• Increase font size
  • Default font size
  • Decrease font size
Apogee Consulting Inc

DCAA and the Future of Reimbursable Audits

E-mail Print PDF

January, as we’ve noted before, seemed to be devoted to the audit staffing issues of the Defense Contract Audit Agency. That was not intentional—which is to say we did not set out after Christmas to focus on DCAA to the exclusion of all other issues; yet that is where the news of the moment took us. And now here we are, back once again, with yet another article about DCAA and its audit staffing issues.

Sorry about that, folks.

After our last series of articles we received an email from a fairly reliable “inside” source, somebody who’s proven over time to give us good stuff. That source alerted us to the lobbying efforts of DCAA leadership and their attempts to alter the FY 2016 NDAA language, convince Staffers that the language had created a problem, and to work to get the language “fixed” as soon as possible. (We assume you know about the problematic FY 2016 NDAA language from our articles on the topic. If not, you may want to review them before continuing with this article.)

Our source also alerted us to the lobbying efforts of DCAA leadership to persuade the civilian agencies to “stay the course” while Congress (and its Staffers) work to fix the problem. Our source wrote—

The civilian agencies are reportedly telling DCAA that ‘You guys are the gold standard and we want to stick with you; we'll remain patient until the new language goes into effect.’ Only a minority of work is expected to leave DCAA in favor of private CPA firms.

Now, our normal practice is not to write about that kind of stuff. First, we don’t know if it’s true or not, so we tend to err on the side of caution. Second, it’s not really newsworthy. Of course DCAA leadership is trying to get the problematic language fixed. Of course DCAA leadership would like to persuade the civilian agencies to accept a pause (of at least a year’s duration) in audit support while the language is getting fixed. All that is to be expected; and because it’s to be expected we tend not to want to write about it.

But then it was officially confirmed and certain details were added. And now we are writing about it.

We attended a public event at which the keynote speaker was a high-level DCAA SES person. That speaker—who was excellent by the way—addressed the issue and was quite up-front in confirming everything our source had told us. But it was the details we found to be of interest.

Here’s what we learned:

  • DCAA’s interpretation of the NDAA prohibition is that it applies only to audit work that is 100% reimbursable. For example, if DCAA is auditing a contractor’s proposal to establish final billing rates (which is commonly called an “incurred cost submission”) and that proposal has a mixture of both DoD and non-DoD contracts, DCAA will continue to perform the audit. However, if the contractor’s proposal has zero DoD contracts, then DCAA will not perform the audit. This interpretation minimizes the impact to DCAA’s workload.

  • The freeze (or pause, if you prefer) in performing audits has already had consequences. For example, the backlog of incurred cost submissions awaiting audit is now starting to creep back up. This is because DCAA still counts civilian agency ICS proposals in its backlog even though—according to the NDAA language—it cannot perform audits on those proposals. Nonetheless, this now gives DCAA yet another reason for having a backlog, a reason unconnected with management effectiveness. We predict that next year you will hear DCAA assert that it would have met its commitment to bring the backlog down to an 18 month supply, if it weren’t for those meddling Congressional Staffers.

  • Another impact of the audit freeze, according to the SES speaker, was that it has resulted in an agency-wide hiring freeze. The hiring freeze stems from DCAA management not knowing whether the auditors performing reimbursable work are actually available to be reassigned, or whether they will be back performing that work in less than a year. Until the resources are sorted out, DCAA isn’t sure what its needs are and has chosen to freeze hiring.

  • Meanwhile, according to the SES speaker, auditor attrition is still attriting and up to half the current DCAA leadership team is up for retirement within 3 to 5 years. Thus, there will be openings at all levels within DCAA and high potential auditors should expect promotion opportunities.

All in all, the SES speaker painted a bright, rosy picture of the future. There was an acknowledgement of past problems, but the focus was on all the in-process initiatives designed to move the audit agency forward into the 21st century. It was well done.

Yet while the SES speaker was pleading for patience, the acquisition environment continued to move forward. Proposals were submitted and evaluated, contracts were awarded, and public vouchers were submitted and paid. In the midst of the usual hustle-and-bustle of it all, many individuals still have their concerns about DCAA’s role and ability to add value. For example, we received the following email from an anonymous source—but a source that’s proven to be fairly accurate in the past.

Taking a Defense Acqusition University (DAU) class … The instructor when talking about DCAA in helping support anyone said basically ‘Forget DCAA they can't do anything’. The people in the class, that represented a pretty good cross section of agencies seemed to agree. What a great reputation DCAA has earned.

The question then becomes whether DCAA’s customers and stakeholders will grant DCAA the time necessary to effectuate the in-process initiatives—or whether it is already too late. The SES speaker did a great job in communicating those initiatives and in selling a vision of a more effective audit agency—but can those initiatives repair the reputational damage already done? When civilian agencies talk about DCAA being the “gold standard”—are they talking about the DCAA of 10 years ago or the DCAA of today?

Obviously we don’t know the answers to those questions. But you can bet that if we were running the audit agency, it would be those questions that would keep us up at night.

 

IRAD Accounting, Take Three

E-mail Print PDF

The proposed DFARS rule that was on, then off, is now back again in a new form.

As we’ve reported in past articles, certain high-level muckety-mucks in the Pentagon (and elsewhere) have long expressed a desire to “encourage effective use” of contractor Independent Research and Development (IRAD or IR&D). Here’s a link to a 2012 article that described the situation as of that date.

More recently, DoD’s “Better Buying Power 3.0” declared a renewed Pentagon focus on “increas[ing] the productivity of corporate R&D.” We noted that phrase with some alarm in this article. As we discussed, the implementing memo identified three initiatives that would be undertaken in order to accomplish the stated objective. The third initiative was described as: “Director DPAP, with ASD(A), will develop a proposed regulatory or statutory change that would preclude use of substantial future IRAD expenses as a means to reduce evaluated bid prices in competitive source selections and provide it to USD(AT&L) by July 2015.”

With respect to that third initiative, we opined at the time that—

This specific action will lead to a situation where DoD will realize (perhaps for the first time in history) how much its weapon systems actually cost taxpayers. There is no budget for these weapon systems if all the development costs are included. Nunn-McCurdy breaches are just waiting to happen. Congressional and taxpayer criticism will manifest quickly. We predict disaster will follow for DoD if this specific action is successfully implemented.

Since then, DoD has attempted to rein-in contractors’ IR&D spending through a regulatory change (which was another one of the three BBP 3.0 initiatives). That didn’t go well for Pentagon policy and rule-makers. As we noted, though, despite a public walk-back from the precipice of micro-managing so-called “independent” R&D projects, there were more than a few hints that DoD hadn’t given up its fight in the area.

And now, we are back once again talking about a Pentagon effort to micro-manage R&D spending, through a DFARS “Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” that offers the public an opportunity to comment on and “assist in the development of a revision to the DFARS to ensure that substantial future independent research and development (IR&D) expenses as a means to reduce evaluated bid prices in competitive source selections are evaluated in a uniform way during competitive source selections.”

As stated in the ANPRM—

DoD is considering a proposed approach whereby solicitations would require offerors to describe in detail the nature and value of prospective IR&D projects on which the offeror would rely to perform the resultant contract. Then, as a standard approach, DoD would evaluate proposals in a manner that would take into account that reliance by adjusting the total evaluated price to the Government, for evaluation purposes only, to include the value of related future IR&D projects.

That approach sounds … problematic.

The first part is actually fine. Contractors should be required to identify their IR&D projects upon which they will rely to perform the work. Doing so fosters transparency and also helps comply with the requirements of CAS 402 and 420, as interpreted in the important ATK Thiokol decision. We wrote about that decision here.

But that second part? The one where a Contracting Officer or Cost Monitor or Pricing Analyst is going to “adjust the total evaluated price … to include the value of related future IR&D projects”? Yeah, that’s not going to work. At all.

First of all, the value of any related future IR&D projects is an estimated value. It is subject to change based on the financial fortunes of the company and the whims of management. The value of any such projects is as fixed as Birnham Wood. (Go look up that reference. We’ll wait.)

If a contractor puts those notional values into its proposal, does that make those estimates certified cost or pricing data? If those notional values are certified cost or pricing data, then if the contractor spends less than “promised”—is that somehow defective pricing?

(Well, no. Because cost or pricing data are facts, not estimates. But you wait and see how many auditors assert those notional IR&D project values are actually cost or pricing data. You heard it here first.)

Additionally, if this proposed methodology is implemented we’ll all have to deal with the fact that IRAD projects are allocated to final cost objectives using the same base as is used to allocate G&A expense. (It’s commonly held that IR&D and B&P costs are part of G&A. That’s not strictly true. But it’s close enough for government work.) Thus, the value of any IRAD projects, for price evaluation purposes, is not the value of the IRAD projects—the value for price evaluation purposes is in fact the value of the IRAD projects that ends up being allocated to the awarded contract after it is awarded.

To figure out the correct value of the IR&D projects, for price evaluation purposes, you will need to know not only the value of the related IR&D projects, but also the percentage of the G&A allocation base that the proposed contract will end up being, after award. That means not only knowing the contract value of the proposed contract, but also knowing the contract values of all the other contracts that will comprise the cost input base used for G&A expense allocation.

In the future.

Perhaps years in the future. For the entire period of performance of the contract for which the contractor is submitting its proposal.

Yeah, you go figure that out. We’ll wait here (again).

This is a bad idea and you should tell the DoD that it’s a bad idea.

And you should tell the policy makers and rule-makers why it is a bad idea.

In this case, you will have more than one opportunity to do so. DoD is holding a public meeting on the topic. According to the ANPRM, “a public meeting will be held in the General Services Administration (GSA), Central Office Auditorium, 1800 F Street NW., Washington DC, 20405, on March 3, 2016, from 12:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., local time. The GSA Auditorium is located on the main floor of the building.” But you just can’t waltz in there; you have to follow protocol, if you want to have your comments heard. The ANPRM has all the details as to how to do that.

In addition, you can also submit written comments between now and April 8, 2016. Again, the ANPRM has the salient details for submitting your comments.

We here at Apogee Consulting, Inc., sincerely hope you will avail yourselves of the opportunities to make your voice heard on this important topic.

 

 

Direct or Indirect, but Not Both

E-mail Print PDF

The most important concept in the Federal Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) is consistency. Do what you say you are going to do, and do it that way every single time. It’s a deceptively simple concept and violated more often than one might think. Simple to articulate, difficult to apply.

Case in point: Standard 402: “Consistency in Allocating Costs Incurred for the Same Purpose.” The fundamental requirement of CAS 402 is as follows:

All costs incurred for the same purpose, in like circumstances, are either direct costs only or indirect costs only with respect to final cost objectives. No final cost objective shall have allocated to it as an indirect cost any cost, if other costs incurred for the same purpose, in like circumstances, have been included as a direct cost of that or any other final cost objective. Further, no final cost objective shall have allocated to it as a direct cost any cost, if other costs incurred for the same purpose, in like circumstances, have been included in any indirect cost pool to be allocated to that or any other final cost objective.

And there you go. Costs must be either direct or indirect costs and, once a contractor determines which of its costs are direct and which are indirect, then all of those costs incurred for the same purpose, in similar circumstances, must be treated the same way—either direct or indirect. The contractor must be consistent in its cost accounting treatment, and the only loophole is that you can treat costs differently if the purpose and/or circumstances are different. Otherwise: consistency is the watchword.

The DCAA Contract Audit Manual contains several illustrations to help auditors distinguish cost accounting practices that are compliant with CAS 402 requirements from cost accounting practices that are not compliant. Here’s one that caught our eyes—

Problem. A contractor has a Government contract which requires extra effort for planning and cost management. It hired extra people to accomplish this effort and accounted for all their labor cost as a direct charge to the contract. The contractor has other people performing the same functions for more than one contract and their labor is charged to indirect costs.

Solution. Since the work being performed is the same and the only difference is in the amount of effort required to accomplish the function, this practice would not comply with the standard. The contractor could correct the situation by:

(1) charging all of these costs to indirect costs and developing an equitable distribution base or

(2) direct charging all of these costs.

We’ve encountered many upon many unintentional violations of CAS 402; some were trivial in amount (and consequences) and others not so much. Recently, government contractor Centerra Services International Inc., formerly known as Wackenhut Services LLC, seemingly ran afoul of CAS 402 and, as a result, had to pay $7.4 million to settle the resulting False Claims Act litigation.

According to the Department of Justice announcement—

Wackenhut provided U.S. military bases with firefighting and fire protection services under a subcontract with Kellogg Brown & Root Inc. (KBR), the prime contractor for the Army’s contract for logistical support in the military theater, known as LOGCAP III. LOGCAP III is the third generation of contracts under the Army’s Logistical Civil Augmentation Program. The government alleged that from 2008 to 2010, Wackenhut inflated its labor costs by billing the salaries of certain managers as direct costs under the subcontract, when those salaries had already been charged as indirect costs. The government further alleged that Wackenhut artificially inflated its labor rate by counting its costs for holidays, vacation, sick leave, rest and recuperation and other variable labor costs twice in calculating the rate. Wackenhut billed KBR, which then passed on the costs to the government under LOGCAP III.

While we don’t know any of the specifics of the allegations, it appears that Wackenhut (or Centerra Services, as the company is now called) decided to bill the labor associated with “certain managers” as direct costs, even though the salaries of those managers had been budgeted as indirect costs and included in the approved contract provisional billing rates as indirect costs. CAS 402 says you can’t do that. If you budget your managers’ salaries as indirect costs you have to treat those salaries as indirect costs on a consistent basis—even if “certain managers” supported the LOGCAP efforts on a full-time basis.

This CAS-based logic may seem counter-intuitive to some people. They might tend to think that if a cost can be identified to a project or contract (or “final cost objective” in CAS lingo) then it should be—or must be—a direct cost of that project or contract. But CAS says otherwise: CAS 402 says that if you identified that cost as an indirect cost, then it must always be treated as an indirect cost, even if it might be easy to treat it as a direct cost. As we noted, the only exception would be for a different purpose or different circumstances.

Indeed, if you were to go look at the very definition of “direct cost” in the FAR or in the CAS regulations, you would see that a direct cost is one that has been identified as a direct cost within the contractor’s accounting system—not one that could be identified as a direct cost. The distinction between those two concepts is crucial to CAS compliance.

The decision to make certain costs—or certain functions or activities—direct costs only or indirect costs only needs to be made with a lot of discussion and forethought, because once that decision is made it is very difficult to change. Typically, contentious discussions arise with respect to Security, Contracts, and similar functions. If the contractor states that Security is always an indirect function then, absent a different purpose or different circumstances, it must remain an indirect function—even if a Security person is assigned to an individual contract on a full-time basis.

CAS 402 means that if you decide that the cost of all personal computers is an indirect cost, then you cannot charge the cost of certain personal computers as a direct contract cost, even if you wouldn’t have purchased them absent the contract’s need for them.

CAS 402 means that if you decide that the salary costs of managers is an indirect cost, then you cannot charge the cost of certain managers as a direct contract cost if they are incurred in like circumstances. Because if you do so, you are violating the requirements of CAS 402 and you may find yourself in the midst of expensive False Claim Act litigation as a result.

 

 

Commercial Item Determinations—A Different Viewpoint

E-mail Print PDF

Commercial_ItemThe Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA) established a statutory preference for acquisition of “commercial items” instead of military specification (MIL-SPEC) items, whenever possible. Ever since that time, certain groups within and without the Department of Defense have been fighting against that statutory preference. We noted some of the contentious history in this article, discussing last year’s attempt—ultimately an unsuccessful one—to roll-back the DFARS regulatory language to a new approach that was remarkably similar to the pre-FASA methodology used by Contracting Officers more than 20 years ago.

Many of the more contentious disagreements center on the definition of “commercial item” (and the definition of commercial item services), which is currently found at FAR 2.101. How does an item (or service) qualify as a “commercial item,” and if it does, then how does the customer establish the price it is paying is a fair and reasonable one? This issue is especially important with respect to non-competitive acquisitions of spare parts, where the contractor asserts that its spare parts are “of a type” that it routinely sells (or offers for sale) in the commercial marketplace. Such problems tend to result in adverse reports from the DoD Office of Inspector General.

The DoD has issued a Commercial Item Handbook to help Contracting Officers determine whether or not an item or service meets the FAR definition. The Handbook acknowledges that “the commercial item definition is broad” and that many items and services will meet the definition. Importantly, the Handbook states—

The commercial item definition is not limited to items acquired by the Government from prime contractors; it also extends to commercial items acquired from subcontractors at all tiers, including items transferred from a contractor’s divisions, affiliates, or subsidiaries.

That statement means that the issue of whether or not a part (or service) meets the FAR definition is not simply the problem of DoD or civilian agency Contracting Officers; it means that the issue is also a problem for prime contractors and lower-tier subcontractors. Making a proper commercial item determination ultimately is a problem for acquisition professionals throughout government contracting.

And nobody is especially good at it.

The problem is two-fold. First, the determination must be based on solid data and information. The supplier or contractor who seeks to have its items/services declared to be commercial items must provide sufficient evidence to permit the buyer or Contracting Officer to make an accurate determination. The burden is on the supplier to provide the evidence, and suppliers who are not transparent and forthright in providing that evidence should not expect the determination to go in their favor. Suppliers should not expect a determination of commerciality unless they provide the person making that determination with convincing evidence.

Second, the determination must be documented. The documentation must be sufficient to survive a skeptical review by an OIG auditor or DCMA CPSR reviewer. This is a critical area in which many otherwise proper commercial item determinations fail. Importantly, a failure in this area may lead to a determination that the price being paid cannot be supported as being fair and reasonable. For Contracting Officers, that finding may be an embarrassment or even a career set-back. For contractors, that finding might result in disallowed supplier costs.

Much has been written about failed commercial item determinations and, as a result of concerns in this area, the DoD has created “centers of excellence” to help its Contracting Officers get it right. In this article, we want to focus on a situation where the commercial item determination was made correctly, but the underlying customary commercial item practices were misinterpreted. In other words, the government went to the commercial marketplace to buy a commercial item service, but did so in a manner that the commercial marketplace did not support. The government’s missteps led to a successful bid protest at the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

We think this particular bid protest is noteworthy because it shows us another side of commercial item determinations, another viewpoint into this difficult area. It shows us that when a buyer makes a determination that a particular item or service is commercial, then that buyer also needs to design an acquisition strategy that corresponds to the way that item/service is sold commercially.

In other words, when the government (or higher-tier contractor) buys a commercial item/service, then it must acquire that item or service in the same manner in which it is offered for sale in the marketplace. The buyer cannot impose his or her own acquisition methodology on the commercial methodology; s/he must accept what the market offers.

In the instant case (link above), Red River Waste Solutions (RRWS) protested the terms of a solicitation issued by the Department of the Army for solid waste management services “at or near Fort Polk, Louisiana.” RRWS protested “that the solicitation, which seeks commercial services pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12, contains terms that are inconsistent with customary commercial practice. …” RRWS was the incumbent contractor, and noted that the new solicitation contained terms that were significantly different from its current contract. Among other changes, the new solicitation eliminated CLINs for variable costs and, instead, required offerors to “to submit prices that reflect ‘all fixed and variable costs’ on a per-ton basis, and ‘only permits the Contractor to invoice on tonnage collected.” RRWS asserted in its protest that using a per-ton basis for invoicing was inconsistent with customary commercial practices.

The government disagreed, and asserted that its market research had led to a determination that a per-ton basis pricing methodology was aligned with customary commercial practices in this area. As the GAO decision stated—

In response to RRWS’s protest, the agency acknowledges that the services contemplated by this solicitation are commercial services, and that the solicitation is subject to the requirements of FAR Part 12. … Nonetheless, the agency asserts that it performed market research supporting a determination that requiring per-ton fixed prices in refuse contracts is customary commercial practice. The agency’s market research consisted of the following: (1) review of other Army refuse contracts; (2) request for feedback from industry in a Sources Sought Notice (SSN); and (3) contact with a sales representative for Thomas Trash Services, a company located in upstate New York. … [T]he agency states that it considered other Army refuse contracts at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, at Fort Drum in New York, and at Fort Stewart in Georgia, to determine whether those contracts contained prices based on tonnage. … The agency found that Fort Bragg ‘utilizes CLINs based on months’; that Fort Stewart operates its own landfill and, therefore, ‘do[es] not track cost by tonnage’; and that Fort Drum ‘utilizes a tonnage approach’ for its post-wide refuse contracts. … Finally, the agency states that it obtained ‘historical market research’ that had been performed in September 2014 by personnel at Fort Drum, New York, by contacting a sales representative for Thomas Trash Services, a company located in upstate New York. Based on this contact, the agency stated:

[The named sales representative] explained that fixed and variable costs can be combined to establish a per ton price. [The sales representative] stated that this is the method of pricing used by Thomas Trash Services and it is a practical method of pricing for trash removal services. Based on [the sales representative's] expertise and knowledge of industry, it has been verified that pricing based on tonnage is an acceptable commercial practice.

The problem with the foregoing is that it did not represent adequate market research into customary commercial practices associated with the commercial item service being acquired. In our view, it appears to be a rather lackadaisical approach to performing market research. Indeed, it appears that the research was more focused on how the government acquired, rather than how the market offered, the services being sought.

The GAO decision stated—

… we agree with the protester’s assertion that it was unreasonable for the agency to rely on other government refuse contracts as a basis for establishing customary commercial practice, since contracts with the federal government are not generally considered to be part of the commercial marketplace. … If government contracts were generally considered part of the commercial marketplace, everything the government procures could be considered a commercial item, and a significant portion of FAR Part 12 would be rendered superfluous. … In this regard, since the intent of FAR Part 12 is that both the government and its contractors will benefit by the government’s acquisition of commercial goods and services using the same terms and conditions used in the commercial marketplace, such benefits fail to be realized when the government includes solicitation terms in commercial acquisitions that are contrary to that objective. In short, the agency’s reliance here on other government refuse contracts does not provide a reasonable basis for its determination that the pricing provisions in this solicitation reflect customary commercial practice. … Finally, we agree with the protester’s contention that the market research previously performed by Fort Drum personnel through their contact with a sales representative for a trash company in upstate New York does not provide an adequate basis for concluding that this solicitation’s price-per-ton approach reflects customary commercial practice. Here, the record does not contain, or even reference, any particular commercial refuse contract to which the New York trash company was a party. Further the record does not contain any documentation from the sales representative himself, nor does it even contain any documentation from the Fort Drum personnel who contacted the sales representative.

Because the agency did not perform adequate market research, and because the agency structured the terms of its solicitation in a manner other than customary commercial practices (based on that inadequate market research), the protest was sustained.

This successful bid protest has implications not only for government Contracting Officers, but also for acquisition professionals throughout the various tiers of government contracting. It stands for the proposition that when a commercial item or service is being acquired, it must be acquired in a manner consistent with the manner in which the commercial marketplace offers it for sale. If somebody wants to impose a government-unique pricing methodology on a commercial item or service, then that person is undercutting his/her commerciality argument—and perhaps leaving the acquisition vulnerable to a successful protest.

(Hat tip to Bob Antonio of WIFCON for posting the bid protest on his site.)

 

 

DCAA Reorganizes to Rebalance its Workload

E-mail Print PDF

Much has been written, here and elsewhere, about recent changes to DCAA’s workload. If you don’t know what we’re talking about, please visit the News Archive over there on the left side of our website’s front page, and take a look through the recent articles on the topic.

Suffice to say, DCAA leadership has a lot to deal with these days—and to deal with it they have decided to significantly reorganize the audit agency.

More than one source provided us with purported internal communications on the topic, including maps and org charts – so we’re going with this story as being confirmed and accurate. If you know anything different, send us an email and we’ll correct any mistakes.

From those internal communications, we learned that DCAA is embracing the “CAC Network” concept at all of the largest defense contractors. The “CAC Network” approach is not new: it was first introduced by then-Director Pat Fitzgerald in 2011. The concept envisions a coordinated and communicative network of auditors, all of whom focus on one single contractor and all of whom are under the direction of a single audit leader. It was first piloted at Raytheon, where it seemingly worked well for DCAA and DCMA. Challenges included negotiating with the union to break auditors out of local union siloes and negotiating with Field Detachment regarding its proper role within the CAC Network. DCAA overcame those challenges and is moving the concept to other contractors, including General Dynamics, BAE, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Honeywell. All auditors associated with each of those contractors will report into the CAC Network, which will be managed in single offices. (As a side note, L-3 Communications is going to have its own CAC Network, managed entirely by Field Detachment. Good luck with that.)

The thing of it is, the CAC Network concept is not particularly new news and most of the contractors listed above have been identified before as being candidates for implementation. Indeed, in the 2012 Annual Report, Northrop Grumman was identified as being next in line after Raytheon. That was literally four years ago. That said, the more widespread implementation of the CAC Network is the official reason for the workload “rebalancing” that requires such a significant agency reorganization.

And what is that reorganization?

In the words of Ms. Bales—

The result [of the reorganization] is 3 regions—Eastern in Atlanta, Central in Dallas, and Western in Los Angeles. The physical size of the regions has increased significantly, and the boundaries may appear awkward compared to our current regional structure. While we now have a more evenly balanced workload among the regions, the workload distribution does not fall neatly along geographical lines. … Our customers will get the benefits of the new structure without being affected by the physical regional boundaries.

Ms. Bales wasn’t kidding when she stated that the three new regions look “awkward” when compared to the way it used to be. For example, the new Western Region stretches from Alaska and Hawaii to Arkansas—and apparently includes South Asia as well. The new Western Region encompasses 24 of the 50 states. In contrast, the new Eastern Region stretches from Maine to Georgia and seems to include Europe and North Asia. And the new Central Region encompasses 13 states (including Florida), and also includes Puerto Rico. So yeah, awkward. But it must make sense to the folks in Ft. Belvoir.

Regional Audit Manager (RAM) assignments may be a more telling indication of the workload/audit volume between the three Regions. There are eight (8) RAM assignments in the Western Region, ten (10) RAM assignments in the Eastern Region, and eight (8) in the Central Region. (FD has 5 RAM assignments.) Interestingly, two of the eight Western Region RAM positions are shown as being vacant, meaning there are promotion opportunities available.

What happened to the Mid-Atlantic Region? It’s gone. Disappeared. It no longer exists. And that means the Mid-Atlantic Compensation Team no longer exists as well. Our understanding is that at least one other Region is standing up its own Compensation Team to meet the needs of the Incurred Cost audit teams.

Importantly, the new CAC Network leaders (Directors?) report directly to Ms. Bales and not to the Regional Directors (with the possible exception of the L-3 CAC Network leader, who may report directly to Ms. Cash, Field Detachment Director). There are three RAMS in the GD/Raytheon/BAE CAC Network (reporting to Lowell, MA). There are three RAMS in the Lockheed Martin CAC Network (reporting to Fort Worth, TX). There are three RAMS in the Boeing/Honeywell Network (reporting to St. Louis, MO). And there are two RAMS in the Northrop Grumman Network (reporting to Falls Church, VA).

For those readers who may be wondering which Region their cognizant Field Audit Office (FAO) reports into, DCAA prepared several slides to answer that question. Basically, it’s as you would expect. If you are in one of Western Region states, your FAO very likely reports into the Western Region (even if it previously reported into the Central Region). Ditto for the Central and Eastern Regions.

We have asked our technologist and web master to post the documents we received to our website. They should go up soon. If you are a member, you can access them. If you are not a member, you are out of luck.

As a reminder, membership is not a big deal. Membership is free. Apogee Consulting, Inc. does not sell membership information to anybody. Apogee Consulting, Inc. does not use membership information for any commercial purposes. Instead, membership is simply an acknowledgement of commitment to following the information we provide, on the blog and elsewhere on the site. If you are not willing to commit to a free membership then you cannot access the resources available on the site.

Will the reorganization help DCAA with its perceived productivity problems? We’ll have to wait to see. But one thing is for sure: it’s the biggest shakeup to impact DCAA in quite a while.

 


Page 97 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.