Lockheed Martin Also Acquires Sikorsky’s Legal Liabilities
At this point it’s old news that United Technologies Corporation has sold its Sikorsky subsidiary to Lockheed Martin. The acquisition is generally held to be a “win” for LockMart, and reports state it will be immediately accretive to earnings. So: Good for Lockheed Martin. Also: Good for Sikorsky, which escapes a corporate parent that really didn’t want it.
As is the case with any acquisition, the buyer doesn’t just get the assets; it also gets the liabilities. Due diligence is the process of reviewing the acquisition target to make sure all liabilities – especially including any contingent liabilities – are identified and factored into the purchase price. Due diligence on government contracting targets is a bit different and more focused than “normal” due diligence, because the cost of defending (or settling) a contract non-compliance can change a good deal into a bad one. For example, if the target has weak controls over its estimating and pricing, the due diligence team is supposed to assess the potential for post-closing “defective pricing” allegations to surface. Similarly, if timekeeping controls are week, the team is supposed to evaluate the possibility that systemic labor mischarging might be taking place. For a final example, an evaluation of the controls over identification and segregation of unallowable costs helps identify any potential legal issues in that area.
Presumably, when Lockheed Martin decided to acquire Sikorsky, it performed a rigorous due diligence and worked hard to identify any areas of potential non-compliance that might spark legal issues after the deal closed.
One issue – one contingent liability – that was already on the table months before the acquisition was the legal problem of Sikorsky’s subsidiary, Sikorsky Support Services, Inc. (SSSI). SSSI was awarded a Navy contract in 2006 to provide support to the T-34 and T-44 turoprop training aircraft. In turn, SSSI issued a subcontract to another Sikorsky subsidiary, Derco Aerospace, to procure and manage the spare parts needed to provide that support. Derco billed SSSI its costs for doing so, plus overhead and profit. The U.S. Government objected to that arrangement, and filed suit in October, 2014.
As our readers know, accounting for inter-company costs (or inter-organizational transfers, as they’re more formally called) between related parties under common control is difficult, and companies don’t always get it right. Normally, inter-organizational transfers are done at cost, excluding profit; but there are regulatory exceptions that permit transfers at price (including profit) under certain circumstances. We don’t know whether Derco was entitled to an exception.
In this case, not only is the government alleging that SSSI misbilled its Navy customer, but that SSSI also submitted “false Certificates of Final Indirect Costs” in its annual proposals to establish final billing rates for years 2006 through 2012. The government has alleged “numerous claims for violations of the False Claims Act, for breach of contract and for unjust enrichment.” The government seeks $148 million in restitution for SSSI’s alleged noncompliances.
For its part, Sikorsky stated (in its SEC filing) that “We believe that Derco was lawfully permitted to add profit and overhead to the cost of the parts, and maintain that SSSI did not submit any false certificates. We also believe that we have other substantial legal and factual defenses to the government’s claims.”
That being said, on July 13, 2015, or just a couple of weeks before the Lockheed Martin acquisition was announced, Sikorsky was informed that the Department of Justice had “opened a criminal investigation with respect this matter.” There is a difference – a big difference – between civil and criminal allegations. The DoJ’s subpoena definitely raised the stakes. Sikorsky was quick to note that it intends to “cooperate fully in the investigation.”
We are obviously unclear on the details of the matter or what DoJ’s motivation may have been for moving the matter from civil to criminal. However, we noted in this WaPo story that “the Justice Department also claims SSSI submitted false certificates for aircraft maintenance from 2006 to 2012.” If true, those allegations might have been sufficient to get the criminal thing going. But we don’t know.
We do wonder, though, if the continual series of investigations and allegations, and costs of providing legal defense for those investigations and allegations, played a role in UTC’s decision to sell Sikorsky. UTC is a conglomerate that has huge purely commercial entities. Those entities have their own issues, of course; but they don’t have the same level of regulatory oversight and extreme legal consequences that the government contracting entities do. Maybe the UTC Board of Directors got tired of dealing with the problems of one of its largest government contracting entities, and decided to sell the entity to the largest defense contractor in the world—one that presumably deals with such regulatory oversight and investigations and allegations on a daily basis.
Thus: We wonder if the known contingent liabilities associated with this matter played a role in bringing the sales price down to a point where commenters think that Lockheed Martin got a very good deal, one that is immediately accretive to earnings.
Louis Berger Group … Again?
Readers of this blog have had an opportunity to use the travails of the Louis Berger Group (LBG) as object lessons. We’ve reported on LBG as it has contended with allegations of violations of the False Claims Act with respect to “gaming” its cost allocations and resulting indirect billing rates. Settling those allegations cost the company $69 million. The former LBG Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and its former Controller pleaded guilty to those allegations. More recently, we reported that the former LBG Chief Executive Officer (CEO), President, and Chairman of the Board (which were all the same individual) had pleaded guilty to the allegations, and was sentenced to 12 months in home confinement and a fine of $4.5 million.
Just to recap, by this time LBG has had its CEO/COB/President, its CFO, and its Controller all plead guilty to improper accounting and billing practices. What else could go wrong for the company?
Well, this could go wrong.
The Department of Justice reported that LBG had pleaded guilty to violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FPCA). As part of its settlement, the company agreed to enter into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement and make a payment of $17.1 million. In addition, two former LBG Senior Vice Presidents pleaded guilty “to conspiracy and FCPA charges in connection with the scheme.”
According to the DoJ press release –
… from 1998 through 2010, the company and its employees … orchestrated $3.9 million in bribe payments to foreign officials in various countries in order to secure government contracts. To conceal the payments, the co-conspirators made payments under the guise of ‘commitment fees,’ ‘counterpart per diems,’ and other payments to third-party vendors. In reality, the payments were intended to fund bribes to foreign officials who had awarded contracts to [LBG] or who supervised [LBG’s] work on contracts.
So that’s pretty much the entire C-Suite of senior executives that participated in some part of the various schemes, isn’t it. What does that say about “tone at the top” and how that tone creates (or doesn’t create) a culture of integrity and compliance?
To be fair to the current leadership team at LBG, there does appear to be a newly energized commitment to integrity and ethical behavior. The page may have been turned. We say this because the Department of Justice commented on it. The DoJ said—
Among other factors, in entering into a DPA in this case, the government considered: (1) LBI’s self-reporting of the misconduct; (2) the company’s cooperation, including voluntarily making both U.S. and foreign employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing and organizing evidence and information for federal investigators; (3) the company’s extensive remediation, including terminating the officers and employees responsible for the corrupt payments; and (4) the company’s demonstrated commitment to improving its compliance program and internal controls.
One of the frustrations in this profession is that compliance is often viewed by executive leadership as a necessary evil, an overhead cost that really doesn’t add much value to the entity’s ability to win work and execute it. And the internal controls that assure compliance are far too often viewed as something whose cost has to be minimized, and whose requirements have to be avoided.
Then something like this comes along. A company like LBG is investigated and wrong-doing is discovered. Far too often, the wrong-doing is discovered at the highest levels of executive leadership. And then lawyers are hired, and investigators, and outside consultants. Fines are paid. Careers are ruined. In extreme cases, people go to jail.
At that time, if not before, smart leaders realize that compliance and internal controls are not necessary evils. In fact, they are investments whose ROI can be measured in terms of litigation avoided, lawyers not hired, and fines not paid. Not to mention: careers not ruined.
When you find leaders who poo-poo compliance and internal controls, and an entity where budgets are cut first in those areas, you need to ask yourself why that’s the case. Perhaps there’s a reason that senior leadership doesn’t like the notion of compliance, or doesn’t want to spend money on internal controls.
When you find a place like that, remember the story of the Louis Berger Group, and learn from it.
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In Case You Were Wondering …
The blog hasn’t been updated in a couple of weeks and I thought I’d let you know what was going on (or not going on, as the case may be). It’s not really a big deal.
To give you an understanding of why no article has appeared for a couple of weeks, I need to tell you the mechanics of how articles get published here. It’s something I’ve been meaning to do for a while, and this seems like an opportune time to get into the sausage-making of the blog.
In order to get a new article on this site, several things need to happen. Those things are, in chronological order –
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Something has to catch my eye in the world of government contracting, accounting, or compliance. It has to be of interest to me, personally. Something that sparks my passion. If I don’t have that initial passion, the article doesn’t get written. Yes, ideally the topic should be of general interest to a wider audience, but the truth of the matter is that if I can’t find a reason to write the article, then the article doesn’t get written.
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I have to have a hook. I need a lesson to be learned or a moral to the story. I need to visualize the first couple of sentences and, in general, how the article will flow. In a perfect world, I will see how the article will end, but frankly that doesn’t happen every time. I know I have a good hook when I have a title. If I can’t pick the title right off the bat, I’ll try typing a couple of sentences to see where the article will go. Rarely (and I mean very rarely), I’ll hold-off on giving the article a title until I’ve roughed-out a draft, just to see what the real hook is. From time to time, I’ll type out a thousand or more words, only to realize that there is no hook. That article does not get published.
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I have to have the time to write. Each of these articles takes from an hour to three or more hours to type and proof-read. Finding that time is not easy. For example, this article is being written at 10:30 PM on a Thursday night. It will take at least an hour to write. So it probably won’t be done until nearly midnight.
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After the article is written and proofed, I send it to Mark, my webmaster and publisher. Chances are, if I send it by midnight, he’ll get it in the morning. No offense to Mark, but his morning is not my morning. He works around the clock some times, but more often he’s not in the office until 9 AM or even 10 AM. So he won’t see the new article until then, at best, But Mark has a job in addition to being my webmaster, so he may not be able to get to the new article right away.
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When Mark does get to the article, it takes him less than 30 minutes to prep it for publishing. He does some magic with Google docs and other assorted software, formatting my Word document into a web-ready article.
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When I send Mark the article, I specify when I want it to be published. Typically I write two or three articles on the weekend, and then he sets them up for publication at midnight on the dates I specify. I like a random pattern (as you may have noticed) because I like the notion that articles just spring up unexpectedly.
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I see the articles before you do, and I give them a once-over before publication, looking for typos and infelicitous syntax. I have the ability to edit them, and I frequently do edit them, even after publication, when I see something that bugs me.
So based on the foregoing, you may have noted some variables in the timing. There is the lag between me finding a topic and typing it up. There is the lag between me sending the article to Mark and his ability to get to it. And there is the lag between when Mark puts in on the site and when I set it for publication. Those variables affect the timing of when you see a blog article.
What happened in the past couple of weeks is that Mark’s “real” job took him out of the office and on the road for 10 days. I have a couple of articles in his queue for him to get to, but he’s not been able to get to a computer to do his thing. He gets back to the office tomorrow, and then the articles will start to flow again. This will be the third article in his queue when he returns.
I am also working on two other articles. One is the promised article on DCAA audit quality, and the other is a review of the recent ASBCA decision on concurrent changes to cost accounting practices. Each of those is rather long and involved, so they’ll take a while to finish. But when they are done, Mark should be able to get to them quickly.
So all this detail may be of little interest to you. But some of you may have been wondering, and I trust this answers your questions.
Boeing Acknowledges Growing Losses on Aerial Tanker Development Program
In February, 2011, the Pentagon awarded Boeing a $35 billion fixed-price incentive fee (FPIF) contract to develop and deliver 179 KC-46A aerial tankers and refueling aircraft, ending a decade-long struggle to pick the contractor that would replace the US Air Force’s fleet of aging KC-135 Stratotankers. At one point or another, bidders included Northrop Grumman, a Russian aircraft company, and Airbus. Boeing won and, reportedly, it won on price, aggressively bidding on modifying its 767 commercial aircraft to meet tough USAF requirements, and promising to deliver the first 18 aircraft by August, 2017.
A few months later, we reported that grumbles were surfacing that Boeing had “bought-in” to the contract, and that the company fully expected to lose as much as $300 million on the initial contract, in order to position itself to replace the entire USAF fleet of 500 tankers and generate revenue through aftermarket sales and fleet support. Apparently, Boeing was willing to take a short-term loss in order to clear the playing field of its European rivals, and to position the company for future sole-source contract awards in the long term.
Expectations at the time were that Boeing could have to fund as much as $700 million of aircraft development on its own dime--$400 million as its share of the contract cost-growth/overrun and $300 million in additional funds.
Now, four years later, Boeing has taken a $536 million charge in recognition of its KC-46A program losses. The charge represents a reduction of about $0.77 per share to Boeing’s EPS. Apparently, the program schedule has not been slipped, but the company stated that some technical problems remain with the aircraft’s integrated fuel system – i.e., the main thing that modifies the aircraft from a commercial 767 to a military KC-46A. So of course that would be the problem area, wouldn’t it?
The current charge of $536 million in in addition to a $425 program charge Boeing recorded almost exactly a year ago. That charge was related to “wiring problems” on the aircraft. In sum, Boeing has reportedly now recorded aggregate charges in excess of $1 billion.
In the meantime, Boeing’s hopes of making up some of its development losses through global sales of its aerial tankers suffered a setback recently, as South Korea chose Airbus to provide its tankers. You know, Airbus: The aircraft maker that lost to Boeing in the competition for the USAF aerial tanker (after first being declared the winner). That’s gotta hurt.
How lucky it is for the US Air Force that Boeing (and its shareholders) has the financial resources to absorb more than $1 billion in losses. Many other potential bidders would not have been able to take the financial hit, and likely would have had to stop performance. So, is the lesson here that fixed-price development contracts are only suited for the biggest of contractors, the ones who can take the short-term losses in return for a hope of long-term revenue? If that’s the case, then is the use of fixed-price development contracts antithetical to participation of small businesses in defense contracting?
And if small businesses are frozen out of design and development contracts because the Pentagon insists on awarding fixed-price development contracts, then what does that say about obtaining innovation? Most observers think that innovation can best be found in the smaller, more nimbler, companies—the start-ups and the just-getting-on-their-feet companies. Most observers think that innovation is inversely correlated with size and the bureaucracy and process control that comes with size. If that’s true, then fixed-price development contracting is antithetical to innovation.
Who knows?
What we do know is that Boeing took a large gamble on its KC-46A aerial tanker program. Despite bigger losses than initially forecast, the company is still in the game, playing to win.
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