, “vesting title in the equipment to the government.”

Contracts end and this one was no exception. As the contract ended, Snowdon and the government “engaged in a series of communications” regarding disposition of the government-owned, contractor-acquired, property. According to the decision—

On 17 May 2012, the government informed Snowdon by email that ‘[i]f none of the equipment is deemed good for use here or transferred to another project then it will be left to Snowdon,’ ending the email with the postscript ‘More to follow ....’ … Later the same day, in response to Snowdon asking when the government might make its decision, the government's representative stated ‘I think 2 weeks at the most’ … On 20 June 2012, Snowdon followed up, requesting that the government provide equipment disposition instructions because, Snowdon advised, it was vacating its facility at the end of the month…

Hearing nothing back from the government customer, Snowdon sold the equipment on July 30, 2012, netting $47,500. Importantly, Snowdon never offered to remit its proceeds to the government; it simply pocketed the cash. When the Contracting Officer found out about the sale, he issued a Final Decision demanding the funds. Snowdon refused and appealed the COFD to the ASBCA.

We suspect many contractors sympathize with Snowdon’s plight. The company gave the government ample notice to provide disposition instructions, and provided a clear deadline with a good rationale (“we are vacating our facility”). The government, as is so frequently the case, did not provide timely property disposition instructions. The deadline came and passed. What was Snowdon to do?

Well, we think Snowdon was lucky. Judge McIlmail found that Snowdon only was liable for the proceeds from the sale of the equipment plus interest. Nobody filed charges alleging that Snowdon stole government property.

But the possibility, as remote as it may have been, was always there.

 

Accounting for Offsets

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Offsets are hard.

But before we get into the hows and whys and wherefores of accounting for offsets, we’d better start by defining them.

Offsets (according to the DFARS) are “the entire range of industrial and commercial benefits provided to foreign governments as an inducement or condition to purchase military supplies or services, including benefits such as coproduction, licensed production, subcontracting, technology transfer, in-county procurement, marketing and financial assistance, and joint ventures.”

Offsets arise in the context of Foreign Military Sales (FMS). We’ve written a primer on FMS-related stuff on this blog before (link here). There is also a DPAP slide presentation on the role of FMS in national security available in our Knowledge Resources (to members of the site). In essence, offsets are the part of the deal that’s other than the item or service being provided.

Typically an offset involves a requirement to purchase of something from the country that’s buying the goods/services from the U.S. contractor. Often the U.S. contractor is expected to enter into a contract with the foreign company as part of the overall FMS deal. When the contract between the U.S. contractor and the foreign company is a subcontract (i.e., in support of the prime FMS contract) then we are dealing with a “direct” offset agreement. When the contract is not a subcontract, then we are dealing with an “indirect” offset agreement.

But offset agreements can include requirements other than an agreement to acquire good and/or services. Offset agreements can also include coproduction, licensed production, technology transfer, marketing and financial assistance, and joint ventures. Some of that stuff is easier to account for than other stuff. For example, marketing costs are fairly easy to handle—though we strongly suspect there will be some significant FCPA hurdles to leap over. But from an accounting view, the effort should be easy to handle.

Challenges arise when the offset agreement requires in-country procurements (use of local businesses) or subcontracts under the “prime” FMS contract. The primary challenge is in the pricing of the FMS deal that includes the offset subcontracts. The DFARS (at subpart 225.70303) requires that FMS contracts must be priced “using the same principles used in the pricing of other defense contracts.” The DFARS states –

If the contractor has made sales of the item required for the foreign military sale to foreign customers under comparable conditions, including quantity and delivery, price the FMS contract in accordance with FAR Part 15.

The DFARS also provides that the contractor can include “the reasonable and allocable costs of doing business with a foreign government … even though such costs might not be recognized in the same amounts in pricing other defense contracts.” In particular, “A U.S. defense contractor may recover all costs incurred for offset agreements with a foreign government or international organization if the LOA [Letter of Offer and Acceptance] is financed wholly with customer cash or repayable foreign military finance credits.” Clearly, then, the reasonable and allocable costs of direct offsets, including some costs not normally recognized as being fully allowable in other circumstances, will be deemed allowable in FMS sales.

However, problems have arisen when contractors attempt to price the cost of indirect offsets. While pricing the FMS deal and any direct offsets is a fairly straightforward effort, pricing indirect offset has proven to be a tough challenge because the DoD Contracting Officer lacks the necessary information to determine that the proposed price is fair and reasonable. If the price cannot be determined to be fair and reasonable, then the contractor risks having the indirect offset costs challenged, and disallowed, as being unallowable.

On June 2, 2015, the DAR Council attempted to remedy those problems by revising the DFARS via an interim rule – i.e., one promulgated without the benefit of public input. The necessity of issuing an interim rule was explained by the DAR Council as being related to the “recent and foreseeable trend of increasing numbers and complexity of indirect offsets….” According to the rulemakers—

Contracting officers must follow these regulations even though no DoD appropriated funds are being used to pay for the effort, and DoD contracting officers have no insight to pricing of the indirect offset. In the past several years, compliance with regulations has resulted in an inability of contracting officers to finalize FMS contract negotiations.

Accordingly, the interim rule –

… affirms that all offset costs that involve benefits provided by a U.S. defense contractor to an FMS customer that are unrelated to the item being purchased under a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), i.e., indirect offset costs, are deemed reasonable for purposes of FAR part 31. The rule provides that no additional analysis is necessary on the part of the contracting officer, provided that the U.S. defense contractor submits to the contracting officer a signed offset agreement or other documentation showing that the FMS customer has made the provision of an indirect offset of a certain dollar value a condition of the FMS acquisition. Finally, the rule provides that the FMS customer shall be notified through the LOA that indirect offset costs are deemed reasonable without any further analysis by the contracting officer.

And so one challenge associated with offsets has been solved.

 

Opposing Points of View

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Opposing_POVThis blog site has become famous in some circles—and infamous in others—for expressing a point of view. That seems to be a rarity these days—especially in the worlds of government contracting and/or management consulting. But that’s what we do here.

We don’t just link to stories; instead, we explore them and discuss what we like (or don’t like) about them. We employ sarcasm and snark. We name names. We attempt to point a finger of blame where we think it should be pointed. We aim for accountability. We opine.

From time to time, some people have a problem with that.

So here’s the deal. This is a blog, not a newspaper. This is a blog, not an academic journal. We don’t hold ourselves to the higher standards of official news sources or academia, and we hope you won’t hold us to those standards either.

We don’t get paid for this. Accordingly, we are not professional writers. We don’t have editors or fact-checkers or typists. These articles aren’t peer-reviewed. It’s just us. (Or me, really. But we told you about that bit here.) We do our best, but we don’t expect perfection. Neither should you. If you find a typo, drop us an email. If you find a grammatical mistake, do the same thing. We’ll correct the errors as time permits.

But we sincerely hope that you don’t judge the value-added by this blog solely by those superficial criteria. Instead, we hope you’ll judge it by the content. Even though occasionally our content may be wrong as well.

We get our content from many sources. We use legal decisions from judicial sites and articles from newspaper sites. We use regulatory filings and DoJ press releases, and we use Google searches and auto-notifications of certain keywords. We use other blogs that cover subjects that interest us. We get input from many sources and we wait to see what sparks our interest or curiosity. That spark becomes a blog article.

We strive for accuracy but we don’t always achieve that goal. We normally don’t just take the input from one source; instead, we run searches and see what other sources have to say about the same event. But news sources are fallible, and most of the stuff on the internet is written down to a middle-school grade level, and most of the stuff is written in one or two sentence paragraphs, with only the most superficial facts being reported. And sometimes those facts are wrong.

So despite our best efforts, from time to time we get the story wrong ourselves. We get our dander up about a thing that is not really a thing, or we get upset for the wrong reasons. Or we name the wrong names or point the finger of blame at the wrong person. We opine, but our opinion is based on a flawed understanding.

From time to time, we screw up.

But that’s in the nature of a blog. More importantly, when we screw up, we admit it. We post follow-up stories or out-and-out corrections. We do our best to get it right the first time, but sometimes we get it wrong and then we try to fix it. We don’t hold ourselves to journalistic standards but we do try to operate with integrity and honesty. We do our best, knowing that sometimes we’ll screw up.

But that’s not good enough for some people.

Every so often we get an email or phone call from somebody who feels wronged by one of our blog articles. They hold us accountable for getting it wrong, even though in almost every one of those instances we based our reporting on publicly available sources. Somehow they hold us responsible for the reporting errors of major newspapers or other similar sources. As if we were supposed to fact-check those sources before we based a blog article on them.

Recently we received an email about an article we wrote more than a year ago, telling us we were unfair to the employees of a certain company, that if we knew all the facts, we would have never opined as we did, or pointed the finger of blame as we did. The email provided additional facts, facts never reported by the newspapers or magazines or the DoJ press release. Twice we have received a phone call from the same soldier, telling us we unfairly characterized certain soldiers (and this soldier in particular) in an article written nearly three years ago. The soldier made certain allegations, allegations not substantiated by any independent source. The soldier expected us to see his side of the story and change our blog article as a result. In fact, he wanted us to delete that allegedly inaccurate blog article.

People who feel wronged by our blog articles want us to fix it in a manner we are not prepared to perform. They want us to delete the offending article altogether. They want us to make is disappear. (Well in fairness the email about the employees didn’t ask for that, but the wronged soldier definitely did.) In the case of the wronged soldier, he demanded we remove the offending article and threatened legal action if we did not accede to his demands.

That ain’t happening.

There are many limitations associated with a weblog, but one of its virtues is that it provides a chronological record. You can use this site to search out articles from 2009, and see what we thought and said about events at the time. There’s no revisionism here. Right or wrong, the articles stand as written.

What we offer, instead, is to post a rebuttal article. If somebody feels upset enough to email or to call us, we believe they ought to be willing to lay out their opposing point of view for us to publish. We won’t edit it; we’ll just publish it and link to the original article that caused the offense. That’s what we offer and we mean it.

Nobody has ever taken us up on our offer.

In particular, the soldier who was so upset he called us twice and threatened legal action never accepted our offer to post his rebuttal article.

But the offer remains open and this article memorializes it. If you are upset or offended by one of our articles, if we got it wrong and you want to correct the record, you know how to do it. Type up your own article and send it in for publication. We’ll take it from there.

We are not perfect. We’ll get it wrong from time to time. If we need to correct the record we will do so. But the record will stand as written. If you think we should do more, you are welcome to submit your own article. In the meantime, if you don’t like the way we operate this blog, you are welcome to start your own, and to see how easy it is to crank out 3,000 to 5,000 words a week—every week—and to try to add some value while doing it.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.