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Apogee Consulting Inc

Busy Season

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CPAs and tax-preparers will recognize today’s blog title. It’s that time of year when financial statements need to get audited in order to sign-off on the 10-K, the time of year when everybody wants their taxes done so they can file by the deadline. It’s the time of year when one needs to buckle down and put distractions to the side, so that the inputs can be converted into outputs. It’s the time of year when most of the annual revenue gets generated.

In the consulting life it doesn’t really work that way. There are workload peaks and valleys scattered throughout the year, depending on what the clients need and when they need it. There is no “busy season” per se; but you hope that the whole year will be a good balance of input and output. Ideally, the work to be done is a mix of short-term revenue generation and long-term client development. In addition, it’s always nice to throw some learning and some thought leadership into the mix. You don’t want the peaks to be too high and you don’t want the valleys to be too low. What you want is steady state.

But sometimes you don’t get steady state. Sometimes you get a workload peak and you’ve got to buckle down and get it done. Such has been our lot in life over the past several weeks. Which is good news from a revenue generation perspective but not so good news from a “time to write a blog article” perspective.

Thus, there’s been a bit of a hiatus in the article-writing department.

It’s not like there haven’t been topics of interest, topics we would have liked to discuss here. For example, DCAA put out a new MRD on use of blended rates which piggy-backed on a DCMA guidance memo (same topic). We would have liked to review that guidance in light of our previous article on the topic. But alas, that was not to be the case. Some people like to post a link to guidance with no further comments; other people post a link and a high-level summary of the contents. That’s just not our style here. We like to think about the guidance and how somebody might actually implement it. We like to offer an opinion regarding whether or not it’s good guidance. And we like to have some substance behind that opinion.

All of which takes time, time that has been in short supply recently.

The good news for readers is that we can see an end to this busy season, a drop from the current peak—hopefully not into a deep valley, but who knows? The point is that the production of blog articles will resume in the near future.

We’ll discuss blended rates. We’ll discuss the postscript to the NEON audit controversy. We’ll note in passing continued problems with Boeing’s KC-46 aerial tanker, and lessons that should be learned about the F-35 Lightning II program. We’ll perhaps discuss innovation and acquisition reform, since those topics continue to be discussed by policy-makers. We’ll complain (once again) about the missing-in-action CAS Board and we’ll complain about the missing ASBCA website. In short, we predict a return to normalcy in the near future.

But not just yet.

 

Misinterpretations and Misinformation

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Normally we go out of our way to extend courtesy to fellow consultants who express opinions on topics of current interest.

Normally.

However, sometimes there is an interpretation that is so off-base that it demands to be set straight. People rely on solid interpretations and solid advice given by self-proclaimed experts; and sometimes those “experts” get it wrong.

Granted, there’s a lot of gray area in the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Cost Accounting Standards. We’ve been doing this compliance thing for 30 years now, and we are still learning new things. That said, the fundamental requirement to giving good advice is to read thoroughly, think critically, and support opinions with facts. If you can’t do that, you’re in the wrong business.

Come we now to a little post on LinkedIn by a consultant who’s been consulting for 6 months, after a 26 year career with DCAA. This consultant has “in depth understanding of Government contracting and extensive experience in compliance determination” and “over 20 years of extensive knowledge in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), DFARS, and Cost Accounting Standards (CAS).” This consultant posted a link to a GovExec article entitled “Air Force Told to Save Millions on Contractors’ Depot Labor” and used that article to offer potential clients the following advice:

Federal Government budget is not like it use to be due to cost costing mandated by the Congress. It is better for companies now thinking about getting in a new contract with multiple subs to do the job. It does not have to worry as much of cost control and still earn profit over subcontract costs plus an allocation of procurement and G&A costs. Forecasting costs and planning is very crucial. Best scenario in this environment. The problem of this for public companies is that they have to prove to shareholders and investors that sales are growing .

As we interpreted that advice, it seemed that the consultant was advocating use of subcontractors. Which was weird, because the article didn’t seem to have much relevance to that advice. Other LinkedIn posters interpreted the advice in the same way. One comment stated “Are you trying to say it is better for contractors to use subs than employees? I agree that subcontracting work is a good solution in some cases but definitely not always and in most cases I think it is more expensive to the contractor when they already have the capacity to hire employees as their own.” To which the consultant replied (somewhat cryptically) “Fee applies on total costs and subcontracts is a part of total costs.”

Had the consultant read the GovExec article more closely, or actually read the DoD OIG audit report that was the subject of the GovExec article, that consultant would have realized that the DoD OIG audit report was very poor support for the position that more subcontracting was better. To the extent the audit report was even discussing subcontracting, it was advocating that the prime contractor should not receive the same fee on subcontractors’ overhead as it did on subcontractors’ direct labor—which would tend to make subcontracting less financially attractive.

We pointed out the error but the consultant had a quick rebuttal to our point. The consultant posted “what IG talked about is an issue that has been around, it is called pass through costs to government where the prime applies fee to subcontract costs, as part of the prime's total costs. The opinion is that there is no added value of the prime on subcontract costs. …”

(Which was no rebuttal at all, but never mind that.)

The point of this article is that people and companies in search of government contracting consultants need to carefully vet those consultants before hiring them, paying them, and relying on their advice. The fact that somebody spent 26 years with DCAA—or 30 years elsewhere—doesn’t meant s/he knows what s/he is talking about. It’s not all about regulatory knowledge; it’s about applying that knowledge to further the business objectives of the client. And not everybody can do that, despite spending decades dealing with the issues.

Now let’s move on to the DoD OIG audit report (link above). Here’s a summary from the DoD IG website—

The Air Force did not effectively negotiate depot labor profit. Specifically, contracting officials did not adequately reduce or eliminate profit and fees paid for work performed by the depot. … DoD guidance did not require contracting officials to:

  • assess the depot at lower risk and reduce profit and fees when it was treated differently from other subcontractors, and

  • eliminate profit and fees the contractor is paid on the depot nonrepair costs since those expenses do not directly support the maintenance performed. The nonrepair costs accounted for 69.3 to 78.4 percent of the total profit for the three contracts.

As a result, the three contractors will earn millions in profit and fees on low-risk DoD labor.

The DoD OIG report was addressing a fairly rare deal: the use of public-private partnerships to accomplish depot repair work. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are “cooperative arrangements between a DoD depot-level maintenance activity and one or more private sector entities to perform DoD-related work or utilize DoD depot facilities and equipment." Right there we see that any lessons learned from the audit report were going to have a very narrow application.

In the PPP, the DoD depot activity is the subcontractor to a prime contractor. Obviously, having a government entity as a subcontractor is a bit different than the usual run-of-the-mill prime contractor/subcontractor relationship. The DoD OIG audit report addressed three PPPs between Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC) and prime contractors. In those arrangements, DoD negotiated prime contract prices with the primes that included the costs of WR-ALC depot activities as subcontractors. The WR-ALC depot costs consisted of direct labor plus allocated overhead expenses for such items as “office supplies, depreciation of buildings, and military salaries.” The DoD OIG asserted that the prime contractors shouldn’t receive the same profit on the overhead expenses as they did for the depot direct labor hours.

We read that audit report with some interest, because it seemed counterintuitive to split total costs into various constituent components and apply a different profit rate to each component. That’s not at all what the DoD weighted guidelines for negotiating profit/fee tell a Contracting Officer to do. Ultimately we decided against blogging about the IG audit report, because it seemed to be such a niggling point, with only limited applicability to the general contracting world.

But then our consultant friend decided to use an article about that audit report as the jumping-off point for … something. We really don’t know what that consultant was trying to accomplish, other than perhaps get some LinkedIn recognition. But that something caught our attention. That something was misinformed and contained gross misinterpretations of what was really going on. Some people on LinkedIn saw that consultant’s advice and the article that was being used as support for the advice, and they probably didn’t click the link to the article (let alone read the original IG audit report), and so they didn’t see that the article was poor support for the advice, and they didn’t see what was wrong with advice and the follow-up posts. For all we know, some people might have taken the advice being offered at face value, which would have been a bad mistake.

And that’s what led to this article.

 

DoD’s Guerrilla War on Contractors’ IRAD

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Guerrilla_WarfareThat’s not our headline; it’s the headline from a recent client alert issued by the esteemed law firm of Crowell & Moring. It’s a pithy summary of our feelings on the matter, though, as exemplified by our most recent article on the topic. In that article we recounted some of the history of the various DoD-led attempts to micro-manage contractors’ R&D spending, so as to “encourage effective use” of R&D dollars to meet Pentagon objectives.

“Micro-manage” is our term. Others might use terms such as “guide” or “control” or even “engage in centralized planning”. Whatever term you prefer to use, the fact of the matter is that one of the defining characteristics of the Obama Defense Department is its focus on contractors’ IR&D budgets. That focus, of course, in inimical to fostering the kind of innovation that the DoD also says it wants to achieve. On one hand, the Pentagon talks about losing its technological edge to adversaries and trying to leverage the “fail faster” agility of Silicon Valley; but on the other hand it talks about “sponsoring” IR&D projects and using the amount contractors spend on certain R&D projects as an adder to price evaluations, which effectively penalizes a contractor for engaging in research and development.

Dear Dr. Carter: You can’t have it both ways. You have to choose between managing contractor R&D projects from a central Pentagon bureaucracy, or else getting that bureaucracy the hell away from contractors and let them go to town—just like they do it at Silicon Valley. Pick one, please.

A recent example of how Pentagon policies stifle innovation was reported by DefenseNews in this story, written by Laura Seligman. Ms. Seligman reported that—

Lockheed Martin has decided not to offer a clean-sheet design for the US Air Force’s T-X program, instead moving forward with the original plan to offer the T-50A to replace the service's aging T-38 trainer fleet. Lockheed had been toying with the idea of offering a clean-sheet design for the T-X competition for months, but ultimately concluded that option would pose too much risk to the program’s cost and schedule …

… the [Lockheed Martin] team concluded that a brand-new blueprint would be about eight times more expensive than the modernized T-50A and would not meet the Air Force’s new target date of 2024 for initial operational capability … [and] would add significant risk to the program.

Thus, instead of getting a “clean-sheet design” that maximizes innovation, the Air Force gets the same trainer aircraft it has been using for more than 50 years. Of course, Lockheed touted the “block changes” it will make to the existing aircraft if it wins the competition. (You can read about those changes in the DefenseNews story.) But none of those changes represent fundamental, innovative, advances on the original nearly 60 year-old design.

Lockheed Martin chose a path that minimizes risk but sacrifices innovation. In the current acquisition environment—one rife with Lowest-Price Technically Acceptable contract awards and management reviews of any price “premiums” paid in best value trade-off analyses—it’s probably the smart way to go.

And yet, once again the Pentagon isn’t getting what it says it wants. Why? The culprit may be the acquisition folks and the recent “Better Buying Power 3.0” initiative. Let’s look at that initiative (once again).

BBP 3.0 is the poster child for the Pentagon double-speak. On one hand, the goal of BBP 3.0 is to “increase the productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness” in the areas of acquisition, technology and logistics. On the other hand, page 11 of the implementing memo declared open war on contractors’ R&D spending, stating –

Reviews of IRAD spending indicate that a high fraction of IRAD is being spent on near-term competitive opportunities and on de minimis investments primarily intended to create intellectual property. A problematic form of this use of IRAD is in cases where promised future IRAD expenditures are used to substantially reduce the bid price on competitive procurements. In these cases, development price proposals are reduced by using a separate source of government funding (allowable IRAD overhead expenses spread across the total business) to gain a price advantage in a specific competitive bid. This is not the intended purpose of making IRAD an allowable cost.

The intent of the actions below is to ensure that IRAD meets the complementary goals of providing defense companies an opportunity to exercise independent judgement [sic] on investments in promising technologies that will provide a competitive advantage, including the creation of intellectual property, while at the same time pursuing technologies that may improve the military capability of the United States. The laissez faire approach of the last few decades has allowed defense companies to emphasize the former much more than the later [sic]. The goal of this initiative is to restore the balance between these goals.

To achieve the stated objective of “improve communication between DoD and industry and restore a higher degree of government oversight of this technology investment,” the BBP 3.0 memo identified three initiatives that were to be undertaken by various Pentagon entities. The three initiatives were as follows (and we quote):

  1. ASD(R&E), beginning in 2015, will organize and initiate the execution of a continuing series of annual joint Technology Interchange Meetings (TIMs) with industry, organized by the existing S&T CoIs. Through virtual exchange of data and in person reviews, the S&T CoIs will provide industry with more detailed information about future program plans and gain enhanced DoD understanding and visibility into relevant IRAD.

  1. Director DPAP, with ASD(R&E), will recommend to USD(AT&L) new guidelines for allowable [sic] of IRAD expenses by May 2015. The new guidelines will include: identification and endorsement of an appropriate technical DoD sponsor from the DoD acquisition and technology community prior to project initiation; and provision of a written report of results obtained following the completion of the project, or annually if the project spans multiple years. Following USD(AT&L)’s approval, the new guidelines will be implemented through a standard rule making notice and comment process.

  1. Director DPAP, with ASD(A), will develop a proposed regulatory or statutory change that would preclude use of substantial future IRAD expenses as a means to reduce evaluated bid prices in competitive source selections and provide it to USD(AT&L) by July 2015.

As far as we know, the first initiative is going on. The second initiative was started but then stalled (publicly, at least). And we recently commented on the third initiative, which includes an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), an opportunity for the public to comment on the ANPRM, and a public meeting to air grievances and concerns with the ANPRM.

We’ve noted this apparent war on contractors’ IR&D several times on this blog. We’ve railed against it. We’ve used intemperate language, and even implied that the kind of centralized planning and control the Pentagon said it wanted to impose was hard to differentiate from Soviet-era centralized planning and control. But it hasn’t just been us! Others, including the President of Textron Systems, called on the Pentagon to walk away from its efforts to “micro-manage” IR&D. (That was her word, not ours.) At the time of the initial controversy, an article on the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) blog carried the following quote—

“The point of IRAD is to have government reimbursed R&D that isn't government directed, in order to see what the best minds in industry can do to solve the government's tough problems,” said a defense industry representative who asked to not be quoted by name. “Having the government dictate exactly what it wants kind of takes the ‘I’ out of IRAD.”

(Emphasis added.)

Having recited some of the history of this issue, we come at last to the final question: why?

Why do Defense leaders and policy-makers engage in double-speak on this topic? Why do so many Pentagon bureaucrats believe the best way to encourage innovation is to control it? Why are they looking to penalize contractors for engaging in unauthorized R&D projects?

In more than five years of thinking and writing about this particular topic, it is the “why?” that has always eluded us. Why would something so obviously counter-productive be perceived to be in the Pentagon’s best interests? We’ve never gotten it, and our lack of understanding has bothered us.

And now we think we’ve figured it out, thanks to Sam. Sam is a smart friend and we thank Sam for explaining it all to us.

The answer is right there in the last sentence of the quote above, the one we italicized. The unspoken objective is to take the “I” out of IRAD.

Why would that be important?

If the IRAD projects were not “independent” then the Pentagon would have access to the intellectual property developed by those projects.

Sam pointed out that the FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), at Section 824, eviscerated the long-standing “follow-the-funds” test to determine who owned intellectual property rights. Under that test, whichever entity paid for the research or development efforts owned the rights. For example, ideas discovered by people who were directly charging their time to a government contract were owned by the government; whereas ideas discovered by people who were charging to IR&D or other contractor-funded projects were owned by the contractor. But that was changed by the FY 2011 NDAA. Statutory language seemed to require that B&P and IR&D efforts be treated as “government expense”—since the government reimbursed the contractor for such efforts through indirect rates. As Louis Victorino of Shepherd Mullin wrote at the time—

As enacted, the Act seems to require, at least to some extent, that Independent Research and Development (‘IRAD’) costs and Bid and Proposal (‘B&P’) costs be treated as ‘government expense’ in applying the data rights follow-the-funds test. As such, the government would be allocated, at a minimum, a Government Purpose Rights License in data related to an item or process developed under an IRAD or B&P project or, more likely, an Unlimited Rights License in those data. This, obviously, would be a marked departure from established principles that define IRAD and B&P costs as ‘private expense.’ Indeed, the treatment of IRAD and B&P costs as ‘private expense’ has its roots in the earliest interpretations of the rights in data provisions set forth in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation of the late 1950s and 1960s. This historic treatment of IRAD and B&P costs even avoided the assault on the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (‘DFARS’) data rights provisions adopted in the late 1987-88 time period (only to be reversed in the 1995 revisions).

The FY 2012 NDAA contained similar challenges to contractors’ rights to their own intellectual property. In a February, 2012, Law360 article pulled from the Crowell & Moring website, Ralph Nash (esteemed èminence grise of all things government contracting) was quoted as saying that he —

sees the [FY 2012 NDAA] provisions as part of the ‘steady erosion of contractors' ability to protect his data in the first case.’ The government cannot force a contractor to give up data rights, but by using data rights as part of its evaluation of competing contract bids, it can leverage its buying power to get more and more data, he said. ‘You could always buy data rights, but you had to buy them as a separate procurement,’ Nash said. ‘[Government agencies] have been, in the last five years, busily finding ways to use that competition to get data rights by treating it as something they're going to evaluate in selecting the winner of the competition.’

Government agencies looking for ways to obtain data rights by making the issue a part of competitive evaluations? Where, oh where, have we heard that before?

A January, 2014, National Defense magazine article by Sanda Irwin discussed the “tension” between the Pentagon and its suppliers over rights to data and other intellectual property. The article (which we recommend you read in full) includes the following discussion points—

The origins of the conflict can be traced back to the mid-1990s, when the Defense Department saw its R&D budgets collapse and decided it should tap into the commercial market for innovation. The thinking was that the government would save money and benefit from industry’s investment. … What sowed the seeds of the current discontent were contracts agreed upon years ago in which data requirements were not well defined. … The Pentagon is now searching for less expensive options to maintain its aging equipment and finds that, in some cases, it cannot compete the work because the original manufacturer owns the IP ….

The cards are being stacked against contractors, as the Pentagon has Congress’ full backing on this issue. … DoD and Congress believe this flexibility is needed to ensure market competition …. The law would permit the government to give a company’s data to other contractors, which is a nightmare scenario for most manufacturers. …

As IP disputes become more frequent, contractors confront a dilemma. They can agree to their customers’ demands or take them to court. … Attorneys suggest that, to get beyond this impasse, the government should consider licensing agreements so companies are compensated for their IP.

There is no easy solution, said Louis D. Victorino, an attorney at Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP. ‘Free and open competition is a fundamental tenet of procurement policy,’ he said. ‘But unless the government chooses to fund all R&D costs, it needs manufacturers’ data rights.’ If the government wants rights, he said, it should pay for the R&D. Unless the Defense Department can find a way to satisfy industry’s concerns, he said, it soon will find that companies are not going to be willing to invest upfront R&D money.

The debate is unfolding as contractors are being asked by a cash-strapped Pentagon to invest in technology. As one executive noted, industry CEOs will have to ask themselves before they compete for Pentagon work: Do I want to risk losing control of my intellectual property?

To sum up this rather long-winded article, we think our friend Sam has nailed it. This is not about leveling the playing field by reducing “games” that some contractors can play—tactics that are perfectly permissible under the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of CAS 402 and 420 in the ATK Thiokol decision. No. Instead, this is about obtaining contractors’ intellectual property rights via subterfuge, in the guise of adjusting price evaluations. It’s about taking away the “independent” in IRAD and thereby weakening contractor protections of their IP rights. As we think we’ve shown, the Pentagon has a long history of trying to obtain those IP rights, and the latest DFARS ANPRM fits perfectly into those historical efforts.

In that context, the attorneys at Crowell & Moring are absolutely correct to call the ongoing Pentagon snatch-and-grab efforts “guerrilla warfare”.

 

 

So You Want to Sell Commercial Items?

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Cheese_in_the_MazeRecently we wrote about commercial items in support of the notion that when the government enters the marketplace it must buy those commercial items in the manner in which the marketplace offers them for sale. The government contracting officer (or prime contract buyer or higher-tier subcontractor buyer) must acquire commercial items via use of “customary commercial practices.” The customary commercial practices must be determined by adequate market research; and market research involves more than simply looking at how other government agencies acquired such services.

Similarly, sales to government entities—whether foreign or domestic—do not support the determination that an item meets the FAR 2.101 definition of a “commercial item.” Those wishing to have their items determined to be “commercial items” must demonstrate several things, including (but not limited to):

  • The item is “of a type” that is “customarily used by the general public” or by “non-governmental entities”

  • The item is used for “purposes other than governmental purposes”

  • The item has been “sold, leased, or licensed to the general public” or “has been offered for sale, lease, or license to the general public”

Having a service determined to be a commercial item is even harder. Without going into detail, the fundamental requirement is that, to be determined to be commercial, the services must be “of a type offered and sold competitively in substantial quantities in the commercial marketplace based on established catalog or market prices for specific tasks performed or specific outcomes to be achieved and under standard commercial terms and conditions.”

As we noted in our prior article (link in first sentence), when a contractor seeks to have its items (or services) determined to be commercial items, the contractor bears the burden of providing sufficient information to enable the contracting officer (or buyer) to make the determination of commerciality. It is not the contracting officer’s job (or the buyer’s job) to ensure sufficient information has been provided; it is the responsibility of the entity who desires to have the commerciality determination made.

But for some reason many entities are reluctant to provide that information. They don’t want to tell anybody else who else has purchased the items or services, and under what conditions. They want a determination of commerciality, but they don’t want to provide the necessary support to enable it to be made.

Obviously, looking at the bulleted points we listed above, anybody seeking a determination of commerciality should be prepared to identify—at a minimum—the non-governmental entities that have purchased the items in the past and for what purpose they were acquired. If no sales have yet taken place, there needs to be sufficient information to show that the items have been offered for sale. If you can’t at least muster that information, you should not expect to get the determination you say you want. Yet many entities seem to think providing such information in an intrusion into their private business.

No doubt some of that perception stems from the lack of experience with governmental sales. If you’ve never sold to the Federal government, you may not fully appreciate just how intrusive the experience can be. Indeed, having your transaction with the Federal government conducted under FAR Part 12 procedures—as compared to Part 15 procedures—significantly reduces the intrusions. But in order to get to Part 12 you have to first get that coveted determination of commerciality—which means you’ve got to provide the necessary information.

It is also possible—perhaps even likely—that companies that have not sold to the Federal government before have not collected the information or organized it in the necessary format to support that determination of commerciality. They may not actually know their customers to the level of detail necessary to stratify them into governmental versus non-governmental. But if you can’t get organized to that extent, you probably shouldn’t be thinking about selling to the Federal government.

Even if the commerciality determination is made and Part 12 procedures are used for the acquisition, the contracting officer must still made another determination that the price being paid is “fair and reasonable.” And that’s a whole ‘nother challenge.

In order for the buyer to determine that the price is fair and reasonable, more information is necessary. If your company is involved in a competitive acquisition, it is likely the buyer will use price analysis to determine if your price is fair and reasonable. That means your price (and terms) will be compared to the other bidders. But in a sole-source acquisition—one in which there are no other bidders—that comparison is not possible, and so the buyer will be asking for “information other than cost or pricing data”—which is likely to be the prices (and terms) at which your items have been sold previously to the public. That may well be a difficult challenge for companies selling commercial items.

Many companies consider their prices to be proprietary information, not to be disclosed outside the company. They may (reluctantly) provide pricing information to a government official, for official use only. But they will tend to resist providing that information to another commercial entity (such as a higher-tier subcontractor or the prime)—especially if that other commercial entity is a competitor in the same or adjacent market.

Circling the wagons and protecting that information by calling it “proprietary” is your privilege; but it also means you are not likely to get what you want. And if you think supporting the determinations under Part 12 procedures is invasive—just wait for the cost and pricing data requirements under Part 15.

Companies selling commercial items actually may not know the historical prices paid for their items, especially if there are complex discounting strategies in play. It may be labor-intensive and overly expensive to mine the data and conduct interviews and prepare the necessary information for submission to the buyer who has requested it.

But as noted above, if you are not willing to do the work involved, you probably aren’t going to be happy with the result.

What happens if the government buys commercial items without competition, and without obtaining the necessary information to support a determination that the price being paid is fair and reasonable? Well the DoD Inspector General recently issued an audit report that discussed just such a situation.

Because the DoD OIG audit report was “for official use only” our information is limited to the summary it published. There are no details. But the summary is sufficient for our purposes.

According to the audit report, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) issued a contract with a maximum value of $1 billion to CFM International for the purchase of spare parts for the F108 engine. According to Wikipedia, the F108 engine is a “high-bypass turbofan aircraft engine.” Interestingly, CFM International (CFMI) is only the distributor of the engines. The engines are actually manufactured by GE Aviation and SNECMA (an French company). Some components are made by Avio (an Italian company). According to Wikipedia: “The engines are assembled by GE in Evendale, Ohio, and SNECMA in Villaroche in France. The completed engines are marketed by CFMI.” Wikipedia says that CFMI is “a 50/50 joint-owned company” of GE and SNECMA.

Wikipedia also states that the F108 (aka CFM56) “is now one of the most common turbofan aircraft engines in the world, with more than 20,000 having been built in four major variants.” The engine is used by both commercial and military aircraft; it is used by both Airbus and Boeing. Accordingly, it should have been relatively easy for CFMI to support the DLA determination of commerciality. However (according to the DoD IG), “the contracting officer did not question the commercial off-the-shelf classification for parts with no commercial sales.”

You’d think that parts that have been in continuous production since 1974, and which have been sold worldwide to companies that include both Airbus and Boeing, and which have been used in commercial aircraft such as the Boeing 737 and the Airbus 320, would obviously be commercial items. But you’d be wrong—at least, according to the DoD Inspector General. Apparently, although some of the parts sold to DLA were “of a type” that were also sold commercially, in fact the exact parts being acquired had no commercial sales. (We assume this; the summary doesn’t really say so.) Our position on the matter is that “of a type” is right there in the commercial item definition in FAR 2.101, and that should have been sufficient for the contracting officer and the Inspector General auditors.

On the other hand, determining that the prices being paid were “fair and reasonable” is a whole ‘nother problem—especially because the acquisition was on a sole source basis. (Which makes sense, because CFMI is the only company that sells the engines and the spare parts for them.) The DoD IG report summary stated—

The DLA Aviation contracting officer did not appropriately determine fair and reasonable prices for sole-source commercial spare parts purchased from CFM International. This occurred because the contracting officer did not conduct a sufficient price analysis. Specifically, the contracting officer:

  • relied on sales data that did not include customer names;
  • did not review commercial sales quantities; and
  • accepted prices for sole-source commercial parts with no commercial sales. 

It seems that CFMI was unwilling to provide the names of its customers when the DLA contracting officer requested that information. This put the CO in a bind, because CFMI was the only game in town. Unlike most transactions where the Federal government is the big gorilla in the room, in this transaction CFMI was the big gorilla.

“You want our parts? Fine. Here are the prices. You want support? No. Shop somewhere else.”

The above imaginary monologue illustrates the attitude of many commercial entities seeking to do business with the Federal government. In this case, the entity had the negotiating position to carry it off—but note that the transaction resulted in an adverse Inspector General audit report which carried a recommendation that the DLA Director should “take administrative action [regarding the contracting officer] … for not following the Federal Acquisition Regulation and defense acquisition guidance.”

This story is not really about CFM International and that particular transaction. It’s intended to be about entities that want to have their items or services determined to be commercial items, and their prices for those items/services determined to be fair and reasonable. If you want to make that happen, you need to be prepared to give the individual making those determinations sufficient information. If you don’t give sufficient information, you are not likely to get what you want. And if, by some lucky happenstance, you do get what you want without providing the required information, then you need to be prepared for downstream consequences, such as an adverse Inspector General audit report.

 

IRAD Limits … Again!

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In a confusing move, the DAR Council decided to issue a proposed rule that would revise the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). DFARS Case No. 2016-D002, called “Enhancing the Effectiveness of Independent Research and Development,” was issued on February 15, 2016—a national holiday. The timing of the issuance was confusing, since the Federal Register notice says the date of the issuance is February 16th. (We are typing this article on February 15th, being off work because of the holiday—yet the notice of proposed rulemaking is right there in front of us. Weird, right?)

The confusion regarding the date of issuance is just about the least confusing thing about the rule.

Readers with memories longer than the lifespan of a Mayfly will remember that we have been concerned—nay, alarmed—by the repetitive attempts by certain DoD individuals and entities to micro-manage contractors’ R&D spend. In our last article on the topic, we had a moment of epiphany (aided by a friend’s research into some of the history on this topic) and we asserted (with what we believed to be substantial supporting evidence) that the purpose of the various initiatives is not to curtail R&D spending, but instead to position the Pentagon to assert that the R&D spending is no longer “independent” and, thus, position the DoD to snatch contractors’ Intellectual Property (IP) rights. If the R&D is no longer “independent” then one of the main legal arguments that permits contractors to retain IP developed by their R&D projects is significantly weakened.

Our last article went into some detail and noted that the DoD is pursuing three separate but related initiatives to attack contractors’ IP rights. The most recent activity was issuance of an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) with respect to track #3—i.e., using contractor IR&D spending as a price “adder” in competitive price evaluations. As we noted, there will be a public hearing and there is opportunity to provide written feedback to the DAR Council with respect to the ANPRM.

This latest notice of proposed rulemaking is not a duplicate of the ANPRM—though the public should be excused for thinking so.

Remember, there are three separate but related initiatives in play. Initiative #1 is the use of Technical Interchange Meetings (TIMs) between industry and DoD personnel so that the Pentagon may “gain enhanced DoD understanding and visibility into relevant IRAD.” Initiative #3 is the use of R&D spending that is related to proposed contract awards being used as an adder in the price evaluations. And Initiative #2 is the coordination and management of contractor R&D spending by DoD.

This latest proposed rule is part of Initiative #2. Many people thought Initiative #2 was dead because of the strong opposition from industry. We weren’t so sure, and we told our readers it might rise again, like a zombie in search of brains. Well, it has risen from the dead and now here we are with a proposed rule that looks to require that “proposed new IR&D efforts be communicated to appropriate DoD personnel prior to the initiation of these investments, and that results from these investments should also be shared with appropriate DoD personnel.”

Did you notice the language? Did you notice that contractors will have to “propose new IR&D efforts” before they start? Do you see how that requirement not only slows down R&D efforts but—more insidiously—puts DoD in the position of approving such efforts and thus taking away the “independence” of such efforts? Do you see how that’s going to work out when there is a legal wrangle over IP rights and technical data developed as a result of such efforts?

The proposed rule is careful to dispel any notions that there is a power grab going on as the result of any bilateral communication regarding R&D project content. It says—

The intent of such engagement is not to reduce the independence of IR&D investment selection, nor to establish a bureaucratic requirement for Government approval prior to initiating an IR&D project. Instead, the objective of this engagement is to ensure that both IR&D performers and their potential DoD customers have sufficient awareness of each other's efforts and to provide industry with some feedback on the relevance of proposed and completed IR&D work.

Yeah, sure.

The proposed rule would make such technical interchanges a condition of allowability. In other words, if a contractor fails to hold those interchanges, or fails to adequately document them, then its IR&D spending will be determined to be unallowable. The proposed rule would revise the DFARS Cost Principle at 231.205-18 to state—

For IR&D projects initiated in the contractor's fiscal year 2017 and later, as a prerequisite for the subsequent determination of allowability, major contractors must—

(i) Engage in a technical interchange with a technical or operational DoD Government employee before IR&D costs are generated so that contractor plans and goals for IR&D projects benefit from the awareness of and feedback by a DoD employee who is informed of related ongoing and future potential interest opportunities; and

(ii) Use the online input form for IR&D projects reported to DTIC to document the technical interchange, which includes the name of the DoD Government employee and the date the technical interchange occurred.

As we’ve noted before, there are a myriad of problems associated with this requirement. Perhaps the most important of them is that the exact title, function or identity of the “technical or operational DoD Government employee” with whom the technical interchange is supposed to take place is notably missing from the rule. If contractors send an email to the Secretary of Defense and then note that email in their DTIC input, does that satisfy the requirement? If not, why not? The ambiguity of this aspect of the proposed rule is astounding.

And as we’ve noted before, some contractors have hundreds of IR&D projects going on simultaneously, in various stages of completion. To brief those projects and document the briefing is going to take time and money. Who’s going to pay for that? Where does it get charged? Those questions are left unanswered in the proposed rule.

To sum this up: Another bad idea in a long string of bad ideas, brought to you by the same people. The same people who want to take your IP and use it to give your competitors an advantage, and not pay you for the privilege.

If you agree (or don’t agree) and want to provide your comments to the DAR Council, you have until April 18, 2016 to submit them. As always, there are several means of providing your input, and the proposed rule provides the details.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.