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Apogee Consulting Inc

External Peer Review Report on the Defense Contract Management Agency Office of Independent Assessment Internal Review Team

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On November 2, 2015, the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General issued audit report number DODIG-2016-007. In that report, the DoD OIG issued its opinion after reviewing “the system of quality control for the Defense Contract Management Agency’s Internal Review Team.” The DoD OIG review “was conducted in accordance with Government Auditing Standards and the Council of the Inspector Generals on Integrity and Efficiency Guide for Conducting Peer Reviews of the Audit Organizations of Federal Office of Inspector General.”

As part of its review, the DoD OIG audit team reviewed three of nine audit reports issued by the DCMA’s Internal Review Team during the period, for a 33% sample. In its review, the DoD OIG audit team “tested compliance with the requirements for continuing professional education hours” and they “interviewed personnel to determine their understanding of and compliance with quality control policies and procedures.” In addition, the DCMA Internal Review Team’s audit policies and procedures, which were issued in May, 2013, were reviewed.

Based on that methodology and scope, the DoD OIG issued an opinion stating that “the system of quality control for the Defense Contract Management Agency’s Internal Review Team in effect for the year ended May 31, 2015, has been suitably designed and complied with to provide the audit organization with reasonable assurance of performing and reporting in conformity with applicable professional standards in all material respects.”

In other words, the DCMA Internal Review Team received a rating of “pass” from the DoD Office of Inspector General’s independent external peer review.

See DCAA? It doesn’t have to be that difficult.

Oh, wait. You say DCAA issues more than nine audit reports in any given year, and thus has many more chances for noncompliance? You say DCAA has many more auditors than the DCMA Internal Review Team, and thus has many more chances for any given individual to give a wrong answer during an interview?

Yes, all that is true. DCAA has many more opportunities to fail its independent external peer review.

And yet, the fundamental requirements applicable to both the DCMA Internal Review Team and DCAA are very much the same.

The requirements are the same, but how each DoD agency chooses to comply with those requirements is quite different. One DoD agency keeps it simple and passes easily; whereas the other DoD agency has interpreted GAGAS in such a way that passing is much more difficult.

Which approach makes more sense? The answer to that question will be left as an exercise for the reader.

 

Interim FAR Rule Redefines “Responsible” Federal Contractor

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If you are—or want to be—a Federal contractor and your tax returns have all been submitted, and you have no additional tax assessments that the IRS alleges you owe, and you have never been convicted of a Federal felony, you are fine and can receive a new Federal contract award.

But if you are—or want to be—a Federal contractor and your tax returns are overdue, or the IRS has alleged you owe additional taxes, or you have been convicted of a Federal felony, then you will have difficulties in being determined to be a “presently responsible” organization and you may not be able to receive a new Federal contract award.

That’s the deal with the recently promulgated interim FAR rule entitled “Prohibition on Contracting with Corporations with Delinquent Taxes or a Felony Conviction.” The new interim rule creates two new Representations/Certifications: 52.209-11 (“Representation by Corporation Regarding Delinquent Tax Liability or a Felony Conviction under any Federal Law”) and 52.209-12 (“Certification Regarding Tax Matters”).

Basically those new Reps/Certs create additional requirements that define when a contractor is “responsible” and we all know that only “responsible” contractors can receive Federal contract awards. Thus, this is kind of a big deal.

If you are an organization that might have some skeletons in your closet that would tend to lead to you mark the “wrong box” in one or the other of the new Reps/Certs, all is not lost. According to the background information published along with the interim rule, you will not be automatically excluded. For example, with respect to a “wrong answer” on the 52.209-11 Representation, the rule states—

When an offeror provides an affirmative response in paragraph (b)(1) or (2) to the representation, the contracting officer is required to request additional information from the offeror and notify the agency official responsible for initiating debarment or suspension action. The contracting officer shall not make an award to the corporation unless an agency suspending or debarring official has considered suspension or debarment of the corporation and determined that this further action is not necessary to protect the interests of the Government.

Similarly, with respect to the 52.209-12 Certification, the rule states—

If the certification regarding tax matters is applicable, then the contracting officer shall not award any contract in an amount greater than $5,000,000, unless the offeror affirmatively certified in its offer to all the required certifications regarding tax matters in FAR Clause 52.209-12(b).

So there are some escapes built into the new rule. But to be safe, we strongly suggest Federal contractors take all necessary steps to avoid having to submit a “wrong answer,” because it’s going to create problems for you and your Contracting Officer when it comes time to be considered for a new contract award.

 

 

National Defense Authorization Act – GFY 2016 Version 2

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President Obama vetoed the first version of the GFY 2016 NDAA and so a second version was submitted. As far as we can tell, the second version will become public law.

As has become a happy tradition, Bob Antonio’s wonderful WIFCON site has published an analysis of the NDAA. You need to review it. You need to review it because the NDAA provisions become DFARS regulations, as the DAR Council receives its marching orders (or many of them) from Congress via the NDAA. Thus: it is important to read the NDAA language if you want to see what’s coming your way.

Here are some provisions we found interesting. There are more, of course. But we are bringing just a few to your attention, a foretaste of the contents, if you will.

Section 809 directed the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) to establish “an advisory panel on streamlining acquisition regulations.” Let’s all hope that goes better than the BBP-directed effort to roll-back non-value-added rules and regulations (which we’ve recently written about).

Section 812 eliminated the applicability of TINA to offset agreements, except for offset agreements that relate to “contract or subcontract under the offset agreement for work performed in such foreign country or by such foreign firm that is directly related to the weapon system or defense-related item being purchased under the contract.”

Section 828 imposed a penalty for cost overruns on major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs). The offending military service will have to pay 3 percent of the overrun, the amount of which will be taken from the service’s RDT&E budget. We are sure this provision will have no impact on a military service’s willingness to take a risk on unproven technology in order to obtain an innovative and game-changing new weapon system. (Note: sarcasm.)

Section 844 directed SECDEF to ensure mandatory training in how to conduct market research.

Section 851 appeared to formalize the prior DoD decision to centralize the determinations of what is and what is not a commercial item. We would like to think that decision would not be necessary if acquisition professionals had received (or were going to receive) mandatory training in how to conduct market research, but what can you do?

Section 854 required the “establishment of a list” in the DFARS of “inapplicable defense-unique statues to contracts for commercial items and commercial available off-the-shelf items.” Didn’t we already have this in the FAR and DFARS? We thought DFARS 212.503 and 212.504 already listed laws that “are not applicable to contracts for the acquisition of commercial items.” Guess we were wrong about that.

Section 873 implemented a pilot program “to provide an exception from the requirements under sections 2306a(1) and 2313 of title 10, United States Code, for contracts or subcontracts valued at less than $7.5 million that are awarded based on a technical merit based selection procedure.”

Section 885 modified existing rules regarding counterfeit electronic parts “to expand the eligibility for covered contractors to include costs associated with rework and corrective action related to counterfeit electronic parts as allowable costs under Department of Defense contracts.” This would seem to be good news.

Section 887 required the FAR Council “to prescribe a regulation making clear that agency acquisition personnel are permitted and encouraged to engage in responsible and constructive exchanges with industry, so long as those exchanges are consistent with existing law and regulation and do not promote an unfair competitive advantage to particular firms.” Guess that OFPP “myth-busting” memo wasn’t getting the job done.

Section 893 is entitled “Improved Auditing of Contracts” and this is the one that prohibits DCAA from providing audit services to civilian agencies until it gets its incurred cost audit backlog down to a reasonable level (defined by the provision as being 18 months’ worth). An early version would have required the SECDEF to use “outside auditing staff to help address DCAA’s audit backlog,” but that bit did not seem to make it into the language of the final bill sent to President Obama. We’ve already done an article on the early version, and we’ll have more on this provision as events develop.

Section 896 required the SECDEF to survey “defense contractors with the highest level of reimbursements for cost-type contracts” to determine “the cost to industry of regulatory compliance with government unique acquisition regulations and requirements that are not imposed on commercial item contracts.” It’s like the 1990’s all over again, isn’t it? Only in 2016 Coopers and Lybrand won’t be around (by that name) to conduct the study. Let’s hope SECDEF Carter doesn’t give this one to the same BBP folks who released that pathetic study to the USD (AT&L).

Section 899 would seem to raise the TINA threshold to $5 million (for certain contracts under certain conditions) under a pilot program to demonstrate the efficacy of “using risk-based techniques in requiring submission” of certified cost or pricing data. Quite frankly, we’re not entirely sure what the provision requires. What do you make of this language? “The head of an agency shall establish a risk-based sampling approach under which the submission of certified cost or pricing data may be required for a risk-based sample of contracts, the price of which is expected to exceed $750,000 but not $5,000,000. The authority to require certified cost or pricing data under this paragraph shall not apply to any contract of an offeror that has not been awarded, for at least the one-year period preceding the issuance of a solicitation for the contract, any other contract in excess of $5,000,000 under which the offeror was required to submit certified cost or pricing data under section 2306a of title 10, United States Code.”

The foregoing was simply a high-level summary of some of the provisions that caught our eyes. Again, we recommend readers head over to WIFCON and review the entire NDAA themselves. And stay tuned to see how the FAR Councils and DAR Council tackle some of the Congressionally mandated initiatives that they’ve been handed.

 

DCAA Audit Staffing and Workload Challenges

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DCAADCAA has had a problem with its backlog of unperformed audits for quite some time, dating back at least to 2009 when the audit agency made two fateful decisions: (1) DCAA was going to intentionally stop performing audits of contractors’ proposals to establish final billing rates (colloquially called “incurred cost audits”), and (2) DCAA was going to comply with GAGAS—as the agency interpreted it—even if it killed auditor productivity to do so. As a result of those two decisions, the backlog of incurred cost audits grew and grew and grew … to the point where we thought the audit agency would never catch up. Despite the growing backlog, DCAA insisted on continuing to use onerous audit procedures and in performing multiple levels of (redundant) reviews—to the point where agency metrics showed it took nearly three full years to audit one year’s worth of claimed costs.

Despite that rather problematic metric—that it takes DCAA, on average, nearly three years to issue an audit report covering one year’s worth of contractor costs—DCAA has proudly announced that it has reduced its audit backlog to only 170% of “normal” (where “normal” is defined as 18 months’ worth of audit backlog). Since math doesn’t lie, how did that happen?

As readers of this blog know, DCAA didn’t change its audit approach nor did it change its peculiar interpretation of GAGAS, but it did manage to significantly reduce its backlog of incurred cost audits via three strategic decisions: (1) DCAA intentionally shifted much of its non-incurred cost audit workload to DCMA, (2) DCAA adopted a “do not audit” approach to many “low-risk” contractor proposals, and (3) DCAA decided that if a contractor didn’t submit an “adequate” final billing rate proposal on time, it would simply not perform an audit … ever. It would wash its hands of the whole mess. Instead, the agency would (1) recommend an arbitrary 16.2% decrement to the contractor’s claimed direct and indirect costs, and (2) close the file and let DCMA handle it.

In essence, then, DCAA reduced its embarrassing backlog of incurred costs audits by figuring out how to not perform the audits.

While DCAA was implementing its innovative do-not-audit approach to its audit backlog, others—including both DoD leadership and Congress—were growing impatient with the seemingly intractable problem. As we noted in late 2012, DoD’s “Better Buying Power 2.0” initiative targeted DCAA's audit backlog. The GFY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required DCAA to issue an annual report to Congress that contained specified performance metrics. It was clear that DCAA’s audit backlog made people nervous.

And it wasn’t just Congress and DoD leadership who were nervous about DCAA’s audit backlog. The GAO told DCMA that it was overly reliant on DCAA audits, and needed to develop (or relearn) its “key skill sets” including cost/price analysis. NASA’s Inspector General told NASA leadership that “NASA contracting officers place an unhealthy reliance on DCAA audits.” The Department of Energy’s Inspector General told DOE that “DCAA has been unable to meet the non-M&O contract audit needs of the Department” and recommended that the Department “develop a comprehensive strategy to supplement DCAA’s [lack of] audit coverage until the backlog of unaudited contractor submissions is eliminated.”

So this has been a concern of DoD and DOE and NASA and Congress for about four years … and DCAA’s promises of “catching up” by GFY 2015 did not inspire robust confidence. Indeed, as noted above, DCAA did not catch up (despite its innovative do-not-audit approach), and now here we are in GFY 2016 and the problem remains.

Let us be clear, then, that Section 893 of the GFY 2016 NDAA should not be an extreme surprise to anybody who has been following this issue for the past four years. Nobody who was following DCAA's progress (or lack thereof) in reducing its audit backlog should have been blindsided by the language in the public law. Indeed, Version 1 of the NDAA (the one that was vetoed) had that same verbiage in it, and we wrote about it right here. In a nutshell, Section 893 prohibits DCAA from performing audit work for non-DoD agencies until “DCAA certifies that the backlog for incurred costs is less than 18 months of incurred-cost inventory.”

The point being: if DCAA can’t work through its backlog of DoD-related audits, then it should not be spending precious audit resources performing audits for any non-DoD agencies. Seems logical to us.

The problem is: DCAA has become accustomed to the funding provided by non-DoD agencies. Thus, it has positioned its staff to support non-DoD agency audits. When the non-DoD workload vanishes, then its staff is out of place and cannot easily return to performing DoD audits. This is a problem and some auditors are nervous about it.

As colleague Darrell Oyer explained in his recent newsletter—

DCAA has appropriated funds to audit for DoD. DCAA also has a staffing allocation (not $, but people) greater than the amount of funds available via DoD. This must be made up by doing reimbursable work for non-DoD agencies. This initially started when NASA disbanded their audit organization in about the early 1970’s. NASA transferred about 70 positions to DCAA but no funds. The funds were to be obtained by [performing] reimbursable work for NASA. Almost all non-DoD agencies have had Agreements with DCAA for such audits. In recent years, this work has dropped off because audit report users have found the DCAA audits to be much less useful due to having more 'protective fluff' than substance.

In an earlier newsletter, Darrell reported on a notice received from DCAA, stating that it was stopping work on an audit of a subcontractor to a “reimbursable” prime contractor (“reimbursable” in this case meaning that the audit was being performed on a reimbursable basis for a non-DoD agency). Essentially, DCAA simply walked away from in-process audit work.

What’s puzzling about that report is that it seems to contradict what Ms. Anita Bales (allegedly) promised her staff in a pre-Thanksgiving email. In that email, she (allegedly) said of the Section 893 audit prohibition: “We are working with the managers and the audit teams that are affected by this to make sure we shut down that work in an orderly manner.” Darrell’s report sure didn’t sound “orderly” to us.

As we noted in our prior article on Section 893, it’s not all bad news for DCAA auditors who are affected by the audit prohibition. There is a fair amount of work available for ex-DCAA auditors, especially for those who are willing to relocate. Those who leave the agency tend to have good experiences at their new places of employment. For example, one ex-DCAA auditor wrote us to say—

I worked 28 years at DCAA. I left X years ago to come to DCMA. Best decision I ever made. DCAA was and is broken. At DCMA I have so much work it's insane. Do I make pretty work papers all day that management reviews and critiques? No. Is DCMA perfect? No. But at least we are looking at stuff and issuing reports. Something is actually being done!!!!!!! Costs are being questioned and the government is saving money. I know it is. DCMA has problems. All their systems for filing cases and tracking cases, is awful. DCAA could teach them something there. However at the end of the day reports are issued and recommendations are made. …

I have never been so busy in my XX year Federal career and honestly enjoy it after wasting so much time at DCAA. I never realized how truly broken DCAA was until I left. Is [DCMA] perfect? No but at least we are doing something. How is DCAA doing? … DCAA does close to nothing. Low risk memos and paid voucher reviews. While I look at $40 million proposal after $50 million proposal. … As a taxpayer I have no problems with what DCMA is doing. It still bothers me what goes on at DCAA

So for those at DCAA affected by the Section 893 audit prohibition, try to look on the bright side. You might find yourself doing meaningful work that generates taxpayer savings. That’s not to say that DCAA doesn’t generate taxpayer savings … it’s just that it takes the agency so long to do so.

 

 

University of Florida Pays $20 Million for Failing History Lessons

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FailureIn 1994, Stanford University paid $1.2 million to the U.S. Navy, to settle allegations that it had “overcharged the government for research overhead for 12 years,” according to one contemporaneous news report. That same article noted that the settlement settled years of rancorous dispute, which included a lawsuit alleging that Stanford owed $250 million for such no-nos as “depreciation of a 72-foot yacht, a steady supply of fresh flowers for [Stanford President] Kennedy's residence and upkeep of the mausoleum where the founding Stanford family is buried.” The fact that the Navy accepted a token $1.2 million settlement offer is testimony to the weakness of its case, but that didn’t stop Kennedy from resigning under fire.

The settlement did not end the relator’s qui tam suit against Stanford, which continued even though the Department of Justice declined to intervene. As this press release noted, “The Justice Department chose not to join the suit after it investigated for more than two years, during which the university responded to 11 subpoenas for information and provided 150,000 pages of documents.” Four years later, the Ninth Circuit of the Court of Appeals ruled that the relator, a former Naval employee, was not eligible to bring a suit under the False Claims Act. Why? Because the relator, Mr. Paul Biddle, was the Navy’s Contracting Officer. The court found that an employee in such a situation "should not collect a windfall for merely doing his job." Mr. Biddle pursued his crusade against Stanford for roughly eight years before his suit was finally rejected.

The ruling – that a government employee cannot separately pursue a False Claims Act suit and profit thereby when it is his or her job to protect the taxpayers’ interests – was so important at the time that it still resonates, more than 20 years later.

What also still resonates, more than 20 years later, was the pain and indignity heaped upon Stanford University, which is one of the nation’s premier institutions of higher education. As noted, the University President was forced to resign. In addition (according to this summary),

The revelations led to embarrassing Congressional hearings, at which lawmakers ridiculed the university for having included a portion of the cost of questionable items including the depreciation of a yacht, flowers, and furniture for the former president's residence on its bills to the government for research overhead. Stanford withdrew those charges before the hearings, but after Congress had begun its inquiry. … The government substantially lowered Stanford's rate for overhead reimbursements. The institution conceded that it had made accounting errors and inappropriate charges, but said it had not intentionally overbilled. … The scandal eventually engulfed other research universities and led to a series of moves by the government to tighten the rules for reimbursing colleges for research costs.

The point is, even though this all happened long ago, it was an important case with far-reaching implications—not only for Stanford but also for “other research universities.” This was a big deal at the time and it led to a “tightening” of the rules related to how colleges and universities are reimbursed for indirect costs allocated to research contracts and grants. Everybody was supposed to learn a lesson from the pain and indignity heaped upon Stanford University.

And now it appears that the University of Florida forgot the lesson.

We know this because of a recent DoJ press release that announced that the University of Florida had agreed to pay just a hair under $20 million to settle allegations that “the university improperly charged the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for salary and administrative costs on hundreds of federal grants.” According to the announcement—

The University of Florida receives millions of dollars in grant funding from HHS on hundreds of grants each year. The settlement announced today resolves the alleged misuse of grant funds awarded by HHS to UF between 2005 and December 2010. The United States contended that the university overcharged hundreds of grants for the salary costs of its employees, where it did not have documentation to support the level of effort claimed on the grants for those employees. The government also contended that UF charged some of these grants for administrative costs for equipment and supplies when those items should not have been directly charged to the grants under federal regulations. Lastly, UF allegedly inflated costs charged to HHS grants awarded at its Jacksonville campus for services performed by an affiliated entity, Jacksonville Healthcare Inc.

So the issues were: (1) timekeeping/labor accounting problems, (2) direct versus indirect charging, and (3) transfer pricing of inter-organizational transfers. You might say that those were different issues than those faced by Stanford 20 years ago, and you’d be right. But that argument misses the point: research universities were put on notice 20 years ago that the government would audit and scrutinize charges to contracts and grants and, as a result, those research universities would have to be vigilant to ensure that they were strictly complying with applicable rules and regulations.

The lesson was clearly communicated and many recipients of federal funds heard it loud and clear. But either the University of Florida never received the message, or else it forgot the lesson over the passage of time. As a result, the University and its faculty and students are now $20 million poorer.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.