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Apogee Consulting Inc

Fake Cert Leads to Big Settlement

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CategoriesFile this story in the “Captain Obvious” folder. There’s nothing earth-shattering about this one. But it serves as a good example of how a false certification can lead to big troubles.

The story comes to us—as so many do—courtesy of the U.S. Department of Justice press release. From that source, we learn that UFC Aerospace and its former President (Doug Davis) settled a civil fraud lawsuit filed against them by the U.S. Government (as intervenor). The suit alleged that UFC and its then-President engaged in “fraudulent conduct in violation of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 632(n), in order to secure numerous lucrative defense subcontracts with government contractors.” More specifically, the complaint alleged that “UFC falsely certified to government contractors that UFC was a woman-owned small business (‘WOSB’) when UFC at no point met either requirement for WOSB status under the Small Business Act. Specifically, no women were majority owners of UFC or managed or controlled UFC’s management and daily business operations.”

According to the DOJ press release –

UFC began claiming WOSB status at least beginning in late 2001, by representing to contractors UFC knew were doing work with the federal government that it was a WOSB. UFC falsely relied on the purported ownership interest of the wives of the actual owners, John Davis and Douglas Davis, to make these representations. UFC continued to represent that it was a WOSB at various times until 2011, and earned millions of dollars on the contracts procured with those representations. UFC did so because it understood that this status mattered both to the contractors and to the Government, and it believed that it was obtaining a competitive advantage by claiming to be a WOSB. However, at no time during the entire time period from 2001 to 2011 did UFC ever qualify under the Small Business Act as a WOSB. The only ownership interest that the wives of John and Douglas Davis had in UFC was through trusts that were entirely controlled by John and Douglas Davis, and under which the women were entitled to a maximum of only 5% of the trusts’ assets. Moreover, neither woman controlled or managed the company at any time. In fact, neither woman had company email accounts, attended management meetings, or spent regular time in the office during the relevant time period.

How big was the settlement that Davis and UFC negotiated with the DoJ? “In the settlement … UFC and DAVIS admitted and accepted responsibility for the fact that UFC never qualified for WOSB credit under the Small Business Act and will pay the Government $20,015,956.92.” (Emphasis added.)

$20 million for a false certification should serve as a definite warning to those entities who scheme to win Federal contracts and subcontracts under false pretenses. Indeed, the DOJ press release contained the following statement—

SBA Inspector General Peggy E. Gustafson said: ‘This settlement sends an important message that falsely certifying a company’s status as a Woman Owned Small Business is unacceptable and bears a significant consequence. We will continue to aggressively pursue parties that wrongfully obtain both prime and subcontracting opportunities for small businesses that are legitimately owned and controlled by women. I want to thank the U.S. Department of Justice for its dedication to reaching a settlement in this case.’

This story should also serve as a warning to prime contractors who may be willing to turn a blind eye towards potential subcontractors that may be in the “right” socioeconomic category and to which a contract award would enable meeting commitments made in Small Business Plans. The socioeconomic status of an entity should not – and must not – be the overriding criterion used to make source selection decisions. Yes, it is the responsibility of the subcontractor to accurately complete Reps and Certs, and there is no regulatory obligation that compels a prime to audit potential subcontractors to confirm the accuracy of those Reps and Certs. However, the prime cannot act with reckless disregard either. The prime cannot knowingly or negligently make a subcontract award based on false pretenses. Moreover, when there is corruption in the source evaluation and selection process, we need to carefully examine the course of dealings between the prime’s buyer and the subcontractor in order to identify whether there were any violations of the company’s business conduct policy (e.g., bribes or kick-backs) in the procurement. Given all that, in our view, the unnamed prime contractor in this story dodged a bullet.

Consider our assertion regarding the duties and responsibilities of the prime contractor when designing internal controls over subcontractor evaluations and selection decisions. And consider the consequences for UFC Aerospace when thinking about winning new contract awards through false or intentionally inaccurate Reps and Certs.

 

 

DCAA Resources

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Our recent articles on the dearth of published DCAA audit guidance (called Memoranda for Regional Directors, or MRDs) must have struck a chord, because we started to get emails from people who had access to those MRDs and who were willing to share them. Truthfully, there wasn’t much of interest except for the MRD that addressed how to deal with offsetting debit/credit transactions in a sample universe. (Indeed, our anonymous sources state that MRDs continue to be published in GFY 2016 but those MRDs continue to be of little interest to the general public.) But that fact just goes to support the notion that there was no reason for the audit agency to hide the guidance. There were no “secrets” and thus nothing to hide. Refusing to publish the “releasable” audit guidance feeds the suspicious minds of folk (like us) and does nothing to reduce the too-adversarial nature of the relationship between DCAA auditors and those being audited.

Regardless, we thank those who care enough to provide us insight into the “behind the walls” inner workings of DCAA. To that end, we thought it would be appropriate to lay-out our ground rules for receiving and using such insight.

  1. If a document says “For Official Use Only” or FOUO we don’t want it. Don’t send it to us.

  2. If a document is contains proprietary information regarding a contractor, we don’t want it.

  3. If a document pertains to on-going litigation and is protected by Attorney-Client Privilege, we don’t want it.

  4. If you are breaking an agency rule by sending it to us, we don’t want it.

  5. If you are a Contracting Officer and you want us to give you advice on a dispute between DCAA and a contractor—and you are looking to issue a Determination on the matter—please don’t ask. We have nearly 900 blog articles and, chances are, we’ve already expressed our opinion somewhere in there. Maybe you can find what you’re looking for via the site’s search feature. If not, you’re on your own. Be bold.

Other than that, if you have things you would like to share, go ahead and email us. It’s always nice to augment our meager resources with information and insight from others.

And speaking of resources, it seems that DCAA has some concerns in that area. The concerns center on certain provisions of H.R. 114-270 – the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). While the bill has not yet been sent to President Obama—and there’s a decent chance he may veto it—the House and Senate have agreed on the Conference Report and it’s not likely to change much (if at all) from this point on. Of special concern to DCAA leadership is the language found in Title VIII of the bill (“Acquisition Policy, Acquisition Management, and Related Matters”). Proposed Section 893 states—

SEC. 893. IMPROVED AUDITING OF CONTRACTS.

(a) Prohibition on Performance of Non-defense Audits by DCAA.--

(1) In general.--Effective on the date of the enactment of this Act, the Defense Contract Audit Agency may not provide audit support for non-Defense Agencies unless the Secretary of Defense certifies that the backlog for incurred cost audits is less than 18 months of incurred cost inventory.

(2) Adjustment in funding for reimbursements from non-defense agencies.--The amount appropriated and otherwise available to the Defense Contract Audit Agency for a fiscal year beginning after September 30, 2016, shall be reduced by an amount equivalent to any reimbursements received by the Agency from non-Defense Agencies for audit support provided. …

(d) Incurred Cost Inventory Defined.--In this section, the term ``incurred cost inventory'' means the level of contractor incurred cost proposals in inventory from prior fiscal years that are currently being audited by the Defense Contract Audit Agency.

(Emphasis added.)

According to one source, Ms. Anita Bales (Director, DCAA) issued an email that said—

Last week, the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) conference report was released with provisions that affect DCAA. Specifically, the current House- and Senate-approved conference report prohibits DCAA from performing any non-DoD audits if our incurred cost inventory is not less than 18 months. We have been pushing hard to remove or modify this language, and we have been adamant in our arguments that reimbursable work has no impact on our resources for performing DoD work because of how each is funded.

Importantly, the Authorization Act is not yet final because it still has to be signed by the President. We are continuing to work this issue from several angles, and I want to assure you that we are working diligently with Congress staff members to explain that the proposed language in the bill will not help our efforts in reducing the backlog and will, in fact, hinder our ability to achieve their desired outcome.

(Emphasis added. Note we could not independently verify that this was a legitimate quote from Ms. Bale’s email.)

We do not presume to assume that it is a real email quote, but what if it were? The logic underlying the bolded statement would be consistent with what we’ve experienced of DCAA management. The logic conflates “resources” with “budget dollars” instead of linking “resources” with “audit staff.” In other words, it should be obvious that if you have a fixed number of “resources”—i.e., audit staff to perform audits—then you have to prioritize how those resources are used, regardless of funding source. Whether funding is provided by DOE or NASA or USAID or DHHS or from the DoD itself, the funding all comes from the taxpayers and they should expect (and get) the most efficient and effective use of their funds. Playing shell games with appropriation accounts achieves neither objective.

Our anonymous source states—

… the argument of the DCAA is that the reimbursable work is self-supporting. If that work is taken away by NDAA 2016, then auditors will have to be RIF'd, because they're in the wrong locations and there is not funding to TDY them to other locations, as was done in decades past. That may be true I don't know. I don't have access to the numbers.

Why is DCAA managing itself this way? Let’s be clear that we are almost wholly without insight into how DCAA prepares and manages its budgets – but it seems fairly obvious that Field Audit Offices (FAOs) are being created and staffed (and presumably funded) at the local Branch level. Why? Why not budget and manage at the Regional Level and let the appropriate Regional leadership determine where best to put his or her scarce audit resources, given the overall funding provided? Why determine local staffing based on local budgets, augmented by reimbursable work? Doesn’t that impact prioritization of the agency’s workload?

It sure seems that way to us.

It seems likely that Congress will send the FY 2016 NDAA to the President, who may or may not sign it. If a veto is made, it may or may not be overridden by Congress. Thus, there is a chain of “maybes” that need to happen in order to create a situation where the individual DCAA auditor would need to worry about the Section 893 language. But DCAA could mitigate any impact by rethinking its budgeting and management processes so as to limit reliance on non-DoD funding when developing program plans and priorities for the audit staff.

And those other non-DoD agencies that have come to rely on DCAA for audit support? They could mitigate the risk associated with elimination of DCAA audit support by making plans to get their own audits done. Indeed, certain agencies (including DOE and NASA) have begun talking about just that issue, and have begun to make plans to carry on without DCAA audit support.

In our experience, good DCAA auditors typically do not have a tough time finding new jobs at DCMA, EPA, DOE, or other agencies. DCAA trains its auditors well (or used to), and thus other Federal agencies are happy to fill their open slots with ex-DCAA auditors. Hell, private industry tends to fill its audit liaisons and compliance staff with ex-DCAA auditors—and we know there are several openings right now, for those interested in leaving Government service. So it’s not all bad and we don’t think the average DCAA auditor needs to be overly concerned—especially if that auditor is willing to relocate.

But we do think DCAA needs to rethink its current management approach and figure out how to manage its agency workload priorities without being overly reliant on funding from non-DoD sources. Funding is not resources; people are resources. That’s why former Comptroller David Walker started calling employees “human capital.” And when you have limited “human capital,” then the amount of funding you have is really irrelevant.

 

Corruption – Government versus Contractor!

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As has become our policy, we don’t really report on corruption much anymore. The fact of the matter is that corruption – including bribes, kick-backs, and other wrongdoing – has become the new normal. Or perhaps it was always thus, and we never noticed. In any case, the spate of headlines announcing the latest in corruption is just depressing. Plus, it’s boring.

But the headlines are clear: there is corruption on the buying side of the table, just as there is on the selling side. You can find wrongdoing by government employees just about as frequently as you can find wrongdoing by contractors.

So we thought we would do a table to illustrate what we’ve been saying for years: corruption is found everywhere and, if we say we want ethical behavior, we have to be vigilant in looking for corruption.

Corruption: Government vs. Contractor

Date

Government

Contractor

Link

9/22/15

A former specialist with the U.S. Army stationed at Forward Operating Base Gardez, Afghanistan, was sentenced to 30 months in prison for accepting a $20,000 bribe in exchange for allowing thousands of gallons of fuel to be taken from the base.

 

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-us-army-specialist-sentenced-30-months-prison-taking-bribes-while-deployed-afghanist-0

9/18/25

DoD Employee Sentenced to over Three Years in Prison -- Caused the Army Research Laboratories to Fund a Research Project, and Then Persuaded the Defense Contractor to Subcontract with a Company He Secretly Controlled

 

http://www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/department-defense-employee-sentenced-over-three-years-prison-fraudulently-obtaining-over

9/18/25

A former Navy noncommissioned officer pleaded guilty today to accepting approximately $25,000 in cash bribes from vendors while he served in Afghanistan.

 

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-navy-noncommissioned-officer-pleads-guilty-accepting-bribes-while-serving-afghanistan

9/15/15

A former contracting official with the Georgia National Guard, and the owners of two vendor companies have been sentenced to federal prison for a corruption scheme wherein Elliott awarded contracts to the vendors in exchange for illegal kickbacks.

A former contracting official with the Georgia National Guard, and the owners of two vendor companies have been sentenced to federal prison for a corruption scheme wherein Elliott awarded contracts to the vendors in exchange for illegal kickbacks

http://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/former-georgia-national-guard-employee-and-two-vendors-sentenced-corruption-scheme

9/15/15

 

A man was sentenced to one year in prison and ordered to repay $6.7 million for making false representations about the company’s office location so it could obtain a HUBZone certification and qualify for federal contracts.

http://www.justice.gov/usao-ndoh/pr/canton-man-sentenced-prison-ordered-repay-67-million-fraud-getting-federal-contracts

9/11/15

 

Scientists Sentenced To Prison For Defrauding The Small Business Innovation Research Program

http://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/scientists-sentenced-prison-defrauding-small-business-innovation-research-program

9/11/15

 

PAE Government Services and RM Asia (HK) Limited to Pay $1.45 Million to Settle Claims in Alleged Bid-Rigging Scheme

http://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/pae-government-services-and-rm-asia-hk-limited-pay-145-million-settle-claims-alleged

9/10/15

Two Contractors and One Former Civilian Employee Sentenced in Bribery Scheme at Georgia Military Base: The Defendants Received 22 Years, 10 Years and Five Years in Prison Respectively

Two Contractors and One Former Civilian Employee Sentenced in Bribery Scheme at Georgia Military Base: The Defendants Received 22 Years, 10 Years and Five Years in Prison Respectively

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-contractors-and-one-former-civilian-employee-sentenced-bribery-scheme-georgia-military

9/04/15

 

Government Subcontractors Convicted For Bribery

http://www.justice.gov/usao-ak/pr/government-subcontractors-convicted-bribery

9/10/15

 

Tutoring Services Corporation And 31 Individuals Indicted And Arrested For Defrauding The Department Of Education

http://www.justice.gov/usao-pr/pr/tutoring-services-corporation-and-31-individuals-indicted-and-arrested-defrauding

9/04/15

 

Two Individuals Agree to Pay $435,000 to Settle False Claims Act Suit Alleging Evaded Customs Duties

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-individuals-agree-pay-435000-settle-false-claims-act-suit-alleging-evaded-customs-duties

Seems pretty balanced to us. And note, dear readers, that the table above reports DoJ enforcement activities only for a period of about three weeks.

We think we’ve made our point.

 

DoD IG Criticizes DCMA Over Business System Oversight Failures

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Opinions_VaryI recently finished a fairly lengthy paper to be presented at the upcoming ABA Section of Public Contract Law meeting in Charleston, SC. The meeting’s theme is “Building Bridges to Succeed in Federal Contracting and Grants”—which to me implies that the pathway to successful Federal contracting is paved with strong relationships rather than arms-length bargaining and strict compliance to contract terms. I’m not sure I buy that but, you know, they asked me to join one of the panels and I like Charleston (or should I say pre-deluge Charleston?), and so I agreed. The name of my panel is “A Bridge Too Far: The Ever-Increasing Compliance Challenges for Government Contractors”—which is a topic I have opinions about.

And then they told me I could submit either PowerPoint slides or an article for publication.

The article had to be at least ten typewritten, double-spaced, pages in length. So of course I turned in a 20-pager, because (as I said) I have opinions about the topic.

Writing the paper was not enormously difficult. I’ve been writing about compliance for a long time now, as evidenced by this blog. I chose to focus on the relatively recent compliance phenomenon commonly known as “contractor business systems” or “business systems administration” or “business systems oversight regime” because, you know, I have opinions about that particular relatively recent compliance challenge. Opinions that I have expressed in this blog.

So my basic approach was to build on opinions previously expressed and then punch it up (in terms of history and support for those opinions) … and then tone it down (because there will be Government folks – lawyers! – in the audience).

The executive summary of my paper, prior to punch-up and tone-down, may be found here.

My paper was informed by recent DoD OIG audits of DCMA, in which reviewers found that DCMA was not meeting business system administration deadlines established in DFARS contract terms and in DFARS PGI (“Procedures, Guidance, and Information”). The first DoD OIG review was discussed in this blog article. The article contained opinions about the DoD OIG report. Chief among those opinions was the notion that the DAR Council set up the contracting parties (and DCAA) to fail when it issued the final business systems oversight rules in 2012, because requirements were established on Government agencies that didn’t have the resources to meet them. And it wasn’t as if the DAR Council didn’t know or understand what it was doing: it simply didn’t care.

Thus, my primary opinion is that the DFARS contractor business systems administration/oversight regime cannot work as intended. DCAA cannot devote audit resources from efforts to catch-up on “incurred cost” audits in order to perform business system reviews (and the required follow-up reviews to verify the efficacy of contractors’ corrective actions). DCMA cannot meet PGI-imposed deadlines for initial determinations and final determinations and the multiple layers of management review (including the DCMA HQ CBS Review Boards). The “first line of defense” is a fragile illusion, because it is simply unworkable in practice.

Given all that, should anybody be surprised that the DoD OIG issued yet another report finding that DCMA Contracting Officers were failing to meet process milestone deadlines when administering contractor business system deficiency reports received from DCAA?

To be honest, there is very little new in the DoD OIG report; there is very little that expands on the recent DoD OIG findings with respect to contractors’ estimating systems. The difference in this report is that is covers all business systems. Here’s a summary:

  • DCAA issued 164 business system deficiency reports between July 2012 and June 2013. OIG selected 21 of those reports for review. The OIG found a 100% failure rate. That is to say, in each of the 21 DCAA reports reviewed, the DCMA Contracting Officers failed to comply with one or more applicable DFARS requirements.

  • Of the 21 reports, the initial determination was issued late in 17; the Contracting Officer failed to obtain a timely contractor response in 13; the Contracting Officer failed to make a timely evaluation of the contractor’s response in 16; the Contracting Officer failed to issue a timely final determination in 17; and the Contracting Officer failed to disapprove systems and make payment withholds in 8 instances.

And so it goes, right? Basically we have a series of bureaucratic processes with self-inflicted deadlines that are pretty much impossible to meet. But that doesn’t stop the intrepid OIG auditors from pointing out the missed deadlines. And it doesn’t stop the Director, DCMA, from promising to do better next time. Everybody promises to work harder and to do better … but nobody actually, you know, points out that the system is unworkable and what few resources there are should not be devoted to working harder to make an unworkable system work better.

Because that is the elephant in the room: the contractor business system administration and oversight regime is unworkable as currently designed and implemented. And even if it could work, it is arguable as to whether any value is being added, or whether any taxpayer dollars are being saved from waste, fraud, and/or abuse by virtue of the fact that contractors have approved business systems.

The one interesting point from the latest DoD OIG finger-pointing exercise is a recommendation to the Director, DCMA, that DCMA Business Instructions should be revised to require “contracting officers [to] request a Board of Review when they reject an auditor’s opinion based on the significance of a business system deficiency.” Fortunately for us all, the Director, DCMA, considered that recommendation and “concluded that the determination of significance is within the contracting officer’s authority and responsibility.” Hence, the OIG recommendation was not adopted.

At the end of the day, opinions vary. My opinions regarding the history and current processes of contractor oversight gave me a 20-page paper that is going to be presented and discussed before a room full of lawyers—both from the Government and from Big Law. The conclusion of that paper calls for a ABA-led task force (which I believe should include Government attorneys and Contracting Officers) to reform the current contractor administration/oversight regime, and to develop the next generation solution. We shall see how it goes from there.

 

About that DCAA Audit Guidance

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Totally a coincidence. Totally.

But just a few days after we posted a couple of articles about the lack of DCAA audit guidance being posted on the DCAA website … one appeared!

DCAA Memo for Regional Directors (MRD) 15-PPD-005(R), dated 8/27/2015 has been posted. It announces what we already told our readers: there is a new Incurred Cost Adequacy Checklist. In the words of the MRD –

The revised IC Proposal Adequacy Checklist ensures that adequacy considerations are based on the Allowable Cost and Payment Clause requirements for Final Indirect Cost Rates (FAR 52.216-7(d)(iii)). The checklist steps were clarified to ensure that the effort expended is based on determining whether the proposal is auditable and whether the audit team should accept the audit engagement rather than expending effort on performing work generally done during the IC audit. In addition, the revised IC Proposal Adequacy Checklist now contains an overall determination at the end of the checklist where auditors will document whether the IC proposal is adequate or inadequate and provide supporting rationale.

That’s actually pretty good news. We have complained both publicly and privately about the “blurred lines” between the adequacy assessment and the actual audit steps associated with determining whether or not claimed contractor costs are allowable, allocable, and reasonable. Anything that clarifies the distinction is welcome, as far as we are concerned.

Another piece of good news in the MRD is the reinforcement (to auditors) that an Incurred Cost Submission (which really should be called a proposal to establish final billing rates, but whatever) can be determined to be adequate for audit even if it has some inadequacies within it. The MRD states –

In some cases, the audit team may determine that there are multiple inadequacies, but still determine that the IC proposal is adequate (acceptable to audit), while in other cases a single significant inadequacy alone could render the proposal inadequate (unacceptable to audit). Audit teams should use their professional judgment in determining the significance of any specific missing/inadequate data when making a determination on the proposal’s adequacy …

This kind of stuff is why we all need to see DCAA audit guidance when it is issued to the auditors. This kind of stuff helps contractors understand expectations—expectations for both auditor and auditee. This kind of stuff helps avoid adversarial tension and, in the long run, tends to reduce the number of disputes. We just wish DCAA would publish more of the guidance it issues.

And speaking of unreleased audit guidance, after our last whining article, complaining about the dearth of released audit guidance, some kind soul sent us a copy of MRD 15-OTS-021(R), dated 7/23/2015. That MRD deals with the pesky problem of offsetting debits and credits in a transaction universe, and how to cleanse the offsets before selecting a transaction sample. Thank you kind soul!

As we suspected, the correct answer is not to add the debits and credits together to calculate an “absolute value” of questioned costs—even though doing so undoubtedly creates more questioned costs to report to HQ. (Sorry, FD.)

We have asked Tech Guru Mark to add that particular MRD to the Knowledge Resources page on this website, for those interested in the topic. (Apparently the topic is also covered in the DCAA Variable Sampling Guidance, available to auditors on the DCAA intranet. Unfortunately, we don’t have access to the DCAA intranet, which is why we need to see this piece of guidance.)

Do you want DCAA to publish all releasable audit guidance on its website in accordance with the direction from the Commander-in-Chief? If you do, you might consider sending a polite and respectful email to Ms. Anita Bales, DCAA Director, regarding the subject.

 

 


Page 103 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.