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Apogee Consulting Inc

UPDATE: Raytheon Settles One Dispute

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The decision whether to settle or litigate is a hard one, no doubt about it. At one place, we heard a rule “$2 million/2 years” – meaning that if you weren’t disputing at least $2 million and/or if you weren’t willing to wait at least two years for a decision, then you should settle. The rule made some sense because litigation is expensive and the wheels of justice turn very slowly. Settlement is usually the preferred option.

Actually, as we’ve noted before, negotiation is the preferred solution and Contracting Officers are directed to negotiate an equitable solution wherever possible.

Even if nobody likes litigation, sometimes litigation is inevitable. But if litigation is a freeway, note that there are many off-ramps. Litigation and negotiation are not mutually exclusive. One way to push to a negotiated settlement is to request a Contracting Officer Final Decision (COFD) that can be appealed. Another way is to receive a COFD and file an appeal. Those actions signal the seriousness of the matter and can often spur negotiations that lead to a mutually acceptable settlement. Remember, then, that litigation does not preclude a negotiated settlement and may actually be the necessary catalyst to achieve one.

That may be the reason why the ASBCA website is littered with so many announcements that contractor appeals have been settled and the cases have been dismissed.

That lesson was brought to mind when we saw the recent ASBCA announcement that Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems (SAS) had reached a settlement with the government in its appeal of the government’s demand for $512,732 (ASBCA No. 87803) related to Raytheon SAS’ change to cost accounting practice disclosed in Revision 5 to its CASB Disclosure Statement. We wrote about Raytheon SAS’ litigation in a couple of articles (see link). As we noted, after Judge O’Connell was done with his rulings on the motions for summary judgment, it seemed to us (as non-lawyers) that Raytheon was liable for not more than $153,000, plus interest.

At that point, Raytheon and the government obviously negotiated a mutually acceptable settlement, as was announced on August 14, 2015. The amount of the settlement was not publicly disclosed. We assume, however, that it was in the neighborhood of $153,000. We do not know how much Raytheon SAS spent on attorneys to reach that negotiated settlement.

Originally, Raytheon SAS brought six appeals to the ASBCA related to demands for payment stemming from various changes to cost accounting practice. Three of those six were determined to be time-barred and dismissed (meaning Raytheon SAS owed nothing). One of them was a complete victory for Raytheon SAS (meaning that it owed nothing on the government’s demand for $1.2 million). One has now been settled after being significantly whittled down. That leaves just one case remaining to be heard on the merits.

All in all, not a bad outcome for Raytheon SAS.

 

 

Operator of Sandia National Laboratories Learns Unallowable Lobbying is Unallowable

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Was_That_WrongRecently the Department of Justice announced that Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin, had agreed to pay $4.7 million in order to “resolve allegations that [it] violated the Byrd Amendment and the False Claims Act by using federal funds for activities related to lobbying Congress and federal agencies.” Lobbying, of course, is one of those activities made expressly unallowable by the FAR Cost Principle at 31.205-22. Not merely unallowable: expressly unallowable. A Federal contractor cannot claim the costs of lobbying activities as allowable costs. Period.

To make the concept even clearer for its contractors, the Department of Energy has a webpage devoted to the topic of lobbying. The webpage lists in great detail the various statutory and regulatory prohibitions on using Federal funds to engage in lobbying activities. There is really no room for misinterpretation as far as we can tell.

Regardless of the foregoing, it appears that the management team at Sandia Corporation allegedly “used federal funds to support activities to lobby Congress and other federal officials to receive a non-competitive extension” of its Management & Operating (M&O contract with the DOE.

Apparently, they should not have done that.

How did this happen? According to various sources—among them a recent story by Time magazine—the goal of the (alleged) lobbying efforts was to keep the DOE from awarding a follow-on M&O contract through competition. Historically the DOE has been criticized for awarding its M&O contracts on a sole or single-source basis and, to address that criticism, the agency formulated a strategy of competing the follow-on M&O contracts. Apparently, Lockheed Martin and its subsidiary thought they had a good chance of overturning that strategy if they could persuade a small number of legislators and high-ranking officials that competition would not be in the interests of the taxpayers.

(As a side note, as our recent article on the GAO’s concerns with competition showed, there may well have been some merit to that strategy.)

The allegations stemmed from a series of DOE Inspector General audit reports, the most recent of which (dated November, 2014) can be found here. The DOE IG report documented that Lockheed Martin and its subsidiary had allegedly used M&O funds to secure non-competitive contract extensions for a long time—dating back to 1998. Naturally, the decision-makers at Sandia Corporation had a rationale for such use. As the DOE IG report stated—

Clearly, SNL [ed. note: Sandia National Labs, not Saturday Night Live] officials were committed to the notion that the SNL/LMC relationship should continue into the future and that this should be accomplished without the benefit of competition. This was, as best we could determine, the underlying rationale for the actions identified in this report. SNL took the position that FAR 35.017, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, allowed SNL to undertake these activities in order to be prepared to demonstrate to the Department/NNSA that SNL was fulfilling the Department's needs. SNL indicated that these were typical activities for any contractor intent on continuing a relationship with its sponsor, especially a Jong-term relationship, and that SNL was preparing to demonstrate that it deserved a full 5-year extension as contemplated by the FAR. Also, SNL indicated that, in accordance with prime contract clause I-8, FAR 52.203-12, Limitations on Payments to Influence Certain Federal Transactions, Subsection C, and prior to a formal solicitation for competition, SNL prepared information and met with NNSA personnel because SNL felt it necessary for the Department and NNSA to make an informed decision on a contract extension. SNL argued that its actions to obtain a contract extension were based on ‘the merits of the matter,’ and that SNL costs associated with such activities were allowable.

What did the DOE IG think of that rationale? The report stated--

In contrast, we find that the position and actions taken by SNL to develop and execute the contract extension plan to be highly problematic. Given the specific prohibitions against such activity, we could not comprehend the logic of using Federal funds for the development of a plan to influence members of Congress and Federal officials to, in essence, prevent competition. As noted above, SNL was cognizant of problems with using Federal funds for similar purposes, but chose to interpret Federal regulations and use Federal funds in a manner that was intended to benefit its parent corporation.

Based on the foregoing, it appears to us that Sandia’s compliance folks were told one thing (i.e., that the “capture team” was simply preparing pre-RFP information for Congress and other high-ranking officials with no intent to influence anybody), while instead the team was (allegedly) working hard to influence individuals in order to avoid the issuance of an RFP in the first place. The compliance folks seem to have been given a certain set of facts about the activities, and then they found enough ambiguity in the regulations and contract clauses to make those activities allowable.

Or so they thought at the time. Years later, $4.7 million proves they were overly optimistic—or else simply misled. We suspect it’s the latter and not the former.

The lesson to be learned here is that facts matter. The determination of cost allowability is highly fact-dependent.

If you tell us what you are doing and (more importantly) why you are doing it, we can give you an allowability determination with a high degree of confidence. But it you mislead us, or withhold certain crucial facts, then our determination may well be wrong. And that error may end up costing the company millions of profit dollars.

As a corollary to that lesson, remember that compliance practitioners need to dig for the facts. We cannot simply accept what we are told without challenge. We need to probe and compare and question, so as to make sure we are confident we understand the what and the why, so that the correct cost allowability determination can be made. If we just accept what we are told without probing and verifying, then we become “yes men” instead of professionals.

Being a compliance practitioner is hard. Sometimes it involves deep research in order to understand the rules governing certain transactions. Often, it involves saying “no,” which is always a risky proposition from a career point of view. But that is what the job entails. If you are not up for it, you need to find another line of work.

 

 

GAO Finds Downside of Competition

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The notion that competition is good is one of the foundational principles of the Federal government’s acquisition system. It’s right there in the FAR Statement of Guiding Principles (FAR 1.102). The Federal Acquisition System will promote competition. It’s like motherhood and apple pie: competition is a good thing and nobody can question it.

Nobody, that is, except for the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

Recently GAO issued a report that discussed the evolving competitive landscape of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). Currently, the EELV is provided to the Air Force by the United Launch Alliance (ULA) via a sole-source, cost-reimbursement contract. However, in future acquisitions the Air Force intends to “procure launch as a commercial item using a firm-fixed price contract.” We’ve discussed ULA and its sweet spot with the EELV launches before, and we noted then that the situation was subject to change based on smaller, more nimble, commercial companies looking to capture market share from ULA. So the in-process change in USAF acquisition philosophy is nothing new. And yet, that change in approach has GAO concerned, even though use of competition and firm fixed-price contracting would seem to fit right in line with the acquisition emphases of the current administration.

Haven’t we posted article after article talking about increased use of fixed-price contracting (including fixed-priced development contracting)? Haven’t we posted article after article talking about the general focus on increasing competition? Yes to both questions. Yet GAO is concerned.

Let’s explore GAO’s concerns.

The GAO report takes a reader through the history of the USAF relationships with Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin – companies that eventually merged and/or agreed to a joint venture—the joint venture that became ULA. The GAO report discusses the Air Force’s ability to obtain cost or pricing data and the ability to rely on such data from ULA’s “immature” business systems. That data was deemed necessary because of the sole-source award to ULA – since there was no competition, the Air Force needed detailed, reliable, cost data in order to determine that the price being paid was fair and reasonable. ULA and the Air Force struggled with the issues (and were criticized by GAO while they struggled). However, by July 2014, all six DFARS business systems at ULA had been approved.

Now that ULA has its business systems approved, the Air Force is moving to a competitive acquisition strategy, one in which certified cost or pricing data will not be required—because competition will permit the use of price analysis alone to determine that the price being paid is fair and reasonable. This concerns GAO.

As GAO wrote –

Relying on the commercial market reduces the Air Force’s insights into and access to certain types of information that is currently provided under ULA’s Phase 1 contract. For example, under the current ULA contract, the Air Force requires ULA to maintain six major business systems that need to be reviewed and approved by a government oversight organization, and provide insights into ULA’s cost and schedule performance on a continuous basis, among other benefits. Under the revised acquisition strategy, the Air Force will not have access to the same level of detail it currently obtains and the contractors will be allowed to use business systems that are not required to meet DOD standards.

Let’s bottom-line this: GAO is concerned because the Air Force’s new acquisition strategy will rely on competition and commercial market forces to assure price reasonableness.

Really. That’s their concern.

What we see here is the old guard fighting for “the way we’ve always done it” while the new guard implements new and innovative strategies. To be clear: we view GAO’s concerns as a great example of why it is so difficult for the Pentagon to undertake meaningful acquisition reform.

In addition, notice that what the GAO is fighting for is the traditional oversight processes, the kind of stuff that was once estimated to add as much as 17 percent to defense acquisitions. We wrote once that the six DFARS business systems were a big waste of taxpayer funds. We wrote –

Reviewing contractor business systems has become a cottage industry, with consultants and attorneys eager to assist contractors with creating adequate business systems, or remediating those systems that failed DCAA or DCMA audit.

And now we have reenergized DCMA functional specialists and refocused DCAA auditors, with new and improved audit programs to help them evaluate business systems. We have peer reviews of ACO business system adequacy determinations, and at least two levels of Review Boards to help adjudicate disagreements between the ACO and those who performed the reviews. We have process upon process, and guidance upon guidance—all to help focus oversight on the first line of defense against fraud, waste, and abuse.

And that is what GAO is arguing for. GAO is arguing for bureaucracy. It is afraid of innovation. It is afraid of change. And it is afraid that too many bureaucrats will be out of work if the Air Force decides to acquire launch services via commercial competition.

 

 

 

The Navy Has the Best Coffee and the Best Food

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Chef_of_the_YearIt is a widely accepted fact that the U.S. Navy brews the best coffee of all the military services. For example, see this article by Chief Journalist Earl Smith (USN, of course). In it he wrote—

Sensitive-palate coffee quaffers admit that when it comes to preparing the delicious beverage, U.S. Navy men have no peers. Experience is undoubtedly one reason behind this superior brewing talent for no group on earth drinks more coffee than sailors. Currently they are gulping almost a million cups per day. In many places aboard ship such as the bridge, radio shack, machine shop, engine and firerooms, the formula for preparing a particular distinct flavored coffee is a jealously guarded secret.

(Astute readers may have noticed the article from which we quoted is nearly 70 years old. No matter. The truism is still true.)

But if it’s a widely held truism that the Navy has the best coffee, it is perhaps less well-known that the Navy also has the best chefs and the best food.

We know this because Navy Senior Chief Petty Officer Derrick D. Davenport was recently named 2015 Chef of the Year by the American Culinary Foundation. (See the news feature.) Senior CPO Davenport is the executive chef for the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. He is also the senior enlisted aide to the Chairman of the JCS, Army General Martin E. Dempsey.

After joining the Navy in 2000, Senior CPO Davenport’s career included five years aboard a fast-attack submarine and a 14-month tour of duty in Afghanistan. According to the article—

Davenport was selected for the chairman’s staff because they needed a chief who could both cook and lead. The test was they gave him a basket of food and said he had 30 minutes to craft a menu and make a three-course meal. ‘I did seared tuna with an Asian slaw, chicken breast risotto and a Grand Marnier mousse for dessert,’ he said. ‘I was hired on the spot.’

Senior CPO Davenport has been with the Joint Chiefs for several years. He served former JCS Chair Navy Admiral Mullen for three years, and then stayed to serve Army General Dempsey. Some might find it unusual for an Army General to have a Navy Senior CPO as an executive chef and enlisted aide, but that is probably a feature of the “jointness” of the JCS. Plus, you know, why get rid of a top-notch chef? That would be foolish and, clearly, General Dempsey is no fool.

How did Davenport become Chef of the Year? According to the article—

For the Chef of the Year competition, Davenport first had to compete regionally. He won that competition in Buffalo, New York, in January. The secret ingredient he had to cook was rabbit. In Orlando, the secret ingredient was squab and frog. That competition was like Iron Chef in front of an audience of chefs. The rules are four courses in one hour with no advance prep.

The first course was tomato consomme with tomato compote and a frog fritter on top of that. ‘The second course was a smoked squab breast … and a small salad and some pickled fruits with citrus vinaigrette and a goat cheese soufflé,’ he said. ‘The third course I sort of paid homage to my Dad and grandmothers -- those good Southern cooks -- so I was thinking shrimp and grits, but I couldn’t use shrimp so I substituted frog legs.’ The fourth course was squab with the dark meat made into a sort of sausage and the breast meat in the center. Davenport had two apprentice chefs helping, but they could not touch the secret ingredient.

The article ended with the sad news that Senior CPO Davenport will be retiring next month, after 15 years of service. We salute him and thank him for his service.

Somehow, we don’t believe he’ll have any trouble finding a post-military job. We suspect he’ll have no trouble whatsoever.

 

 

Raytheon … Again

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VictoryWe can’t help reporting on Raytheon’s litigation because the decisions in its cases are important. Plus, you know, Raytheon actually litigates—unlike the other major defense contractors who report settlement after settlement in the contract dispute fora. As we’ve noted before, we suspect one reason that Raytheon keeps litigating is because it seems to win more than its fair share of disputes.

And here we are again, reporting on another decision at the ASBCA. This decision addressed ASBCA Nos. 57576, 57579, and 58290. As Judge Delman noted in his decision, he had previously dismissed three other appeals that covered many of the same issues because the claims had been issued “untimely” by the government—i.e., the Statute of Limitations associated with the Contract Disputes Act had expired. Thus, Raytheon had already started with a victory for its Fiscal Years 2002, 2003, and 2004.

The three appeals at issue concern alleged violations of both CAS and FAR. In one dispute (No. 57576) “the government contends that Raytheon failed to identify and exclude from its cost submissions the costs of bonus and incentive compensation (BAIC) for those persons engaged in activities that generate unallowable costs under the following cost principles: FAR 31.205-1, -22, -27, and -47, and that are ‘expressly unallowable’ under these principles.” In other words, the government asserted that the bonus and incentive compensation (BAIC) was a directly associated unallowable cost and, accordingly, it should have been treated as being expressly unallowable.

In the other two disputes (Nos. 57579 and 58290), “the government contends that Raytheon failed to identify and exclude from its cost submissions the costs of certain stock awards to employees under its long-term performance plan (LTPP) that are ‘expressly unallowable’ under FAR 31.205-6(i).”

Obviously, the definition of “expressly unallowable” played a key role in Judge Delman’s decision. We’ve addressed the controversy over that definition before. The decision would also turn on the requirements of Cost Accounting Standard (CAS) 405. In fact, the Judge took about 11 pages to establish the pertinent statutes, CAS rules, and FAR requirements before turning to the Statements of Facts for each appeal.

Getting back to No. 57576, Judge Delman found that Raytheon had briefed DCAA on its various incentive compensation plans as early as 2000. In September, 2002, a DCAA audit report on Raytheon’s incentive compensation concluded that the audit agency “took no exception” to Raytheon’s incentive compensation. A year later, another DCAA audit report concluded that Raytheon’s FY 2002 incentive compensation costs were allowable costs pursuant to the requirements of FAR 31.205-6(f). A year after that, another DCAA audits report reached the same conclusion. In 2006, another DCAA audit report reached the same conclusion. There were other DCAA audit reports discussed by Judge Delman; they also reached similar conclusions. Perhaps our readers are sensing a pattern here.

Regardless of the foregoing litany of audits and audit conclusions, in September, 2007, a DCAA audit alleged a Raytheon noncompliance with CAS 405, stemming from its failure to “withdraw from its incurred cost submissions a proportionate share of its costs of bonuses, restricted stock, and other compensation costs paid to employees engaged in ‘expressly unallowable activities’ as defined by various FAR cost principles. The alleged CAS noncompliance pertained to Raytheon’s Fiscal Years 2002 through 2005. The Corporate Administrative Contracting Officer (CACO) agreed with DCAA, and told Raytheon –

Raytheon Company, Corporate Home Office, withdraws labor and a portion of fringe expenses for employees engaged in expressly unallowable advertising, lobbying, organization, and legal activities. However, they do not withdraw the applicable portion of bonus, restricted stock, and other incentive compensation in connection with these expressly unallowable activities.

Subsequently, DCAA and DCMA added Raytheon’s FY 2006 claimed costs to the alleged CAS noncompliance. Meanwhile, Raytheon was busy calculating GDM cost impacts related to the alleged noncompliance. There was a “fringe delta” cost impact, which was rejected by the government. Then Raytheon prepared a “discrete” impact calculation. Importantly, although the government’s alleged CAS noncompliance covered only four (4) areas of unallowable activity, Raytheon’s cost impact included a fifth area (“Contributions”). Raytheon argued that inclusion of the fifth area was inadvertent. However, the government used Raytheon’s calculation (which included all five areas) to arrive at a quantum of $20,012,578. (That amount included penalties and interest as well.)

With respect to No. 57576, Judge Delman dismissed the part of the government’s claim relating to Raytheon’s inadvertent inclusion of the Charitable Contributions cost center in its cost impact calculation. Because the government had never specifically asserted a claim for a violation of that FAR cost principle, it could not include that amount in the damages it sought from Raytheon. With respect to the rest of No. 57576 and the other two appeals, the Judge had more work in front of him.

Judge Delman reminded the litigants that “An ‘expressly unallowable’ cost, by the plain terms of the definition, must be an item of cost or a type of cost that is specifically named and stated as unallowable by law, regulation or contract.” He then explored the various FAR cost principles to determine whether or not “BAIC” was expressly unallowable under each. He concluded as follows:

31.205-1 – BAIC was not specifically named and stated as being unallowable. Victory to Raytheon. However, Judge Delman did not rule on whether BAIC was merely unallowable, or whether it was a directly associated unallowable cost. The parties will have to proceed to trial on those issues.

31.205-22 – BAIC was not specifically named and stated as being unallowable. Victory to Raytheon. However, Judge Delman ruled that the BAIC paid to individuals engaged in such activities was unallowable (but not expressly unallowable), so the Government won on that issue.

31.205-27 – BAIC was not specifically named and stated as being unallowable. Victory to Raytheon.

31.205-47 – Because the cost principle made “all elements of compensation” unallowable, and “it is unreasonable under all circumstances to conclude that [Raytheon’s] BAIC costs with respect to the defined proceedings are allowable,” the BAIC was found to be expressly unallowable. Victory to the Government.

With respect to Nos. 57679 and 58290, Judge Delman found that certain aspects of Raytheon’s Long-Term Performance Plan (LTTP) were expressly unallowable under 31.205-6(i). That was a victory for the Government.

To the extent that the Government “won” a victory with respect to Raytheon’s claimed costs, Raytheon argued that the Government should be precluded from recovering any damages, under the “retroactive disallowance” principle. Judge Delman wrote—

According to [Raytheon], given the government's consistent approval of and/or acquiescence to the subject BAIC and TSR metric costs, it was barred from disallowing those costs prior to the issuance of an authoritative notice that such costs were no longer allowable. [Raytheon] posits that the government's 2011 final decisions on the BAIC costs and TSR costs were the first such government notices, and hence any costs incurred prior to these dates are not recoverable.

(Internal citations omitted.)

Judge Delman found that there were material facts in dispute on that affirmative defense, and declined to issue summary judgment to either party. Thus, the matter will proceed to trial.

What is one to make of this Raytheon decision? First, there will be a trial and there will be another decision. And that decision may well be appealed by either party (or both parties). Therefore, it’s not clear at this point how big a victory Raytheon won. That said, it’s fairly clear that the amount of damages sought by the government was whittled down significantly by summary judgment.

Other commenters, more learned that we, offered the opinion that Judge Delman’s rulings in favor of the government were flawed. For example, one set of legal practitioners wrote –

Unfortunately, the Raytheon decision does nothing to resolve the long-standing dispute between contractors and the government regarding the proper application of expressly unallowable penalties. Specifically, while the Board acknowledged that a cost is only subject to penalty if it is ‘specifically named and stated to be unallowable,’ the Board then found that certain bonus and incentive costs where an employee billed time to unallowable legal activity and long term compensation costs that include a Total Shareholder Return (TSR) element, both which are not expressly referenced anywhere in the FAR, are expressly unallowable.  Thus, contractors will be left guessing at whether the government will consider particular costs to be expressly unallowable even if they are not specifically named in the FAR.

Thus, it appears that to the extent Raytheon lost an aspect of its appeals, legal commenters believe that Judge’s logic was flawed. That might give some hope to Raytheon, as it considers whether or not to appeal the ASBCA decision.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.