• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

DoD IG Says DCMA Fails to Properly Administer DFARS Estimating System Requirements

E-mail Print PDF

The_Blame_GameRecently the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General issued a report finding fault with the Defense Contract Management Agency’s oversight of contractors’ business systems. Specifically, the DoD IG found that DCMA was not taking timely actions with respect to administration of various contractors’ estimating systems.

We are shocked by those findings. Shocked, we tell you. Shocked and disappointed.

That last bit was sarcasm, folks. Sarcasm.

We saw this coming a long time ago.

We told the blinded-by-bureaucracy apparatchiks on the DAR Council this was going to happen. We told them and they refused to listen. We told them a second time, and they again refused to listen. So here we are, mired in an environment where contractors are (quite literally) punished for the sin of failing to pass a DCAA (and DCMA functional specialist) audit. An environment where DCMA Contracting Officers are poorly trained in the adequacy criteria of the business systems and, in any case, are afraid to overrule the auditors’ findings lest they find themselves the target of a IG Hotline call. An environment where the parties who are required by regulation and agency policy to effectively administer contractors’ business systems are overworked and trapped in a bureaucracy that not only impedes—but actively discourages—use of independent judgment, decisiveness, and the taking of effective action.

So let us tell you how we really feel.

Actually, skip that. We already told you how we really feel about the DFARS business systems environment. Instead, let’s just talk about the current DoD IG audit report and what it might tell us about that same environment.

The DoD IG audit report, as noted in the opening paragraph, reported results from the evaluation of 18 DCMA Contracting Officer actions. Seventeen of the 18 actions reviewed “did not comply with one or more DFARS requirements involving reported estimating system deficiencies.” Seventeen out of 18 is quite a high percentage of failures, actually. What went wrong?

According to the DoD IG, DCMA Contracting Officers did not issue timely initial determinations and final determinations on the reported estimating system deficiencies. And they failed to obtain or adequately evaluate contractor responses to those determinations. And they failed to withhold payments “to protect the Government’s interests” as they were required to do.

The IG started with eighteen DCAA audit reports implicating the adequacy of a contractor’s estimating system. Each of those audit reports asserted one or more “significant deficiencies” in the estimating system. Upon receipt of an audit report addressing a contractor’s estimating system, the cognizant Contracting Officer must issue an initial determination within 10 days (which is not required by any DFARS language, but is instead required by the DFARS Procedures, Guidance and Information (“PGI”) at 215.407-5-70(e)(2)(ii)(A)). The contractor has 30 days to respond to that initial determination. Upon receipt of the contractor’s response, the cognizant CO must issue a final determination on system adequacy within 30 days, which is (again) a PGI requirement and not a DFARS requirement. If the system is disapproved or found to be inadequate, the cognizant CO must begin withholding of a certain percentage of payments due the contractor, until the significant deficiencies are remedied. According to the IG, in 17 of the 18 audit reports reviewed, the cognizant Contracting Officer failed to take one or more of those required steps.

According to the DoD IG—

  • In 12 audits, the CO failed to issue the initial determination within 10 days

  • In 9 audits, the CO “failed to obtain” the contractor’s response within 30 days. We’ll guess that means that the contractor failed to submit the response within 30 days, which makes it arguable where the fault lies.

  • In 14 audits, the CO failed to issue the final determination within 30 days after receipt of the contractor’s response (assuming the contractor actually submitted a response).

  • In 5 audits, the CO found the contractor’s estimating system to be inadequate, but failed to withhold a percentage of payments.

Let’s start by talking about that first bullet – the requirement that Contracting Officers must issue the initial determination within 10 days of receipt of the DCAA audit report. How realistic is that deadline? Before you answer, consider that DCMA Instruction 133 (“Estimating System Review”) requires that COs must obtain DCMA management’s “review and approval” of the initial determination letter before it goes out. Thus, not only does the cognizant Contracting Officer need to review the DCAA audit report and evaluate it for usefulness, the CO must also write the initial determination and then submit it up the food chain for review. The reviewer must be in the office (and not on TDY or leave), and then must review the audit report and the initial determination. If there are any questions, the parties must discuss them; and it’s quite possible that the CO will have to revise and resubmit that initial determination in order to have it successfully approved. And only then will the initial determination be issued to the contractor.

All that activity has to take place in 10 days.

So if the cognizant CO can’t make that deadline, is that the fault of the CO? Or, perhaps, is it the fault of the policy? Perhaps the policy has established an unrealistic deadline that cannot be met?

And the policy doesn’t seem to take into account the quality of the initial DCAA audit report. Going back to the promulgation of the Business System Administration clause in 2012, it was clear (at the time) that the initial audit report had to be clear and complete, and granular enough for the contractor to understand the asserted deficiencies and how to correct them. (Plus the CO had to be able to understand the findings in order to evaluate them.) The current policy does not take into account the well-known and publicly documented fact that DCAA audit reports generally suffer from shortcomings in the GAGAS compliance and quality departments.

Thus, if the cognizant CO can’t make the 10-day deadline, is that his or her fault? Or, perhaps, is it the fault of the initial DCAA audit report, which may be of such poor quality that neither the CO nor the contractor knows what to do with it? That’s a real-life problem that the policy blithely ignores.

In a similar vein, if 50 percent of contractors don’t submit their response to the initial determination within 30 days, does that mean they don’t care enough to make it a priority? Or, perhaps, are they scratching their heads trying to figure out what the heck the problems actually are?

The DoD IG audit report fails to address the most prominent problem in the business system oversight and administration regime, which is that DCAA’s definition of “significant deficiency” doesn’t match the regulatory definition of “significant deficiency”. Thus, when DCAA asserts that a contractor’s estimating system has one or more significant deficiencies, it is (intentionally?) speaking a different language—one that requires the Contracting Officer to translate into DFARS. This takes time and it takes training and it takes expertise; too many COs lack one or more of those necessary attributes. Consequently, when the average CO sees “significant deficiency” in a DCAA audit report, that deficiency tends to show up—word for word—in the initial business system determination, whether or not warranted by the language of the DFARS definition and system adequacy criteria themselves. This is a problem. It is in our view the most prominent problem that leads to the majority of the disputes between government and contractor. The problem is not going to be solved until both the Inspector General and the DCMA leadership acknowledge it, and until they call out DCAA on the rogue definition.

In the meantime, cognizant Contracting Officers are faced with a choice: either overrule DCAA on the basis that their sui generis definition of “significant deficiency” is an impermissible deviation from regulatory requirements (which runs the risk of an IG Hotline call), or else ignore the problem and move forward in an attempt to meet the arbitrary policy deadline. In our experience, the vast majority of COs choose the latter course of action.

Similarly, when a contractor response to the initial business system determination is received, should a reasonable person expect the average CO to accomplish the following actions within 30 days?

… evaluat[e] the sufficiency of the contractor’s response to the initial determination in order to determine whether the contractor addressed all significant deficiencies. If the contractor included a corrective action plan in its response, the contracting officer is required to verify the proposed actions and the milestones to eliminate the deficiencies in consultation with the auditor.

According to the DoD IG, in six of the 18 cases reviewed, the CO’s took an average of 157 days—five full months—to evaluate the contractors’ responses. You know what? That doesn’t seem especially unreasonable to us. But it did to the IG.

With respect to issuance of final determinations, eight of the 18 were issued late—taking an average of 236 days (nearly eight months) instead of the policy-required 30 days. Is that the fault of the Contracting Officers, or something else? What was the root cause or causes of the delays? We don’t know the answer to that question because the DoD IG stopped when it reported data and failed to meaningfully analyze that data.

Similarly, in five of the 18 cases, the contractors’ estimating systems were found to be inadequate, but the COs didn’t start payment withholdings. Again, the DoD IG didn’t delve into the causes of the failure to follow regulatory requirements, so we don’t know if the root cause is overwork, poor guidance (as in, the COs didn’t know how to implement payment withholdings), or what. Maybe the COs felt bad for the poor contractors, or maybe the COs were simply too lazy to follow direction. We don’t know, because the DoD IG didn’t deign to dig into the problem.

In responding to the DoD IG’s findings, the Director, DCMA, noted that some situations are “complex,” and may therefore “require additional time” to fully disposition, regardless of policy requirements. In addition, the DCMA Director noted that payment withholds, while mandatory for disapproved or inadequate systems, “are not the only remedy contracting officers can use to incentivize contractors to take corrective action on deficient business systems.” Other potential remedies include “reduction in contract financing, suspension of progress payments, or revocation of the Government’s assumption of risk for loss of property.” In other words, in some cases it may not be the best course of action to implement payment withholds (despite the regulatory requirement to do so), especially if another incentive is more readily available.

The DCMA Director noted that DCMA has developed the “Contractor Business System Determination Timeline Tracking Tool” to help ensure that Contracting Officers make timely determinations. In addition, and “to further assure compliance,” DCMA has “been working on development of a performance indicator that measures the timeliness of business system determinations.” According to the new performance metric, determinations are being issued on time (as defined by policy) 68 percent of the time.

Need we point out that DCMA has created yet another process, database, and performance metric to overlay on top of all the other processes, databases, and metrics? Is this progress or, perhaps, evidence of an encroaching bureaucracy? Or is it perhaps evidence of the number of bandaids necessary to stop the bleeding of a broken system, one that was ill conceived and implemented despite the pleas of those who foresaw the problems that quickly manifested themselves?

Finally, the Director, DCMA, noted that at the time, there were 132 contractor business systems that had been disapproved and/or declared to be inadequate. The breakdown of inadequate/disapproved business systems is as follows—

  • Accounting 42

  • Estimating 24

  • Earned Value 9

  • MMAS 1

  • Property 35

  • Purchasing 21

Those deficient systems had generated $180.9 million in payment withholds. In other words, to date contractors have been assessed nearly $200 million in penalties for failing to pass their business system audits.

We told the DAR Council this was a bad idea. We were certainly not alone in that regard. Many others cautioned concern and pleaded for restraint. The DAR Council would have none of that. Council members dismissed public input—and our input in particular—with a wave of the hand: “The need to have effective oversight mechanisms is unrelated to resources.” And so here we are, years later, dealing with the fallout from that callous and cavalier disregard for the limitations of real world by bureaucrats who, it seems, couldn’t have cared less.

We predict the DoD Inspector General will continue to issue reports blaming DCMA Contracting Officers for failing to execute their responsibilities as delineated by regulation and policy. We predict the DCMA Director will continue to promise to do better next time. Meanwhile, contractors have lost nearly $200 million—funds that could have gone to hiring extra employees or investing in additional IR&D efforts—because they failed their business system audits.

Many of us knew this would be the result of the DFARS business system administration clauses and oversight protocols. We saw this trainwreck coming from a long way away. And yet, we couldn’t get off the rails. None of us could.

Don’t blame the DCMA Contracting Officers for this mess.

Blame the DAR Council. Blame Congress. Blame DCAA.

Blame yourselves for failing to submit comments to the rules and for failing to have the DAR Council held accountable for the high-handed actions of the members.

There’s plenty of blame to go around.

 

The More Things Change …

E-mail Print PDF

Way back in the earliest of articles on this site, we reported that the FAR was revised to incorporate an interim rule prohibiting the Federal government from awarding a contract to an “inverted corporation”. As we noted six years ago—

As defined in the rule, an inverted corporation is one that ‘that used to be incorporated in the United States, or used to be a partnership in the United States, but now is incorporated in a foreign country, or is a subsidiary whose parent corporation is incorporated in a foreign country.’

On July 2, 2015 – six years later – the FAR was revised to implement a final rule that continues the interim rule. As the promulgating comments explained—

DoD, GSA, and NASA have adopted as final, without change, an interim rule amending the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to address the continuing Governmentwide statutory prohibition on the use of appropriated (or otherwise made available) funds for contracts with any foreign incorporated entity that is an inverted domestic corporation or any subsidiary of such entity.

Thus, the interim rule published on December 14, 2014, was adopted as a final rule without change.

What’s all this about? Well, promulgating comments on the interim rule explain that Congress has been driving the annual rule-making exercise, and has been doing so since 2008. The comments explained—

The prohibition on contracting with inverted domestic corporations is addressed at FAR 9.108. In the years since the Governmentwide prohibition was first enacted in FY 2008, the FAR Council has sought to update this FAR section to reflect the enactment of new appropriations acts. …

Insofar as Congress has retained the statutory prohibition in place since FY 2008, this interim rule amends FAR 9.108-2, 9.108-3, and 9.108-5 to reflect the ongoing nature of the prohibition for as long as Congress extends the prohibition in its current form through subsequent appropriations action (in full-year appropriations acts and in short-term and full-year CRs).

In other words, the FAR Councils got tired of waiting for the annual public law prohibition which lead to an annual regulatory update exercise, and decided to make the change permanent. That makes sense to us.

In addition, on the same day the solicitation provision (contractor representation) was changed to reflect the requirements of the final rule. Notably, a contractor is now required to certify that it is not an inverted corporation in its proposal – and to notify the Contracting Officer if it becomes an inverted corporation during contract performance.

One public comment was received in response to the issuance of the rule, and the comment had little, if anything, to do with the rule itself. The commenter objected to “a particular contract” which was alleged to be “in violation of Federal law, because the contractor merged with a corporation outside the United States,” The response to that comment was that “The Councils are not enforcement agencies, and are not in a position to assess whether the merger of two companies resulted in an entity that meets all the criteria in the applicable definition of ‘inverted domestic corporation.’”

In other words, a contractor is now required to notify the cognizant Contracting Officer if it becomes an inverted corporation during contract performance. It is up to the Contracting Officer (acting in conjunction with advice from agency legal counsel, we presume) to remedy any statutory violations. If the contractor fails to notify the CO as required, then it has breached its contract and, again, the Government has remedies available. As readers know, the Government (acting sua sponte or via a qui tam relator) may allege violations of the False Claims Act under the implied certification theory when there is a contract breach. Regardless of the outcome, that’s going to be an expensive matter for the contractor.

In sum, the rule is simple: don’t be an inverted corporation and expect to contract with the Federal government. In practice—as this series of rulemaking exercises shows—it’s more complicated than it might seem at first glance.

 

 

Looking at DCAA’s 2014 Statistics

E-mail Print PDF

As we do every year, we look back at DCAA’s Government Fiscal Year (GFY) results to evaluate how the DoD”s premier contract audit agency is faring. Using a combination of DCAA’s Annual Report to Congress and the DoD Inspector General’s Semiannual Reports to Congress, we look for trends and attempt to draw some conclusions. We’ve trended DCAA’s metrics back to FY 2006, so we have some robust data at this point.

We did a bit of “first approximation” analysis about a month ago, in this article. That analysis was based solely on the GFY 2014 DCAA Annual Report to Congress. As we noted in the article, we did not use the DoDIG Semiannual Report. Still we noted a few things, to wit—

… consider this—

  • DCAA auditor staffing levels reached 4,556 in GFY 2014, an increase of nearly eight percent from GFY 2011 levels. Despite that staffing increase (which came in the midst of sequestration and other budget pressures), DCAA managed to issue only 5,688 audit reports in GFY 2014, a decrease of 23 percent from GFY 2011 levels.

  • In GFY 2011, DCAA issued 1.75 audit reports per auditor. In GFY 2014, DCAA issued 1.25 audit reports per auditor.

… DCAA reported that it still takes the audit agency more than 1,000 days to perform an incurred cost assignment and to issue an audit report to a cognizant Federal agency official (CFAO) for negotiation with a contractor. That means it still takes DCAA nearly three full years to perform an audit on one year’s worth of contractor costs. … Despite those problematic numbers, DCAA reported that it had managed to ‘close’ 11,101 incurred cost assignments during the year, leading it to report that the agency had worked down its backlog of incurred cost audits to a year-end balance of 18,185 – for a reported reduction of 21 percent during GFY 2014.

To sum up that initial analysis, in GFY 2014 DCAA continued to do less with more. Despite adding audit staff, the number of audit reports continued to decline. Before we get into detailed comparisons, we have to be forthright and tell you that the official numbers are squishy. For example, sometimes staffing is reported as “audit workyears” and sometimes as “audit staff”—are those the same things, or not? Our analysis assumes they are. Also, in GFY 2009 DCAA reported “assignments completed,” not “audit reports issued,” which is not at all the same thing. The distinction between the two metrics grows more important each year, since DCAA is now closing more assignments without issuing an audit report than ever. In fact, our analysis shows that nearly two-thirds of all audit assignments are closed without the issuance of an audit report. Finally, DCAA reports its metrics two different ways. In the DoD Semiannual Report to Congress DCAA makes a distinction between “questioned costs” and “funds put to better use”. The audit agency doesn’t count questioned costs on “forward pricing proposals” in its questioned cost totals. On the other hand, in its own Annual Report to Congress, DCAA most definitely does count those “funds put to better use” as questioned costs, and claims those dollars count as taxpayer savings if the cognizant Contracting Officer implements them. (See Figures 3 and 4 in DCAA’s Annual Report.)

Interestingly, DCAA told Congress that –

DCAA takes a conservative approach to reporting savings and return on investment. DCAA savings do not represent potential savings or possible future savings if DCAA recommendations are implemented. Instead, DCAA only reports savings that have been realized based on actions taken by Government contracting officers.

That may be true (and it is certainly true in the DoDIG Semiannual Report to Congress), but DCAA still counts its findings on contractor cost proposals in its “questioned costs” metrics, and thus so do we.

Finally, let’s discuss other statistical problems that we need to tell you about. What is one to make of this? According to DCAA’s GFY 2014 Annual Report to Congress, DCAA issues four categories of reports: (1) Forward Pricing, (2) Special Audits, (3) Incurred Cost, and (4) Other. But according to the DoD IG Semiannual Report to Congress, the four categories are (1) Incurred Costs, Op Audits, Special Audits, (2) Forward Pricing Proposals, (3) Cost Accounting Standards, and (4) Defective Pricing. It’s almost as if somebody doesn’t want people comparing the reports, using the metrics and analyzing trends.

With all that out of the way, let’s look at DCAA’s GFY 2014.

  • DCAA completed 15,857 assignments, but issued only 5,688 audit reports. Consequently, DCAA closed 10,149 assignments without issuing an audit report. Sixty-four percent (64%) of all assignments were closed without issuance of an audit report.

  • DCAA examined $182,743,100 in GFY 2014, and questioned $10,689,100 of that amount. Consequently, DCAA questioned 5.85% of each dollar examined. In contrast, last year (GFY 2013) DCAA examined $163,075,100 and questioned $16,010,200 of that amount, for a questioned cost ratio of 9.8%.

  • For another contrast, in GFY 2007 DCAA examined $358,351,600 and questioned $13,954,600 of that amount, for a questioned cost ratio of 3.9%.

What do those metrics tell us? Well we can see that DCAA has started to reverse the trend of examining fewer dollars each year. Almost $20 million more dollars were examined last year than in the prior year. However, the amount of dollars examined is still dramatically less than was examined before the attacks on DCAA by GAO and the DoD IG.

DCAA continues to have problems in the area of incurred cost audits. Despite touting the reduction in IC backlog, the fact of the matter is the reduction was achieved by closing assignments without issuing audit reports. DCAA issued a mediocre 3,796 IC/Special audit reports in GFY 2014, which was actually 9 percent less than the 4,187 audit reports issued in GFY 2013. We predicted this bureaucratic legerdemain back in November, 2013. Clearly, the agency is “risking-away” its IC backlog without performing audits on those dollars. While that’s great news for contractors, we predict Congress is going to be less than thrilled when that fact surfaces.

GFY 2014 also saw the continuation of a trend in the area of “post-award” (defective pricing audits). DCAA issued an astounding 24 DP audit reports in the year, across the entire agency. (That’s fewer than the paltry 31 GFY 2013 DP audit reports—and dramatically fewer than the 485 DP audit reports issued in GFY 2006. We can’t say with any certainty why DCAA has chosen to focus its efforts elsewhere, but we do note that the agency reported generating $117,500,000 in GFY 2014 questioned costs associated with those six reports … so we would think that would be a fruitful area for DCAA to go ferret out taxpayer savings.

Well, that’s about it for GFY 2014.

Except for one thing.

We’ve looked at DCAA’s productivity, in terms of dollars examined, audit reports issued, audit reports not issued, and dollars questioned. What about audit quality?

We’ll tackle that topic in an upcoming article.

 

Changes to Acquisition Thresholds

E-mail Print PDF

Every 5 years the FAR Councils revisit the various FAR acquisition thresholds and update them to account for inflation. As you might expect, the last time the thresholds were revised was back in 2010. We blogged about those changes here.

The changes are a good thing, since the thresholds tend to indicate the inflection points at which additional compliance requirements are established. For example, back in 2010 the threshold at which “cost and pricing data” (which would now be called “certified cost or pricing data”) must be obtained moved from $650,000 to $700,000. That seemingly minor change reduced the number of subcontractor proposals on which the prime contractors were required to obtain cost or pricing data to support their price and cost analyses—thus reducing (somewhat) the workload of the analysts. In addition, that change led, ultimately, to a similar increase to the threshold at which a contract became subject to Cost Accounting Standards. (See FAR 9903.201-1(b)(2).)

The first change to the acquisition thresholds was made to the DFARS values, via DFARS Case 2014-D025, and published as a final rule on June, 26, 2015. We looked at those threshold changes and didn’t see anything we need to call out on an individual basis. If you’d like, you can follow the link and check for yourself.

The second change to the acquisition thresholds was made to the values in the FAR, via FAR Case 2014-022, published as a final rule in Federal Acquisition Circular (FAC) 2005-83 on July 2, 2015. This revision had some significant changes. We point some of them out below. We suggest you visit the FAR Case and review all the changes.

Significant threshold revisions include:

  • The micro-purchase threshold moved from $3,000 to $3,500. The NBRC micro-purchase threshold moved from $15,000 to $20.000.

  • The threshold for applying the FAR’s Ethics and Business Conduct clause into a contract moved from $5 million to $5.5 million, meaning that fewer contracts will require a contractor to develop and implement a Code of Ethics and Business Conduct. (We suggest contractors seeking to do business with the Federal government ignore this change, and develop and implement a Code anyway.)

  • The threshold for making sole-source awards to Section 8(a) small businesses moved from $20 million to $22 million.

  • The various thresholds involved in determining the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) increased. It’s complicated and we hesitate to make any single-sentence general statements; however, in general, the SAT range is from $20,000 to $150,000, except for NBRC-related acquisitions, in which case it ranges up to $350,000. This matters because acquisitions within the SAT are reserved solely for small businesses.

  • The FAR Part 15 threshold for obtaining certified cost or pricing data is now $750,000—which means that the CAS applicability threshold is now the same. For contracts valued below that threshold, no certified cost or pricing data should be obtained, and the awarded contract will be exempt from CAS.

  • An entire host of solicitation provisions and contract clauses was updated to reflect the new acquisition thresholds. You should click the link (above) and see how your favorite provision or clause was updated.

Note that the rule is not effective immediately. It is effective on October 15, 2015. We are unclear as to why it will take more than three months to be effective, when other rule changes are effective in much shorter time periods. Perhaps it is timed that way to give prime contractors (and higher tier subcontractors) sufficient warning to update their own procurement policies and procedures. Those entities subject to Contractor Purchasing System Reviews (CPSRs) should probably get moving on implementing these changes right away.

 

BAE Systems Charged with TINA Violations

E-mail Print PDF

FMTVOn June 19, 2015, the Department of Justice announced that it had filed suit in the Eastern District of Michigan, in which it alleged that a subsidiary of BAE Systems located in Sealy, Texas, had violated the requirements of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act (TINA) and, as a result, had violated the False Claims Act. Now, readers of this blog know that we’ve explored the strange relationship between TINA and the FCA before. For example, about a year ago we wrote this article, in which we pondered that relationship.

We wrote –

We are interested in how a TINA violation that has the stated legal remedy of a unilateral contract price reduction plus interest on any overpayments that may have resulted leads to a situation in which every invoice submitted for payment in connection with that defectively priced contract has become a false claim, subjecting the contractor to up to $11,000 per invoice, plus up to treble damages, plus interest. … Now we have a new rule: If the Federal government detects the defective pricing, then it’s a TINA matter. But if the relator detects the defective pricing, then it’s a FCA matter. Which is inconsistent and, on its face, somewhat inequitable. But that’s the way we’re seeing it these days.

We thought then that we’d figured things out pretty well. Instead of the FCA being used as an additional penalty when the Feds encountered an egregious example of defective pricing, we believed that the FCA allegations were the natural result of a qui tam relator (aka “whistleblower”) being the source of the allegations. But now we have to rethink that understanding, because the DoJ hit BAE Systems with allegations of both TINA and FCA violations, and there is no relator in the picture.

We’re confused. Again. Which is probably the natural state of affairs for non-lawyers trying to understand the complex litigation landscape of public contract law.

The factual heart of the allegations is BAE Systems’ certified cost and pricing data submitted to the U.S. Army for a contract awarded in 2008 to build 20,000 trucks. Now these trucks were not your commercial Fords or Dodges; instead, these trucks were “Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles” or FMTVs. The FMTV production contract actually goes back to 1996—nearly twenty years ago—when Stewart & Stevenson originally designed and built them at its plant in Sealy, Texas. Stewart & Stevenson held the contract for ten years (between 1996 and 2006, and then the Sealy plant was merged with Armor Holdings, Inc., who held the contract for two years (2006 to 2007). BAE Systems bought Armor Holdings, Inc. in 2007 and merged it into its Land & Armaments Division (which also included the old United Defense manufacturing operations). BAE Systems continued to hold the Army’s FMTV contract until 2010, when it lost it to Oshkosh. (We wrote about that competition and its aftermath here and also here.) In 2011, the final FMTV rolled-off the Sealy production line and the plant was shuttered in mid-2014.

But the fact that the plant was closed and most employees laid-off didn’t stop the DCAA auditors and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the Army Criminal Investigation Command and the DoJ’s Civil Division Commercial Litigation Branch from filing suit against the parent company seven years after the alleged violations took place.

No details were given in the DoJ press release. The only description of the allegations was “The government alleges that BAE knowingly inflated the price of the FMTV contract by concealing cost and pricing data on numerous parts and materials during contract negotiations, despite having certified that the data it had disclosed was accurate, complete and current.” In essence, we were told that Stewart & Stevenson and/or Armor Holdings failed to comply with TINA by not making a full disclosure of all relevant facts that might affect price negotiations. BAE Systems inherited that alleged violation when it acquired Armor Holdings and is now left “holding the bag” (so to speak).

The ironic thing here is that BAE Systems lost the 2010 follow-on contract award to Oshkosh because Oshkosh underbid it. So if BAE Systems was inflating its bids, it already paid a substantial price for doing so. Indeed, all of its employees in the Sealy plant already paid a substantial price for any systemic bidding errors.

But we don’t know the facts of the allegations. We don’t know what cost or pricing data was allegedly intentionally withheld. We don’t know whether it was supplier pricing or the fact that a sale was being contemplated or whether it was known improvements or cost reductions to the production process. So it’s impossible to evaluate the merits of the case.

But we do know that BAE Systems is going to have a very tough time mounting a defense seven years after the fact, without access to the employees who prepared the cost proposal and negotiated it with the Army.

 


Page 109 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.