Big 4 Drama
So Bob Esernio passed away last week.
You may not have known Bob; or maybe you did. Bob was one of those guys at the periphery of the well-known “celebrity” government contracting experts. To my knowledge he never authored an article for publication or wrote a book. He rarely (if ever) taught seminars or classes. Bob only had one connection on his LinkedIn profile. Chances are, you would have known Bob only if you were one of his clients or one of his Ernst & Young colleagues.
And that was Bob, basically. A head-down, get-r-done kind of guy: focused on meeting his commitments as an EY Partner. Which is not to say that his career was without drama. He had that in spades.
I first met Bob when I was trying to exit Andersen. Andersen was what they called it then, having recently changed the name from Arthur Andersen and having recently changed the Andersen logo from open doors to a bright orange ball. Was there a correlation between the firm’s branding change and its collapse? I’ll leave that to you to decide. The point here is that Andersen was shutting-down and I was one of about 26,000 people suddenly out of work.
I looked for a new job and EY was on my shortlist. I knew their Government Contracting Services (GCS) Partners—at least by reputation. Lou Rosen was the Head Honcho and I knew him from first-hand experience (as a Fed Pubs instructor) and by reputation (from his service on the CAS Board back when the CAS Board was a force to be reckoned with). I reached out and submitted a resume and—much to my surprise—I was contacted by Bob Esernio and his team. If memory serves I had a phone call or two before I realized that Bob didn’t work with Lou; it was an entirely separate team that was focused on government contractors. I didn’t know what was going on; but I knew that I wanted to work with Lou Rosen (because Lou, right?) and not this other guy I had never heard of. I called Deb Nixon and asked about this Esernio guy and I quickly got back on track. I guess it helped that Bob was interested in me; because I suspect that if Bob wanted me, then Lou’s team wanted me more—if only to upset Bob. And so I found myself working for Lou Rosen and his established GCS team, and my interaction with Bob from then on was minimal.
When I joined EY I learned that Bob and Lou had had a falling-out. The details were before my time, but I gathered that Bob had decided his career path was better served by starting his own, independent, practice. As he departed Lou’s team, he took some people with him. If you were there at the time, you had to choose between Bob and Lou, which I suspect would not have been an easy choice to make. Would you stay with the established team of SMEs, who were demanding and somewhat condescending and (quite honestly) more than a little arrogant in their SME-ness? Or would you take a chance on the Young Turk who could be charming and promised frequent team-building dinners at nice (and expensive!) restaurants? People made their choices and as those choices were made, friendships were strained and working relationships were broken.
Later on I made a similar choice, leaving EY in order to (re)start the West Coast Government Contracts practice at PwC. It was a gamble but I wanted to do things my way instead of how the EY Partners wanted to do them. I suppose Bob felt much the same way as he left to start his own practice. As it turns out I was good at many of the right things but not at the politics. It is more important to be good at the politics, as Bob knew. Bob was really very good at the politics and so it was no surprise that he made Partner while I never did.
Politics are important and people (like me) who focus on technical excellence get blind-sided by politics. If you have a choice in life, my advice is to be good at the politics and let the technical stuff take care of itself.
After I left EY (and after certain Partners retired) the two independent practices were force-fit back together and Bob served as the National Practice Director for several years. I suspect it was the fulfillment of his career aspirations. I don’t know whether or not he did well at the role, but I’m sure he tried very hard at it. Further, I don’t know whether there was drama in the merger but I suspect there was. At the very least, there would be suspicion that “Bob’s people” received favorable treatment as a reward for their loyalty to him back in the split. That said, one of "Lou's people" who worked for Bob at that time called him "mentor and friend" so maybe the drama was more in my imagination than anywhere else.
Partners retire at 60 but Bob retired at 55. I wasn’t around but I heard there was drama involved. That didn’t surprise me. There is usually drama and politics when you have a bunch of smart, ambitious people jockeying for power and money. And make no mistake: that is exactly what you have at a Big 4 professional services firm.
Those firms say that they are inclusive and focused on diversity, but the kind of diversity they welcome is not unlimited. If you are in a practice role (as opposed to a support role), it is highly likely that you are well-educated, smart, ambitious, and driven. We’re talking “Type A” personality all the way. Everybody is trying to impress and outdo everybody else. Late nights, weekends, extra tasks not only accepted but actually sought out. Learning the metrics that matter and excelling at those metrics. Learning the Partners that matter (which is just about all of them) and excelling at building relationships with them. Taking the required learning classes and making sure your accrued vacation balance is acceptably low while your utilization metrics are acceptably high. Doing whatever it takes because if you don’t there are many others who will! It’s a system intended to weed out people who don’t fit—those who don’t have the right “chemistry”—because every year another class of Associates joins the firm, and some of them may make Partner one day if you can’t (or won’t) do what it takes to make it. How can such an environment be short of drama? It can’t. Drama is everywhere.
People are different and they have different skills and different motivators. The Briggs Myers folks claim there are 16 different personality types. I don’t know about 16, but I know there is more than one type. But in the world of the Big 4, there really is only one type that succeeds—and that is the type that is driven to succeed.
A long time ago we published an article discussing the Netflix approach to HR management. It’s been called the single most innovative thing to ever come from Silicon Valley. You really ought to review it. Netflix tries to emulate a professional sports team: the company wants superstars at every position. My point is that each position requires a different skillset. It’s inherent in the approach. You think of a professional basketball team, you don’t think about five shooting guards. There are point guards and shooting guards and forwards and a center. Each position requires different skills.
Hopefully, when you staff a practice or create a project team, you get to spend some time thinking about the skills you will need and how you will source talent to find those required skills. But you should also be thinking about different personality types and who’s going to be a leader and who’s going to be a member of the supporting cast. If you have too many leaders, things can get confusing. Drama may ensue.
These thoughts, for better or worse, were inspired by Bob Esernio, who passed away at age 57.
Status of Boeing’s Fixed-Price Aerial Tanker Development Contract
We’ve written before about the tortuous road to award the next generation USAF aerial tanker contract. It was the kind of story we like to document: by turns quirky and humorous and at one point even perhaps criminal. It had Russians competing to supply the US Air Force and you know that story’s got to be funny right there. It had Congressional hearings and bid protests and it was just a story that seemed to write itself. A link to one of our early articles on the topic – from 2009 – can be found here.
The USAF has been trying to replace its force of KC-135 tankers since before 2003 and, while it (finally!) awarded the contract in February, 2011—quite literally more than five years ago—as of this date not a single KC-46A has been delivered. But that was in accordance with the contract’s schedule, which called for deliveries to start in 2017 not 2016. Thus, Boeing had six years to design, develop, test, and deliver its aerial tanker.
Six years is either a very long time or a very short time, depending on how advanced the technology is supposed to be. We don’t have any great insight here, but we think it’s a generous amount of time. We think that because we know that Toyota developed the Prius automobile—which used the world’s first hybrid internal combustion engine—in less time than that. According to our research, it took Toyota 24 months to develop a working prototype and another 24 months to put the car into production. So Toyota went from a sheet of blank paper to a car available for purchase in four years. Certainly Boeing, which had a strong design in its proposal and used its own commercial aircraft as the basis for the tanker, could get its first plane into flight within six years, right?
Not so fast.
Boeing’s Fixed-Price-Incentive-Fee program has had troubles and not only has Boeing burned through all of its possible incentive fee covering cost overruns, the company has had to take accounting charges to cover unplanned cost growth. To date, Boeing has written-off more than $1.5 Billion against the program, which we suspect does not thrill its shareholders. (Disclosure: I own some Boeing stock and I wish the stock price would get back to where it used to be.) Boeing took write-offs in 2014, 2015, and in 2016. It’s almost become an annual ritual for Boeing to announce write-offs on its KC-46A program.
But despite cost overruns, Boeing has always maintained that it was on schedule for initial delivery of 18 tankers.
Until now.
Boeing recently announced a schedule slip in the program, a six-month delay in the delivery of the first plane. In addition, the USAF will not receive its 18th tanker until January 2018. But those first 18 planes will not have full refueling capability (via wing pods) until October 2018. As the article written by Dominic Gates in the Seattle Times headlines: “Boeing tankers will be delivered to the Air Force late—and incomplete.”
The Seattle Times article (link above) also reported that “In addition to the delay in initial deliveries, the Air Force said it will also push out its formal go-ahead to Boeing to build production tankers, from June to August. That’s to give Boeing more time to develop a software fix for the refueling-boom stress problem.”
Old-timers who lived through the defense environment of the late 1980’s and knew about the A-12 program (and others) that were Fixed-Price development contracts might have predicted this outcome. Really old-timers might remember Lockheed’s C-5A overruns and technical problems that contributed to the need for a government “bail-out” of the corporation in 1971.
Fixed-Price development is a bad idea. We all know this. But we keep forgetting it.
A fixed-price contract assumes that both parties know the risks and the actual scope of work. Development—going from nothing to something—is fraught with risks and unknowns. Thus, the KC-46A development contract joins the pantheon of government programs whose contract type was a Bad Idea.
So here we are again, writing about Boeing and its development of an aerial tanker under a FPIF arrangement. Cost overruns, schedule slips, technical problems. It’s really just another chapter in a long story that might stretch a long time. We don’t know whether this is the last chapter, or if Boeing will be announcing additional problems in the future, as it analyzes the cost impact of the program’s new schedule slip.
What we do know is that the US Air Force doesn’t have its new aerial tankers.
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GSA Price Reductions Clause
Although sales to the Federal government via General Services Administration multiple-award, Federal supply, or government-wide Schedule are considerably less risky than other contract vehicles, they are not without their risks.
GSA Schedule sales are typically considered to be “commercial” sales, in that the companies providing the goods or services are considered to be commercial entities and the prices are negotiated based on a commercial sales history. But although the GSA Schedules website claims: “The Schedules program mirrors commercial buying practices, so customers can easily comply with federal procurement rules and regulations,” that is not entirely true. Compliance risks exist and many companies have run afoul of them. This website has several articles on settlements (very large dollar value settlements) entered into by companies that either failed to properly disclose their commercial pricing history prior to award, or failed to comply with the Trade Agreements Act (as the GSA interprets it).
Or failed to comply with the Price Reductions Clause.
See, the Price Reductions Clause is something that exists only in GSA Schedule-land. You don’t find it in contracts awarded under FAR Part 13, Part 14, or Part 15 procedures. You don’t find it in commercial sales practices. Thus, because of its existence, it gives lie to the GSA claims that its Schedules mirror commercial buying practices. It’s a big risky compliance area and many otherwise reputable companies have been tripped-up by its requirements.
Such as Deloitte Consulting, to name one recent victim of the Price Reductions Clause.
But before we get into that story, let’s make sure we all understand what the PRC requires of a GSA Schedule contractor. GSA Supplemental Acquisition Regulation contract clause 552.238-75 (“Price Reductions,” May 2004) states:
(a) Before award of a contract, the Contracting Officer and the Offeror will agree upon (1) the customer (or category of customers) which will be the basis of award, and (2) the Government’s price or discount relationship to the identified customer (or category of customers). This relationship shall be maintained throughout the contract period. Any change in the Contractor’s commercial pricing or discount arrangement applicable to the identified customer (or category of customers) which disturbs this relationship shall constitute a price reduction.
(b) During the contract period, the Contractor shall report to the Contracting Officer all price reductions to the customer (or category of customers) that was the basis of award. The Contractor’s report shall include an explanation of the conditions under which the reductions were made.
(c)
(1) A price reduction shall apply to purchases under this contract if, after the date negotiations conclude, the Contractor—
(i) Revises the commercial catalog, pricelist, schedule or other document upon which contract award was predicated to reduce prices;
(ii) Grants more favorable discounts or terms and conditions than those contained in the commercial catalog, pricelist, schedule or other documents upon which contract award was predicated; or
(iii) Grants special discounts to the customer (or category of customers) that formed the basis of award, and the change disturbs the price/discount relationship of the Government to the customer (or category of customers) that was the basis of award.
(2) The Contractor shall offer the price reduction to the Government with the same effective date, and for the same time period, as extended to the commercial customer (or category of customers).
(d) There shall be no price reduction for sales—
(1) To commercial customers under firm, fixed-price definite quantity contracts with specified delivery in excess of the maximum order threshold specified in this contract;
(2) To Federal agencies;
(3) Made to State and local government entities when the order is placed under this contract (and the State and local government entity is the agreed upon customer or category of customer that is the basis of award); or
(4) Caused by an error in quotation or billing, provided adequate documentation is furnished by the Contractor to the Contracting Officer.
(e) The Contractor may offer the Contracting Officer a voluntary Governmentwide price reduction at any time during the contract period.
(f) The Contractor shall notify the Contracting Officer of any price reduction subject to this clause as soon as possible, but not later than 15 calendar days after its effective date.
(g) The contract will be modified to reflect any price reduction which becomes applicable in accordance with this clause.
All those words above basically boil down to the GSA contractor identifying its Basis of Award customers, the prices (and other terms) paid by those BOA customers, and the relationship between those BOA prices and the GSA Schedule prices offered to the Federal government buyers. If the price paid by the BOA customers drops, there is supposed to be a corresponding drop in the GSA Schedule prices. The contractor has 15 days to notify the GSA of a required pricing change driven by the change in the BOA customer prices. If the contractor fails to notify GSA in accordance with the clause requirements, it has to refund any overpayments made by the Federal government (i.e., the difference between the price paid and the price that would have been paid had the contractor complied with the notification requirement).
But if the contractor knowingly reduced its BOA customer prices and knowingly withheld that information from the GSA, then it might be subject to allegations that it had submitted False Claims and then things can get really expensive.
See: Deloitte Consulting, LLP.
According to the DOJ announcement (link above the GSA clause)—
The Department of Justice announced today that Deloitte Consulting LLP (Deloitte) has agreed to pay $11.38 million to resolve allegations under the False Claims Act that it submitted false claims under a General Services Administration (GSA) contract. Deloitte is a nationwide consulting company headquartered in New York City. …
In 2000, GSA awarded Deloitte a contract for the provision of information technology services. The contract required Deloitte to reduce the prices it charged the government if it offered lower prices to specific commercial customers during the course of the contract. This settlement resolves allegations that between 2006 and 2012, Deloitte failed to comply with the price reductions clause in its contract, resulting in government customers paying more for Deloitte’s services than comparable commercial customers.
Deloitte Consulting paid more than $11 million to settle allegations that it had knowingly failed to comply with the GSA Price Reductions Clause. For those few who may not know, Deloitte is a very respected professional services firm—an affiliated entity of one of the “Big 4” accounting firms. The entity has access to whatever compliance expertise and resources it may need; and yet it failed to comply with the PRC in its GSA Schedules.
In fairness, Deloitte is a partnership and, if our experience with the Big 4 is anything to go on, project cost accounting and pricing is an extremely complicated exercise. It may have been difficult to monitor and report on BOA customer pricing. Indeed, it may have been nearly impossible to keep track of pricing offered to its BOA customers, given the number of projects, the number of partners, and the vagaries of the partnership’s accounting system.
And yet, that is what the firm signed up to when it entered into its GSA Schedules.
And that is what all GSA Schedule holders sign up to.
If you want a GSA Schedule, you must realize the compliance requirements that come with the deal, and be prepared to meet them. If you don’t exercise diligence, you too may find yourself the subject of a DOJ press release one day.
Advance Agreements
“Certainly the game is rigged. Don't let that stop you; if you don't bet you can't win.” – Robert A. Heinlein
This past week was Fed Pubs’ La Jolla Government Contracting Week, in which one of the most popular seminar-providers scheduled multiple courses in multiple areas of government contracting—all held in one hotel. Lots of people attended; it’s kind a big deal and there’s even a sponsored reception for students from the various classes to meet, mingle, and network. We know most of the instructors and they are, for the most part, top-notch. We have had no problem recommending these courses. That said, we were eager to get some feedback from course attendees.
One thing we heard was that some instructors were recommending use of Advance Agreements in order to proactively establish defenses against adverse DCAA audit findings. Obviously we weren’t there, but the logic seemed to be that DCAA auditors were going to have findings—often findings that were obviously meritless—but the cognizant Contracting Officer was going to be hesitant about flatly overruling those findings because of the DCMA bureaucratic rules that govern the process.
Gone are the days when a warranted Contracting Officer had the authority to use independent business judgement to adjudicate and negotiate and resolve disputes without litigation. In today’s Federal contracting environment, it’s a rare CO who wants to risk their career in order to support a contractor’s rebuttal of an adverse audit finding.
The theory, then, is that it is better to negotiate and work out a deal before things get adversarial. The contractor and CO should come to an understanding, memorialize it, and sign it. Then when DCAA shows up with problematic findings, it’s not about an auditor being wrong; instead, it’s about a pre-existing agreement that needs to be upheld by the US Government.
It’s a good theory and we have no problem seconding the recommendation. Advance Agreements are great things when you’ve got them (and have retained them to support future audits). Our only problem is that they are damn hard to get these days.
Let’s talk about Advance Agreements.
FAR Rules
Advance Agreement are discussed in FAR 31.109. FAR 31.109(a) states that “To avoid possible subsequent disallowance or dispute based on unreasonableness, unallocability or unallowability under the specific cost principles at Subparts 31.2, 31.3, 31.6, and 31.7, contracting officers and contractors should seek advance agreement on the treatment of special or unusual costs and on statistical sampling methodologies at 31.205-6(c).” So there’s the rationale for having them: they are intended to avoid cost disallowances or disputes in areas where it is “difficult to determine” cost allowability. Importantly, the FAR is clear that Advance Agreements should be negotiated “before incurrence of the costs involved” – i.e., in advance. (Duh.) According to FAR 31.109(b): “The agreements must be in writing, executed by both contracting parties, and incorporated into applicable current and future contracts. An advance agreement shall contain a statement of its applicability and duration.” In addition, “Advance agreements may be negotiated with a particular contractor for a single contract, a group of contracts, or all the contracts of a contracting office, an agency, or several agencies.” Other than that, the parties are relatively free to draft their Advance Agreement in any manner they may choose.
FAR 31.109 lists areas in which Advance Agreements may be of particular value in avoiding disputes. These areas include:
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Compensation for personal services, including but not limited to allowances for off-site pay, incentive pay, location allowances, hardship pay, cost of living differential, and termination of defined benefit pension plans
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Use charges for fully depreciated assets
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Deferred maintenance costs
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Precontract costs
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Independent research and development and bid and proposal costs
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Royalties and other costs for use of patents
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Selling and distribution costs
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Travel and relocation costs, as related to special or mass personnel movements, as related to travel via contractor-owned, -leased, or -chartered aircraft; or as related to maximum per diem rates
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Costs of idle facilities and idle capacity
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Severance pay to employees on support service contracts
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Plant reconversion
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Professional services (e.g., legal, accounting, and engineering)
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General and administrative costs (e.g., corporate, division, or branch allocations) attributable to the general management, supervision, and conduct of the contractor’s business as a whole. These costs are particularly significant in construction, job-site, architect-engineer, facilities, and Government-owned contractor operated (GOCO) plant contracts
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Costs of construction plant and equipment
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Costs of public relations and advertising
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Statistical sampling methods
In addition to the foregoing, the FAR emphasizes that construction and architect-engineer contracts are especially good candidates for use of Advance Agreements. The FAR states (at 31.105) “Because of widely varying factors such as the nature, size, duration, and location of the construction project, advance agreements … for such items as home office overhead, partners’ compensation, employment of consultants, and equipment usage costs, are particularly important in construction and architect-engineer contracts.”
The DFARS adds (at 231.205-70(d)(viii)) that the Contracting Officer should negotiate an Advance Agreement when a contractor is engaging in external restructuring (think Lockheed and Martin Marietta merging). That external restructuring Advance Agreement must set forth “at a minimum, a cumulative cost ceiling for restructuring projects and, when necessary, a cost amortization schedule.”
Finally, you need to know that Contracting Officers cannot sign an Advance Agreement that makes an unallowable cost allowable. (See 31.109(c).) Some costs are made unallowable by statute, and no CO has the authority to contravene a public law.
Sounds pretty straightforward, right? So what’s the problem?
DCMA Boards of Review
The first problem—as we alluded to earlier—is that DCMA doesn’t give its Contracting Officers much independent discretion these days. For example, depending on the scope and/or estimated value of the contracts covered by a proposed Advance Agreement, that agreement may have to be reviewed by two separate Boards of Review (one at the Division level and one at the DCMA HQ level). If annual costs on contracts covered by the agreement are estimated to be less than $25 million, then the CO can execute it. But if annual costs on covered contracts are greater than $25 million then a Division-level Board of Review must be convened. And if annual costs on covered contracts are greater than $50 million, or if more than one contractor segment is affected, or if the Advance Agreement covers pension and/or insurance costs, then an HQ-level Board of Review must be convened.
DCMA has a Policy Instruction (“134—Boards of Review”) but it’s not available to the public. Consequently we can’t tell you with certainty how they work. But we do know this: Each time a DCMA Board of Review is convened, the CO must prepare a review package. The package takes a lot of work and its quality (or lack thereof) is a direct reflection back on the CO who prepared it. Obviously, many Contracting Officers will be reluctant to invest the necessary time and effort to prepare a package that they won’t mind being reviewed by their peers, superiors and/or the brass at Ft. Lee. You are going to have a lot of convincing to do.
Even if the CO decides to submit a review package in order to obtain approval to enter into an Advance Agreement, there is no guarantee that the Board (or Boards) of Review will go along with the plan. It’s not unheard of for a CO to hear a resounding NO back from the Board (or Boards) of Review. What happens then? Well, the CO can resubmit the package and hope for a different answer—knowing that may upset some people, who may be under the impression that the CO is dense because they didn’t get the message the first time. Or the CO can simply tell the contractor “sorry” and then get back to business.
Even if the Board (or Boards) of Review reach a favorable consensus and endorse the proposed Advance Agreement, that process is not going to happen overnight. It’s going to take weeks or months. It’s going to take time to prepare the review package and it’s going to take time to convene the Board (or Boards) of review, and it’s going to take time for the Board (or Boards) to deliberate and get back to the CO. Meanwhile, the contractor is not supposed to incur any costs covered by the proposed Advance Agreement until it’s been executed.
Good luck with that.
DCAA’s Role
At noted above, the objective of having an Advance Agreement is to proactively agree on the treatment of certain costs so that they do not become subsequently disallowed or become the subject of a dispute between contractor and customer. DCAA believes it has a role in the process of negotiating and executing an Advance Agreement, at least in certain areas. One of those areas is compliance with the unique requirements of contractor executive compensation. Without going into too much detail, DCMA and the contractor may enter into an Advance Agreement regarding use of “blended rates” to comply with the myriad statutory limits on executive compensation. DCMA and DCAA seem to have agreed that “prior to signing an advance agreement or accepting a methodology” (with respect to blended rates) “the ACO … must invite DCAA to review the computation of the compensation cap, and participate in prenegotiation discussions and/or subsequent negotiations.” (See MRD 16-PSP-005, dated 2/19/2016.) Thus, if a contractor is proposing an Advance Agreement to address use of blended rates to comply with the executive compensation ceilings, not only will all of the DCMA process steps discussed above need to be followed, but your friendly local DCAA auditor will be part of the process as well.
As somewhat of a side note, we were piqued by the notion that DCAA would be participating in prenegotiation discussions and/or subsequent negotiations, as if DCAA somehow had co-equal authority as the warranted Contracting Officer. That seems … odd—and would seem to defeat at least a part of the objective for having an Advance Agreement in the first place. But what do we know?
More generally, the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (at 6-710) clearly states that “The auditor shall abide by properly executed advance agreements that are in effect for the fiscal year when determining final rates.” However, the CAM notes that “Should the auditor find that an advance agreement is not in the best interest of the Government, he/she will follow established procedures for recommending to the contracting officer, in writing, that the advance agreement be rescinded.” We have some experience with rescinded Advance Agreements and, let us tell you, the rescission leaves a very bad taste in the contractor’s mouth. Rescission of an Advance Agreement—after a cost has been incurred—is very much akin to breach of contract, in our view.
Where does this leave us with respect to the advice offered by the Fed Pubs instructors?
Well, we agree with it. It’s good advice.
In theory.
But in the real world of today’s somewhat adversarial defense acquisition environment, we believe that it’s going to be a difficult challenge to get an executed Advance Agreement prior to incurrence of the costs at issue. Is it impossible? No. Not at all. But it is a challenge and it will take a long time, and the odds are stacked against a favorable outcome.
But don’t let that stop you. If you don’t bet you can’t win.
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