Raytheon Wins at ASBCA (Again) Part 1
We’ve been holding off writing about Raytheon’s near-total victory at the ASBCA, but now it’s time to get into that 100+ page decision that covers multiple appeals and multiple issues and multiple years. It’s a must-read if you are dealing with cost allowability or CAS 405 noncompliance allegations. It sets things straight in a number of areas that have long vexed the contracting parties. On the other hand, we understand the government is going to appeal the Board’s decision, so it’s possible that many of the things that were set straight will be made crooked again in the near future.
Here is a link to the massive (and massively complex) decision. We spent hours trying to sort the various appeals and issues. (Remember, we are not attorneys.) The decision is so massive, we will need multiple blog articles to tackle it all. In today’s article, we’ll attempt to sort out the decision and tackle one of the many issues: airfare allowability.
Here’s what we sorted:
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2007 and 2008 indirect rates at Raytheon Missile Systems (RMS) included allocations from Raytheon’s Corporate Home Office. DCAA asserted that some Corporate Home Office costs were unallowable and others were expressly unallowable. Because Raytheon allegedly had included expressly unallowable costs, DCAA also asserted non-compliance with CAS 405 requirements for those two years.
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The CACO issued a Final Decision (COFD)--$10,468,740 related to 2007 for unallowable costs, interest, and penalties. Raytheon appealed (ASBCA No. 59435)
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The CACO issued a COFD related to 2007 noncompliance with CAS 405—$7,469,506; but Raytheon only appealed $1,870,428+$307,776=$2,178,204 of that amount. (ASBCA No. 59436)
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The CACO issued a COFD--$1,154,383 related to 2008 for unallowable costs, interest, and penalties. Raytheon appealed (ASBCA No. 60056)
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The CACO issued a COFD related to 2008 noncompliance with CAS 405—$2,030,636. Raytheon appealed. (ASBCA No. 60058)
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The CACO issued a COFD related to claimed 2008 Corporate airfare--$760,861. Raytheon appealed and settled most of the disputed amount; the amount remaining was $76,556. (ASBCA No. 60057) The Board noted that “numerous appeals from government claims relating to corporate airfare costs have been stayed pending the outcome of the instant appeals.”
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The RMS DACO issued a COFD related to 2007 claimed airfare, outside legal costs related to patents, and employee recruiting costs. Raytheon appealed. (ASBCA No. 59437)
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The RMS DACO issued a COFD for penalties and interest, related to Raytheon’s inclusion of allegedly expressly unallowable costs in 2007. Raytheon appealed. (ASBCA No. 59438)
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The RMS DACO issued a COFD, disallowing RMS’ indirect airfare costs claimed in 2008; but he did not make a payment demand because the amount of costs claimed to be unallowable, plus an amount Raytheon had agreed to remove from its claim for other indirect costs, was less than the amount being withheld from current approved billing rates for 2008. Raytheon appealed. (ASBCA No. 60059)
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The RMS DACO issued two COFDs, disallowing RMS’ direct airfare costs that had been included in its billings under two named contracts and demanding payment of $167,427 and $17,274. Raytheon appealed. (ASBCA Nos. 60060 and 60061)
The parties prepared the following table explaining the amounts in dispute and the reasons for disallowable. Where the parties disagreed on the amounts, both amounts are shown.
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Segment
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Cost Type
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Year
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Amount
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Basis for Disallowance
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Corp
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Airfare
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2008
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$76,556
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31.205-46, Travel costs
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RMS
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Indirect airfare
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2007
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$815,036
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31.201-2(d) (supporting documentation);31.205-46
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RMS
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Indirect airfare
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2008
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$978,429
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31.201-2(d) (supporting documentation);31.205-46
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RMS
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Direct Airfare
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2008
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$184,701
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31.205-46, Travel costs
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Corp
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Corp. Development
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2007
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$307,776
(Gov’t $862,010)
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31.205-27, Organization costs (Expressly unallowable)
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Corp
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Corp. Development
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2008
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$868,322
(Gov’t $831,797)
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31.205-27, Organization costs (Expressly unallowable)
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Corp
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Gov’t. Relations
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2007
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$1,870,428
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31.205-22, Lobbying and political activity costs (Expressly unallowable)
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Corp
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Gov’t. Relations
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2008
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$1,065,481
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31.205-22; however, only $981,822 is expressly unallowable
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RMS
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Outside legal – patents
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2007
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$120,600
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31.201-2(d) (supporting documentation); 31.205-30, Patent costs
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RMS
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Engineering Labor Ovhd
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2007
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$96,701
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31.205-30, Patent costs (Expressly unallowable)
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RMS
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Recruiting Travel Costs
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2007
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$51,436
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31.201-2(d) (supporting documentation); 31.205-34, Recruitment costs
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Corp
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Restricted Stock, Incentive Comp, Bonus
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2007
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$1,242,895
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FAR 31.205-22, Lobbying; FAR 31.205-27, Organization costs; FAR 31.205-47, Costs related to legal and other proceedings (Expressly unallowable)
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Corp
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Restricted Stock, Incentive Comp, Bonus
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2008
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$125,280
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FAR 31.205-22; FAR 31.205-27; FAR 31.205-47 (Expressly unallowable)
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Corp
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Recruitment Souvenirs
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2008
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$17,780
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31.205-1, Public relations and advertising costs
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Corp
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CAS 405 Noncompliance
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2007
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$2,178,204
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31.201-6, Accounting for unallowable costs; CAS 405; inclusion of expressly unallowable costs
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Corp
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CAS 405 Noncompliance
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2008
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$1,813,619
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31.201-6, Accounting for unallowable costs; CAS 405; inclusion of expressly unallowable costs
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Airfare Costs
Long-time readers of this blog will know that the FAR travel cost principle was revised in 2010, muddying what had, up to that point, been a relatively well-understood cost principle—at least with respect to how to determine the allowability of airfare. Prior to the 2010 regulatory revision, the cost principle read:
Airfare costs in excess of the lowest customary standard, coach, or equivalent airfare offered during normal business hours are unallowable except when such accommodations require circuitous routing, require travel during unreasonable hours, excessively prolong travel, result in increased cost that would offset transportation savings, are not reasonably adequate for the physical or medical needs of the traveler, or are not reasonably available to meet mission requirements.
After the 2010 revision, the cost principle read:
Airfare costs in excess of the lowest priced airfare available to the contractor during normal business hours are unallowable except when such accommodations require circuitous routing, require travel during unreasonable hours, excessively prolong travel, result in increased cost that would offset transportation savings, are not reasonably adequate for the physical or medical needs of the traveler, or are not reasonably available to meet mission requirements.
Notice that change? It turns out the change was driven by DCAA’s fanatical belief that Raytheon had taken advantage of the government by negotiating volume-based discounts with certain air carriers. Those discounts permitted Raytheon, in certain circumstances, to claim premium class airfare as fully allowable because the premium airfare was actually lower than the “lowest customary standard, coach, or equivalent airfare offered during normal business hours.” DCAA really didn’t like that. DCAA didn’t like that so much that when DCMA and the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the DAR Council all told DCAA that its interpretation of the cost principle was wrong, and that “the words in the FAR [ ] would support the company’s position,” DCAA did an end-run by issuing an MRD in November, 2002, that told auditors to question Raytheon’s airfare costs based on their insistence that everybody else was wrong. Fortunately for Raytheon, the DCMA Defense Corporate Executive—what we would now call the CACO—told DCAA to stuff it, writing “DCMA Headquarters disagrees with the guidance in the attached DCAA memorandum. … There is nothing in the record to indicate defense contractors are to negotiate airfare rates with carriers and that the negotiated rates are the customary rates to be used for determining the unallowable amount. Accordingly, I can't support or sustain DCAA’s audit position.”
Several years later (2006) DCAA sponsored a new DAR Case to “clarify” the cost principle to match their interpretation. Despite the fact that the majority recommended that the Case be closed “with no further action,” it turns out that DCAA didn’t want to accept that answer. Instead, “DCAA persisted and brought the travel cost principle issue to the Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP).” What did DPAP think? “While DPAP does not concur with our interpretation of the existing language, (nor do they wish to take a position regarding the proper interpretation of the current language), they have conceded that the language is ambiguous.” Thus, the FAR Case was opened and the rest was history.
Well, except for the fact that DCAA applied the revised cost principle retroactively, because it was only a clarification of the ambiguity of which DCAA had always understood the correct interpretation—at least with respect to Raytheon. And then DCMA decided to go along with the DCAA’s retroactive interpretation, and issue a COFD using the revised cost principle to address the allowability of airfare incurred five or six years before the regulatory revision. Which required Raytheon to appeal…
In addition, DCAA questioned Raytheon’s use of a “10-hour rule” to justify an upgrade from coach to a premium fare. After much back and forth, DCMA and Raytheon had agreed that an upgrade would be an allowable cost if three conditions were met: (1) Travel primarily took place during non-customary business hours; (2) Raytheon employees reported directly to their TDY or permanent duly station (PDS) after arrival at their destination airport; and (3) Actual flight time (not an employee’s departure from their residence and travel time to a TDY site, and the reverse when returning home), must exceed 10 hours in duration. When all three factors were met, the cost of premium airfare was allowable. The agreement was memorialized and Raytheon revised its travel policy accordingly. Naturally, DCAA—who was not a signatory to the agreement—had a problem with that it.
The successor DCE rescinded the MOU. Upon the recission, Raytheon revised its travel policy again, this time by relaxing the requirement that employees must report for work upon arrival. DCAA countered by questioning premium class airfare incurred in accordance with the revised policy, and then citing Raytheon for a significant deficiency in its accounting system because it failed to properly account for the allegedly unallowable airfare. “After a five-year audit of Raytheon’s accounting system, on January 29, 2015, DCAA issued an audit report questioning how Raytheon accounted for allowable and unallowable costs. DCAA found a significant deficiency in Raytheon’s accounting system due to its treatment of premium class airfare.”
Seriously: a five-year accounting system audit? Are you kidding us? The Board did not express an opinion on why in the world it would take DCAA five years to complete an audit, so we will just leave that little factoid there.
Then DCAA issued another audit report that found the Missile Systems’ business unit estimating system had deficient controls because the business unit estimated premium class airfare in accordance with the Corporate travel policy. This caused Raytheon to revise its travel policy for the third time (in order to not have its estimating system determined to be inadequate). In the third iteration of the travel policy, in order to make the premium airfare allowable, the employee must perform “meaningful work upon arrival.”
If you are getting the impression that DCAA was “out to get” Raytheon in this matter, welcome to the club. So much for independence and objectivity….
Back to allowability, DCAA not only retroactively applied the 2010 cost principle “clarification” to costs incurred prior to 2010, but they questioned all premium airfares regardless of whether there was a justification that would have made the costs allowable under the exceptions found in the cost principle itself. Further, there were some errors or, shall we say, questionable assumptions made by DCAA when quantifying the allegedly unallowable premium airfare costs.
Under oath, the DCAA auditor defended the methodology used thusly:
Because we were just trying to determine -- when we were doing the audit, we were just trying to determine a reasonable amount. We understand these are negotiations, so we were just trying to give the government some kind of platform to, kind of, base where they should start at.
Accordingly, it seems that DCAA made no real attempt to be accurate when quantifying costs that were allegedly unallowable, notwithstanding that the agency would also allege that Raytheon’s failure to properly account for those allegedly unallowable airfare costs represented a significant deficiency in the accounting system as well as the estimating system; and notwithstanding that at the Missile Systems business unit, DCAA and the DCMA DACO were also making similar allegations based on similarly flawed audit methodologies.
How this was all not a massive GAGAS violation remains a mystery to us.
Anyway, at the end of the day the Board sided with Raytheon, finding that “the government has failed to prove its contention that the policy did not comply with the regulation.” Along the way, the Board made some statements that have important implications for government contractors seeking to comply with the 31.205-46 rules on airfare allowability. Let us quote them for you.
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“While Raytheon’s interpretation of the pre-2010 version of FAR 31.205-46(b) as referring to a standard coach fare available to the general public is reasonable, the government’s interpretation is not reasonable. As noted, the governing statute makes commercial aircraft travel costs that exceed the ‘standard commercial fare’ unallowable. It does not refer to any negotiated airfare available to a particular contractor. Similarly, the pre-2010 implementing regulation, FAR 31.205-46(b), refers to the ‘lowest customary standard, coach, or equivalent airfare.’ … Contrary to the government’s stance, its revision of the regulation in 2010 was not a mere clarification, it was a change. If that change were made to apply to the 2007 and 2008 costs in question, it would be an impermissible retroactive change.”
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“Under FAR 31.205-46 ‘[c]osts incurred by contractor personnel on official company business are allowable,’ subject to certain limitations, including those in FAR 31.205-46(b) regarding premium airfare. However, we agree with Raytheon that, by its plain language, the pre-2010 version of FAR 31.205-46(b) does not make premium class travel unallowable per se. Rather, it imposes an allowability limitation upon airfare costs that exceed the ‘lowest customary standard, coach, or equivalent airfare offered during normal business hours,’ which Raytheon reasonably interprets as a baseline of standard coach fare available to the general public. Therefore, as long as airfare costs do not exceed that limitation, they are not unallowable under FAR 31.205-46.”
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Importantly, the Board let stand Raytheon’s policy that permitted premium airfare costs to be claimed as being allowable when the circumstances met criteria established by the Federal Travel Regulations and Joint Travel Regulations. (See FTR §301-10.123 and §301-10.125.) Often, DCAA auditors will point to the exception circumstances found in 31.205-46(b) as the sole determinants of premium airfare allowability (e.g., circuitous routing, require travel during unreasonable hours, excessively prolong travel, result in increased cost that would offset transportation savings, are not reasonably adequate for the physical or medical needs of the traveler, or are not reasonably available to meet mission requirements.) However, it is clear that the additional FTR exception criteria may be used, or at least used to justify the reasonableness of the additional airfare costs.
Okay, that’s it for today. Part 1 complete. We still have many aspects of this important ASBCA decision to discuss. Stay tuned.
DCAA’s External Quality Control Audit
In our opinion, except for the deficiencies described in this report, the system of quality control for the DCAA in effect for the 3‑year period ended June 30, 2019, has been suitably designed and complied with to provide the DCAA with reasonable assurance of performing and reporting in conformity in all material respects with applicable professional standards. Audit organizations can receive a rating of pass, pass with deficiencies, or fail. The DCAA has received a rating of pass with deficiencies.
Every couple of years, DCAA’s quality control system gets an “external peer review.” In March, the DOD Inspector General published its latest peer review findings. The initial quote, above, is the summary of the report: “pass with deficiencies.”
Long-time readers may recall that the DOD Inspector General hasn’t always reported favorably on the quality of DCAA’s audits. Moreover, DCAA went without an externally reviewed quality system for several years, because the agency failed a peer review. In 2017, we reported that DCAA had passed its peer review, even though 25 of the 67 selected audit reports had deficiencies. To put it another way: nearly 40% of the audit reports selected for review by the DOD Inspector General had deficiencies. Importantly, no deficiencies were found (in 2017) to be significant deficiencies that would have imperiled DCAA’s audit quality system.
We took some issue with that 2017 audit, quoting a finding from the report that stated:
For 18 of 67 audits (27 percent) we selected for review, we found one or more instances in which DCAA auditors did not obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to support an opinion expressed in the report. We found this deficiency in all six DCAA regions. Among the 18 audits, we found a total of 25 instances when the auditors did not obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to support DCAA’s opinion that contractor proposed costs were reasonable, allowable, or compliant with contract terms.
Back in 2017, we opined on that particular finding as follows:
Well, gosh. More than a quarter of all selected reports lacked sufficient evidence to support audit conclusions. That seems like kind of a big deal to us. Yet, the IG, using professional judgment, did not deem that deficiency to be a significant deficiency.
Moreover, as the IG itself noted in the report, this is a repeat finding from the external peer review it conducted in 2014. The IG stated that DCAA had taken corrective actions in response to the 2014 finding, but the corrective actions had proven ineffective and “based on the results of our current review, DCAA still needs to consider additional steps to ensure that auditors gather sufficient evidence to support reported opinions.”
If this were a contractor business system review and there had been a repeat finding, we all know what the result would be.
We had more to say in that vein; you can read our 2017 article (link above) if you are so inclined. In the meantime, let’s see what the IG had to say in 2021.
The Inspector General team selected 60 DCAA audit reports from a universe of 3,616 audits performed between July 1, 2018 and June 30, 2019. From the sample of 60, the IG found 50 findings associated with 29 of the reports. In essence, roughly 50% of all DCAA audit reports selected had at least one finding; and many had multiple findings.
In 19 of the 60 audits (or about one-third), the auditors “did not obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to support their opinion.” The audit report noted that this finding was a repeat from its 2017 peer review, which was at that time a repeat finding from the 2014 peer review. DCAA keeps struggling to implement corrective actions to improve in this area; however, “Based on the results of this peer review, the DCAA still needs to take additional actions to ensure that auditors obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence.”
We’re sure they will get it right the next time the DOD IG shows up.
There were other findings. As far as we could tell, each finding in the latest peer review audit report was a repeat finding from the 2017 audit report. DCAA had taken its promised corrective actions, yet those corrective actions proved to be insufficient to remediate the issues.
Repeat findings. Ineffective corrective actions.
Yet, DCAA gets another pass.
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Q1 Check-In
Visitors and readers may have noticed that the blog article output has fallen off recently. We’ve published nine articles year-to-date, which annualizes to an output of less than 40. Not good! But in my defense, I’ve been busy.
In my spare time, I edit two texts for LexisNexis. One addresses accounting aspects of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the other covers the Cost Accounting Standards. This is the third year I’ve edited those books, having taken over from Darrell Oyer in 2019. Darrell edited those same two books for many years, having taken over from the original author, Lane K. Anderson. You’d think editing the texts would be relatively painless. (At least, I thought so when I agreed to become the editor.) All you do is update the text for regulatory revisions and significant court cases. Et voila! Easy peasy.
But it turns out that each book is about 1,000 pages long, and the editor needs to review every word on every page, because over time things change. Footnotes that reference obsolete citations need to be updated. Paragraphs written in the present tense when they were new now need to be rewritten in the past tense. And yes, recent court cases and regulatory revisions need to be addressed as well.
Plus, in 2020 there was this whole COVID-19 pandemic thing. Perhaps you’ve heard of it? In any case, many chapters (of both books) needed to be updated to discuss the implications of the CARES Act and the Payroll Protection Program loans (and forgiveness thereof) and Section 3610 “paid leave” cost allocations (and recoveries thereof). This led to quite a bit of new text being added.
To sum up this rather wordy mea culpa, I just spent about 300 hours editing those two texts, and so I really didn’t have much time to spend on writing blog articles for this site. (Plus, you know, Apogee Consulting, Inc., had some client work that needed tending to as well.)
All that being said, I did find some time to try something new. I joined a podcast along with two other people. It’s called the “Acquivore.” (Don’s idea, not mine.) Every two weeks we spend an hour discussing some aspect of government contracting. The other two participants are long-time government contracting experts, having working in the DOD’s “Fourth Estate” as well as being (past) instructors at the Defense Acquisition University, teaching up-and-coming contracting officers the ropes. I am honored that Don “Acquisition” Mansfield and Jennifer Townsend asked me to join them; and I hope that I don’t come off as the newbie in comparison.
In my opinion, the podcasts are kind of rough. None of us is a polished talking head, and I don’t think Don spends a lot of time editing the product. So it is maybe not the easiest hour to spend, unless you are interesting in the topic(s) we are discussing.
If you are interested in the podcasts, here are some links to Don’s YouTube channel:
Acquivore Podcast #1 Why Won’t Contracting Officers Settle Questioned Direct Costs?
Acquivore Podcast #2 Prescribing "Statement of Work Language"
Acquivore Podcast #3 Contracting in the time of COVID-19
We will continue doing these podcasts every two weeks until we run out of things to say.
At this point, the end of March, 2021, the editing job is complete. (I finished early!) The client work has settled down a bit. (The termination settlement proposal was submitted, among other client milestones.) And therefore, unless something unexpectedly drops in, I will be returning to writing these blog articles. I will aim for writing two per week, but we’ll have to see how it goes. If there is nothing that comes to my attention that calls for an article, then I don’t write one. (But there usually is something nearly every week that needs to be written about….)
Until then, take care of yourselves.
Product Substitution is Bad Business
Last year we reported about fraudulent quality testing that led to substandard steel castings being supplied to naval construction. That was an expensive lesson for the company that employed the Director of Metallurgy who falsified the test results.
More recently, an environmental laboratory analyst was sentenced to two years of probation and ordered to pay a $2,500 fine for falsifying laboratory test results, according to this Dept. of Justice press release. According to the DOJ, the analyst “failed to properly calibrate and tune the quality control instruments, which was the foundation of the quality control process. This failure resulted in unreliable measurements of pollutants and hazardous substances, and therefore invalidated the testing process.”
That’s not good, and we suspect the laboratory that employed the analyst may have paid some expensive attorneys to make sure it was the analyst who was sentenced, and not the laboratory executives.
These are examples of product substitution fraud, which occurs when a contractor supplies nonconforming materials to the government. Most government contracts contain specifications that define what constitutes acceptable materials (and the quality assurance steps to ensure the materials meet spec). When a contractor falsifies lab results or other quality assurance report and, as a result, the government receives nonconforming materials (or materials that cannot be objectively determined to be conforming because of falsified tests), then that is product substitution. The “fraud” part speaks to intent.
Those two stories about are not good, but those aren’t today’s stories.
Today we want to talk about Djibouti.
Djibouti is in Africa, which makes it the purview of the Africa Strike Force, an initiative out of the Dept. of Justice’s Southern District of California. The Africa Strike Force was “developed to combat fraud and corruption as the United States expends resources across Africa,” according to the Dept. of Justice. The Strike Force’s first indictment was issued in October, 2020; it contained 98 counts of conspiracy, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The CEO of the contractor was arrested for and charged with (among other things): “submitted fraudulent quality control plans with résumés of fictitious employees; fabricated quality control checklists, certifying quality control work that was never performed; fraudulent concrete strength test results; and fraudulent claims for construction that was never performed or that did not adhere to specification.” That’s not good.
But that massive October, 2020, indictment is not today’s story.
Today’s story concerns another African contractor, another target of the Africa Strike Force, that settled its fraud allegations by agreeing that it “faked testing results and submitted a series of false documents and false claims to the United States as part of a scheme to defraud the United States in the sale of substandard concrete used to construct U.S. Navy airfields in Djibouti.” Link to the press release: here. The contractor in question was a subsidiary of a French civil engineering company.
According to the press release, the contractor (Colas Djibouti) “created fictitious testing results, made fraudulent representations regarding the concrete’s composition and characteristics, and knowingly provided concrete to the United States that did not comply with the specifications.” Yeah, that’s not good. You’ll notice that the “knowingly” part in that sentence introduces the fraud aspects.
The press released opined “As a result of this criminal conduct, Colas Djibouti ultimately supplied substandard concrete to the Department of Navy in Djibouti that could promote early cracking, surface defects, and corrosion of embedded steel, and thus significantly impair the concrete’s long-term durability.”
Part of the criminal conduct included falsifying water testing: “in response to a request for an analysis of the water used in the concrete mix, Colas Djibouti provided an analysis for a store-bought bottle of drinking water.”
To settle the criminal charges, Colas Djibouti agreed to “forfeit $8 million, pay another $2,042,002 to the Department of Navy in restitution, and pay a monetary penalty of $2.5 million.” That’s $12.54 million.
But in order to settle the civil charges, the company also agreed to pay another $1.858 million, bringing the total to $14.4 million.
As the headline says, product substitution is bad business.
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