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Apogee Consulting Inc

Don’t Look Now but Your False Claim Act Risk Just Skyrocketed

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Dont_Look_NowThe False Claims Act (which includes both civil and criminal statutes) is one of the biggest sticks wielded by the Federal government against allegations of contractor fraud. Alleged violations can easily lead to multi-million dollar settlements, not to mention large (unallowable) legal bills and huge investments of contractor time and resources. Not really a good thing at all.

Reportedly, 70 percent of all suits under the False Claims Act are filed by whistleblowers, called qui tam relators, who are eligible to receive bounties of large percentages of whatever the government collects as a result of the litigation. Your disgruntled employees may become whistleblowers, unless you listen to their concerns and do something about them. Indeed, your company may already be facing a FCA suit and you know nothing about it, because the suits are filed under seal.

Add to this situation the fact that most companies—especially small businesses—really don’t understand how to do a risk analysis that compares the potential FCA liability against the potential profit when they decide to cut corners in the Federal procurement marketplace. We’ve pointed out before just how ill-equipped most business leaders are to decide how much to budget for internal controls and internal audits and contract compliance, simply because they lack information regarding the consequences. Unlike other aspects of the business, they can’t quantify a Return on Investment (ROI) because they lack knowledge and experience in this area.

Examples from this website:

  • SAIC settled its fraud-related claims for $500 million

  • United Technologies Corporation settled its export control violation charges for $76 million

  • CH2M Hill settled its timecard-related fraud charges for $18.5 million

And that’s just three of the many examples we have written about. It’s a decent rule-of-thumb that any company accused of violations of the FCA is going to be out-of-pocket at least $1 million—no matter what. And if the allegations have merit, that number is going to go up and up and up. Granted, the probability of a FCA suit being filed against your company may be low but the consequences are almost certainly going to be higher than you’d care to think about. Therefore it’s imperative to understand the risks when considering how much to invest in fraud prevention. The risks almost always outweigh the cost of anti-fraud activity, which makes such anti-fraud activity a good investment.

That’s always been the math, whether your corporate leadership wanted to run the numbers or not.

And all the math just changed, courtesy of the Supreme Court of the United States.

(This is the part where we remind readers that we are not attorneys and any legal analysis we offer is just that of a layperson. If you want legal advice, please go hire a competent government contracts attorney.)

SCOTUS just issued a decision that changes the risk analysis equation. The recent decision, captioned UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. ESCOBAR, ensures that the probability that you might find yourself the defendant in FCA litigation just increased significantly.

Let’s start with the summary of the case—

Yarushka Rivera, a teenage beneficiary of Massachusetts’ Medicaid program, received counseling services for several years at Arbour Counseling Services, a satellite mental health facility owned and operated by a subsidiary of petitioner Universal Health Services, Inc. She had an adverse reaction to a medication that a purported doctor at Arbour prescribed after diagnosing her with bipolar disorder. Her condition worsened, and she eventually died of a seizure. Respondents, her mother and stepfather, later discovered that few Arbour employees were actually licensed to provide mental health counseling or authorized to prescribe medications or offer counseling services without supervision. Respondents filed a qui tam suit, alleging that Universal Health had violated the False Claims Act (FCA). … Respondents sought to hold Universal Health liable under what is commonly referred to as an ‘implied false certification theory of liability,’ which treats a payment request as a claimant’s implied certification of compliance with relevant statutes, regulations, or contract requirements that are material conditions of payment and treats a failure to disclose a violation as a misrepresentation that renders the claim ‘false or fraudulent.’ Specifically, respondents alleged, Universal Health (acting through Arbour) defrauded the Medicaid program by submitting reimbursement claims that made representations about the specific services provided by specific types of professionals, but that failed to disclose serious violations of Massachusetts Medicaid regulations pertaining to staff qualifications and licensing requirements for these services. Universal Health thus allegedly defrauded the program because Universal Health knowingly misrepresented its compliance with mental health facility requirements that are so central to the provision of mental health counseling that the Medicaid program would have refused to pay these claims had it known of these violations.

SCOTUS, in a unanimous ruling, held that—

  • The implied false certification theory can be a basis for FCA liability when a defendant submitting a claim makes specific representations about the goods or services provided, but fails to disclose non-compliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements that make those representations misleading with respect to those goods or services.

  • By submitting claims for payment using payment codes corresponding to specific counseling services, Universal Health represented that it had provided specific types of treatment. And Arbour staff allegedly made further representations by using National Provider Identification numbers corresponding to specific job titles. By conveying this information without disclosing Arbour’s many violations of basic staff and licensing requirements for mental health facilities, Universal Health’s claims constituted misrepresentations.

  • A defendant can have ‘actual knowledge’ that a condition is material even if the Government does not expressly call it a condition of payment. What matters is not the label that the Government attaches to a requirement, but whether the defendant knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant knows is material to the Government’s payment decision.

  • A misrepresentation about compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be material to the Government’s payment decision in order to be actionable under the FCA. The FCA’s materiality requirement is demanding. An undisclosed fact is material if, for instance, ‘[n]o one can say with reason that the plaintiff would have signed this contract if informed of the likelihood’ of the undisclosed fact. … When evaluating the FCA’s materiality requirement, the Government’s decision to expressly identify a provision as a condition of payment is relevant, but not automatically dispositive. A misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely because the Government designates compliance with a particular requirement as a condition of payment. Nor is the Government’s option to decline to pay if it knew of the defendant’s noncompliance sufficient for a finding of materiality. Materiality also cannot be found where noncompliance is minor or insubstantial. Moreover, if the Government pays a particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that those requirements are not material. The FCA thus does not support the Government’s and First Circuit’s expansive view that any statutory, regulatory, or contractual violation is material so long as the defendant knows that the Government would be entitled to refuse payment were it aware of the violation.

What does all that mean (to a layperson)?

Well, to some extent the decision is so new that it’s hard to tell how it will impact future litigation. No doubt learned practitioners and law school students are feverishly typing up reviews of the opinion, even as we are feverishly typing up this article. But while the reviews are likely to be mixed, it seems clear that, by accepting some form of the implied certification theory, SCOTUS has expanded the universe of false claims subject to litigation.

SCOTUS held that the implied certification theory can be an accepted basis for a qui tam suit when a contractor fails to disclose “non-compliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements that make those representations misleading with respect to those goods or services” that constitute the subject of the invoice for which payment is being sought. The opinion spends time discussing how to tell whether a requirement is or is not material, and concludes that a requirement is material if the Government would not have entered into the contract, had it known the contractor would not comply with that particular requirement. Further, SCOTUS held that it was the contractor’s knowledge of the materiality of the non-compliance that mattered, and not the Government’s knowledge.

Accordingly, contractors that fail to comply with any statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement now risk being subject to FCA liability, if it can be alleged that no reasonable party would have entered into the contract had it known that particular requirement would not be complied with. That’s a big deal, in our view.

On the other side of the coin, SCOTUS seemed to have also held that there must be some representation included in or associated with the invoice to create FCA liability. “Materiality also cannot be found where noncompliance is minor or insubstantial.” And that’s good news for contractors, because not every single Section I contract clause is going to be found to be material with respect to invoice submission.

In our view, the issuance of this SCOTUS opinion is a good time to review your government contracts and their terms and conditions, including contract clauses, to see (a) which ones might support a finding that they are material to invoice payment, and (b) which ones you might not be fully complying with. Where you find an intersection between (a) and (b), we think you have a problem that needs to be fixed soon.

 

 

DCAA Revises Policy to Avoid Auditing Contractors’ Incurred Cost Submissions (Again)

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In what was arguably a predictable move, the Defense Contract Audit Agency has once again revised its policy so as to exempt more contractors’ incurred cost submissions from audit. MRD 16-PPD-06, issued May 27, 2016, revised (for at least the second time) its policy regarding which incurred cost proposals (which technically should be called “proposals to establish final billing rates” but almost nobody actually calls them that) will be considered to be “low-risk” and therefore accepted without any kind of transaction testing.

Yeah, we’ve been down this road before, haven’t we?

Our article on this topic, from November, 2013, really said all that needs to be said. We pointed out then that DCAA’s plan to reduce its embarrassingly large backlog of unaudited proposals wasn’t working out for the agency. We noted a GAO report “had found that DCAA’s initial assessment of contractor proposals had resulted in more than half the submissions being classified as high-risk, meaning that a full scope audit would be required. In contrast to reality, DCAA’s initial planning has assumed that only about 20 percent of submissions would be found to be high risk. And this was in relation to contractor proposals with ADVs of less than $15 million.” Thus, relaxing the criteria would create more “low-risk” contractor proposals and enable DCAA to reduce its audit backlog without, you know, actually performing audits.

The more recent policy change documented in MRD 16-PPD-16 is just more of the same. More relaxing of criteria to permit more proposals to fall into the “low-risk” category. More backlog “risked-away” because, gosh, it’s just not worth spending taxpayer dollars to audit such low-risk proposals, even though they are more likely to be submitted by small businesses that don’t have a good understanding of the FAR Part 31 cost principles and related requirements, and thus are more likely to have unallowable costs included in them.

If we interpret the new policy correctly, then any incurred cost submission with an Auditable Dollar Value (ADV) of less than $5 million is automatically considered to be low-risk, and shall not be audited. (This assumes the contractor was able to make the schedules tie-out the way DCAA’s math-checks require them to.) Quite literally, an auditor will need to obtain high-level permission in order to classify any such proposal as other than low-risk. The MRD states “FAOs will need to obtain Regional Audit Manager (RAM) approval if performance of an audit is warranted based on significant relevant risk.” The auditors (and their Audit Supervisors and their FAO Managers) will have to make a case to a RAM in order to protect taxpayer dollars by performing an audit on such small dollar proposals.

Whatever.

It’s more of the same. While DCAA’s audit protocols call for months of risk assessment followed by literally years of field work in order to audit one single contractor’s proposal to establish final billing rates, the only way to actually make progress against the backlog of audits is to declare the audits don’t need to be performed, or have been performed via a math-check, or that the proposal is not adequate and can’t be audited.

The purpose of this article is not to bash DCAA. It is simply to document, for the record, the decisions being made. One day some Masters or Ph.D. candidate may stumble across this blog and cite it as source material for a thesis on “Abnormal Psychology as Exhibited by Governmental Organizations: A Case Study on DCAA”.

 

Out with the Old

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TelegraphFrom Australia comes a story (courtesy of The Telegraph) that PwC has “ditched” its “outdated” dress code for men and women. According to the story—

The company previously requested men wear suits and business-appropriate socks, while women wear tailored dresses or trousers. … men had to wear fine knitwear, smart shirts with collars, tailored trousers, traditional suits and dress shoes or boots. Women had to wear similar clothes, with additional options of tailored dresses, skirts, smart shirts or blouses and business-style shoes or boots.

What changed? Well, one thing that changed is that a temp worker in PwC’s London offices inspired a petition to prohibit firms from requiring women to wear heels while at work. However, the PwC spokesperson said the two events were not connected. She was quoted as saying: “The reality is we are in a war for talent and we want the same creative, innovative and diverse people that all the other companies are chasing. We think this change will help us do that.”

Thus: the connection between removing hierarchical controls and the retention of “creative, innovative and diverse” people. If you want people to do their best work, you have to give them the freedom to do so.

Or, as General George Patton reportedly said: “Don't tell people how to do things, tell them what to do and let them surprise you with their results.”


In related news, on June 6, 2016, a proposed FAR revision was published in the Federal Register. FAR Case 2015-035 proposed to “delete reference to obsolete technologies no longer in use and replace with references to electronic communications.” Basically, this means the terms “telegram” and “telegraph” will be eliminated.

As the background comments to the proposed rule-making action noted—

The word ‘telegram’ emerged shortly after the invention of the electrical telegraph in the 1840s. This terminology and way of communicating was incorporated into the first issue of the FAR, effective April 1, 1984. The emergence of electronic means of communication, starting with the facsimile machine, and then followed by email and mobile-phone text messages in the 1990s, resulted in the sparing use of telegraph services and use of telegrams.

Yes. “Sparing use” is one way to describe the current proclivity to use telegraph and telegrams to communicate in the 21st century.

Or: TELEGRAM COMMA TELEGRAPH SPACE USAGE SPACE DOWN PERIOD TIME SPACE TO SPACE UPDATE SPACE FAR STOP

 

Federal Circuit Discusses Statute of Limitations (Again)

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It may surprise you to learn that this mostly self-taught government cost accountant is a member of the American Bar Association. Well, an Associate Member, to be precise. The ABA has been gracious enough to accept my annual dues for many years, and membership has proven helpful in a number of ways.

Why join the ABA? Because you can’t understand what the regulations mean unless you understand how judges have interpreted them. The regulations are just words until a judicial decision gives them meaning. (Even if sometimes those decisions surprise people who think the “plain meaning” of the language ought to be evident.) And what better group of people to hang with in order to learn about recent meaningful judicial decisions that impact government contract compliance than the attorneys of the ABA’s Section of Public Contract Law? So, yeah. Membership has proven to be a good investment.

Because of my membership, from time to time I receive emails inviting me to listen in as groups of attorneys (or even Judges) discuss recent cases and their import. (Those panels are ever-so-respectful to the Judges, carefully expressing disagreement in the most courteous terms. I don’t have to be so deferential on this blog—and we are not, in case you haven’t noticed.)

A recent opportunity to listen to top-notch attorneys discuss impactful cases was provided by the Contract Claims and Disputes Resolution Committee (CCDRC) of the Section of Public Contract Law, as a panel including Paul Pompeo (Arnold & Porter) and Mike Chiaparas (DCMA Chief Trial Attorney) addressed recent cases of cost disallowance and what they might portend for government contractors. The panel discussion was hosted by the attorneys at the firm of Covington & Burling, but the discussion took place as part of the regular CCDRC meeting.

From the discussion we learned of a recent decision at the Federal Circuit that discussed application of the Statute of Limitations. The decision, issued May 18, 2016 is captioned “Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. Patrick J. Murphy, Acting Secretary of the Army” but the panelists referred to it as the “Murphy decision.” The dispute involved—once again—KBR’s LOGCAP contract. It’s not like KBR hasn’t been in court many many many times regarding actions taken (or not taken) on that behemoth contract to support the warfighters in many parts of the world, including Southwest Asia. There are plenty of articles on this website that discuss KBR’s victories and losses with respect to LOGCAP-related litigation.

To be fair, it’s not like the Contract Disputes Act’s Statute of Limitations hasn’t been discussed on this website many many many times either. It was once a very interesting and important aspect of disputes between Government and contractor, before the Federal Circuit eviscerated it in the Sikorsky decision. Now it is less important and less interesting, but we still keep following it in the (likely futile) hope that some legal body, somewhere, will reverse Sikorsky or take similar action.

Back to KBR v. Murphy. (Remember that this is a CDA SoL case, so dates are critical.)

As related in the decision, KBR awarded a subcontract under its LOGCAP prime contract to a joint venture between The Kuwait Company for Process Plant Construction & Contracting K.S.C. and Morris Corporation (AUST) PTY Ltd., which for brevity’s sake was called “KCPC/Morris”. KCPC/Morris was issued work release orders for construction of dining facilities and provision of food service at two locations in Iraq. On July 31, 2003, KBR terminated the KCPC/Morris subcontract for default. KCPC/Morris disputed its termination but (at KBR’s request) continued to perform through September 12, 2003, when a new subcontractor started performance.

In 2003 KCPC/Morris filed suit against KBR. As part of settling the suit, the T4D was converted into a T4C and the amount of money KCPC/Morris sought was divided into two pieces: (1) $17.4 Million for “settlement” and (2) an unquantified amount for costs incurred (and profit applied to those costs) for performance under the subcontract, plus “certain costs incurred in preparing requests for payment to the U.S. Government.” The settlement agreement was dated January 24, 2005.

For the second set of (unquantified) costs, the settlement agreement required KBR and KCPC/Morris to cooperate in order “to prepare a well-supported invoice or invoices to the U.S. Government.” On August 26, 2006, KCPC/Morris submitted a certified claim to KBR (instead of invoices) for “outstanding payments, costs and lost profit associated with” the subcontract’s T4C. Which is kind of puzzling, right? Because what was the $17.4 Million “settlement” for if not for outstanding payments, costs and lost profit associated with the termination? Instead of going “WTF? Over” back to KCPC/Morris, KBR simply forwarded its subcontractor’s claim to the Army, along with a note that most reasonable people would construe to mean KBR didn’t endorse or sponsor the claim of its subcontractor.

Let’s pause for a second and note the timeline again. The settlement was negotiated January 24, 2005 and the KCPC/Morris claim was submitted to KBR on August 26, 2006. It took more than 18 months for that claim to be prepared. And then KBR passed it on to the Army on November 3, 2006, more than 60 days after receipt from KCPC/Morris.

Unsurprisingly, the Army told KBR to settle its own subcontractor problems. On May 30, 2007 (more than 6 months after receipt) the Army rejected the claim and “refused to consider the submitted information, and directed KBR to ‘settle a claim by its sub with the sub, then bill the government.’”

More months passed, until October 10, 2007, at which point KBR finally sponsored the original claim. A certification followed, on January 10, 2008. However, on September 8, 2010, KBR withdrew the claim, stating “upon further review of the data provided … KBR has determined that this constitutes a business dispute … and should be resolved in accordance with KBR’s subcontract with KCPC/Morris.” So to be very clear, it took KBR more than 2 years to realize it was responsible for settling its subcontractor payment problems. That took a lot of diligence to reach that intuitively obvious insight, we’re quite sure.

Further, at this point nobody at KBR seemed to realize that the dispute had already been settled way back in January 2005. The only “dispute” remaining was to effectuate the settlement agreement by preparing and submitting invoices.

Our viewpoint regarding the ignorance of the parties seems to have been validated by the fact that, on August 4, 2011, KCPC/Morris filed yet another lawsuit against KBR, alleging that KBR “allowed” the claim “to languish with the Government … and then inexplicably withdrew the entire claim … without consulting KCPC/Morris….” At this point the Court provides details of this heretofore mysterious claim, which included “construction costs, equipment, expenses such as medical care and travel, meals served, overhead and G&A, profit, and termination settlement costs.” Instead of fighting in court, KBR apparently conceded and (once again) submitted the claim to the Army as a certified/sponsored subcontractor claim, on May 2, 2012—almost six years after KCPC/Morris originally submitted it. The Army CO did nothing, and thus the claim was deemed to have been denied. KBR then appealed that deemed denial to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA).

With all that in mind, now we get to the Statute of Limitation stuff.

In order for KBR to have filed its appeal within the CDA SoL, the claim had to accrue before May 2, 2006 (six years before the appeal was filed). The Board found that the claim had accrued before that date, and dismissed the appeal. As part of its analysis, the Board found that the claim accrued on September 12, 2003, “the date when KCPC/Morris ended its work under the subcontract” or, alternatively, on “January 24, 2005, “when KBR and KCPC/Morris agreed to cooperate to present an invoice to the Army for costs above the ‘Settlement Amount’ of $17.4 Million.”

The Federal Circuit performed its own CDA SoL analysis and reversed the ASBCA. The Federal Circuit’s analysis is the meat of this article. (Our apologies for the long road to get here!)

According to Judge Newman (writing for the Court), the problem with the ASBCA’s logic was that it had “adopted the theory, presented by the Army, that the payment of the remaining subcontractor costs was a ‘non-routine’ request for payment, and thus accrued as of the date the subcontractor ended its work, on September 12, 2003.” Judge Newman wrote that “[w]hether a request for payment is deemed routine or non-routine in the context of an accrual of a CDA claim against the government is ‘dependent on the circumstances in which the requested costs arose.’” She wrote that “[a]ccrual in accordance with FAR § 33.201 does not occur until KBR requests, or reasonably could have requested, a sum certain from the government.”

Judge Newman wrote that—

KBR states that the Board’s ruling and the Army’s position would require cost-reimbursement contractors to request payment of subcontractor costs while those costs are under dispute, lest the prime contractor lost the right to recover those costs. KBR correctly observes that the CDA does not require the filing of protective claims related to subcontractors while those claims are being resolved between the prime and sub.

Thus, until KBR was able to quantify the costs it was willing to sponsor, it was unable to submit a claim and therefore the CDA SoL did not start running until that time.

The problem with this theory, as some of the ABA attorneys noted, is that it seems to undercut the “should have known” part of the CDA Sol accrual language. Although the precise amount of the claim may not have been known, it seems likely that KBR knew it would be submitting a claim to the government for some amount. As we discussed in one of our previous CDA SoL articles, prior ASBCA decisions had held that “Claim accrual does not depend on the degree of detail provided, whether the contractor revises the calculations later, or whether the contractor characterizes the impact as ‘immaterial.’ It is enough that the government knows, or has reason to know, that some costs have been incurred, even if the amount is not finalized or a fuller analysis will follow.” (Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems, April, 2013) This recent Federal Circuit opinion seems to call into question whether that prior precedent is still accepted by the Federal Courts.

Certainly, this decision raises questions about claim accrual dates when a subcontractor payment dispute is involved. In some respects, then, it harkens to a 2006 ASBCA decision (International Technology Corp., No. 54136) in which the prime contractor (IT Corp.) was denied reimbursement for a subcontractor’s claimed costs in excess of its FFP subcontract. Although the subcontractor told IT Corp. that it intended to submit a Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA), and although the subcontractor did in fact submit an REA to its prime, IT Corp. failed to notify its prime contract CO and IT Corp. never included the additional subcontractor costs in its contract costs for purposes of complying with the Limitation of Cost (LoC) clause in its prime contract (52.232-20). Because the costs weren’t included in its LoC calculations, and because IT Corp. had exceeded 75% of estimated costs without providing the required advance notification to the CO, IT Corp’s request for reimbursement was denied—as was its appeal of that denial. The ASBCA found that IT’s ongoing evaluation of the validity of TK’s claimed costs was no excuse for not promptly notifying the Government of possible cost increases. Instead, the Board stated that the LOC clause “does not limit a contractor’s notice obligations to those costs proven to be allowable to a certitude.”

Thus, the Federal Circuit’s use of the term “sum certain” with respect to accrual of a claim under the CDA SoL was troubling—at least to the attorneys discussing the case. As has been the situation with this topic ever since we started following it, Courts have consistently refused to create a bright line for the contracting parties to follow. Indeed, whatever steps toward a bright line seem to be taken by a series of decisions, there then follows steps backward, away from any such bright line, by subsequent decisions. All we can tell you is that if you think you have a claim to file against your government customer, or if you have a dispute between a prime and a subcontractor that might ripen into a claim against your government customer, you would be very well served by consulting a top-notch government contracts attorney and getting some advice on the timing of notifications and submissions.

 

Acquisition Reform, Again

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The Federal acquisition system and, in particular, the DOD acquisition system, is broken and nobody knows how to fix it.

Sure, we’ve had Better Buying Power in at least three different flavors—all woefully limited in results obtained. We’ve had should-cost teams and peer reviews and Review Boards and a new DOD Directorate of Pricing was created—and problems still persist. The system remains broken.

It’s not like we haven’t written about this topic before. We have. We certainly have. We’ve opined and asserted and ranted and pointed out that individuals from within the bureaucracy are probably the worst people to try to make radical changes to that bureaucracy. Of course, nobody in power did anything in response to our pontifications … because they’ve probably never heard of this boutique consultancy. We’ve been told by people who should know that those SES and Schedule C leaders are doing the best they can. We’ve been told that it’s an almost impossible task and nobody is setting out to waste taxpayer money with doomed-to-fail reform efforts.

Yeah. But still …

Congress thinks it’s time for some radical changes to the bureaucracy, at least as expressed in this year’s not-yet-final National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). If enacted as drafted, the NDAA will drive an “avalanche of acquisition reforms,” according to Sandra Irwin, writing for the National Defense Industrial Association. She lists some of the proposed reforms—but notes that not every proposal is expected to survive to the final bill that gets sent to President Obama. The list of proposed reforms includes—

  • Roll-back military benefits

  • Disband the office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

  • Redefine the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

  • Penalize the Pentagon for issuing cost-type contracts (Irwin writes that the penalty would equal 2 percent of the funds obligated for procurement contracts or 1 percent of funds provided for research, development, testing and engineering contracts.)

  • Reduce the number of general and flag officers by 25 percent and reduce the number of four-star officers to 27 from 41

  • Require a DOD review of whether to allow small-business contractors to remain temporarily eligible for small-business set-aside contracts even if they outgrow size limits because of growing commercial sales

And that’s not all. Reportedly, Title VIII of the bill goes from Section 801 to Section 899, indicating there are at least 99 statutory reforms included.

In addition to the list above, Paul Pompeo wrote that the NDAA proposes “establishment of a new Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) Board to be housed within the Department of Defense (DoD).” According to Mr. Pompeo (a Government Contracts attorney at the firm of Arnold & Porter)—

The Committee had no kind words for the existing CAS Board. The Committee noted that the CAS Board has not met in more than three years, does not have a quorum, and that ‘it is doubtful that any credible reform will emanate out of [the CAS] Board in the future ...’ The Committee also asserted a need for a DoD-based CAS Board to meet national security needs better.

On that point, we have ourselves railed at the inactive CAS Board. For example, in this article we wrote—

The CAS Board needs to be active. The CAS Board needs to be soliciting input. There are real challenges that need to be addressed. For instance, we need a definition of ‘increased costs in the aggregate’ and we need to know whether the CAS Board accepts that the FAR Council took on the role of defining CAS rules, regulations and terms with respect to the 2005 revisions to FAR Part 30.6 and related CAS clauses. Does the CAS Board agree that concurrent changes in cost accounting practice must be calculated independently, without any offsets?

We need a workable approach to determining the value of an ID/IQ-type contract for CAS purposes. We need to take a look at the $700,000 floor for CAS coverage to see whether imposing the CAS requirements on such tiny contracts is in the best interests of the taxpayers.

There are a lot of things the CAS Board could be doing, but we’re not hearing about any of it, nor does the CAS site indicate that anything is happening. And that’s a real problem, in our view.

The lack of activity by the CAS Board has come to the attention of the Senate and they are proposing a significant reform in order to fix the perceived problem. In his article, Mr. Pompeo discusses why the fix might be worse than the problem. In our view, Ms. Rung (the CAS Board Chair) needs to attend to her duties and get the CAS train moving again.

So that’s the thing with respect to these upcoming acquisition reforms, isn’t it? Will the proposed fixes—and there are many of them—actually solve any problems, or will they make the problems worse. If recent history is any guide, it will be the latter.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.