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Apogee Consulting Inc

Ish Kabibble, Wrong-Way Corrigan, and the Charge of the Light Brigade

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My father, who passed away in 2010, used to try to get me to believe the craziest things. He tried to get me to believe that there was once a person with the name “Ish Kabibble.” He tried to tell me that there was a real person with the name “Wrong-Way Corrigan.” He was always trying to get me to believe that nonsense and I learned to be wary of what he called his “facts.”

And yet, in the present day, when Google can lead one on a learning adventure, it turns out that my father was telling me the truth about a lot of things. I was the one who was wrong, not he.

Ish_KabibbleIndeed, there was a person named “Ish Kabibble” and it turns out good ol’ Ish hailed from Pennsylvania, just like my father did. Ish (real name “Merwyn Bogue”) was a coronet player and a member of Kay Kyser’s popular big band. (Wikipedia tells me that Kyser’s band had 11 number one records in the 1930’s and 1940’s, including a 1943 version of “Praise the Lord and Pass the Ammunition”.) Not only did he play coronet for Kay’s band, but Ish was also the band’s business manager for 20 years. In addition, Ish was a member of Kay Kyser’s Kollege of Musical Knowledge, which was a television quiz show in 1949 and 1950. My father likely would have watched that TV show. Ish (and Kay Kyser) also appeared together in several films released in the 1940’s. They were comedies and Ish was supposedly a singer of comedic songs, kind of like the Weird Al Yankovic of his day. My father probably saw those films as a young boy. Wikipedia even posits that Ish’s name, roughly translated from Yiddish, was the source for Mad Magazine’s famous catchphrase, “What, me worry?” (But somebody else edited the article to point out that was a very tenuous reach. Want more detail on the etymology of the name? Check out this article.) So yeah, Ish Kabibble was a real person. He was actually kind of famous, once upon a time, even if he was known more for his foolish persona than his musical skills.

Wrong-Way_CorriganWrong-Way Corrigan was also kind of famous, once upon a time. He was a real person (real name Douglas Corrigan) and he was a mechanic and helped build Charles Lindbergh’s famous plane, The Spirit of Saint Louis. Like Lindbergh, Corrigan also wanted to make a daring solo flight across the Atlantic Ocean, but was denied permission to do so. Instead, he “accidentally” flew his plane “the wrong way” from New York to Ireland in 1938, about ten years after Lindbergh’s historic flight. Like Lindbergh, Corrigan flew solo and nonstop; his flight took 28 hours (versus Lindbergh’s 33-hour trip). But unlike Lindbergh, Corrigan claimed his flight had been a terrible mistake. Although Corrigan’s flight plan called for flying from New York to Long Beach, California, he ended up flying the wrong way to Ireland because of “heavy cloud cover that obscured landmarks and low light conditions, causing him to misread his compass.” Sure. And yet Corrigan never admitted to intentionally violating his flight plan. He was a true hero, even if he was known more for flying the wrong direction than for his heroics.

And he was a true hero. Corrigan’s heroics were noted by a journalist at the time, who wrote—

You may say that Corrigan's flight could not be compared to Lindbergh's in its sensational appeal as the first solo flight across the ocean. Yes, but in another way the obscure little Irishman's flight was the more audacious of the two. Lindbergh had a plane specially constructed, the finest money could buy. He had lavish financial backing, friends to help him at every turn. Corrigan had nothing but his own ambition, courage, and ability. His plane, a nine-year-old Curtiss Robin, was the most wretched-looking jalopy..

As I looked over it at the Dublin airdrome I really marveled that anyone should have been rash enough even to go in the air with it, much less try to fly the Atlantic. He built it, or rebuilt it, practically as a boy would build a scooter out of a soapbox and a pair of old roller skates. It looked it. The nose of the engine hood was a mass of patches soldered by Corrigan himself into a crazy-quilt design. The door behind which Corrigan crouched for twentyeight hours was fastened together with a piece of baling wire. The reserve gasoline tanks put together by Corrigan, left him so little room that he had to sit hunched forward with his knees cramped, and not enough window space to see the ground when landing

I was thinking about these perhaps random, unconnected people recently when I found myself in a heated discussion about the outcome of a very expensive ERP system implementation. I was not part of the implementation—not really. I had been brought in very late and none of my suggestions/recommendations could be acted upon—not because people disagreed with them, but because it was simply too late in the implementation process to make those changes. More to the point, there were a number of suggestions/recommendations made by a number of people that were “deferred” or passed on altogether, so as to move the implementation along. As a result of those decisions, the final ERP product lacked significant functionality. Immediately after implementation, the contractor began to realize some of those suggestions/recommendations by all those people really should have been acted upon, because now that poor contractor was going to have to spend even more time and money to get the ERP system right. The fixes were going to be extensive and expensive. It was almost as if the original implementation was going to have to be redone.

I was in a meeting when some of the post-implementation “fixes” were being discussed, and I made the observation that it was a shame the contractor was, in essence, going to have to do two system implementations, because the first one simply hadn’t done the job. Perhaps undiplomatically, I opined that it was too bad the ERP implementation leadership had placed more importance on achieving the “go-live” milestone instead of achieving full system functionality, and had placed more emphasis on reporting schedule progress than they had on listening to the input of those designing the ERP system. I noted that I thought those designing the ERP system hadn’t voiced their concerns to leadership strongly enough. (I also noted the requirements definition was lacking, as well.) With 20/20 hindsight, it was clear that the company should have postponed the implementation date so as to incorporate all the suggestions/recommendations, rather than proceed to implement a substandard system right on time. It would have meant a bit of embarrassment for those involved, but it would ultimately have saved the company a lot of money.

To be clear, I was voicing my opinion in the nature of a “lesson learned” discussion amongst people who had spent many long hours, late nights, and weekends trying to do the best job they could in the timeframe they had been given. I wasn’t disparaging their efforts; I acknowledged their efforts but felt they had been wasted to some extent because the objective hadn’t been fully achieved despite those heroic efforts. It was the direction that was lacking, not the execution. They had heroically flown their plane despite the odds stacked against them—but they had flown it the wrong way.

My observations really upset one of the people in the room—somebody who was not a leader of the implementation, but was instead one of the crew of people who had worked those long hours and late nights and weekends to make the “go-live” implementation date. He felt that nobody—especially somebody who had come late to the party—should criticize those efforts.

Basically, his point was that any criticism demeaned the heroic efforts of the implementation team. He felt that any criticism, even criticism aimed at leadership and the direction provided, was criticism of the team as a whole. From his point of view, the team was covered in glory because of their valiant efforts, and he didn’t want to discuss anything else about the project. He couldn’t see my point that there was a lesson to be learned about heroic efforts that were largely wasted because they were spent in the wrong direction.

Kind of like the charge of the British Light Brigade at the Battle of Balaclava in 1854.

(You wondered when that was going to come up, didn’t you?)

The charge, made famous by Tennyson’s poem, combines many of the same elements as I saw in the contractor’s ERP system implementation. (Aside from the whole life and death thing, of course.) The Light Brigade made a frontal assault against a well-prepared Russian artillery battery with excellent fields of fire. The results were not pretty. The British lost about 50% of their force and, although they reached their objective, they could not hold it and were immediately forced to retreat. The Russians were so well situated and the British force so ill-suited to a frontal assault that the French Marshal in the field was moved to say “It is magnificent, but it is not war. It is madness.” As Wikipedia notes, “The semi-suicidal nature of this charge was surely evident to the troopers of the Light Brigade, but if there were any objection to the orders, it was not recorded.”

You see the point here, yes?

As the Wikipedia article dryly states, “The reputation of the British cavalry was significantly enhanced as a result of the charge, though the same cannot be said for their commanders.” Wikipedia goes on to say that “The charge of the Light Brigade continues to be studied by modern military historians and students as an example of what can go wrong when accurate military intelligence is lacking and orders are unclear.” Or for our purposes, it is an example of what can go wrong when accurate requirements and system design is lacking and leadership direction is unclear.

Finally, let’s get to the lessons-learned aspect. My colleague was convinced that any attempt to learn lessons from the semi-failed system implementation was unwarranted criticism of the team—criticism that denied their heroic efforts. I didn’t agree, believing strongly that learning lessons is what leads to future improvement. How does that disagreement play into the charge of the Light Brigade? Well, the Wikipedia article states—

According to Norman Dixon, 19th-century accounts of the charge tended to focus on the bravery and glory of the cavalrymen, much more than the military blunders involved, with the perverse effect that it ‘did much to strengthen those very forms of tradition which put such an incapacitating stranglehold on military endeavor for the next eighty or so years,’ i.e., until World War I.

This has been an admittedly wandering article. We’ve gone from Ish Kabibble—an imaginary figure who turned out to be real—to another real person, Wrong-Way Corrigan, a hero who flew the wrong way. And we ended up with the charge of the British Light Brigade in a war more than 150 years ago. It’s been a long journey. What have we learned from the trip?

It is perfectly proper to conduct a post-implementation “lessons learned” exercise after an ERP implementation. It is perfectly proper to discuss such things as the adequacy of the requirements definition and system design. It is perfectly proper (though perhaps politically unwise) to discuss leadership direction and whether or not meeting schedule milestones was given greater importance than achieving full system functionality.

Those discussions do not—or should not—be seen as criticism of the efforts of those involved in executing the direction provided. Just because you flew in the wrong direction does not mean you didn’t make a heroic flight. Just because you charged into a well-defended position and lost half your troops doesn’t mean the troops didn’t display heroic levels of bravery.

More importantly, it is more than perfectly proper to discuss those things. It is vital. Because a failure to discuss problems and to learn lessons from them means that we will be repeating sub-optimal ERP system implementation in the future.


Even if it’s hard to hear, it needs to be said.

 

This is How You Do Corruption

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We’ve got to hand it to the U.S. Navy. They know how to do corruption big time. You know: gangsta style corruption. Not like those pikers in the Army or Air Force. The Navy team gets it. This is how you do corruption.

And we’re not talking about the little stuff, either. We’re not talking about the cheating scandal at the Navy Nuclear Propulsion School nor are we talking about the now infamous Inchscape Shipping Services scandal (aka the “Fat Leonard Scandal”) which cost at least four Navy officials their careers.

Nope. All that is history. It’s water under the bridge.

Today’s story is about the tainted award of “more than $53 million” in Navy contracts for telecommunications equipment, software, and related services. It’s a complicated story, and thus it’s worth writing about – unlike most of the banal stories of public procurement corruption that we happen across. We hasten to note that the “facts” of this story are based on allegations contained in a Federal grand jury indictment, and that the persons named have not been convicted of any crime yet. They are entitled to be presumed innocent until actually proven guilty. That being said, we are not going to further use the word “alleged” in this article (unless it’s in a quote); please just take the word as a given in what follows.

Now fasten your seatbelt because you are in for a wild ride, courtesy of this U.S. Depart of Justice press release. The press release discussed the actions of three individuals: (1) James Shank, a now-retired Program Manager at the Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) Systems Center; John Wilkerson, who was a DoD “Account Manager” for Iron Bow Technologies, LLC, and (3) Co-Conspirator 2, who was a program manager for Advance C4 Solutions (AC4S) until he joined yet another company (Superior Communications Solutions, Inc. or SCSI). What you need to know is that Mr. Wilkerson not only worked for Iron Bow, but he was also part-owner and operator of SCSI.

So right away we understand that Mr. Wilkerson had a conflict of interest problem with respect to his employment by Iron Bow. He was trying to balance being an employee of one IT company while being part-owner of another IT company—both of whom were competing for work with SPAWAR. That conflict of interest would absolutely play a role in his dealings with Mr. Shank, as we will learn.

The DoJ press release describes a corrupt relationship, where Shank “improperly shared information with Wilkerson and Co-Conspirator 2, and worked with them to structure the government contracts so as to give their companies an unfair advantage over other potential bidders.” But that’s just the summary of the relationship. The devil, as they say, is in the details.

As one example of how Wilkerson tried to play both ends of his two competing interests, note the following quote from the DoJ announcement—

Shank … initiated the procurement process on more than 11 delivery orders that purchased telecommunications equipment and furniture as part of the Air Force project. Those delivery orders were issued to Iron Bow in 2010 and 2011. Shank made sure that the delivery orders included telecommunications equipment and/or furniture that were assigned SCSI-specific part numbers, thereby guaranteeing that SCSI would receive revenue from the delivery orders. The indictment alleges that SCSI received approximately $33 million of the $35 million paid to Iron Bow under the various furniture and equipment delivery orders.

It seems that Wilkerson won lots of work for Iron Bow, while making sure (thanks to Shank) that his own company was a mandatory subcontractor under Iron Bow’s prime contract Delivery Orders. Nice.

For another example of the kind of corrupt chicanery that was going on, check out this bit—

… according to the indictment, Shank, Wilkerson, and Co-Conspirator 2 developed a request for proposal (RFP) for DO27, a contract to supply labor services for an Air Force technology project, including for overall project management services, so that AC4S would win the contract. On June 10, 2010, DO27 was awarded to AC4S in the amount of $18,332,738.10. Wilkerson provided Co-Conspirator 2 with a quote for labor on behalf of SCSI that was less than the quote he had previously submitted on behalf of Iron Bow as their sales representative. After SCSI was selected as a subcontractor on DO27, it subcontracted with Iron Bow to provide most of the labor SCSI was supposed to provide under DO27. Wilkerson was able to earn income from the work Iron Bow employees were doing by having SCSI act as a middleman and charging a mark-up on Iron Bow’s work. Wilkerson and Co-Conspirator 2 then directed an SCSI employee to create false invoices supposedly documenting the hours SCSI employees spent working on DO27, which were submitted to AC4S and paid by the United States government. SCSI received $6,794,432.98 on DO27 out of the $18 million AC4S received for providing labor for the project.

Did you get all that. Go back and read it again, slowly, to be sure.

SPAWAR awarded a Delivery Order to AC4S, using a quote from prospective subcontractor Iron Bow in the pricing. After award, Wilkerson submitted a lower bid from SCSI, thus cutting Iron Bow out of the picture. Naturally, AC4S awarded SCSI the lower-priced subcontract. But then SCSI turned around and awarded its own subcontract to Iron Bow, and Wilkerson pocketed the mark-up on the subcontract while bragging to Iron Bow about all the work he was winning for the company. In addition, somebody at SCSI doctored some fake invoices to make it seem that SCSI was adding value and not engaging in invoicing for excessive pass-through costs (which is a prohibited practice). Nice.

Perhaps the best part of this story happened when SCSI offered Shank, who was the SPAWAR Program Manager awarding all this work to Iron Bow, AC4S and SCSI, a job. The DoJ relates that aspect of the story thusly—

In late 2010 or early 2011, Wilkerson offered Shank employment. Shank did not disclose that fact to anyone at SPAWAR and did not recuse himself from any of the contracts that benefited Wilkerson. In February 2011, Co-Conspirator 2 left AC4S and went to work for Wilkerson at SCSI. According to the indictment, Co-Conspirator 2 received a $500,000 bonus when he joined SCSI, which was paid for by profit Wilkerson had earned on the furniture contracts.

By March 2011, the Air Force project was not complete and there were a number of contract disputes related to the project. Shank was directed not to take any other action related to the project without the approval of a senior manager. Nevertheless, the indictment alleges that in April 2011, Shank accepted more than $3.7 million worth of invoices that benefited SCSI without informing the senior manager. After Shank accepted employment with SCSI in May 2011, but was still working for SPAWAR, he allegedly approved more than $1.1 million worth of invoices that benefitted SCSI and Wilkerson.

Thus, Shank had a prohibited conflict of interest, in that he was awarding contracts and approving invoices related to those contracts, all while he had accepted employment from the same contractor to whom he had awarded the contracts and was sending him invoices to approve for payment. SCSI benefited from that relationship to the tune of $4.8 million in invoices approved for payment—invoices approved for payment in contravention of express direction to Shank not to take any action, because of unspecified contractual disputes. Nice.

But employment was not the only illicit activity that tainted the relationship between Shank and Wilkerson. As the DoJ announcement stated, “In addition, Wilkerson allegedly paid Shank $86,000 in the year after Shank retired from government service, funneling the payment through two other companies in order to conceal the source of the funds.” Nice.

As the DoJ press release stated: “Shank and Wilkerson face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison for a wire fraud conspiracy; and two years in prison for offering and accepting illegal gratuities. Shank also faces a maximum sentence of 5 years for criminal conflict of interest.” Nice.

This is how you do it.

 

 

False Statements and Trouble

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Lessons_LearnedWe’ve mentioned the False Statements Act (18 U.S.C. § 1001) before, in numerous articles. It’s kind of fundamental to the whole government contracting thing. If you don’t know much about it, you should really consider doing some research before your first proposal submission or before your first government audit of said proposal submission.

We are not lawyers but our understanding of the statute’s requirements can be summed up in one sentence: you cannot lie to government personnel and you cannot create false or fictitious documents, or you will get fined and very likely go to jail. (See, e.g., the real reason that Martha Stewart spent five months in a Federal Prison Camp.) Our blog has been rife with stories about deceit, lies, false certifications, false representations, and the like – most of which had some dire consequences for those who were found to have been engaging in such duplicitous activities.

Don’t be those people.

Two more examples to add to the pile of object lessons today.

In the first story, which came to us from our trusted source of a Department of Justice press release, we learned that the estate and trusts of Layton P. Stuart had settled False Claims Act litigation by agreeing to pay the U.S. Government $4 million. In addition to that payment, another corporate “victim” will receive an additional $6.9 million, bringing the final settlement tally to $10.9 million.

From the announcement, we learned that the origin of the FCA case had come from alleged false statements made by Mr. Stuart—“former owner and president of One Financial Corporation, and its subsidiary, One Bank & Trust N.A., both based in Little Rock, Arkansas.” According to that announcement—

The United States’ complaint, filed earlier this year, alleged that Stuart and One Financial violated the False Claims Act by making false statements about the financial condition of One Financial and One Bank to induce the Department of the Treasury to invest Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds in One Financial. … In the lawsuit, the United States alleged that in 2009, Stuart, on behalf of One Financial, applied for a TARP investment. According to the United States, Stuart knowingly made false statements about the financial condition of One Financial and One Bank and about the intended use of the TARP funds. In particular, Stuart allegedly concealed serial frauds that he and other One Financial directors and One Bank executives had been committing, and intended to continue committing, on One Bank. The schemes involved Stuart’s diversion of One Bank funds for personal use, including Stuart’s purchase of luxury vehicles for his wife and children. Within two weeks of receiving the TARP funds, Stuart allegedly diverted $2.185 million into his personal accounts. Stuart was terminated from One Bank in September 2012.

The DoJ press release notes that “The government’s False Claims Act lawsuit remains pending against One Financial. Separate criminal actions against several former One Financial and former One Bank executives also remain pending in the Eastern District of Arkansas.”

The second story also came courtesy of a DoJ announcement, in which it was stated that Wayne Simmons, of Annapolis, Maryland, had been arrested “after being indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of major fraud against the United States, wire fraud, and making false statements to the government.” What makes Simmons’ case interesting (and what’s getting it so much play on Facebook and other sites) is that Simmons was a recurring guest analyst on Fox News—a purported terrorism expert. So Simmons’ victims include Fox News (and the public at large). But his alleged fraud against Fox News is the least of the charges he’s facing.

According to the DoJ press release—

According to the indictment, Simmons falsely claimed he worked as an ‘Outside Paramilitary Special Operations Officer’ for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1973 to 2000, and used that false claim in an attempt to obtain government security clearances and work as a defense contractor, including at one point successfully getting deployed overseas as an intelligence advisor to senior military personnel. According to the indictment, Simmons also falsely claimed on national security forms that his prior arrests and criminal convictions were directly related to his supposed intelligence work for the CIA, and that he had previously held a top secret security clearance. The indictment also alleges that Simmons defrauded an individual victim out of approximately $125,000 in connection with a bogus real estate investment.

So, according to the indictment (which should not be confused with a finding of guilt), Simmons was pretty much a serial liar and con man, bilking news companies, corporations, and individuals alike. If convicted, he’s looking at a maximum of 35 years in Federal prison (20 years on the wire fraud counts, 10 years on the major fraud against the U.S. counts, and 5 years on the false statements count.) That’s a long time in the pen for a 62 year-old man.

Two stories of alleged lies and deceit. One expensive settlement and one potential very long prison sentence. You may want to think twice before you follow in these individual’s footsteps.

 

 

DCAA Staffing, Resources, and Transparency of Same

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Recently we discussed DCAA’s apparent concern with provisions of the as-yet-unsigned FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which, if implemented as drafted, would prohibit DCAA from performing audits for non-DoD agencies until and unless it catches-up on its well-publicized backlog of “incurred cost” audits. In that blog post, we stated—

Let’s be clear that we are almost wholly without insight into how DCAA prepares and manages its budgets – but it seems fairly obvious that Field Audit Offices (FAOs) are being created and staffed (and presumably funded) at the local Branch level. Why? Why not budget and manage at the Regional Level and let the appropriate Regional leadership determine where best to put his or her scarce audit resources, given the overall funding provided? Why determine local staffing based on local budgets, augmented by reimbursable work? Doesn’t that impact prioritization of the agency’s workload?

It sure seems that way to us.

Well, we have received some additional information on that point that we will share in this article. But in the meantime ….

Recently we posted a couple of blog articles bemoaning the lack of published DCAA audit guidance (aka Memoranda for Regional Directors or MRDs). In response to our whining, several individuals took it upon themselves to send us copies of the “releasable” MRDs. It is readily obvious that, to DCAA leadership, “releasable” means the MRDs can be released, not that they must be released. DCAA leadership apparently likes to keep its audit guidance to itself. Thus, if people didn’t send us the MRDs, then we wouldn’t know about them.

But we don’t see all the releasable MRDs. We have seen some but there are other folks who, apparently, have had access to other MRDs. One consequence from DCAA’s close-to-the-vest approach is that there is now an unofficial competition to see who can access the hidden MRDs. After all, information is power and the more access you have to understanding DCAA’s audit approaches, presumably the more valuable you are to potential clients.

Our professional colleagues at Redstone Consulting seem to have good access to the hidden MRDs, as evidenced by their September newsletter. Among the many interesting topics is a discussion of the DCAA 2016 Staffing and Program Plan. We commend it to your attention. But the point here is not the content of Redstone Consulting’s article; the point is the article is based on access to a heretofore hidden DCAA MRD (15-OWD-025(R); August 13, 2015), which lays-out DCAA’s “high level plans for deploying 4,969 staff years.” Redstone Consulting has access to this information and most other non-DCAA folks do not.

Is the information important to contractors? Sure it is.

For example, the Redstone Consulting newsletter reports that the MRD contains such useful information as “DCAA is now planning estimating system and MMAS audits at 5,000 and 4,000 hours each, respectively. In unprecedented fashion, DCAA lists the 12 Estimating System audits by contractor and the 5 MMAS audits by contractor.” In other words, Redstone Consulting knows exactly which contractors are going to have estimating system and MMAS reviews performed on them; and it is likely that those contractors have no idea what is coming their way. Does this information give Redstone Consulting a competitive advantage in the marketplace? You bet it does. Courtesy of DCAA leadership.

To add to that point, according to Redstone Consulting’s reading of the secret MRD, “DCAA HQ has identified 27 [post-award or “defective pricing”] audits at 16 different contractor business segments.” Redstone Consulting knows exactly which contractor business segments are going to be audited; it is likely those segments do not yet know—unless and until Redstone Consulting reaches out to them to let them know.

Lest you think we’re simply whining about the situation, let us hasten to assure you that we are in possession of heretofore secret MRDs of our own—courtesy of a kind soul who goes by the nom de guerre “George Kaplan.” George recently gifted us with a copy of MRD 15-OWD-028(R) (September 22, 2015), which modifies slightly the information that Redstone Consulting’s MRD contained. Our MRD addresses “FY 2016 Revised Staff Allocations” and tells us that DCAA is budgeting 5,014 staff years for FY 2016 audits. It even breaks-out the allocations by Region. So there, Redstone Consulting!

It should be noted that DCAA allocating staff to Regions is exactly what we said the agency should be doing, and what we complained that they weren’t doing. Thus, even if our fundamental point that FAO budgets should not be considered and the only budget line should be at Region was correct (and we still think it was correct), we have to acknowledge that DCAA HQ is allocating staffing budgets to the Regions for the Regional Directors to then manage. Good on them for doing so.

That being said, we think we’ve made our point that withholding releasable MRDs does not protect the information. Instead, holding-back such information merely creates unequal access to information amongst those interested in having it. That unequal access to taxpayer-funded audit guidance not only creates that unintended consequence; it also flies in the face of a Presidential commitment to openness and transparency.

There is no reason to be coy with releasable MRDs and every reason to be transparent and forthright in publishing the guidance. It’s a shame that DCAA won’t do so.

 

 

The Importance of Timekeeping

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Accounting_FraudIn today’s modern aerospace/defense environment, direct labor dollars make up a smaller proportion of total contract cost than has historically been the case. We’ve noted this phenomenon before, with respect to the importance of managing supply chain risk and ensuring that subcontracted work supports overall program execution. While all that is relevant and true, sometimes it all comes down to managing the labor hours of employees within the four (or six) walls of the factory. Sometimes it is about internal controls over timekeeping and labor reporting.

Timekeeping and labor reporting is about the most obvious thing that would generate “interest” for employees (disgruntled and otherwise) looking to find wrongdoing. All they have to do is to look around them and see what their colleagues and peers are doing. They see when their fellow employees show up for work and they see when they leave for home. It’s incredibly easy to notice when somebody is taking advantage of lax management to work less than the standard work day. Consequently, timekeeping irregularities comprise the majority of internal hotline calls. Some of those hotline calls lead to official disclosure reports. At one point a few years ago, it was reported that timekeeping problems comprised as much as 75 percent of all mandatory disclosures made to Federal agency Inspectors General.

When discussing internal controls over timekeeping and labor reporting, the traditional answer is to point to employee certification and the review/approval of the next level supervisor or manager. Unfortunately, the distributed workplace—the new “virtual” workplace where many employees work in offices located miles from their supervisors or telecommute from home—doesn’t lend itself to management visibility over employee activities. Couple that from-a-distance management environment with a flexible employee work schedule, and it becomes relatively clear that the supervisor/manager approval of an employee timesheet is little more than a rubber stamp. It’s an illusory internal control.

DCAA likes to perform annual “floorcheck” audits (MAAR 6 audits) to evaluate the accuracy of contractor employee (salaried and/or hourly) "labor hour charges to contracts, indirect accounts, or other cost objectives,” but the fact of the matter is that no DCAA auditor is likely to surface intentional labor mischarging from floorcheck audit procedures and employee interviews, unless the employee (stupidly) decides to volunteer such incriminating information. The MAAR 6 audit procedures are more likely to uncover systemic, corporate-sponsored, mischarging instead of individual wrongdoing. Thus, DCAA audit procedures are no substitute for rigorous contractor internal controls in this area.

Moreover, the contract clause at 52.203-13 (“Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct”) requires large businesses to “establish … an internal control system” that includes (among other requirements)—

Periodic reviews of company business practices, procedures, policies, and internal controls for compliance with the Contractor’s code of business ethics and conduct and special requirements of Government contracting, including—

(1) Monitoring and auditing to detect criminal conduct;

(2) Periodic evaluation of the effectiveness of the business ethics awareness and compliance program and internal control system, especially if criminal conduct has been detected; and

(3) Periodic assessment of the risk of criminal conduct, with appropriate steps to design, implement, or modify the business ethics awareness and compliance program and the internal control system as necessary to reduce the risk of criminal conduct identified through this process.

Accordingly, if you are a large business (i.e., not a small business as that term is defined in FAR Part 19) then you need to be serious about establishing effective internal controls in the area of timekeeping and labor accounting. If you don’t do so, you risk DCAA finding that your accounting system has a significant deficiency, which will not be happy-making for your company.

Despite all the compliance requirements and disincentives for noncompliance, some contractors—some of the largest contractors—still screw-up from time to time. The Boeing Company is one of those large contractors that recently screwed-up to the tune of $18 million.

According to a Department of Justice press release, Boeing agreed to pay $18 million in order “to settle allegations that “the company submitted false claims for labor charges on maintenance contracts with the U.S. Air Force for the C-17 Globemaster aircraft.” According to the DoJ announcement—

The government alleged that Boeing improperly charged labor costs under contracts with the Air Force for the maintenance and repair of C-17 Globemaster aircraft at Boeing’s Long Beach Depot Center in Long Beach, California. … The government alleged that the company knowingly charged the United States for time its mechanics spent on extended breaks and lunch hours, and not on maintenance and repair work properly chargeable to the contracts.

Further details were provided here at MilitaryTimes.com. According to that story, “A former Boeing employee, James Thomas Webb, alleged that workers at the Long Beach Depot Center in California submitted claims from 2006 to 2013 for eight-hour days despite knowing that they spent less time than that working because of lunch breaks and other extended breaks.”

Importantly, note that the origin of the allegations was a qui tam relator, a former employee. The employee “received $3 million from the government under the settlement, and another $115,000 in legal fees from Boeing.” For its part—

Boeing didn't concede liability in the settlement.

‘Boeing took prompt corrective action immediately after it became aware of the site's irregular billing practice, and the company cooperated fully with the government investigation,’ the company said in a statement to USA Today.

The bottom-line here is that implementing effective internal controls over timekeeping and labor reporting will tend to generate a positive return on investment. Boeing is not the first major aerospace/defense contractor to learn this expensive lesson. Don’t let your company be the next DoJ settlement in the news.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.