USD (AT&L) Disappoints with Notions for Regulatory Roll-backs
We have been less than enthusiastically supportive of the various incarnations of “Better Buying Power” (BBP). It’s not that we don’t support acquisition reform—we do! It’s just that so much of the BBP efforts strike us as bureaucratic B.S. designed to show effort without any measurable situational improvement. You can search this blog (we have a keyword search feature up in the top right of the home page!) and see our many articles on the topic. You’ll see that we’ve been following the various BBP initiatives closely and we have some ideas on what efforts are substantive, and what efforts are less so.
One of the more promising efforts has been to “remove unproductive requirements imposed on industry.” The specific actions under this initiative were detailed in this article found on our knowledge resources page (members only). This is a BBP 3.0 initiative that was a carry-over from BBP 2.0, where it was called “eliminate requirements imposed on industry where costs outweigh benefits.” To achieve that objective, BBP 2.0 called for DoD to “work with industry to collect data that will enable the Department to identify requirements that can be reduced or eliminated to reduce cost without adversely affecting performance.” The BBP 2.0 initiative was a carry-over from BBP 1.0 (or “Better Buying Power” as it was called in 2010 when it was rolled-out by then-USD (AT&L) Dr. Ash Carter). In BBP 1.0, it was called, “Identify and eliminate non-value-added overhead and G&A charged to contracts.”
The point is, the Pentagon has been pursuing this initiative for five years, in every single Better Buying Power incarnation. Since 2010, no matter how worded, the consistent goal has been to reduce the cost of weapons and services by reducing contractors’ overhead costs, and to drive that overhead cost reduction through a reduction in requirements imposed on contractors.
Five years’ of effort devoted to this initiative. During that five-year period, we’ve changed the Secretary of Defense, we’ve change the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), we’ve changed the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, we’ve changed the Director, DCMA, we’ve changed the Director, DCAA, and we’ve changed the OFPP Administrator. Despite those changes, the DoD bureaucracy under the USD (AT&L) has doggedly pursued this initiative for five years.
And so how’s that working out for the Pentagon and the taxpayers?
After five years, we finally have an answer, as the office of the USD (AT&L) recently issued a report showing the results of the five-year efforts.
The report, called “Eliminating Requirements Imposed on Industry Where Costs Exceed Benefits,” is a huge disappointment.
Before we get into the whys and wherefores, let’s pause and acknowledge that perhaps we should have been expecting such a stinker, such a waste of $600,000. Perhaps we should have expected the bureaucracy to spend most of its efforts waving-off contractor suggestions for regulatory relief and justifying the status quo. After all, Godel theorized that no formal complex system will ever be complete, and no management activity within the boundaries of that formal complex system can conceive of the unknowns that lie outside it. Thus, asking the bureaucrats within the bureaucracy to design a new bureaucracy is always going to be a difficult, if not impossible, proposition.
Yet, despite knowing the difficulty of asking bureaucrats to reduce the bureaucracy that keeps them employed, we were still mightily disappointed at the results of the study.
The report is divided into five primary sections: (1) acquisition of commercial items, (2) contract auditing and management, (3) application of earned value management, (4) Truth in Negotiation Act (TINA) and requirements for Cost or Pricing Data, and (5) application of the Buy American Act.
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Acquisition of Commercial Items. Areas covered included the initial determination of commerciality, determining that prices paid for commercial items were fair and reasonable, and government source inspection of commercial items during manufacturing. Even though the DoD study team was provided with real-life examples in which the government demonstrably paid more, and took longer, to acquire commercial items through adherence to its bureaucratic processes, the report concluded that “The examples provided were insufficient to support a quantitative, generalizable cost/benefit assessment of DoD’s policies and practices for acquiring commercial items.” In fact, the study team doubled-down on DoD’s controversial proposal that would make it even harder and more bureaucratic to acquire commercial items. To support the status quo, the DoD will create more bureaucracy (Centers of Excellence), develop more process guidance, and will train its Contracting Officers better.
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Contract Auditing and Management. Contractors provided a number of recommendations in this area, but failed to provide “quantitative costs associated with specific inefficiencies associated with DCAA auditing or DCMA contract management” and, thus, no cost/benefit analysis of those recommendations was possible. Instead, the study team parsed those recommendations into “most promising” and “other” based on “a subjective assessment of their merit.” The “other” recommendations were not considered. The “most promising” recommendations were dismissed. For example, contractors said that certain Contractor Business System reviews could be streamlined if government reviewers would rely on the work performed by external auditors during Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) control system reviews. DCAA (sort-of) agreed, but stated that it would need access to the external SOX reviewers’ working papers in order to rely on them. That ain’t going to happen, mostly because those working papers are the property of the external reviewers and not the contractors, and the government lacks privity. Separately, much verbiage was directed at reducing DCAA’s backlog of incurred costs audits. DCAA defended itself and pointed to all the progress it has made since 2012 via use of its risk-based approach. (Figure 3.1 shows that, as of May 2015, DCAA’s incurred cost backlog had been reduced to 17,600 years, which was allegedly only 170% of the “regular inventory” of 10,300 years.) In addition, contractors recommended changes to FAR 4.703 retention requirements related to scanned images, but the study team concluded that the current requirement “seems reasonable” and therefore did not need to be eliminated. Other contractor recommendations were similarly dismissed, with DCMA, PARCA, and DCAA each (generally) supporting the other’s rationale for why a particular contractor recommendation was already been addressed. For example, footnote 38 on Page 36 states “PARCA: DCAA’s comment indicates they have been responsive to industry concerns on this issue and are open to addressing contractor concerns about multiple requests for information as they are made aware of such instances. If systemic issues remain, recommend that contractors provide specific details and recommended actions to the Director, DCAA and the USD(C).” We could provide numerous other examples; readers are encouraged to review pages 34 to 41 of the report.
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Application of Earned Value Management. This was a happy place, with the study team accepted several contractor recommendations and promising to incorporate the recent Class Deviation into DFARS (which would establish the EVMS review threshold at $100 million). DCMA also promised to scale-back EVMS and individual program implementations to better match levels established by the ANSI/EIA 748 guidelines. The study team also recommended that EVMS metrics (e.g., cost or schedule variances) not be included in award fee evaluations.
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TINA and Requirements for Cost or Pricing Data. Contractors recommended reducing the number of submissions, increasing thresholds for applying TINA requirements, and relaxing the requirements associated with obtaining a TINA waiver. The study team agreed with the first recommendation, disagreed with the second (on the basis that DoD would pay higher prices and that would outweigh any cost reductions achieved), and sat on the fence with respect to the third recommendation. Many report pages were devoted to documenting the rationale for retaining the status quo.
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Application of the Buy American Act (BAA). Contractors made three primary recommendations. None of the three were found worthy of implementation by the study team. The status quo is acceptable.
We were interested in the concluding paragraph of this massive study, which indicates that the report is simply Phase 1 of a multi-phase effort. The concluding paragraph states—
Phase II of this study will continue under the Better Buying Power 3.0 initiative: “Remove Unproductive Requirements Imposed on Industry.” Industry will again be invited to play a key role, both in selecting topics for examination as well as providing evidence, ideas, and alternate approaches to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. Based on industry inputs, some areas under consideration for future study include: DoD’s Application of Low Price Technically Acceptable Criteria; Reducing Procurement Administrative Lead-Time for Contract Awards; Providing Greater Clarity on Intellectual Property Policies and Practices; Reducing Undefinitized Contract Actions; Limiting Flow-Down of FAR/DFARS Clauses; and Consistent Rules for Contract Sun-Setting.
Thus, in the time-honored way of all bureaucracies, more efforts will be undertaken in the efforts to reduce bureaucracy. We look forward to seeing the results of the Phase II efforts, as we are quite sure they will be as value-added as the results of the Phase I efforts.
All we know is, as taxpayers, we want our $600,000 back.
Compliance and Subcontractor Management
Once again we post yet another article blathering on about subcontractor/supplier management and how important it is to program execution. You’d think we’d get off that particular soapbox after six years, right? Seen it; read it; no need to see it or read it again. Boring!
A couple of weeks ago we were privileged to speak at the Public Contracting Institute’s annual “DCAA Hot Topics” update seminar, held in Dallas, Texas. The topic was the DFARS Business Systems but we chose to focus on moving beyond the “first line of defense against fraud, waste, and abuse” and, instead, addressed the compliance risks that the six “first lines” don’t address. (Indeed, as you know if you are any kind of reader of this blog, we don’t think those six systems do much of anything at all with respect to detecting or preventing fraud, waste, or abuse.) We spoke about compliance risks that exist outside the walls of the contractor’s facility: the compliance risks that exist in the program’s supply chain.
Again, a topic that we’ve discussed and written about before. Not much new to say or to write about it, right?
And as we’ve noted before, attorneys have a tendency to want to protect their corporate client(s) by focusing on contract language that protects and perhaps indemnifies the client from any wrongful actions performed by the subcontractors/suppliers in that program supply chain. We’ve even seen the phrase “transfer of risk from prime to sub” used before – and it bothered us. It bothered us because you can’t do that. You cannot transfer risk from prime contractor to subcontractor and there is no contract language that will do so. The most you can do is to put language in your agreement that will make the prime whole from the actions of its suppliers; and even then the phrase “make the prime whole” is problematic, because there are some things (such as schedule slips to significant program milestones) from which the program cannot recover.
Thus: our asserted position that program execution risk cannot be transferred and attorneys who believe otherwise simply do not understand what the phrase “program execution” actually means.
Enough rehashing of points made previously in other blog articles. Where are we going with this? Well, we’re going to make a relatively new point today:
Prime contractors (and higher-tier subcontractors) cannot simply rely on contract language to protect themselves from the wrongdoing of their suppliers and subcontractors. They cannot simply rely on certifications and representations. Prime contractors (and higher-tier subcontractors) will be held accountable for the wrongdoing of their suppliers.
Accordingly, they need to actually verify the representations and certifications. They need to actually review, audit, and/or confirm the assertions made by their suppliers.
That’s a bold set of statements, we hear you saying. Expensive, too. And manpower-intensive as well. Not likely to happen in this budget-conscious age of cost-cutting and layoffs.
But we think we are correct. Contractors that simply accept documents and invoices at face value, without checking and verifying the accuracy of those documents and invoices, may be found to be negligent. Those negligent contractors may be subject to allegations of False Claim Act violations, with all the expense that entails. Remember, “reckless disregard” and “deliberate ignorance” have been held to meet the requisite scienter standard under the civil FCA statute.
Obviously, the amount of checking and verification depends on a risk analysis, and that risk analysis starts with contract type. Choosing the correct contract type is more important that many would think. Cost-reimbursement subcontracts require more invoice review; whereas FFP subcontracts probably require more project status report review. T&M subcontracts are just risky in every sense, and should probably be avoided if possible.
The point is: somebody needs to assess risk and then take actions that would tend to militate against the assessed risk. Program teams simply should not expect suppliers and subcontractors to do the right thing; they should be checking and reviewing and verifying that their suppliers and subcontractors are doing the right thing.
As a President once said, “Trust; but verify.”
With that in mind, let’s talk about CSC’s prime contract with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). CSC (more formally called Computer Sciences Corporation) was awarded a DISA contract to “help manage the telecommunications network” used by the Department of Defense. CSC then awarded a subcontract to NetCracker Technology Corporation. We know about this contractual relationship courtesy of the Department of Justice, which issued a press release describing what went wrong, the ensuing FCA litigation, and how much the two parties (CSC and NetCracker) had to pay in order to settle the allegations.
In summary, “From 2008 through 2013, NetCracker allegedly used employees without security clearances to perform work when it knew the contract required those individuals to have security clearances, resulting in CSC recklessly submitting false claims for payment to DISA.”
To settle the allegations, NetCracker agreed to pay $11.4 million. For its part, CSC agreed to pay $1.35 million.
Now, we all should understand why NetCracker needed to settle the FCA litigation. It provided employees that (allegedly) lacked the requisite security clearances. That’s not good. A former NetCracker employee filed a qui tam suit (as so often happens) and then the legal process took over from there. The original relator reportedly will receive $2.359 million for his efforts. So far, so good. That’s how these things work.
But what about CSC? What did it (allegedly) do wrong to lead to a $1.35 million settlement? We have no inside information, but we strongly suspect the answer lies in the sentence from the DoJ announcement that we italicized above. Notice how CSC’s role was described: “CSC recklessly submitting false claims for payment.” Recklessly. That’s the word we think describes why CSC had to settle and why the prime contractor was even involved in the litigation.
Apparently, CSC acted recklessly when it simply paid NetCracker’s invoices without checking whether or not NetCracker’s employees had the required security clearances. If we are correct in our assumption, then had CSC performed any reviews or checking or verification of the security clearances of its subcontractor, then it would have had some strong defenses to the FCA allegations of the relator. CSC didn’t review or check or verify, and that lack of action cost it a (relatively small) litigation settlement.
CSC was held accountable for the wrongdoing of its subcontractor—a fact which supports the set of bold statements we made earlier in this article. NetCracker represented that its employees had the requisite security clearances. NetCracker may even have certified to that “fact” (though we suspect it was more in the nature of an “implied certification” rather than an express certification). CSC accepted NetCracker’s assurances at face-value, without checking further. And that lack of diligence cost CSC $1.35 million.
Consider our assertions and the support for our assertions.
Consider not making the same mistakes as CSC.
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Some Thoughts re: Contractor Business Systems
As we’ve noted before, we (or actually “I”—but go with it) recently spoke at the Fall Meeting of the American Bar Association’s Section of Public Contract Law on the topic of Contractor Business Systems. As readers of this blog might well guess, we asserted that the administration and/or oversight of Contractor Business Systems costs a lot of bucks and delivers very little bang. We asserted that the premise that contractors’ business systems are the first line of defense against waste, fraud, and abuse, is wrong. We asserted that the whole notion that the majority of defense contractors’ business systems were inadequate, or that the allegedly inadequate business systems contributed to wasteful or fraudulent or abusive business practices, is very largely a fabrication—an imaginary tale dreamed up (we suppose) to scare certain legislators into giving DCAA more funding. We asserted that not only is the focus on Contractor Business Systems misplaced, but that the misplaced focus takes resources away from where they are really needed.
We suggested—or urged, if you will—that it is time to form a joint Government/industry task force to create the “next generation” of contractor internal control systems.
In related news, we (or actually “I”—but go with it) recently spoke at the DCAA Hot Topics Seminar in Dallas, Texas, hosted by the Public Contracting Institute. Again, the topic on the table was Contractor Business Systems, but the focus topic was “Moving Beyond Business System Compliance” to think about where compliance professionals should be spending their time (and where government oversight folks should be spending their time). We asserted that the focus needs to shift from DFARS Business System adequacy criteria (which DCAA largely ignores in any case when auditors create their “significant deficiencies”) to the emerging compliance risks—such as counterfeit electronic parts detection and avoidance, management of controlled unclassified information, complying with anti-human trafficking rules, and maintaining vigilance in the area of cyber-security.
We suggested—or urged, if you will—that it is time to move beyond the six Contractor Business Systems and focus on the real risks faced by contractors (and by extension their Government customers).
This article is where we are going to gather some thoughts that support assertions made in both those presentations. Unlike many articles on this site, there will be no big wrap-up or unifying theme at the end. Instead, we are just going to list some points in no particular order.
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The process of reviewing and determining system adequacy takes too damn long. Remember the Raytheon “pilot” accounting system review—the first one performed by DCAA under the new adequacy criteria and review program? We know that took more than three (3) years to complete. By the time the system review report was issued, many of the facts and evidence relied upon by the auditors was already obsolete.
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And speaking of currency of audit evidence, remember the time when the DoD Office of Inspector General criticized DCAA for using evidence that was no longer current, in violation of GAGAS 6.04b? We do. And we also remember that then-Director Fitzgerald promised the OIG that DCAA would do better. He wrote—
By November 2011, DCAA will issue guidance, which will include the requirement for auditors to (i) perform sufficient testing of data that is relevant to the audit objectives, including the period or point in time covered by the report, (ii) perform testing of data generated by the system throughout the period under audit, and (iii) issue timely audit reports. For audits of contractor business systems, DCAA will perform compliance attestation engagements and report on the contractor’s compliance during a period of time or as of a point in time, consistent with the applicable attestation reporting standards (AT 601.55b) in AICPA’s Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements. Circumstances where auditors would need to expand testing to obtain sufficient evidence for the conclusions expressed in the report should be limited since the transactions being evaluated in the audit will coincide with the defined period covered by the audit. DCAA agrees with the guidance in GAGAS A8.02g, that the evidence provided in the report is more helpful if it is current and, therefore, timely issuance of the report is an important reporting goal for auditors.
How’s that promised audit guidance coming? More importantly (and less snarkily), DCAA’s inability to issue its Contractor Business System reports timely is a continued GAGAS violation and undercuts the audit agency’s conclusions.
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A big part of CBS administration and management is timely follow-up of initial reviews, to determine whether or not the contractor implemented its corrective actions and whether or not those corrective actions, if implemented, remediated the system deficiencies. Remember that time when the DoD IG told the Director of DCAA that the audit agency was taking too long to perform and issue CBS follow-up audits? What’s changed since that time? Or in other words, what did DCAA do to address the OIG’s concerns? Nothing. DCAA did nothing. Nothing has changed. The status remains quo.
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And remember all those times when the DoD OIG told DCMA that its Contracting Officers weren’t complying with the timelines established in the DFARS and DFARS PGI and DCMA Business Instructions? (One example here. This website contains more than one example.)
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The DAR Council issued a proposed rule that would, in essence, recuse DCAA from performing its share of the CBS reviews. That rule was subject to criticism and went nowhere, and the DFARS Case was closed. Why did the DAR Council believe such a rule was even necessary in the first place? Perhaps it was the recognition that DCAA simply lacked resources to fulfill its share of the regulatory bargain, the division of labor between DCMA and DCAA. Many commenters (including us!) told the DAR Council that would be the case, but the rule-makers didn’t listen.
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Perhaps in recognition that the government resources could not support the regulatory requirements, the threshold for reviewing the adequacy of a contractor’s EVMS Business System adequacy criteria was raised by $50 million (from $50 million to $100 million) via Class Deviation.
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Further to that thought, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) recently issued a memo entitled “Reducing the Burden of Certifying Earned Value Management Systems.” The OFPP memo states, “… the cost of certifying the system as ANSI/EIA-748 compliant can be significant … the cost of a certification can exceed $1 million. In addition, a contractor that achieves certification for its system at one agency may not be recognized by other agencies as having a compliant system and may be required to complete yet another costly certification process.” This revelation (that establishment of separate DFARS adequacy criteria created a duplicate compliance structure, since the DFARS doesn’t apply to civilian agencies) wasn’t shocking to those of us who told the DAR Council that would be the case during the public comment phase. Again, the DAR Council didn’t listen so now OFPP has had to step in to mediate the expensive problem caused by the DAR Council’s deafness.
No big wrap-up here. Just some thoughts/facts that we believe support our assertion that the DFARS Business System administration and oversight regime was poorly thought-out, and that experience is showing that public commenters (including us!) were spot-on in their submitted concerns and criticisms. Now we have an expensive, complicated, poorly-understood process that the parties cannot execute within the regulatory and non-regulatory requirements the DAR Council (and DCMA) established. Just some thoughts/facts that we believe support our assertion that it is time to form a task force to guide the parties past this albatross, this Maginot Line of defense, and into a more substantive “next generation” defense that protects the taxpayers in an affordable and effective manner.
DCMA Cost Monitors Fail at Proposal Audits, According to DoD IG
The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, in a report that should not have surprised anybody who’s been following this issue, recently issued an audit report critical of the Cost Monitors at the Defense Contract Management Agency. The audit report essentially said that the DCMA Cost Monitors were less effective than the auditors of the Defense Contract Audit Agency at performing audits of contractor proposals.
Shocking, we know. Shocking.
The DoD OIG, continuing the time-honored tradition of criticizing anybody and everybody in the Federal procurement process that isn’t actually a member of the DoD OIG staff, told Pentagon leadership that DCMA “cannot demonstrate that it performs adequate cost analyses on proposals below the [DCAA] audit thresholds” and that DoD cannot “show that DCMA achieves an annual rate of return comparable to the return that [DCAA] achieved before the change in audit thresholds.” In other words, by shifting the proposal audit burden from DCAA auditors to DCMA Cost Monitors, the government is likely to pay more for its negotiated contracts. How much more? Perhaps lots more.
We don’t know how much money the DoD is leaving on the table because, according to the DoD OIG, “DCMA cannot demonstrate that it … reports reliable performance statistics on its cost analysis efforts.”
The genesis of this predictable finger-pointing exercise was a decision made by Shay Assad in September, 2010, to address DCAA’s inability to issue audit reports by establishing dollar thresholds below which DCAA would not perform audits of contractor proposals for new contract awards (called by DCAA “forward pricing proposals”). We told readers about that philosophical change in audit approach in this article. We were enthusiastic supporters of the notion that the less DCAA involvement in negotiations between Defense Department and contractor, the better it would be for everybody. We wrote: “this seems to be a good first step in DCMA’s evolution towards a contract administration agency that can evaluate and negotiate cost proposals without leaning on DCAA like a crutch. We applaud it—and encourage the Pentagon to keep going!”
A couple of years later (November, 2012, to be more exact) we published another article reviewing a DoD OIG audit report that expressed concerns with the shift of the workload from DCAA to DCMA. We summarized the IG’s concerns thusly—
If you are the DOD IG, you might notice that, despite reports at the time that stated ‘defense officials believe the change will focus resources on high-risk areas and increase savings to the department,’ the fact of the matter is that the change in audit approach did not reduce DCAA audit hours as much as initially predicted, did not help DCAA reprioritize the workload as much as initially promised and, as a result, the new approach actually led to a reduction in taxpayer savings. If you are the DOD Inspector General, you might well conclude that the entire initiative was poorly thought out and was, in essence, a mistake.
Indeed, that’s exactly what the DOD IG concluded, in a new audit report published this month.
Critically, the November 2012 OIG audit report found that the decision to transfer audit workload from DCAA to DCMA lacked a “business case”. In other words, the decision was made for bureaucratic reasons and lacked a solid, defensible business rationale. Which is ironic, because the people making that decision were ostensibly solid businesspeople. When Ash Carter was Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L) he famously hung a sign outside his Pentagon office that said, “In God we trust; all others bring data.” The funny thing is that, in this one decision at least, the data was never provided.
The foundational premise of the November 2012 DoD OIG audit report was that DCAA achieved $1,885 in taxpayer savings for every audit hour spent on such “low-dollar proposal audits.” According to the IG, as a result of shifting the proposal audit workload to DCMA, the U.S. taxpayers were going to lose out in $249.1 million in potential savings each year. The IG wrote—
Lastly, we find that DP and DPAP did not demonstrate why they chose to direct Department and taxpayer resources to DCMA to perform a job DCMA was not prepared to perform when DCAA had the existing infrastructure in place to get the job the done. A formal business case analysis could have identified that it was advantageous and more economical to direct any increase in DoD resources to the organization that already had the existing infrastructure to adequately perform proposal evaluations and track the questioned costs.
We thought the IG’s audit report was damning. We were appalled that such decisions were made based on questionable data, on inflated values of audit hours that could be saved and redirected toward incurred cost audits, and without proper vetting and approval. We admit it: we were young and naïve.
And now, three years later and three years older and three years wiser (or more cynical, if you prefer), we are not at all surprised that the DoD OIG is back once again, criticizing the initial decision and the results of that decision. Nor should you be surprised.
In its 2015 audit report, the IG found that things are looking better for DCAA five years after the policy change. DCAA’s backlog of incurred cost audits has been reduced (though of course not as much as had been promised) and questioned costs have increased as a percentage of examined costs when compared to 2010 (though of course the more recent DCAA annual report indicates that trend has reversed a bit). As predicted, DCAA was the winner. And DCMA was the loser—as the IG found that 34 percent of cost analysis files reviewed were non-compliant with DCMA Instruction 120 (“Pricing and Negotiation”). Granted, that was about half the non-compliance rate found in 2012—but the IG still found it to be unacceptably high.
There was more to the audit report, about DCMA’s delayed implementation of its Pricing and Negotiation (“P&N”) eTool and the fact that its Mission Review Team (MRT) does not evaluate the sufficiency of the cost analysis procedures performed by the Cost Monitors. But none of the other stuff matters as much as the fundamental point that the shift of audit workload from DCAA to DCMA has had troubling results, at least as reported by the DoD OIG.
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