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Raytheon Wins at ASBCA (Again) Part 2

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In Part 1 of this analysis of the recent Raytheon victory at the ASBCA, we outlined the issues—which involved multiple appeals covering multiple issues across multiple years at both the Raytheon Corporate Home Office and its Missile Systems business unit. We also discussed the first major issue: the allowability of Raytheon’s premium class airfare. Here’s a link to the ASBCA decision, in case you want to review the 100+ page decision. (Hint: you really should.)

In Part 2, we are going to discuss two related issues: the allowability of Raytheon’s “Corporate Development” and “Government Relations” costs.

Government Relations Costs

Most large government contractors maintain some sort of “government relations” function. The term encompasses a number of activities, but prominent among them is lobbying—i.e., the effort to influence senior military officers and Congress folks to fund programs that are important to the contractor. FAR 31.205-22 makes lobbying and other political activity costs unallowable, but provides exceptions for certain specified activities. Among the exceptions is the effort to provide Congress with technical and factual information related to performance of one or more of the contractor’s contracts.

As one of the very largest defense contractors, Raytheon maintained a robust “Washington Office,” staffed with roughly 20 employees—though not all of those employees were traditional “lobbyists.” Because this is a sensitive area, Raytheon maintained policies and procedures to help its employees determine what activities were allowable and what activities were unallowable. In addition, Washington Office employees received training to help them properly record their time.

Raytheon collected the unallowable costs and “withdrew” them from its indirect cost rate calculations. That is to say, Raytheon didn’t claim the costs that had been identified as being unallowable. Raytheon’s methodology was described by the Board as follows:

For the lobbying cost withdrawal calculation, Raytheon established a ratio of unallowable hours worked by the Government Relations employees to their total hours worked. The ratio’s numerator was the total number of unallowable hours reported by the lobbyists. The denominator was the total number of work hours available during a given year to the employees who reported unallowable hours, based upon a 40-hour work week less vacation and holidays. Dividing the numerator by the denominator yielded a percentage—the lobbying disallowance factor. Raytheon applied this factor to what it deemed to be Government Relations’ recoverable expenses (including the salary and fringe benefits paid to its lobbyists and their administrative staff) to determine the costs associated with unallowable lobbying activities under FAR 31.205-22.

As can be seen from the above description, Raytheon did not engage in what is popularly called “total-time accounting.” Total-time accounting is the recording of all hours worked, including uncompensated overtime. Once all labor hours are recorded, the contractor has some options about how to account for the uncompensated overtime, but Raytheon didn’t bother with any of that—because it told its employees not to account for any hours in excess of 40 per week. There is no regulatory requirement that mandates total-time accounting, but many smaller contractors have felt the pressure from DCAA auditors to implement it. This decision makes it clear that Raytheon’s practice of “accounting for labor costs as a function of time paid, rather than time worked” is an acceptable method of labor accounting.

Moreover, Raytheon’s time sheets for salaried, exempt, indirect personnel didn’t record hours worked; they recorded only exception hours such as paid time off and hours associated with unallowable activities (e.g., lobbying). It was assumed that, unless an exception was being recorded, all labor costs for those indirect employees would simply be equal to the amount of their salary, and that amount would be recorded in the employees’ home cost centers. No doubt this saved Raytheon some labor processing time and, once again, neither the government nor the ASBCA indicated there was anything wrong with this approach to labor accounting.

What DCAA did have a problem with was the amount of unallowable lobbying that Raytheon had identified and withdrawn from claimed indirect cost. Unsurprisingly, DCAA thought Raytheon’s withdrawal (which was about 50% of all government relations costs) was too low. In the words of the ASBCA, “Essentially, DCAA viewed some of Government Relations’ activities as related to lobbying and expressly unallowable and Raytheon viewed them as allowable.” In Raytheon’s view, activities such as “planning and administrative matters; human resources issues; conferences; external and internal matters that had nothing to do with trying to influence legislation; interpreting existing law for Raytheon headquarters or business divisions; budget analysis after a statute had been enacted; and examining international issues” were completely allowable and claimable. DCAA (and subsequently DCMA) disagreed.

DCAA was not consistent in the amount(s) it believed represented unallowable activities. New specialist auditors were brought in, and those auditors developed a “strategy” to question 100 percent of all Raytheon’s government relations costs. The ASBCA wrote—

The auditors questioned all of cost center 90206’s costs due to an alleged lack of adequate records. They deemed the employees in question to be lobbyists and stated that Raytheon ‘cannot justify the lobbyists[,] time was allowable’. They speculated that employees other than those interviewed might have assisted lobbyists with the creation of white papers or with technical information; many of those employees had trouble remembering their activities during FY 2007; and, because they did not normally take part in lobbying activities, they might not have known how to record their time. We have not been directed to any evidence to support this speculation.

(Internal footnotes and citations omitted.)

In fact, “While DCAA’s initial audit report recommended changing Raytheon’s total disallowance factor from 53.3% to 65.9%, during her testimony [the DCAA auditor] disavowed that report.” Subsequently, “[the auditor] based her ultimate conclusion that all of cost center 90206’s costs should be disallowed on the fact that she did not find documentation ‘either way’ on whether the costs were allowable or not, or claimed or not.” So basically, the auditor who had spent hours upon hours reviewing Raytheon’s claimed costs and the source documents let herself be overruled by the new auditors—to the point where she knew nothing, nothing at all.

For the record, we’ll note that these audits took place more than a decade ago, and so the lack of ability to discuss procedures and to provide sufficient evidence for conclusions—or even the lack of ability to reach a consistent conclusion—should in no way have any implications for DCAA’s 2020 and 2021 audit quality. Readers are reminded that DCAA recently passed its external peer review of its audit quality system where it was noted that only 50% of all selected sample audits had deficiencies, many of which were repeat findings from previous external peer review audits. The other 50% were just fine.

Perhaps it was the flawed DCAA audit methodology that led the ASBCA to find that “DCMA has not met its burden to prove that the Government Relations costs at issue are unallowable lobbying costs and thus has also not met its burden to prove that Raytheon violated CAS 405 regarding those costs.” As the Board wrote, “[the DCAA auditor’s] conclusion, as self-described, is unsupportable and underscores the fact that DCMA has not met its burden of proof.”

Corporate Development Costs

What even is Corporate Development, anyway? The Board answered that question by quoted from another Raytheon appeal.

Raytheon’s Corporate Development department was responsible for working with its business units in strategic development and growth opportunities, including strategic analysis of a business’ capabilities to market its products and services to the government and function in government work. Where there were gaps in business’ capabilities, Corporate Development would work with them to determine the right ways to fill the gaps, either through, inter alia, internal investment, research and development, licensing of intellectual property (IP), partnerships or acquisitions. This process was known as ‘gap analysis.’ Working with Raytheon’s businesses on M&A and divestitures was not Corporate Development’s primary role but was part of its work to find strategic growth initiatives.

How did it work?

Corporate Development made proposals for acquisitions or divestitures to the Acquisition Council which, in 2007 and 2008, consisted of senior Raytheon leaders, including the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, General Counsel and Vice President of Corporate Development. Raytheon declared its intentions regarding potential acquisitions and divestitures through the Acquisition Council. Corporate Development did not know which route Raytheon was going to follow until after the Acquisition Council made its decision. Occasionally, even after an Acquisition Council decision, Raytheon would change course based upon information developed during the acquisition or divestiture process

(Internal citations omitted.)

As was the case with Government Relations, Raytheon maintained robust policies and procedures to help its Corporate Development folks distinguish allowable gap analysis activities from unallowable Merger & Acquisition (M&A) activities. According to those policies and procedures: “Unallowable acquisition costs commence with the submission of an indicative offer. Unallowable divestiture costs commence when the decision to “go to market” with the offering materials is made.” This policy statement, and others, articulated Raytheon’s “bright-line” rule between allowable and unallowable activities. The Board wrote, “Raytheon asserts that its ‘bright line’ rules accurately reflect the relationship among FAR 31.205-12, -27 and -38(b)(4), in accordance with Raytheon I, and it posits that all ‘planning’ is not unallowable, pointing to allowable economic or market planning.”

Timekeeping was consistent with the bright-line rule. Based on the timekeeping, Raytheon withdrew approximately 50% of its Corporate Development costs as being unallowable, while claiming the other 50% as allowable expenses. In what may be becoming a familiar refrain in this series of articles, DCAA disagreed and asserted that 100% of all Corporate Development costs were unallowable. The CACO agreed with DCAA and told Raytheon that not only were the costs unallowable, they were expressly unallowable—meaning that Raytheon owed the government penalties and interest. For grins, the CACO threw in a CAS 405 noncompliance, as well.

Would you be surprised to learn that the Board thought Raytheon’s bright-line policy was reasonable and that the government had failed to meet its burden of proof? Right. In much the same way as they decided the Government Relations issues, the Board wrote:

DCMA has not carried its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount of unallowable hours withdrawn by Raytheon’s personnel, which is supported by documentation and credible witness testimony (see, e.g., findings 41-45, 57-58, 60), from its CY 2007 and 2008 incurred cost proposals was inaccurate, nor that any of the included Corporate Development costs were unallowable, let alone expressly unallowable and subject to penalties. Thus, DCMA has also not met its burden to prove that Raytheon violated CAS 405 regarding those costs.

(Internal footnotes omitted.)

And for grins, the Board wrote “Raytheon’s ‘bright-line’ policy represents a reasonable reading of the FAR provisions governing organization, economic planning, market planning and selling costs and, applying the General Dynamics standard, it was not unreasonable for Raytheon to treat the costs at issue as allowable.” Thus, if you are looking at developing a similar policy to help your employees navigate between allowable planning activities and unallowable M&A activities, you really ought to review this decision and get into the details of what Raytheon’s policy said.

Okay, that’s Part 2. We still have other aspects of this important ASBCA decision to discuss. Stay tuned for more.

 

Raytheon Wins at ASBCA (Again) Part 1

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We’ve been holding off writing about Raytheon’s near-total victory at the ASBCA, but now it’s time to get into that 100+ page decision that covers multiple appeals and multiple issues and multiple years. It’s a must-read if you are dealing with cost allowability or CAS 405 noncompliance allegations. It sets things straight in a number of areas that have long vexed the contracting parties. On the other hand, we understand the government is going to appeal the Board’s decision, so it’s possible that many of the things that were set straight will be made crooked again in the near future.

Here is a link to the massive (and massively complex) decision. We spent hours trying to sort the various appeals and issues. (Remember, we are not attorneys.) The decision is so massive, we will need multiple blog articles to tackle it all. In today’s article, we’ll attempt to sort out the decision and tackle one of the many issues: airfare allowability.

Here’s what we sorted:

  1. 2007 and 2008 indirect rates at Raytheon Missile Systems (RMS) included allocations from Raytheon’s Corporate Home Office. DCAA asserted that some Corporate Home Office costs were unallowable and others were expressly unallowable. Because Raytheon allegedly had included expressly unallowable costs, DCAA also asserted non-compliance with CAS 405 requirements for those two years.

  2. The CACO issued a Final Decision (COFD)--$10,468,740 related to 2007 for unallowable costs, interest, and penalties. Raytheon appealed (ASBCA No. 59435)

  3. The CACO issued a COFD related to 2007 noncompliance with CAS 405—$7,469,506; but Raytheon only appealed $1,870,428+$307,776=$2,178,204 of that amount. (ASBCA No. 59436)

  4. The CACO issued a COFD--$1,154,383 related to 2008 for unallowable costs, interest, and penalties. Raytheon appealed (ASBCA No. 60056)

  5. The CACO issued a COFD related to 2008 noncompliance with CAS 405—$2,030,636. Raytheon appealed. (ASBCA No. 60058)

  6. The CACO issued a COFD related to claimed 2008 Corporate airfare--$760,861. Raytheon appealed and settled most of the disputed amount; the amount remaining was $76,556. (ASBCA No. 60057) The Board noted that “numerous appeals from government claims relating to corporate airfare costs have been stayed pending the outcome of the instant appeals.”

  7. The RMS DACO issued a COFD related to 2007 claimed airfare, outside legal costs related to patents, and employee recruiting costs. Raytheon appealed. (ASBCA No. 59437)

  8. The RMS DACO issued a COFD for penalties and interest, related to Raytheon’s inclusion of allegedly expressly unallowable costs in 2007. Raytheon appealed. (ASBCA No. 59438)

  9. The RMS DACO issued a COFD, disallowing RMS’ indirect airfare costs claimed in 2008; but he did not make a payment demand because the amount of costs claimed to be unallowable, plus an amount Raytheon had agreed to remove from its claim for other indirect costs, was less than the amount being withheld from current approved billing rates for 2008. Raytheon appealed. (ASBCA No. 60059)

  10. The RMS DACO issued two COFDs, disallowing RMS’ direct airfare costs that had been included in its billings under two named contracts and demanding payment of $167,427 and $17,274. Raytheon appealed. (ASBCA Nos. 60060 and 60061)

The parties prepared the following table explaining the amounts in dispute and the reasons for disallowable. Where the parties disagreed on the amounts, both amounts are shown.

Segment

Cost Type

Year

Amount

Basis for Disallowance

Corp

Airfare

2008

$76,556

31.205-46, Travel costs

RMS

Indirect airfare

2007

$815,036

31.201-2(d) (supporting documentation);31.205-46

RMS

Indirect airfare

2008

$978,429

31.201-2(d) (supporting documentation);31.205-46

RMS

Direct Airfare

2008

$184,701

31.205-46, Travel costs

Corp

Corp. Development

2007

$307,776

(Gov’t $862,010)

31.205-27, Organization costs (Expressly unallowable)

Corp

Corp. Development

2008

$868,322

(Gov’t $831,797)

31.205-27, Organization costs (Expressly unallowable)

Corp

Gov’t. Relations

2007

$1,870,428

31.205-22, Lobbying and political activity costs (Expressly unallowable)

Corp

Gov’t. Relations

2008

$1,065,481

31.205-22; however, only $981,822 is expressly unallowable

RMS

Outside legal – patents

2007

$120,600

31.201-2(d) (supporting documentation); 31.205-30, Patent costs

RMS

Engineering Labor Ovhd

2007

$96,701

31.205-30, Patent costs (Expressly unallowable)

RMS

Recruiting Travel Costs

2007

$51,436

31.201-2(d) (supporting documentation); 31.205-34, Recruitment costs

Corp

Restricted Stock, Incentive Comp, Bonus

2007

$1,242,895

FAR 31.205-22, Lobbying; FAR 31.205-27, Organization costs; FAR 31.205-47, Costs related to legal and other proceedings (Expressly unallowable)

Corp

Restricted Stock, Incentive Comp, Bonus

2008

$125,280

FAR 31.205-22; FAR 31.205-27; FAR 31.205-47 (Expressly unallowable)

Corp

Recruitment Souvenirs

2008

$17,780

31.205-1, Public relations and advertising costs

Corp

CAS 405 Noncompliance

2007

$2,178,204

31.201-6, Accounting for unallowable costs; CAS 405; inclusion of expressly unallowable costs

Corp

CAS 405 Noncompliance

2008

$1,813,619

31.201-6, Accounting for unallowable costs; CAS 405; inclusion of expressly unallowable costs

Airfare Costs

Long-time readers of this blog will know that the FAR travel cost principle was revised in 2010, muddying what had, up to that point, been a relatively well-understood cost principle—at least with respect to how to determine the allowability of airfare. Prior to the 2010 regulatory revision, the cost principle read:

Airfare costs in excess of the lowest customary standard, coach, or equivalent airfare offered during normal business hours are unallowable except when such accommodations require circuitous routing, require travel during unreasonable hours, excessively prolong travel, result in increased cost that would offset transportation savings, are not reasonably adequate for the physical or medical needs of the traveler, or are not reasonably available to meet mission requirements.

After the 2010 revision, the cost principle read:

Airfare costs in excess of the lowest priced airfare available to the contractor during normal business hours are unallowable except when such accommodations require circuitous routing, require travel during unreasonable hours, excessively prolong travel, result in increased cost that would offset transportation savings, are not reasonably adequate for the physical or medical needs of the traveler, or are not reasonably available to meet mission requirements.

Notice that change? It turns out the change was driven by DCAA’s fanatical belief that Raytheon had taken advantage of the government by negotiating volume-based discounts with certain air carriers. Those discounts permitted Raytheon, in certain circumstances, to claim premium class airfare as fully allowable because the premium airfare was actually lower than the “lowest customary standard, coach, or equivalent airfare offered during normal business hours.” DCAA really didn’t like that. DCAA didn’t like that so much that when DCMA and the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the DAR Council all told DCAA that its interpretation of the cost principle was wrong, and that “the words in the FAR [ ] would support the company’s position,” DCAA did an end-run by issuing an MRD in November, 2002, that told auditors to question Raytheon’s airfare costs based on their insistence that everybody else was wrong. Fortunately for Raytheon, the DCMA Defense Corporate Executive—what we would now call the CACO—told DCAA to stuff it, writing “DCMA Headquarters disagrees with the guidance in the attached DCAA memorandum. … There is nothing in the record to indicate defense contractors are to negotiate airfare rates with carriers and that the negotiated rates are the customary rates to be used for determining the unallowable amount. Accordingly, I can't support or sustain DCAA’s audit position.”

Several years later (2006) DCAA sponsored a new DAR Case to “clarify” the cost principle to match their interpretation. Despite the fact that the majority recommended that the Case be closed “with no further action,” it turns out that DCAA didn’t want to accept that answer. Instead, “DCAA persisted and brought the travel cost principle issue to the Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP).” What did DPAP think? “While DPAP does not concur with our interpretation of the existing language, (nor do they wish to take a position regarding the proper interpretation of the current language), they have conceded that the language is ambiguous.” Thus, the FAR Case was opened and the rest was history.

Well, except for the fact that DCAA applied the revised cost principle retroactively, because it was only a clarification of the ambiguity of which DCAA had always understood the correct interpretation—at least with respect to Raytheon. And then DCMA decided to go along with the DCAA’s retroactive interpretation, and issue a COFD using the revised cost principle to address the allowability of airfare incurred five or six years before the regulatory revision. Which required Raytheon to appeal…

In addition, DCAA questioned Raytheon’s use of a “10-hour rule” to justify an upgrade from coach to a premium fare. After much back and forth, DCMA and Raytheon had agreed that an upgrade would be an allowable cost if three conditions were met: (1) Travel primarily took place during non-customary business hours; (2) Raytheon employees reported directly to their TDY or permanent duly station (PDS) after arrival at their destination airport; and (3) Actual flight time (not an employee’s departure from their residence and travel time to a TDY site, and the reverse when returning home), must exceed 10 hours in duration. When all three factors were met, the cost of premium airfare was allowable. The agreement was memorialized and Raytheon revised its travel policy accordingly. Naturally, DCAA—who was not a signatory to the agreement—had a problem with that it.

The successor DCE rescinded the MOU. Upon the recission, Raytheon revised its travel policy again, this time by relaxing the requirement that employees must report for work upon arrival. DCAA countered by questioning premium class airfare incurred in accordance with the revised policy, and then citing Raytheon for a significant deficiency in its accounting system because it failed to properly account for the allegedly unallowable airfare. “After a five-year audit of Raytheon’s accounting system, on January 29, 2015, DCAA issued an audit report questioning how Raytheon accounted for allowable and unallowable costs. DCAA found a significant deficiency in Raytheon’s accounting system due to its treatment of premium class airfare.”

Seriously: a five-year accounting system audit? Are you kidding us? The Board did not express an opinion on why in the world it would take DCAA five years to complete an audit, so we will just leave that little factoid there.

Then DCAA issued another audit report that found the Missile Systems’ business unit estimating system had deficient controls because the business unit estimated premium class airfare in accordance with the Corporate travel policy. This caused Raytheon to revise its travel policy for the third time (in order to not have its estimating system determined to be inadequate). In the third iteration of the travel policy, in order to make the premium airfare allowable, the employee must perform “meaningful work upon arrival.”

If you are getting the impression that DCAA was “out to get” Raytheon in this matter, welcome to the club. So much for independence and objectivity….

Back to allowability, DCAA not only retroactively applied the 2010 cost principle “clarification” to costs incurred prior to 2010, but they questioned all premium airfares regardless of whether there was a justification that would have made the costs allowable under the exceptions found in the cost principle itself. Further, there were some errors or, shall we say, questionable assumptions made by DCAA when quantifying the allegedly unallowable premium airfare costs.

Under oath, the DCAA auditor defended the methodology used thusly:

Because we were just trying to determine -- when we were doing the audit, we were just trying to determine a reasonable amount. We understand these are negotiations, so we were just trying to give the government some kind of platform to, kind of, base where they should start at.

Accordingly, it seems that DCAA made no real attempt to be accurate when quantifying costs that were allegedly unallowable, notwithstanding that the agency would also allege that Raytheon’s failure to properly account for those allegedly unallowable airfare costs represented a significant deficiency in the accounting system as well as the estimating system; and notwithstanding that at the Missile Systems business unit, DCAA and the DCMA DACO were also making similar allegations based on similarly flawed audit methodologies.

How this was all not a massive GAGAS violation remains a mystery to us.

Anyway, at the end of the day the Board sided with Raytheon, finding that “the government has failed to prove its contention that the policy did not comply with the regulation.” Along the way, the Board made some statements that have important implications for government contractors seeking to comply with the 31.205-46 rules on airfare allowability. Let us quote them for you.

  1. “While Raytheon’s interpretation of the pre-2010 version of FAR 31.205-46(b) as referring to a standard coach fare available to the general public is reasonable, the government’s interpretation is not reasonable. As noted, the governing statute makes commercial aircraft travel costs that exceed the ‘standard commercial fare’ unallowable. It does not refer to any negotiated airfare available to a particular contractor. Similarly, the pre-2010 implementing regulation, FAR 31.205-46(b), refers to the ‘lowest customary standard, coach, or equivalent airfare.’ … Contrary to the government’s stance, its revision of the regulation in 2010 was not a mere clarification, it was a change. If that change were made to apply to the 2007 and 2008 costs in question, it would be an impermissible retroactive change.”

  1. “Under FAR 31.205-46 ‘[c]osts incurred by contractor personnel on official company business are allowable,’ subject to certain limitations, including those in FAR 31.205-46(b) regarding premium airfare. However, we agree with Raytheon that, by its plain language, the pre-2010 version of FAR 31.205-46(b) does not make premium class travel unallowable per se. Rather, it imposes an allowability limitation upon airfare costs that exceed the ‘lowest customary standard, coach, or equivalent airfare offered during normal business hours,’ which Raytheon reasonably interprets as a baseline of standard coach fare available to the general public. Therefore, as long as airfare costs do not exceed that limitation, they are not unallowable under FAR 31.205-46.”

  1. Importantly, the Board let stand Raytheon’s policy that permitted premium airfare costs to be claimed as being allowable when the circumstances met criteria established by the Federal Travel Regulations and Joint Travel Regulations. (See FTR §301-10.123 and §301-10.125.) Often, DCAA auditors will point to the exception circumstances found in 31.205-46(b) as the sole determinants of premium airfare allowability (e.g., circuitous routing, require travel during unreasonable hours, excessively prolong travel, result in increased cost that would offset transportation savings, are not reasonably adequate for the physical or medical needs of the traveler, or are not reasonably available to meet mission requirements.) However, it is clear that the additional FTR exception criteria may be used, or at least used to justify the reasonableness of the additional airfare costs.

Okay, that’s it for today. Part 1 complete. We still have many aspects of this important ASBCA decision to discuss. Stay tuned.

 

DCAA’s External Quality Control Audit

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In our opinion, except for the deficiencies described in this report, the system of quality control for the DCAA in effect for the 3‑year period ended June 30, 2019, has been suitably designed and complied with to provide the DCAA with reasonable assurance of performing and reporting in conformity in all material respects with applicable professional standards. Audit organizations can receive a rating of pass, pass with deficiencies, or fail. The DCAA has received a rating of pass with deficiencies.

Every couple of years, DCAA’s quality control system gets an “external peer review.” In March, the DOD Inspector General published its latest peer review findings. The initial quote, above, is the summary of the report: “pass with deficiencies.”

Long-time readers may recall that the DOD Inspector General hasn’t always reported favorably on the quality of DCAA’s audits. Moreover, DCAA went without an externally reviewed quality system for several years, because the agency failed a peer review. In 2017, we reported that DCAA had passed its peer review, even though 25 of the 67 selected audit reports had deficiencies. To put it another way: nearly 40% of the audit reports selected for review by the DOD Inspector General had deficiencies. Importantly, no deficiencies were found (in 2017) to be significant deficiencies that would have imperiled DCAA’s audit quality system.

We took some issue with that 2017 audit, quoting a finding from the report that stated:

For 18 of 67 audits (27 percent) we selected for review, we found one or more instances in which DCAA auditors did not obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to support an opinion expressed in the report. We found this deficiency in all six DCAA regions. Among the 18 audits, we found a total of 25 instances when the auditors did not obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to support DCAA’s opinion that contractor proposed costs were reasonable, allowable, or compliant with contract terms.

Back in 2017, we opined on that particular finding as follows:

Well, gosh. More than a quarter of all selected reports lacked sufficient evidence to support audit conclusions. That seems like kind of a big deal to us. Yet, the IG, using professional judgment, did not deem that deficiency to be a significant deficiency.

Moreover, as the IG itself noted in the report, this is a repeat finding from the external peer review it conducted in 2014. The IG stated that DCAA had taken corrective actions in response to the 2014 finding, but the corrective actions had proven ineffective and “based on the results of our current review, DCAA still needs to consider additional steps to ensure that auditors gather sufficient evidence to support reported opinions.”

If this were a contractor business system review and there had been a repeat finding, we all know what the result would be.

We had more to say in that vein; you can read our 2017 article (link above) if you are so inclined. In the meantime, let’s see what the IG had to say in 2021.

The Inspector General team selected 60 DCAA audit reports from a universe of 3,616 audits performed between July 1, 2018 and June 30, 2019. From the sample of 60, the IG found 50 findings associated with 29 of the reports. In essence, roughly 50% of all DCAA audit reports selected had at least one finding; and many had multiple findings.

In 19 of the 60 audits (or about one-third), the auditors “did not obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to support their opinion.” The audit report noted that this finding was a repeat from its 2017 peer review, which was at that time a repeat finding from the 2014 peer review. DCAA keeps struggling to implement corrective actions to improve in this area; however, “Based on the results of this peer review, the DCAA still needs to take additional actions to ensure that auditors obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence.”

We’re sure they will get it right the next time the DOD IG shows up.

There were other findings. As far as we could tell, each finding in the latest peer review audit report was a repeat finding from the 2017 audit report. DCAA had taken its promised corrective actions, yet those corrective actions proved to be insufficient to remediate the issues.

Repeat findings. Ineffective corrective actions.

Yet, DCAA gets another pass.

 
 

Q1 Check-In

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Visitors and readers may have noticed that the blog article output has fallen off recently. We’ve published nine articles year-to-date, which annualizes to an output of less than 40. Not good! But in my defense, I’ve been busy.

In my spare time, I edit two texts for LexisNexis. One addresses accounting aspects of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the other covers the Cost Accounting Standards. This is the third year I’ve edited those books, having taken over from Darrell Oyer in 2019. Darrell edited those same two books for many years, having taken over from the original author, Lane K. Anderson. You’d think editing the texts would be relatively painless. (At least, I thought so when I agreed to become the editor.) All you do is update the text for regulatory revisions and significant court cases. Et voila! Easy peasy.

But it turns out that each book is about 1,000 pages long, and the editor needs to review every word on every page, because over time things change. Footnotes that reference obsolete citations need to be updated. Paragraphs written in the present tense when they were new now need to be rewritten in the past tense. And yes, recent court cases and regulatory revisions need to be addressed as well.

Plus, in 2020 there was this whole COVID-19 pandemic thing. Perhaps you’ve heard of it? In any case, many chapters (of both books) needed to be updated to discuss the implications of the CARES Act and the Payroll Protection Program loans (and forgiveness thereof) and Section 3610 “paid leave” cost allocations (and recoveries thereof). This led to quite a bit of new text being added.

To sum up this rather wordy mea culpa, I just spent about 300 hours editing those two texts, and so I really didn’t have much time to spend on writing blog articles for this site. (Plus, you know, Apogee Consulting, Inc., had some client work that needed tending to as well.)

All that being said, I did find some time to try something new. I joined a podcast along with two other people. It’s called the “Acquivore.” (Don’s idea, not mine.) Every two weeks we spend an hour discussing some aspect of government contracting. The other two participants are long-time government contracting experts, having working in the DOD’s “Fourth Estate” as well as being (past) instructors at the Defense Acquisition University, teaching up-and-coming contracting officers the ropes. I am honored that Don “Acquisition” Mansfield and Jennifer Townsend asked me to join them; and I hope that I don’t come off as the newbie in comparison.

In my opinion, the podcasts are kind of rough. None of us is a polished talking head, and I don’t think Don spends a lot of time editing the product. So it is maybe not the easiest hour to spend, unless you are interesting in the topic(s) we are discussing.

If you are interested in the podcasts, here are some links to Don’s YouTube channel:

Acquivore Podcast #1 Why Won’t Contracting Officers Settle Questioned Direct Costs?

Acquivore Podcast #2 Prescribing "Statement of Work Language"

Acquivore Podcast #3 Contracting in the time of COVID-19

We will continue doing these podcasts every two weeks until we run out of things to say.

At this point, the end of March, 2021, the editing job is complete. (I finished early!) The client work has settled down a bit. (The termination settlement proposal was submitted, among other client milestones.) And therefore, unless something unexpectedly drops in, I will be returning to writing these blog articles. I will aim for writing two per week, but we’ll have to see how it goes. If there is nothing that comes to my attention that calls for an article, then I don’t write one. (But there usually is something nearly every week that needs to be written about….)

Until then, take care of yourselves.

 

Product Substitution is Bad Business

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Last year we reported about fraudulent quality testing that led to substandard steel castings being supplied to naval construction. That was an expensive lesson for the company that employed the Director of Metallurgy who falsified the test results.

More recently, an environmental laboratory analyst was sentenced to two years of probation and ordered to pay a $2,500 fine for falsifying laboratory test results, according to this Dept. of Justice press release. According to the DOJ, the analyst “failed to properly calibrate and tune the quality control instruments, which was the foundation of the quality control process. This failure resulted in unreliable measurements of pollutants and hazardous substances, and therefore invalidated the testing process.”

That’s not good, and we suspect the laboratory that employed the analyst may have paid some expensive attorneys to make sure it was the analyst who was sentenced, and not the laboratory executives.

These are examples of product substitution fraud, which occurs when a contractor supplies nonconforming materials to the government. Most government contracts contain specifications that define what constitutes acceptable materials (and the quality assurance steps to ensure the materials meet spec). When a contractor falsifies lab results or other quality assurance report and, as a result, the government receives nonconforming materials (or materials that cannot be objectively determined to be conforming because of falsified tests), then that is product substitution. The “fraud” part speaks to intent.

Those two stories about are not good, but those aren’t today’s stories.

Today we want to talk about Djibouti.

Djibouti is in Africa, which makes it the purview of the Africa Strike Force, an initiative out of the Dept. of Justice’s Southern District of California. The Africa Strike Force was “developed to combat fraud and corruption as the United States expends resources across Africa,” according to the Dept. of Justice. The Strike Force’s first indictment was issued in October, 2020; it contained 98 counts of conspiracy, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The CEO of the contractor was arrested for and charged with (among other things): “submitted fraudulent quality control plans with résumés of fictitious employees; fabricated quality control checklists, certifying quality control work that was never performed; fraudulent concrete strength test results; and fraudulent claims for construction that was never performed or that did not adhere to specification.” That’s not good.

But that massive October, 2020, indictment is not today’s story.

Today’s story concerns another African contractor, another target of the Africa Strike Force, that settled its fraud allegations by agreeing that it “faked testing results and submitted a series of false documents and false claims to the United States as part of a scheme to defraud the United States in the sale of substandard concrete used to construct U.S. Navy airfields in Djibouti.” Link to the press release: here. The contractor in question was a subsidiary of a French civil engineering company.

According to the press release, the contractor (Colas Djibouti) “created fictitious testing results, made fraudulent representations regarding the concrete’s composition and characteristics, and knowingly provided concrete to the United States that did not comply with the specifications.” Yeah, that’s not good. You’ll notice that the “knowingly” part in that sentence introduces the fraud aspects.

The press released opined “As a result of this criminal conduct, Colas Djibouti ultimately supplied substandard concrete to the Department of Navy in Djibouti that could promote early cracking, surface defects, and corrosion of embedded steel, and thus significantly impair the concrete’s long-term durability.”

Part of the criminal conduct included falsifying water testing: “in response to a request for an analysis of the water used in the concrete mix, Colas Djibouti provided an analysis for a store-bought bottle of drinking water.”

To settle the criminal charges, Colas Djibouti agreed to “forfeit $8 million, pay another $2,042,002 to the Department of Navy in restitution, and pay a monetary penalty of $2.5 million.” That’s $12.54 million.

But in order to settle the civil charges, the company also agreed to pay another $1.858 million, bringing the total to $14.4 million.

As the headline says, product substitution is bad business.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.