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Apogee Consulting Inc

How DOE Moves Forward without DCAA

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Future_VisionIt seems the past month – the first month of 2016 – has been devoted to discussing DCAA. It’s not that we have an obsession with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (though it’s entirely possible that we do have such an obsession); it’s more like those are the stories that compel us to sit down in front of keyboard and monitor and bang some words out. As we’ve noted before, we don’t write stories that don’t seem interesting to us. What’s going on with DCAA right now has caught our interest and thus the proliferation of articles.

Today’s article is more about the Department of Energy than DCAA, but we think it points to one means by which DOE is going to cope with the loss of DCAA audit services. The Department will have more than one strategy, to be sure. In fact, we heard from a local source that at least one large site in the Nuclear Complex is talking to independent auditors about filling the hole left by DCAA. But that’s not what this article is about.

Today’s article is about having Management & Operating (M&O) contractors perform audits of their subcontractors.

For those who may not know, M&O contracts – and associated M&O contractors – have been central to the DOE business model since just after World War II. The M&O contractors operate the large laboratories and nuclear complex sites that comprise large portions of the DOE mission and, as such the M&O contractors are essentially extensions of DOE management. In the words of one early report to Congress—

The working relationship between the Commission and its operating contractors resemble in some respects those between industrial companies and their branch offices. The contractor undertakes to carry on an extensive operation; the Commission establishes the objectives and makes the decisions required to fit the operation into the national program, and exercises the controls necessary to assure security, safety, desirable personnel administration, and prudent use of the public funds.

The DOE M&O contracts are relatively unique but the FAR recognizes them. Under the authority of FAR Subpart 17.6, the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) has a Part 970 that supplements the FAR and governs the solicitation, award, and administration of DOE’s M&O contracts. Interestingly, DOE reports that “In addition, various other Federal agencies have at times recognized DOE’s ‘special relationship’ with its M&O contractors. Prior to enactment of the Competition in Contracting Act in 1984 … the Comptroller General asserted jurisdiction over protests against the award of subcontracts by DOE’s M&O contracts, a very limited instance of GAO’s assertion of protest jurisdiction over the award of subcontracts under a specific type of contract.”

As is relevant to this article, DOE relies “on the DOE Inspector General for auditing its M&O contractors [and] DOE requires the M&O contractor to maintain an internal audit function, which performs critical audit functions under DOE’s Cooperative Audit Strategy.” Thus, it can be seen that while the DOE IG audits the M&O contractors, those same M&O contractors are being required to audit their subcontractors as part of the “cooperative audit strategy.” In other words, DOE doesn’t need DCAA to audit a very large portion of its contract portfolio, because the agency holds the M&O contractors accountable for auditing their subcontractors and it relies on the IG to audit the M&O contractors.

A recent example of this evolution was provided by DOE IG audit report number OAI-V-16-03. That audit report reported on findings from the IG’s audit of Brookhaven National Laboratory, managed under an O&M contract by Brookhaven Science Associates LLC (“BSA”).

The audit report discusses DOE’s “cooperative audit strategy” with some detail, noting that—

The Department’s Office of Inspector General, Office of Acquisition Management, integrated management and operating contractors, and other select contractors have implemented a Cooperative Audit Strategy (Strategy) to make efficient use of available audit resources while ensuring that the Department’s contractors claim only allowable costs. This Strategy places reliance on the contractors’ internal audit function (Internal Audit) to provide audit coverage of the allowability of incurred costs claimed by contractors. Consistent with the Strategy, BSA is required by its prime contract to maintain an Internal Audit activity with the responsibility for conducting audits, including audits of the allowability of incurred costs. In addition, BSA is required to conduct or arrange for audits of its subcontractors when costs incurred are a factor in determining the amount payable to a subcontractor.

Basically, then, the DOE IG audits the work performed by the M&O Internal Audit function, which is responsible for auditing the M&O contractor’s claimed costs as well as the claimed costs by the contractor’s “flexibly priced” subcontractors.

In this case, the DOE IG found nothing with respect to the audits of BSA’s claimed costs. Per the audit report—

Based on our assessment, nothing came to our attention to indicate that the allowable cost–related audit work performed by BSA’s Internal Audit could not be relied upon. We did not identify any material internal control weaknesses with cost allowability audits, which generally met the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (Standards) prescribed by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA). BSA’s Internal Audit identified $1,027,133.24 of questioned costs during FYs 2012 and 2013, all of which had been resolved.

However, the IG found two issues with respect to BSA’s audits of its subcontractor’s claimed costs. The IG found that (1) BSA was not performing “interim audits” of flexibly priced subcontracts, and (2) BSA was not performing any audits whatsoever on its time-and-materials (T&M) type subcontracts.

With respect to Finding No. 1, in fact BSA did perform reviews of interim vouchers submitted by its subcontractors, in order to detect unallowable costs and prevent them from being paid. However, the IG found that approach was insufficient to meet requirements. The IG emphasized that subcontractor audits “at a minimum” should meet IIA standards. Neither the personnel performing the voucher reviews nor the procedures being performed met those standards. BSA concurred that invoice reviews were not “audits” and that audits would be performed on “higher-risk” subcontracts.

With respect to Finding No. 2, the IG audit report stated—

A BSA official initially stated that time-and-materials subcontracts were not audited because they were considered low risk, as they have fully negotiated labor rates and the hours utilized were reviewed for technical sufficiency. However, time-and-materials subcontracts often include variable costs, such as materials and travel, which should still be audited. In a subsequent discussion, other BSA officials acknowledged that time-and-materials subcontracts should have been considered for audit because these types of subcontracts have attributes of cost-type subcontracts. We were informed that BSA plans to include time-and-materials subcontracts in future audit universes.

So this may be the future in a world where DCAA no longer performs audits. The non-DoD Federal agencies will pay their big prime contractors to perform the audits that DCAA no longer performs, and will hold them to similar standards. (Though of course the IIA standards are not the same as GAGAS.) The prime contractors will hire auditors, develop procedures, and implement them—and then bill the Federal agencies for the effort expended in doing so.

And as we noted, while DOE is holding its M&O contractors accountable for performing audits on their subcontractors, we are told the agency is talking to independent CPA firms to cover the rest of its contracts.

Is this the model of the future? Obviously we don’t know for sure, but it seems to be working for the Department of Energy.

 

 

What is a Compensation System?

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Back in the “old days” before Congress and DoD significantly revised the standards for contractor internal controls, there were ten (10) internal control “systems” that contractors were supposed to establish and maintain. To be clear, not all ten systems applied to every contractor; as contractors grew they became subject to new system requirements. The larger the contractor, the more robust and sophisticated its internal controls were supposed to be.

Back in the “old days” DCAA maintained audit programs for each system, along with “matrices” that established expected control objectives, control activities, and the audit procedures that would be used to test them. To be clear (again), these systems were (by and large) not regulatory requirements; except for the more fundamental systems (e.g., estimating, purchasing, government property control), they were not to be found in contract clauses. The ten systems, the control objectives, and the control activities largely were based on DCAA’s own notions regarding what control systems DoD contractors should have.

Yet there was nothing else upon which to base an internal control environment. For better or worse, DCAA’s notions became the de rigueur standard for contractors. And it wasn’t just defense contractors that adopted them; the DCAA notions of internal control adequacy became the sine qua non for every single government contractor. Perhaps the original impetus for the widespread adoption of DCAA's standards came from the fact that DCAA auditors performed audits for agencies other than DoD on a reimbursable basis—including DOE and NASA, to name two major agencies—and thus by default those non-DoD agencies adopted DCAA’s standards. But we think the more salient fact is that there was simply nothing else available. DCAA’s standards were the only game in town.

But that all changed in early 2012 with the promulgation of the “contractor business systems” management and oversight regime. By public law and DFARS rule-making, six contractor business systems were defined, along with associated system adequacy criteria. DCAA audit programs related to areas outside those six systems were retired, and audit programs for those six systems were substantially revised. Internal control matrices related to the old “ICAPs” were retired, and internal control matrices for the six systems were changed to tie to the new official adequacy criteria. It was a sea-change, a revolution in how defense contractors were going to manage their operations. It was the new thing.

Non-DoD agencies were in a quandary, because the six business systems were exclusively the province of DFARS and defense contractors. For example, there were no DOE contract clauses similar to the DFARS contract clause 252.242.7005 (“Contractor Business Systems”). Thus, the actions of the DAR Council created two distinct and separate approaches to contractor internal control: one for defense contractors and another for contractors doing work for civilian agencies.

That wasn’t a terrible thing if you knew which agency you were supporting. But for the many contractors that held contracts with both DoD and non-DoD agencies, it was confusing, to say the least.

To a large extent, DOE solved the problem by adopting an approach that was very similar to the DoD regime. That certainly made things easier for the DCAA auditors performing reimbursable work for DOE! (Not to mention clarifying things for DOE contractors.) However, that approach also resulted in an unforeseen challenge when DCAA cut back on the amount of audits it performed for DOE. It didn’t matter which internal control regime was in place, when nobody was checking to see if contractors were following it.

And that audit challenge was exacerbated when the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included an express prohibition on DCAA performing audit services for non-DoD agencies. Not only was the DCAA audit coverage of DOE contractors being significantly eroded over time (because of changes to DCAA’s “risk-based” audit procedures); but now Congress had effectively reduced it to zero.

It doesn’t matter whether or not DOE adopts the DFARS business system management regime if there are no auditors available to enforce it.

One of the actions that DOE has taken to address its sudden shortfall of audit coverage is to reduce the requirement for audits. For instance, it is officially reducing the need to approve DOE contractors’ compensation systems on an individual contract (or contractor) basis. The fewer contractors that have to have their compensation systems reviewed and approved, the fewer reviews that will need to be performed.

Or in the words of the DOE Acquisition Letter (AL-2016-01)—

DOE Order 350.1 establishes the responsibilities, requirements, and cost allowability criteria for the management and oversight of contractor human resource programs. The Order establishes oversight responsibilities to ensure DOE contractors manage their human resource programs to support the DOE mission, promote work force excellence, champion work force diversity, achieve effective cost management performance, and comply with applicable laws and regulations. Chapter IV, Compensation; Chapter V, Benefits; and Chapter VI, DOE Contractor Pension Plans, establish oversight responsibilities to promote reasonable contractor compensation and benefits in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation’s (FAR) cost principles (FAR Part 31). DOE has determined that a risk-based approach, rather than a transactional approach, is appropriate to promote cost reasonableness in accordance with the referenced FAR cost principles.

Thus—

The purpose of Acquisition Letter (AL) 2016-01 is to provide guidance regarding required actions to move from DOE traditional transactional approach for approving certain costs relating to compensation and benefits, to a risk based approach that removes a requirement for DOE approval where risk reducing conditions are met.

To implement the new approach, DOE has issued a new Section H clause to be “bilaterally” incorporated into the following contract actions:

M&O and non-M&O cost reimbursement solicitations and contracts where work had been previously performed under a DOE M&O contract and the successor Contractor is (a) required to employ all or part of the former Contractor’s workforce and sponsors the employee pension and benefit plans; or (b) retains sponsorship of benefit plans that survive performance of the contract work scope. Contracts in this latter category include, but are not limited to, environmental remediation, infrastructure services and other site-specific project completion contracts.

The new Section H provision/clause defines the type of information that an affected DOE contractor must submit for review. The information includes:

  • Philosophy and strategy for all pay delivery programs.

  • System for establishing a job worth hierarchy.

  • Method for relating internal job worth hierarchy to external market.

  • System that links individual and/or group performance to compensation decisions.

  • Method for planning and monitoring the expenditure of funds.

  • Method for ensuring compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

  • System for communicating the programs to employees.

  • System for internal controls and self-assessment.

  • System to ensure that reimbursement of compensation, including stipends, for employees who are on joint appointments with a parent or other organization shall be on a pro-rated basis

In addition to the foregoing, DOE contractors subject to the new provision/clause must—

… develop, implement and maintain formal policies, practices and procedures to be used in the administration of its compensation system consistent with FAR 31.205-6 and DEAR 970.3102-05-6; “Compensation for Personal Services”. DOE-approved standards (e.g., set forth in an advance understanding or appendix), if any, shall be applied to the Total Compensation System. The Contractor’s Total Compensation System shall be fully documented, consistently applied, and acceptable to the Contracting Officer. Costs incurred in implementing the Total Compensation System shall be consistent with the Contractor's documented Contractor Employee Compensation Plan as approved by the Contracting Officer

But that’s not all. Contractors that have the new Section H clause in their contracts (or agree to have their contracts modified to include the new clause) must also submit to their cognizant Contracting Officer the following information—

  • An Annual Contractor Salary-Wage Increase Expenditure Report to include, at a minimum, breakouts for merit, promotion, variable pay, special adjustments, and structure movements for each pay structure showing actual against approved amounts; and planned distribution of funds for the following year.

  • A list of the top five most highly compensated executives as defined in FAR 31.205-6(p)(4)(ii) and their total cash compensation at the time of Contract award, and at the time of any subsequent change to their total cash compensation. This should be the same information provided to the System for Award Management (SAM) per FAR 52.204-10.

  • An Annual Compensation and Benefits Report no later than March 1st of each year.

There’s more to it than that, of course. (Pages and pages of detail, actually.) But the foregoing provides the basic compliance requirements. In return for agreeing to the clause requirements, DOE contractors (presumably) won’t need to have their compensation systems reviewed by auditors and approved by Contracting Officers.

Not addressed in the DOE Acquisition Letter is what the DOE Contracting Officers will actually do with all the detailed information they receive from their contractors. They are going to be inundated with compensation and HR and pension data; who is going to review it? Who will evaluate it for acceptability? What if it is not acceptable—what happens then? We did not see the answers to those questions in the DOE policy guidance.

If there is no ability to actually evaluate the information received, to determine whether or not the contractor’s compensation system is low-risk, then the result of the new clause is to create the illusion of management oversight and control where none actually exists. In our view, that’s really not a good thing for taxpayers.

Also not addressed is what kind of compensation system a contractor needs if it neither sells to DOE or to DoD. For example, what kind of compensation system is required of a contractor that provides services solely to the Environmental Protection Agency? We don’t know.

For those contractors that fall outside of current regulatory or contractual coverage, or for those contractors that are small businesses and hope to grow into a large business one day, there is precious little guidance available to assist them in this area. The only guidance we would recommend is the DCAA control matrix related to the compensation internal control system, the "ICAPs" internal control matrix that existed before the DFARS contractor business system changes were promulgated.

But where do you find that retired document?

We don’t think you can find that information on the current DCAA website, but it might be available via Google archive or similar data-mining efforts. Or you can ask your local DCAA auditors to see if they can find it. Or maybe your compliance folks retained a copy.

We did.

 

 

What If DCAA Only Did Audits?

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Say what you will about the Defense Contract Audit Agency – and boy howdy have we said a lot over the past eight years – it is an inescapable fact that the audit agency has a backlog of unperformed audits and that backlog has hobbled the ability of both government and contractor to timely close-out contracts. As a result of the backlog of unperformed audits, unliquidated obligations are held open unnecessarily long, final payments (which would include payments of final fees) are unnecessarily delayed, and past performance information (in terms of how much unallowable costs contractors claim) doesn’t get reported (and/or used) as the FAR intends.

That backlog of unperformed audits is a problem. It’s been a problem for years. DoD Leadership has spoken publicly about it. Congress has held hearings about it. GAO and various Inspectors General have expressed their concerns. Everybody has been waiting for DCAA to fix its problem, and the wait has gone on through the tenure of one Director and into the tenure of another.

As we reported, DCAA figured-out a “risk-based” way of closing out certain audit assignments without, you know, actually performing those audits. DCAA also figured-out a way of closing out other audit assignments by declaring the submissions to be irredeemably inadequate (in the short timeframe DCAA gave certain contractors to fix the alleged inadequacies)—and then kicked the proverbial can over to DCMA and made it DCMA’s problem to fix. The DCAA files say “assignment closed” and the unaudited submission no longer counts as backlog, as far as DCAA is concerned.

DCAA has figured-out several innovative ways to reduce its backlog of unperformed audits and, indeed, the reported backlog has dropped over time. DCAA claims this is a significant milestone and is indicative of performance improvement at the audit agency. Nonetheless, the backlog is still in excess of what the prior Director promised Congress and DoD Leadership and the taxpayers. It is still (at last report) about 170% of what the audit agency considers “normal backlog” (which is defined as 18 months’ worth of work—meaning DCAA would only be a little behind instead of being embarrassingly behind).

DCAA’s backlog reduction came too little, too late. DCAA failed to meet its commitment and now the audit agency is being held accountable for its failure. Congress, growing impatient with hollow promises and lack of progress, has acted to “help” DCAA out of its mess.

Congress acted in the form of statutory language in the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that flat-out prohibited DCAA from performing audit work for any non-DoD agencies until it had reduced its backlog to “normal” levels.

In other words, Congress told DCAA that, given the audit agency’s inability to properly manage its workload, Congress would set the priorities for the audit agency. Congress would help DCAA focus on its audit backlog by prohibiting DCAA from wasting its scarce audit resources on activities that were not related to the backlog of unperformed audits. The Congressional action was similar to a teacher telling a distracted student to stop daydreaming and focus on the assignment. It was similar to a parent telling a teenager to stop playing video games until the homework assignment has been completed.

It was a desperation play, because (obviously) we shouldn't need a public law to tell DCAA what to audit. But apparently some people in Congress thought we did. So now we do.

And DCAA has figured-out how to get around it.

On January 7, 2016, DCAA issued MRD 16-PPD-001 (R), entitled “Audit Guidance on the Impact of the National Defense Authorization Act on DCAA’s Audit Support to Non-Defense Agencies.” The apparent purpose of the MRD is to tell auditors how to keep supporting non-DoD agencies. The apparent purpose of the MRD is to explain how DCAA will be ignoring Congressional intent. The apparent purpose of the MRD is to demonstrate (once again) how DCAA will keep doing what it wants to do, regardless of what outsiders may think.

The MRD states: “The NDAA prohibits DCAA from providing audit support to non-Defense Agencies/ reimbursable customers. Our legal team has advised that we can continue to provide services that fall outside audit support.”

In other words, DCAA has received a legal opinion that splits the hair and ignores the spirit of the law in favor of the letter. Sure, the NDAA says DCAA cannot perform audits for non-DoD agencies; but nobody ever said DCAA can’t perform other services for those same agencies.

DCAA is clearly ignoring Congressional intent here. Congress told DCAA to quit messing around with non-DoD stuff and focus all resources on getting its backlog of unaudited DoD submissions handled. The DCAA MRD ignores that, and permits resources to be squandered on matters other than the task that Congress wants DCAA to address.

So what kind of non-audit services can DCAA auditors perform for non-DoD agencies, according to the MRD? It states—

The following are the types of effort that we have determined are permissible to support reimbursable customers:

  • Negotiation support,

  • Litigation support,

  • Investigative support (performed by OIS), and

  • Non-audit services (e.g., requests for specific cost/rate information).

There you go. DCAA will continue to provide those services to non-DoD agencies.

But it got us wondering … what if DCAA only performed audits? What if DCAA only performed audits for DoD agencies? What if DCAA didn’t provide negotiation support or litigation support or non-audit services … for anybody?

If DCAA concentrated its resources solely on performing audits, and on performing those audits solely for the Department of Defense—then how quickly could that backlog of unperformed audits be reduced?

If DCAA focused its efforts, it might find it has sufficient resources to, you know, actually audit all incurred cost submissions, just as it used to do!

Wouldn’t that be nice?

 

What if DCAA Didn’t Do ANY Audits?

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Hollow_VictoryOur previous article posited the notion that the Defense Contract Audit Agency would be better off if it stuck to performing audits, and quit providing “services that fall outside audit support” to its customers—especially those customers that are non-DoD agencies. We asserted that, if DCAA were to focus its staff of some 5,000 auditors on performing audits for DoD only, then it would be better positioned to reduce its embarrassing backlog of unperformed audits (especially including audits of contractors’ proposals to establish final billing rates) and thus get Congress and other critics (including us!) off its back. We opined that a relentless focus on performing audits—and only audits—would be beneficial to the audit agency, as well as to its customers, including DCMA.

Not everybody agreed with our assertion.

In particular, our long-time supporter “George Kaplan” wrote us a fairly long email explaining why we were wrong. George argued that it was DCAA’s focus on performing GAGAS-compliant audits, especially in areas that were not easily susceptible to being audited in accordance with GAGAS, that was the audit agency’s real problem. In George’s view, the audit agency ought to get out of the audit business—or at the very least quit trying to comply with GAGAS in so many of its assignments.

George wrote –

I'd go in the opposite direction. I'd try to categorize more of the assignments as non-audit services, so as to get out from under the GAGAS umbrella. That would include forward pricing audits, which you addressed recently. To get to GAGAS compliance, a huge effort is required - the risk assessment, a lot of transaction testing, multiple layers of review. ‘Auditor judgment’ is a thing of the past. For incurred cost audits, I have a suspicion (not founded on any inside information) that the Agency will give equal weight to all of the audits in its inventory, which would make a Boeing or Northrop Grumman divisional audit equal in weight to smaller audits. The major contractor audits, as you know, typically take a year each, often involving more than one auditor. Counting the assignments equally would likely mean that the Agency can go back to auditing non-DoD ICPs, maybe as early as FY 2017. The number of months of inventory seems to be a state secret, although I've heard a figure of 22 months, which seems unbelievably close to 18 months; so close that 18 should be readily attainable. … The audits that are under $1M of auditable dollar value (or volume, I forget which it is) typically don't pay off. It takes more time to audit them than what the buying command or civilian agency gets back in terms of sustainable questioned costs.

We are sympathetic to George’s point of view. Indeed, we’ve advocated much the same thing, in a blog post from early 2010. More than six years ago we wrote in an “open letter” to then-Director Pat Fitzgerald —

… consider whether all DCAA audits need to be subject to GAGAS. Reasonable people will disagree with GAO’s stringent definition of “independence” under GAGAS, but you can avoid the issue altogether if you make certain audits subject to GAGAS while others are not. There is precedent for this change: the AICPA has Consulting Standards that differ from Auditing Standards. Since DCAA performs both financial advisory services and audits, it would seem to make sense to apportion each type of audit into GAGAS-compliant and non-GAGAS-compliant groupings. And, by the way, DCMA really wants DCAA to participate in the process as an advisor; it wants your audits to offer value-added advice and to support the acquisition process. Contractors want to hear from auditors as well; they want to know where they need to improve and what should be done to fix system deficiencies. Your auditors can’t do this if GAO will allege they’ve compromised ‘independence’ whenever this happens—so change the rules of the game to eliminate the issue altogether.

Really, then, we are not very far apart in our positions.

The point is: DCAA needs to do something different. It needs to address its backlog of unperformed audits. In our view, the audit agency needs to address that backlog without using bureaucratic tricks to close-out audit assignments. DCAA should not be permitted to reduce its audit backlog without actually performing the work. Simply reducing the audit backlog without performing the audit work that is inherent in the backlog strikes us as doing a disservice to DCAA customers, and to the taxpayers.

If DCAA is permitted to continue to claim a backlog reduction via trickery, and if DCAA management then declares victory—defined as having an ICS audit backlog of only 18 months—then it will be a hollow victory indeed.

 

 

2015 Recap—Top 5

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Apogee Consulting, Inc. published 112 blog articles in 2015. That’s about one every three days (more or less). Some were more popular than others, as measured by the number of recorded “hits”—which are the number of times the article was clicked on. (That metric ignores the number of times the article was read from the site’s “main page” but it’s the closest thing we have to a popularity meter.)

Based on that metric, the most popular article was “DCAA Resources” followed closely by “Expressly Unallowable Costs”. But as we’ve noted before, the metric is somewhat misleading, in that older articles have had more time to garner hits.

Last year, we listed our personal “Top 5” favorite articles. But in looking over this year’s crop, what we see are themes rather than articles. We see a series of related articles that, when read together, provide analysis and (if you’ll permit us) insight. Thus, this year we will list our Top 5 themes—themes that we believe captured the trends of the year and provided solid assessments of those trends.

They are, in no particular order—

  1. “Goodbye DCAA” – in which we reported on the lack of DCAA audit coverage being provided to non-DoD agencies (such as the Dept. of Energy and NASA). The articles started with noting that changes in the DCAA “risk-based” audit approach meant that a significant portion of contractors’ annual proposals to establish final billing rates (also known as “incurred cost submissions”) were no longer being audited by DCAA, and the non-DoD agencies didn’t have a plan to address that shortfall. Later in the year, we addressed the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and its prohibition on DCAA performing any audits for non-DoD agencies until the backlog of unaudited final billing rate proposals was reduced to a more manageable size. At this point, the non-DoD agencies are, essentially (though not completely), on their own with respect to audits of proposals, invoices, and the like. As far as we know, nobody has a plan covering how to replace the services DCAA formerly provided.

  1. “No Innovation Here” – in which we discussed the Pentagon’s expressed desire to regain its lead in technological innovation, and why we were so pessimistic that the kind of innovation that DoD leadership said it wanted was ever going to happen. We spoke publicly on the topic in April (at the BDO/PCI DCAA Executive Seminar in Tyson’s Corner) and we wrote many articles about it—culminating with our proposal for “achievable innovation” that laid-out several strategies that we thought might be feasible.

  1. “Contractor B.S.” – in which we discussed our thoughts on DoD’s management and oversight of contractor business systems. Some of the articles dealt with the DoD Inspector General’s criticism of DCMA; others dealt with the sheer unworkableness of the oversight regime. We spoke on the topic in November in front of government and private sector attorneys. At that forum, we called for a regime change, and we suggested that the American Bar Association sponsor a joint government/industry working group to design the “next generation” approach to contractor business system compliance. As of this date, we haven’t heard that anybody accepted our call to action….

  1. “Double-Secret Audit Guidance” – in which we discussed the startling lack of recently published DCAA audit guidance, and what that gap might mean. Readers responded and subsequently we learned that DCAA was issuing new audit guidance (via Memorandum for Regional Directors or MRDs). DCAA simply wasn’t choosing to publish the new audit guidance on its website anymore. Later in the series, we discovered that certain folks were able to access that secret audit guidance and were using it to drive a competitive advantage in the marketplace for consulting services. Thanks DCAA, for creating an unbalanced marketplace.

  1. “CAS” – in which we discussed the seemingly missing-in-action CAS Board, and how the CAS Board’s failure to make decisions and interpret its regulations actually affected multi-million dollar CAS-related litigation. This series of articles included a two-part discussion of the Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems business unit’s litigation at the ASBCA, and how the resulting decision clarified (for better or worse) how cost impacts related to changes in cost accounting practice were to be calculated.

So that was the year that was.

We did not link to the various articles discussed above. The website has a News Archive button over there on the left, and it takes you to a list of articles shown in chronological order by date of publication. You can configure the list to display anywhere from 5 to 100 articles at a time. You can even tell the archive to display all articles in one (very long) list—assuming you want to scroll through the more-than-900 articles we’ve published to date.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.