GE Rethinks Its HR Management Approach
We were recently notified, courtesy of an article at GovExec.com, that the bluest of the blue chip corporations—General Electric Company—has decided to reassess and fundamentally change its employee performance management approach.
According to the article (written by Max Nisen), GE is in the process of “abandoning formal annual reviews and its legacy performance system for its 300,000-strong workforce” and, instead, will implement “a less regimented system of more frequent feedback via an app.” The article noted that GE “got rid of its formal, forced ranking around 10 years ago.” In other words, GE – the company that made employee “racking and stacking” (or, as it was known at GE: “rank and yank”) popular – has decided that that particular approach no longer works for it. Mr. Nisen wrote: “With the decision, GE joins other high-profile companies—like Microsoft, Accenture, and Adobe—that have started dumping or have already gotten rid of formal annual reviews.”
We have railed before on this blog against such knuckle-headed HR strategies. For example, three years ago in this article we wrote –
Recently, we have come across articles and discussions which assert that ‘stack ranking’ is a fairly terrible approach to workforce management—especially when implemented on a routine basis and especially when a pre-selected ‘grading curve’ is issued by upper management. The pre-selected approach was made famous by Jack Welch and the General Electric Company, where the lower 10% of the workforce is identified annually—and then fired—came in for special criticism.
Getting back to Mr. Nisen’s article, why did GE finally abandon the Welch employee management philosophy? Nisen wrote –
But [Welch’s] style and focus on the annual performance review simply doesn’t work for the company or its younger workforce any more, say GE human resources executives. ‘The world isn’t really on an annual cycle anymore for anything. … I think some of it to be really honest is millennial based. It’s the way millennials are used to working and getting feedback, which is more frequent, faster, mobile-enabled, so there were multiple drivers that said it’s time to make this big change.’ She’s not the only one who thinks so. There’s a growing realization that the annual review just isn’t a particularly good way to manage people or to boost performance. It leads to a tendency for HR to focus excessively on process over outcomes.
(Emphasis added.)
Adobe HR head Donna Morris, who led that company’s transition away from annual reviews and ratings [said] ‘It’s a process that looks in the rear view mirror, that’s focused on what you’ve done a year ago. That just isn’t current with how I think we’re working and how many of the employees that we’re looking to attract or grow have been raised.’
And that’s really the thing, isn’t it? The annual performance review and the ranking of employees and the doling-out of the merit increase pool aren’t about boosting (or even rewarding) employee performance. Instead, it’s about HR working its HR process to the detriment of employee morale and employee performance.
Nisen wrote –
The move by more and larger companies away from annual reviews and ratings is well past due, say management theorists. Years of research, from both business school professors and neuroscientists, has found that the practice is ineffective at boosting performance, actively alienates employees, is based on a flawed understanding of human motivation, and is often arbitrary and biased. People simply don’t fit neatly on a bell curve. It ends up being an exercise in paperwork and bureaucracy instead of an agent of change.
Despite its proven flaws, there are many companies in the Aerospace & Defense (A&D) sector that continue to perpetuate that HR management approach. Those are many of the same companies that are seeing the focus of Pentagon R&D funding shift to the more nimble and creative Silicon Valley companies. Those companies include Netflix. We’ve written admiringly about Netflix’s HR philosophy before (as have many others). It’s been called the most important innovation to ever come out of Silicon Valley.
While Silicon Valley focuses on employee freedom and “talent density,” and while dinosaurs like GE abandon their previous HR management philosophies in favor of a more 21st century approach, your company keeps perpetuating the status quo. You still have annual performance reviews that are used to rack and stack employees, and to dole out the paltry merit increase pool. You still receive direction that no more than a certain percentage of employees can receive the highest ratings, and that a certain percentage of employees must receive the lowest ratings—simply because nobody has yet challenged HR to defend the antiquated and fundamentally flawed approach.
If you want the best and brightest employees, we suggest you start pushing back, and tell HR that they need to rethink the employee performance management process. Because if you don’t start to evolve away from the “rack and stack” approach, you may find yourself out of talented employees—and out of business soon thereafter.
Concurrent Changes to Cost Accounting Practice, Part II
Fair warning: This one is going to be fairly long and relatively complex. We’ve been mulling on it for a while, trying to organize our thoughts in order to present them in a semi-cogent fashion. The only way we can digest this is to break it up into two separate parts. Therefore this is Part 1 of 2.
And as is the case with such articles, we need to include the caveat that we here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. are not attorneys and we are not offering legal advice. Our opinions on legal matters are simply those of laypersons. If you want a legal opinion on the matters we are going to be discussing, please consult an attorney.
All that being said, here we go.
For background, please see our October, 2013, article on the same topic. In that article, we reviewed an ASBCA decision regarding concurrent changes in cost accounting practice made by The Boeing Company. That decision addressed Boeing’s situation, which took place before the FAR Councils made significant revisions to the cost impact rules in 2005. Left unaddressed was whether the government’s approach—which was rejected by Judge Freeman with respect to pre-2005 changes—would be upheld with respect to post-2005 changes, where the rules more clearly supported the government’s views.
For additional background, it should be noted that we have in the past proffered criticism of the FAR Councils’ 2005 revisions to FAR Part 30 and related contract clauses, asserting that the Councils overstepped their authority by interpreting terms in the CAS Board regulations, since the implementing statute expressly reserved that right to the CAS Board. Unfortunately, as we’ve noted recently, the CAS Board has been inactive—leaving us as a lonely voice pointing out the FAR Councils’ usurpation of powers. (According to the White House OMB site, the last time the CAS Board met was in October, 2011. Even if that’s not accurate, just the fact that nobody has updated the CAS Board site in four years gives a good sense of the lack of government interest in an active CAS Board.)
With those background thoughts in mind, let’s review the recent ASBCA decision in the matter of Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems (SAS). (The case is dated May 7, 2015, but the decision was actually published about six weeks after that date, to give the parties an opportunity to redact proprietary information.) Of course, readers of this blog know that The Raytheon Company is an active litigant at both the ASBCA and U.S. Court of Federal Claims. A keyword search on this site reveals nearly 50 articles in which Raytheon is mentioned—nearly all of which discuss litigation-related matters. It’s an open secret in the aerospace/defense industry that, while Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman will often settle their disputes with the government, Raytheon is more principled (some might say intransigent or obdurate) and will pursue litigation to its end—especially when the company believes it has strong legal arguments on its side. The fact that Raytheon tends to win more often than not likely creates further incentive for the company to lawyer-up and litigate rather than to settle its disputes.
This particular decision involves three separate appeals (ASBCA Nos. 57801, 57803, and 58068) that were consolidated for judicial efficiency. The cases correspond to different revisions that Raytheon SAS made to its CASB Disclosure Statement (i.e., 57801 = Revision 1, 57803 = Revision 5, and 58068 = Revision 15). ASBCA No. 57801 (Revision 1) was the subject of a prior decision in which the Judge declined to dismiss the government’s claim solely on the basis that it has been filed after the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations (CDA SoL) had expired, because Raytheon SAS did not submit its cost impact analysis until two years after it had made its changes to cost accounting practice. (Other government claims were dismissed, because Raytheon SAS had submitted cost impact analyses more timely.) We criticized that decision, noting that the contract clause 52.230-6 did not require submission of a cost impact analysis until the cognizant Federal Agency Official (CFAO) requested it. Thus, we believed that tying notice of harm to a discretionary event gave the government an inequitable ability to toll the CDA SoL. Nonetheless, the legal doctrine that the government did not know it had been harmed until the contractor announced it in writing became somewhat of a bright line in such matters.
Because the Judge at the time declined to dismiss the government claim, the parties proceeded to trial. Two years later, a different judge (Judge O’Connell) ruled on the merits of the parties’ dispute. Let’s recap the facts, as Judge O’Connell determined them.
Raytheon’s Revision 1 contained four (4) changes to cost accounting practice. When SAS submitted its Gross Dollar Magnitude (GDM) cost impact analysis, the calculations showed that one change (property management) “resulted in increased costs of $313,200 to … flexibly-priced contracts and a decrease in costs of $281,100 to its fixed-priced contracts.” But the other three changes had the opposite impact. In the aggregate, they “decreased costs to flexibly-priced contracts [by $660,800] and increased costs to fixed-priced contracts [by $518,200].” How those impacts were aggregated and netted against each other to determine if Raytheon SAS’ CAS-covered contracts had experienced “increased costs in the aggregate” formed the gravamen of the parties’ dispute. As Judge O’Connell wrote—
… the government takes the position that increased costs of $313,200 to Raytheon's flexibly-priced contracts and a decrease in costs of $281,100 to its fixed-price contracts due to the property accounting/property management change each result in a cost increase to the government and, thus combined, result in a total cost increase of $594,300 ($313,200 + $281,100). Conversely, following this same logic, cost decreases to flexibly-priced contracts and cost increases to fixed-price contracts both save the government money, which would mean that there was a cost savings of $1,179,000 from the other three Revision I changes ($660,800 + $518,200). Further, if the cost increase from the property accounting/property management change could be offset by the cost decrease from the other three changes, there would be an overall cost saving to the government of $584,700 ($1,179,000-$594,300) from the Revision I changes. This question, whether multiple simultaneous accounting changes can be offset against one another, is central to this dispute.
(Emphasis added. Internal citations omitted.)
But there was more to the dispute. DCAA started its audit of SAS’ cost impact analysis nearly five years after Raytheon submitted it. The audit was never finished. Instead, DCAA issued a Rough-Order-of-Magnitude (ROM) to the CFAO. We’ve bemoaned DCAA’s use of Memos and ROMs as poor substitutes for GAGAS-compliant audits before. We’ve also asserted that DCAA’s streamlined approach to determining government damages is a causal factor in increased litigation between the contracting parties. Thus, our opinion regarding the following paragraph should be no surprise to our readers.
On 25 May 2011, DCAA provided to DCMA a rough order of magnitude (ROM) of $772,590 for the Revision 1 property accounting/property management change. It calculated this amount by taking the sum of Raytheon's numbers from the GDM and adding 30 percent: $313,200 + $281,100 x 1.3= $772,590. By way of explanation, DCAA stated: ‘we utilized a 30 percent increment factor for the GDMs based on at least one year of data to determine an estimated cost impact to the government. The 30 percent factor is an estimate intended to protect the taxpayer's interest for items that could have been found if an audit were to be performed.’
(Emphasis added. Internal citations omitted.)
DCAA focused solely on the one change where Raytheon SAS’ CAS-covered contracts had experienced increased costs in the aggregate, and did not look at the other three changes to cost accounting practice. This was intentional, as DCAA agreed with Raytheon SAS that the other three changes resulted in decreased costs to the government. In other words, DCAA didn’t care about cost savings to the government stemming from the three changes, but wanted Raytheon SAS to adjust contract values for the one change where it thought costs had increased. And it wanted Raytheon SAS to pay an extra 30 percent over and above what the calculations showed the cost impact was.
And to make matters worse, the CFAO added compound interest on top of the calculated cost impact value, the value that included the 30 percent adder. The government demanded $404,011 from Raytheon SAS, even though Raytheon SAS believed it had actually saved the government money when all changes were netted together.
Nobody should be surprised that Raytheon SAS felt that the government’s position was rapacious, or that its own position was strong, and the matter was worth litigating.
In rendering his decision on Revision 1, Judge O’Connell cited to the Boeing decision that established the legal doctrine of concurrent cost accounting changes for pre-2005 changes to cost accounting practice. The Judge went out of his way to note that the Boeing doctrine was, and remains, fact-specific. However, he applied it to Raytheon SAS’ Revision 1, since that Revision had been submitted before the 2005 FAR changes. He wrote, “the government has repeated the same arguments it made in Boeing and has put all of its eggs in the ‘Boeing is wrong’ basket. Because the government has not identified any material fact in dispute, we enter summary judgment for Raytheon on Revision I.”
Victory for Raytheon SAS with respect to Revision 1 changes.
In the next article we will discuss the Judge’s view of the Revision 5 and Revision 15 changes. Those changes to cost accounting practice were effected after the FAR Councils’ 2005 revisions to FAR Part 30 and related contract clauses … and thus Raytheon SAS did not achieve such a clear-cut victory. And yet the rest of the story is important, because Judge O’Connell charted some new territory and clarified some important aspects of how to calculate “increased costs in the aggregate” when a contractor makes concurrent changes to cost accounting practice.
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Concurrent Changes to Cost Accounting Practice, Part II (Part 2 of 2)
In the previous article we discussed some of the background issues underlying the dispute between Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems (SAS) and the government. Chief among those issues was how to calculate “increased costs in the aggregate” when a contractor makes concurrent changes to its cost accounting practices. Raytheon SAS was litigating three (3) separate sets of changes—Disclosure Statement Revision 1, Revision 5, and Revision 15. We concluded the previous article by noting a complete victory for Raytheon with respect to its Revision 1 changes, as Judge O’Connell ruled that, under the pre-2005 environment, when a contractor made simultaneous (or “concurrent”) changes to cost accounting practices, the contractor was permitted to use the impact from changes where the government saved money to offset the impacts from changes where the government did not save money. Because three of Raytheon SAS’ Revision 1 changes resulted in cost savings while only one resulted in a cost increase—and the aggregate cost savings were greater than the single cost increase—the government suffered no cost increase in the aggregate, and thus had no claim against Raytheon SAS.
The critical finding that led to Raytheon’s victory on its Revision 1 set of changes was that the rules were silent (at that time) regarding how to handle concurrent changes in cost accounting practice and how to calculate increased costs in the aggregate when there were concurrent changes. Judge O’Connell spent roughly seven pages (out of his 29-page opinion) discussing the fact that the CAS Board never defined the phrase “increased costs in the aggregate” and, since the regulations were silent on the topic at the time, the only option left to him was to look at the parties’ course of dealing and performance in order to discern what the contractual expectations were. He wrote –
We find CAS Working Group Item 76-8, the DCMC and DCAA manuals, and the proposed regulation to be quite informative in identifying the ‘context and intention’ of the parties when they made their bargain. These documents also indicate a clear course of performance between the government and CAS-covered contractors on prior contracts concerning the treatment of simultaneous changes.
(Internal citations omitted.)
Thus, like Boeing, Raytheon SAS was permitted to offset its concurrent changes because that was the expectation of the contracting parties at the time.
As we noted in the previous article, Judge O’Connell was left to piece together the parties’ intent because of a lack of activity by the CAS Board. According to the Judge, the CAS Board had a duty to “fill the gap” left in the regulations. Indeed, he found that the CAS Board recognized that duty; yet the Board failed to fulfill its obligation despite recognizing the need for action for more than fifteen years. He wrote –
In the CAS statute, Congress has left a gap concerning the offset of simultaneous changes. Based on: (1) the absence of any language in the CAS Board regulations that address the offset of simultaneous accounting changes; (2) the CAS Board's abandonment of its rulemaking effort; and (3) the CAS Board's long-stated desire to address this issue, we conclude that the CAS Board has not yet ‘filled the gap’ in the statute by issuing regulations.
(Internal citations and footnotes omitted.)
As we shall see, the CAS Board’s dereliction of its acknowledged duty proved fatal to some of Raytheon’s arguments with respect to its two other sets of Disclosure Statement Revisions.
In its Disclosure Statement Revision 5 (effective January 1, 2005 but submitted July 8, 2005), Raytheon SAS made only one change to cost accounting practice. It submitted a GDM cost impact a bit more than a year later (April, 2006) that calculated a cost increase of $153,000 to flexibly-priced contracts and a cost decrease of $117,900 to fixed-price contracts. As was the case with the Revision 1 changes, DCAA never completed an audit. (The parties disputed the reason for the lack of timely audit completion. We were there at the time and we have our own opinion, which would not be prudent to share publicly.) As was the case with the Revision 1 changes, DCAA issued a ROM that included a 30 percent adder to Raytheon’s calculations, in order to protect the taxpayers. Thus, DCAA told the CFAO that the cost impact was $352,170, to which the CFAO added compound interest and demanded that Raytheon SAS pay the government $512,732. Unsurprisingly, Raytheon SAS opted to litigate the government’s demand for payment.
Raytheon argued, among other things, that the cost impact analysis showed the cost impact was immaterial. As Raytheon saw things, flexibly priced contracts had been impacted by a trivial $153,000, which was a laughably small percentage of its multi-billion dollar business base. Judge O’Connell didn’t buy that argument. However, given his subsequent ruling on the methodology used by DCAA to calculate the cost impact, he agreed that the issue of whether the CFAO should have waived further action based on the materiality of the cost impact would be litigated at trial.
Raytheon also argued that the CFAO should have found the change to cost accounting practice to be “desirable and not detrimental” and, because the CFAO did not do so, the CFAO abused his discretion. Again, Judge O’Connell was not persuaded by Raytheon’s argument, because the decision was inherently discretionary. There was no evidence of bad faith, and so the CFAO did not abuse his discretionary authority.
(As a side note, we non-attorneys here at Apogee Consulting, Inc. have a hard time understanding how Judge O’Connell reconciled his correlation of “abuse of discretion” with “evidence of bad faith” given the Supreme Court’s upholding of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Penner Installation Corp. that the Contracting Officer must perform a “quasi-judicial” role in equitably arbitrating disputes between the government and the contractor. But perhaps that’s just us.)
To sum up the Revision 5 situation, Judge O’Connell decided it much the same way he had decided the Revision 1 changes—with the exception that certain aspects (involving computation of the cost impact and materiality) would have to be litigated at trial.
The Revision 15 set of changes presented the most difficult challenge. Raytheon SAS submitted its revised Disclosure Statement on November 1, 2007, to be effective January 1, 2008. The GDM cost impact analysis of those changes was submitted on February 26, 2010—more than two years after the Disclosure Statement was submitted. (That timing sounds bad, until one realizes that Raytheon was waiting for the cognizant Federal Agency Official (CFAO) to request the cost impact, as CAS clause 52.230-6 provides.)
There were three (3) individual changes described in Revision 15. Raytheon’s GDM cost impact analysis showed that one change “caused a $251,500 decrease to flexibly-priced contracts and an increase of $195,200 to fixed-price contracts” while the other two changes “had the opposite effect.” According to Raytheon’s calculations, change 2 (communications) “caused an increase of $47,800 to flexibly-priced contracts and a decrease of $41,600 to fixed-price contracts” whereas change 3 (inventory maintenance) “caused an increase of $36,000 to flexibly-priced contracts and a decrease of $17,400 to fixed-price contracts.” DCAA recognized that the aggregate or net effect of all the changes, when considered together, was to decrease costs to the government in the amount of $304,000. However, because of the then-recent rule changes to FAR 30.606, DCAA maintained that the impacts of the three changes could not be combined. Instead, each had to be considered individually. Using that logic, DCAA calculated a cost increase to the government of $157,080 related to two of the three changes. As Judge O’Connell wrote—
DCAA recognized that the [REDACTED] change resulted in decreased costs to the government of $446,700 ($251,500 + $195,200). However, it stated that ‘[t]here is no requirement for any adjustment related to this unilateral accounting practice change since adjustments are only made if changes result in increased costs to the Government.’
In other words, as DCAA saw things, the FAR rules permitted the government to cherry-pick which changes would result in a contract adjustment and which changes would be ignored. Naturally, any changes that were favorable to the government and resulted in cost savings would be ignored (i.e., the price of FFP contracts would not be increased if the contractor shifted costs to its FFP contracts). In contrast, changes that were unfavorable to the government and resulted in cost increases, no matter how minute, would result in demands for payment with interest calculated from the date of the change (even if the government intentionally delayed its audit so as to increase interest payable).
Interestingly, the CFAO sought to recover $172,363 (which included interest) be adjusting a contract that had been awarded to Raytheon SAS in 2004 – well before the troublesome FAR changes had been implemented. That created a problem that Raytheon sought to exploit in its legal arguments, and led to an interesting result in the decision issued by Judge O’Connell. He wrote –
Revision 15 did not go into effect until 1 January 2008. This would suggest that, in addition to contracts like Contract II that predate the issuance of FAR 30.606, this revision also applied to some contracts executed after the April 2005 effective date of the regulation. In fact, Raytheon estimates that about two-thirds of the contracts subject to Revision 15 were executed after the regulation went into effect. Raytheon's Revision 15 appeal thus raises the issue of how we should analyze the Revision 15 changes when that revision applies to contracts executed both before and after the issuance of FAR 30.606.
Judge O’Connell split the baby and said that the old FAR (that permitted offsets between changes) applied to impacts on contracts awarded under the old FAR rules, while the new FAR (that prohibited offsets between changes) applied to impacts on contracts awarded under the new FAR rules. He wrote: “The accounting changes that Raytheon made in 2008 do not change the nature of the bargains that the parties struck pre-FAR 30.606. Accordingly, our decision in Boeing means that the contractor can offset the Revision 15 contracts that the parties executed prior to 8 April 2005, the effective date of FAR 30.606.”
With respect to the post-2005 FAR rules, Raytheon SAS argued that the FAR Councils “exceeded their authority by acting in an area that Congress had reserved exclusively to the CAS Board.” This was an argument we’ve raised ourselves in one or more articles on this blog. The argument is basically that the public law that authorized the CAS Board exclusively reserved to that entity the authority to interpret its Standards and regulations and to define the term “aggregate increased costs to the Federal Government.” Because the FAR Councils, instead of the CAS Board, defined that term in its FAR 30.606 revisions, they were a legal nullity.
Unfortunately for Raytheon SAS (and armchair lawyers such as ourselves), the Judge was not persuaded by that argument. He spent nearly six pages discussing the CAS Board’s authority before concluding that the FAR Councils did not usurp the CAS Board’s authority because, in essence, the CAS Board ceded it to the FAR Councils through inaction. The logic Judge O’Connell used to reach his conclusion is illuminating while also being troubling to those of us who favor an “independent” Cost Accounting Standards Board. We’re going to quote at some length. As always, internal citations and footnotes will be omitted.
The question in this case is whether the FAR Councils, in issuing FAR 30.606, have overstepped their authority. Put another way, we are being asked to invalidate a FAR provision even though a CAS Board regulation on this topic, if ever issued, might state the exact same thing. Or, put yet another way, we are being asked to rule that a regulation is invalid even though the official entrusted with statutory authority to do so, the OFPP Administrator, has not taken any action. …
If Raytheon's argument is correct, then FAR 30.606 would have been just as unlawful if it had authorized the offsetting that Raytheon seeks. This is so because the purported grant of exclusive authority to the CAS Board would have prevented the FAR Councils from addressing the issue in any way. Thus, contracting officers would face a legal vacuum in determining whether to offset the cost impact of multiple changes because neither the statute, nor the cost accounting standards, answer this question. …
We hold that FAR 30.606 does not impermissibly intrude on authority reserved exclusively for the CAS Board. We reach this conclusion because we do not read the grant of authority to the CAS Board in § l503(b) as being so broad that it prevents the FAR Councils from issuing regulations that provide guidance to contracting officers who may be faced with an accounting change that affects hundreds of contracts. While Congress has granted clear authority to the CAS Board to define aggregate increased costs in § l503(b), we cannot ignore the fact that the grant of authority is not as strong as the exclusive authority granted in §1502(a) with respect to the measurement, assignment, and allocation of costs. By including specific language in § l502(a)(l) that it did not include in § l503(b), we presume that Congress acted intentionally. The wording of § 1503(b) allows for a coexistence between the CAS Board, whose primary concern in the measurement, assignment, and allocation of costs, and the executive agencies that must administer highly complex contracting arrangements. …
In addition to addressing simultaneous unilateral accounting changes within the same business segment (the situation we have here), agencies may also have to address whether the following types of offsets should be allowed: changes that are not simultaneous; changes that are within the same company but for different business segments; changes that are all compliant changes but are for different categories of compliant changes, that is, required, unilateral, and desirable changes; and whether compliant changes may offset non-compliances. Ultimately, the FAR Councils determined to allow the combination of some types of changes, but mostly took a hard line against offsetting. Due to the lack of any guidance from Congress or the CAS Board that addresses offsetting multiple changes, we are unwilling to disturb the actions of the FAR Councils.
(Emphasis added.)
We are disappointed in the foregoing because it points to the consequences from a do-nothing CAS Board, or perhaps one that is less than fully independent. Judge O’Connell made much of the actions of the CAS Board’s Chair – that same person who also acts as Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy – yet did not explore whether that individual had an inherent conflict of interest that prevented the exercise of independent judgment and action. We’re are emphatically not alleging that any such conflict existed; but when where a single individual wears “two hats” and the authority of one hat is used to ratify the actions of the other hat, we have concerns. And we think Judge O’Connell could have explored that situation a bit more before conflating the authority of the OFPP Administrator with the authority of the CAS Board Chair. Using that logic, the rest of the CAS Board might as well not even exist. There is no reason for them to vote, since the CAS Board/OFPP Administrator has all the authority that s/he needs to act (or to refrain from acting).
But we’re not done with this decision yet. After the bad news comes some good news.
Raytheon SAS introduced a novel argument. Raytheon argued that DCAA’s methodology “double-counted” the cost impact and would lead to a double recovery of costs—a windfall that was clearly prohibited by the CAS Regulations. According to Judge O’Connell—
Raytheon contends that the government is seeking a double recovery on all three revisions because it seeks recovery for not only the increase in costs allocated to flexibly-priced contracts but also the corresponding decrease in costs allocated to fixed-price contracts. … Raytheon emphasizes that it incurred the same amount of costs after this change. … Under Revision 1, Raytheon reduced the costs allocated to fixed-price contracts by $281,100 and increased costs to flexibly-priced contracts by $313,200. Although the government has not challenged Raytheon's assertion that these are the same costs, it nevertheless contends that these two figures should be added together to ascertain the principal amount of its Revision I damages, that is, $594,300
Raytheon SAS provided a simple table to illustrate its point (you can find that table on page 26 of the decision). Judge O’Connell explained the hypothetical situation thusly—
Raytheon provides a simple example to illustrate what it views as the unfairness of the government's position. It posits a world where the Revision I change applies only to two contracts, one fixed-price, one flexibly-priced, both at one million dollars. It then reduces the allocation to the fixed-price contract by $300,000 as a result of the property accounting change and increases the flexibly-priced contract by the same amount … Under this scenario, if no adjustments are made to the contracts, the government would pay $2.3 million for goods or services for which it expected to pay only $2 million. This would violate the statutory bar that the government not pay increased costs in the aggregate. But this [same] statute also prohibits the government from recovering greater than the aggregate increased cost to the government. As Raytheon points out in its brief, if the government recovers $300,000 it seemingly would be made whole because the government would receive the same goods or services as before the accounting change and it would still pay a total of $2 million. According to Raytheon, any recovery beyond $300,000 would violate the bar on recovering more than the aggregate cost increase.
This is an important new argument not previously adjudicated before (to our knowledge). Raytheon was, in essence, challenging the long-held government position that it was entitled to recover cost decreases to fixed-priced contracts in addition to cost increases to flexibly priced contracts. In support of its position, the government cited to the CAS Regulations themselves, at 9903.306(b). However, Judge O’Connell was not persuaded and wrote that—
The government's position runs afoul of the prohibition in § 1503(b). Going back to Raytheon's simple example of a world with one fixed-price and one flexibly-priced contract valued at one million each, the government's position would allow it to recover (or simply not pay) $300,000 on each contract. Thus, although it originally contracted to pay a total of $2 million, after the accounting change it would receive the same goods or services for a total of $1.7 million. This is the very definition of a windfall and is just as inequitable as if no adjustments were made and Raytheon received $2.3 million for this work.
Accordingly, we hold that under § l503(b) the government may recover the increased costs allocated to flexibly-priced contracts, but it may not also recover those same costs when they are removed from the allocation to fixed-price contracts, and grant Raytheon summary judgment on this issue.
In conclusion, Raytheon “won some and lost some” and some decisions were deferred to a trial on the merits. Let’s recap this complex – and very important – decision. (A decision which is almost certain to be appealed.)
Revision 1 – Government sought $1,176,600. Raytheon will have to pay nothing. Victory for Raytheon SAS.
Revision 5 – Government sought $512,732. Raytheon will have to pay not more than $153,000 (plus interest), which is the portion of the impact applicable to flexibly priced contracts. There will be a trial to adjudicate the application of a 30 percent mark-up factor by DCAA and whether the CFAO should have found the cost impact to be immaterial.
Revision 15 – Government sought $172,363. Raytheon will have to pay not more than $83,800 (plus interest), which is the portion of the impact applicable to flexibly-priced contracts. However, to the extent that the impact applies to pre-2005 contracts, Raytheon will be permitted to offset the impacts, which will reduce that value by roughly one-third. In addition, there will be a trial to adjudicate the application of a 30 percent mark-up factor by DCAA and whether the CFAO should have found the cost impact to be immaterial.
As we noted in the prior article (Part 1 of 2), Raytheon is one of the few big defense contractors that seems to be willing to litigate its positions, when it believes that is positions have merit. Based on this decision (which is really three decisions in one), it is apparent why Raytheon is willing to go to court when it believes the government is wrongfully demanding money from it.
Supply Chain Management and Program Risk
It used to be a truism that the purpose of managing the supply chain was to ensure sufficient materials and parts so as to execute the program. The prime contractor won the work and subcontracted portions to lower-tier suppliers, who then subbed out some to the next tier of suppliers, and so on and so forth. Primes got graded on the socioeconomic status of their subcontractors, with competitive advantage being conferred to those primes who could locate suppliers that were both good at execution and at being the right shade of socioeconomic category. The same was true for the lower-tier suppliers. If you could quote a decent price plus be a small or small disadvantaged business, you had a decent chance at winning work and making some money along the way.
The decision to subcontract out a portion of the contract’s statement of work – the “make or buy” decision – was based on many factors, perhaps chief among them the notion that suppliers were generally smaller companies with less overhead—and thus cheaper. Often, there were other factors that also went into the make or buy decision. Some suppliers offered technical expertise unavailable to the prime contractor. Other suppliers offered the ability to promise good socioeconomic stats. Still other suppliers (often competitors) offered something even more valuable: the ability to deliver the political capital necessary to keep the program of record funded. To sum up a complex trade-off analysis in one sentence, the make or buy decision often pointed to a “buy”—a decision to subcontract out—even if the decision introduced additional program execution risk.
We’ve written about effective subcontractor management many times on this blog. For example, see this article, written about a year ago. Or see another example, written in 2010. We’ve asserted (with evidence in support of the assertion) that effective subcontractor management is the key to effective program management. We’ve written about the risks associated with subcontracting and the importance of identifying and managing those risks. We’re kind of passionate about the topic, you might say.
Many of the largest prime contractors have made a specialty of subcontracting out large portions of the SOW, to the point where they like to call themselves “system integrators” and point to subcontract management as one of their (few) core competencies. Their program win strategy is to lock-up and deliver large teams of individual corporations (along with those corporations’ local Congresspersons and Senators). And it tends to work for them often enough that they keep on doing it. Either they have figured out how to manage the risks associated with supply chain management or, perhaps, they haven’t noticed that those risks keep increasing … and so they keep on with what has been working for them.
But make no mistake, those risks do keep increasing. We’ve written about those more recent risks, and the need to manage them, as well. Hell, we’ve even ranted about the importance of a secure supply chain more than once on this site, not that you took us seriously enough to mobilize a tiger team to attack the problem. For example, remember that time where we told readers about the revisions to the DFARS that established criteria for a contractor system to detect and avoid counterfeit electronic parts (“CEPDAS”)? It wasn’t that long ago: it was posted in May, 2014. Yeah, that was the one where we noted that a failure to implement an adequate CEPDAS could lead to a disapproved Purchasing System. That wasn’t the entirety of the risk.
In that article, we noted the new DFARS Cost Principle at 231.205-71, which made the cost of counterfeit electronic parts “and the cost of rework or corrective action” necessary to remedy the impacts of counterfeit electronic parts unallowable, unless the contractor has an approved CEPDAS (among other criteria). If you don’t have an approved CEPDAS and your supplier delivers counterfeit electronic parts, you are going to be in a world of financial hurt, hurt which you will only hope will be recoverable through litigation against your supplier.
This is a supply chain management risk and it’s a big risk and it’s hard to mitigate. Thus, since 2014 the make or buy decision has been impacted and we bet not too many companies have revised their make or buy processes and trade-off criteria accordingly. If you are one of the few who are out in front of this issue, then good for you! If not, you may want to read the next part of this article.
We now link to a very recent Department of Justice press release, in which we learn that Mr. Jeffrey Krantz, CEO and owner of Harry Krantz, LLC, a New York company “that bought and sold, among other things, obsolete electronic parts for use by the U.S. Military and commercial buyers,” pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud. What did Mr. Krantz and his company do? According to the press release, Krantz did the following –
Between 2005 and 2008, KRANTZ purchased and sold, and caused to be purchased and sold, over a thousand chips to Bay Components, which, in turn sold them to the Connecticut company. The chips were marked with certain information, including a certain manufacturer’s name and trademark, a date code, and a military part number. In approximately December 2005, the first shipments of about 330 chips that KRANTZ had sold to Bay Components were rejected by the Connecticut company for being the wrong part because the chip contained the wrong die inside. In 2006, KRANTZ replaced those chips with at least some of the replacement chips bearing the date code 9832. Between 2006 and 2008, KRANTZ sold and caused to be sold at least 900 chips with date code 9832 to Bay Components, the majority of which were sold to the Connecticut company. KRANTZ knew that the chips had originated from a parts supplier in China, and there was a high probability that the chips were falsely remarked not the original chips of the certain manufacturer as represented by the markings on the chip. He also avoided engaging in common practices in the industry, including those which Harry Krantz LLC routinely engaged in for other military parts, to avoid confirming that the chips were likely remarked. The investigation revealed that many of the chips were used in the assembly of U.S. Military and commercial helicopters.
So an unnamed Connecticut company purchased electronic parts from Bay Components, who in turn acquired them from Krantz. The unnamed Connecticut company rejected the first shipments, but permitted its supplier and lower-tier supplier to replace the rejected chips. Unfortunately, Krantz sourced the chips from China and knew they were likely to be counterfeit. The counterfeit chips were sold up the supply chain and installed on “U.S. Military and commercial helicopters.” Now in fairness, let’s note that this all took place a decade ago, well before the recent emphasis on counterfeit electronic part detection and prevention. So that unnamed Connecticut helicopter manufacturer really shouldn’t be embarrassed that it failed to manage the situation. But still, there are some obvious lessons to be learned here.
First lesson: there aren’t that many helicopter manufacturers in Connecticut. It’s kind of obvious who the company is, and we expect Lockheed Martin will implement its own version of CEPDAS after the acquisition is finalized.
Second lesson: if your part supplier delivers a shipment of non-conforming parts, that’s a huge red flag and should spark an immediate investigation. We’re talking about QA folks para-dropping into the supplier’s operation with no warning, along with sniffer dogs trained to detect made-in-China chips. (Okay that may have been a bit over the top, but we suspect you get the drift.) Procurement should not treat that event as a business-as-usual supplier mistake, as it may well just be the tip of a nasty iceberg looming dead ahead. That kind of event is the announcement that the supplier’s risk probability curve has reached an inflection point, and is quickly approaching a 100% certainty that your program is going to have significant negative cost and schedule variances. Does your supply chain team know what to do if there is such an event?
Third lesson: that unnamed Connecticut helicopter manufacturer may have an approved CEPDAS and, if so, its reaction and recovery costs may be allowable. But if not, then we bet a significant amount of unallowable costs were incurred. The negative impacts may be recoverable through litigation against the middleman supplier (Bay Components) or against Krantz directly. But that assumes that either or both companies have the financial resources to compensate the big unnamed Connecticut helicopter manufacturer. If the money (or insurance) isn’t there, then we suspect the big prime may be SOL.
So here’s a timely object lesson on the importance of securing your supply chain and implementing a strong CEPDAS. We’ve been ranting about this stuff for years, but we’re not asking you to listen to us. We’re asking you to look at the unnamed Connecticut helicopter manufacturer and learn from that company’s misadventures.
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