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Apogee Consulting Inc

DOE Withdraws Proposed Business System Rule

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More than two years ago we reported on the Department of Energy’s implementation of a business system administration regime, one that was remarkably similar to (but not a copy of) the DOD’s business system administration regime. Late last year, we collected some of our thoughts on the state of the DOD’s business system administration regime. Since that time we have found no reason to change our mind regarding those thoughts. The current DOD business system administration regime just ain’t working out the way the DAR Council thought it would.

Everybody knows it just ain’t working; but nobody has said so publicly.

Except for Apogee Consulting, Inc. We called for a new approach last November at the ABA Section of Public Contract Law meeting. Not that our call for action resulted in any action being taken ….

Everybody knows DCAA is understaffed to perform its share of the business system reviews. Everybody knows that DCMA is unable to review and issue System adequacy determinations within the timelines established in the applicable DCMA Business Instructions. Everybody knows it takes too long and costs too much money to fulfill the regulatory (and internal) requirements associated with Contractor Business Systems administration and management. They just don’t talk about it.

We all shrug and try to do the best we can with a misguided and obviously flawed approach. What else can be done? There seems to be no appetite for change at the moment. Which is unfortunate ….

Thus, we took it as a very good sign that the DOE withdrew its proposed rule that would have officially implemented its version of Contractor Business System administration on July 6, 2016.

No rationale was provided. The Federal Register notice said simply: “the Department has determined that it will not proceed with the rulemaking and, as such, is withdrawing the proposed rule.”

We are left only with speculation regarding the motivation(s) for withdrawing the proposed rule.

Was it a belated recognition that five years of evidence has shown the flaws inherent in the DOD’s implementation?

Was it an acknowledgement that DOE lacks the necessary resources to effectively implement the proposed rule—especially because (for the moment) DCAA is prohibited from performing any business system reviews on behalf of DOE?

Was it recognition of the resources and costs associated with contractor business system administration and management—costs which would have to be borne by DOE? Did somebody do the math and calculate the impacts to DOE’s budget?

Obviously we don’t know why DOE withdrew the rule after more than two years of consideration. But we are glad the Department did so.

Good move, DOE.

 

Northrop Grumman’s Subcontractor Management Puts $10 Billion Program at Risk

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From time to time we bloviate about the importance of subcontractor management to effective program execution. Here’s a link to a recent story about Northrop Grumman’s management of a Triton program subcontractor. Corrective Action Requests (CARs) that date back to 2013 are jeopardizing the program’s ability to obtain Milestone C approval. Milestone C would move the program from development to Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP). The LRIP phase of the program has been estimated to be worth $4 Billion to NOC. Moving from LRIP to FRP would add perhaps another $6 Billion to the pot, bringing the Triton’s program value (excluding development) to about $10 Billion, according to the article.

How much would you pay to ensure your $10 Billion program received Milestone Decision Authority approval? We bet you’d pay quite a bit. We bet you’d bring in engineers and quality assurance experts and experts in composite manufacturing, and you’d drop them into that supplier and have them camp there until all the problems had been fixed. We bet anybody who tried to argue about budget overruns and cost/schedule variances would be told to STFU because there was $10 freakin’ BILLION dollars at stake. But that’s at your company.

Apparently at Northrop Grumman, subcontractor management is handled a bit differently.

That’s a shame, really, especially if you are a NOC shareholder.

Finally, anytime you think we’re full of hot air, and that we are making too much noise about the importance of subcontractor management, feel free to review this article.

 

The Veterans Administration and the “Rule of Two”

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The Supreme Court of the United States doesn’t often agree to hear government contracts cases, but when it does then its opinion becomes the law of the land. Recently SCOTUS agreed to hear a bid protest case and its opinion established how the Veterans Administration (VA) will decide to award contracts to service-disabled and other veteran-owned small businesses. The opinion was good news for those small businesses.

Various statutes pertaining to the VA require that “a contracting officer ‘shall award contracts’ by restricting competition to veteran-owned small businesses if the officer reasonably expects that at least two such businesses will submit offers and that ‘the award can be made at a fair and reasonable price that offers best value to the United States.’” That requirement is known as the “Rule of Two.”

According to the SCOTUS case summary—

In 2012, the Department procured an Emergency Notification Service for four medical centers for a one-year period, with an option to extend the agreement for two more, from a non-veteran-owned business. The Department did so through the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS), a streamlined method that allows Government agencies to acquire particular goods and services under prenegotiated terms. After the initial year, the Department exercised its option for an additional year, and the agreement ended in 2013.

Petitioner Kingdomware Technologies, Inc., a service-disabled veteran-owned small business, filed a bid protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), alleging that the Department procured multiple contracts through the FSS without employing the Rule of Two. The GAO determined that the Department’s actions were unlawful, but when the Department declined to follow the GAO’s non-binding recommendation, Kingdomware filed suit …. The Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment to the Government, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Department was only required to apply the Rule of Two when necessary to satisfy its annual [socioeconomic] goals.

In a unanimous opinion, SCOTUS held that the statutory language was unambiguous. The language required the VA to use the Rule of Two before contracting under competitive procedures. The Rule of Two is not discretionary; it may not be waived even if the Department has already met its annual socioeconomic goals. Before opening a full and open competition, a VA Contracting Officer must first conduct market research in order to determine whether or not there are at least two service-disabled veteran or veteran-owned small businesses that can perform the work and will submit offers than can be found to be fair and reasonable. If the CO determines there are at least two such small businesses, then the procurement must be “set aside,” or restricted, such that only service-disabled veteran or veteran-owned small business may submit proposals for the contract.

The only exceptions to the foregoing are those in the statute itself, which provide that the VA may use noncompetitive procedures and sole-source contract awards for lower-value contract awards (which we believe means awards below the simplified acquisition threshold). In particular, SCOTUS held that orders under FSS contracts were not exceptions (as the VA had argued) and were thus subject to the Rule of Two.

If you are a service-disabled veteran-owned small business, or simply a veteran-owned small business, and you sell goods or services to the Veterans Administration—or want to sell goods or services to the Veterans Administration—then this SCOTUS opinion is excellent news. You need to make sure that you are on the appropriate VA list of SDVOSBs and VOSBs with all your NAICS codes, so that you can be positioned to submit responsive bids when you receive a call or email from a Contracting Officer. And make no mistake, you will be receiving communications—because the VA has to comply with this SCOTUS ruling.

 

Fat Leonard Continues to Spread

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The first time we discussed the “Fat Leonard” scandal was at the end of 2013, when we wrote “The DOD Leadership is focused on beating up its industrial base, because it simply cannot face the fact that its own house is in slip-shod repair and in desperate need of attention. It’s clear that the Department of Defense needs a thorough house-cleaning, from top to bottom.”

If you follow the link above to our original article, you’ll find background on the Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA), and on its corrupt practices, as well as some details on the widespread corruption and “systematic weaknesses in the Navy’s worldwide contracting bureaucracy.”

We’ve mentioned GDMA from time to time, mostly in passing. We’ve noted a couple of indictments, a couple of guilty pleas, a couple of sentences. We thought we’d take a minute and catch our readers up on the continuing scandal.

We were prompted to recap the story (so far) by this Dept. of Justice press release, which announced that Paul Simpkins, a retired DOD “supervisory contracting officer” had pleaded guilty to charges of accepting “hundreds of thousands of dollars through wire transfers to a bank account in Japan controlled by Simpkins’s former wife.” In return, Simpkins admitted that he “extended GDMA’s contract after a subordinate recommended the contract not be extended due to high costs; instructed U.S. Navy officials in Hong Kong to discontinue using meters that ensured proper accounting of the amount of waste that GDMA removed from U.S. Navy ships to ensure that no overbilling occurred; and instructed a U.S. Navy official to ignore invoices that GDMA submitted after Francis complained that U.S. Navy personnel were asking questions.”

The “Fat Leonard” tally so far, as summarized by The Washington Post:

A federal prosecutor said last year that 200 individuals were under investigation. Of those, about 30 are admirals, Navy officials have said.

Fourteen people have been charged so far in federal court, all but three of whom have pleaded guilty. Justice Department officials have said more arrests are likely. Another Navy contracting official who worked in the same office with Simpkins has been arrested in Singapore and faces corruption charges there.

The scandal has its own Wikipedia page. It includes the following:

A number of American naval personnel have been arrested as a result of the investigation, including two navy commanders, a navy captain, and a special agent with NCIS. The chief of naval intelligence was stripped of his security clearance. Also, two admirals were suspended, and three admirals were censured by Ray Mabus, the Secretary of the Navy, and forced into retirement after it was determined that they improperly accepted gifts from Francis. …Those three officers served with the USS Ronald Reagan strike group in 2006 and 2007 while the bribery occurred.

Captain Daniel Dusek, who oversaw operations in the US Pacific Fleet, became the highest-ranking Navy officer to be convicted in one of the US military’s worst bribery scandals. In addition to the 46-month prison sentence, a US judge ordered Dusek to pay $100,000 in fines and restitution for passing ship and submarine schedules to Glenn Defense Marine Asia … In June 2016, the US Navy announced that Rear Admiral Robert Gilbeau was to be charged in the case. He would be the 14th officer charged, and the most senior. He had served as a supply officer in several ships served by GDMA.

As for Fat Leonard himself, the Wikipedia article reports that –

On January 15, 2015, Francis, 50, pleaded guilty to all charges in San Diego federal court. He admitted to bribing scores of U.S. Navy officials with $500,000 in cash, sex from prostitutes, lavish hotel stays, and luxury goods. Leonard admitted to using his Navy contacts, including US Navy ship captains, to obtain classified information and to bilk the Navy out of about $20 million by steering ships to specific ports in the Pacific and falsifying service charges. In his plea, Francis identified seven Navy officials who accepted bribes. The 6-foot-3-inch, 350-pound Malaysian playboy faces a maximum prison sentence of 25 years and agreed to forfeit $35 million in personal assets.

One of the biggest challenges in establishing anti-fraud and anti-corruption internal controls is that most people don’t want to believe their employees (or executive officers) would actually stoop so low. They don’t want to believe that all those controls are actually needed.

Well, we’re here to tell you that those internal controls absolutely are needed. From Segregation of Duties to inventory cycle counts to Accounts Payable data mining, it’s all necessary and a worthwhile investment.

Because it can happen to you.

 

“The prime is responsible for managing the subcontractor.”

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This truism was posted recently in a LinkedIn group thread. It was posted as if it were some great profundity, instead of an example of the obvious. Of course the prime is responsible for managing its subcontractors. If you’ve read this blog for any length of time, you know we frequently pontificate on the importance of managing subcontractors. Subcontractor management may be the single most important differentiator between projects that fail and projects that succeed.

Contractors that don’t effectively manage their subcontractors not only risk suboptimal program outcomes, but they also risk being accusing of “excessive pass-through costs.” Excessive pass-through costs are what happens when a prime incurs too much subcontractor costs and can’t show a Contracting Officer that it (the prime) adds value to the work being performed by the subcontractors. (See FAR clauses 52.215-22 and 52.215-23.)

But what does “managing” mean in this context? What does it mean to “manage” subcontractors? Is it the same thing as managing one’s own workforce? If not, what’s the difference?

FAR 42.202(e)(2) states—

The prime contractor is responsible for managing its subcontracts. The CAO’s review of subcontracts is normally limited to evaluating the prime contractor’s management of the subcontracts (see Part 44).

That seems to point toward FAR Part 44 as the location where we can learn about subcontractor management. Unfortunately, while that Part of the FAR has quite a bit to say about the adequacy of contractors’ purchasing systems and granting of consent to subcontract, it has very little to say about the expectations regarding how a prime (or higher tier sub) should manage its subcontractors.

This shouldn’t really be surprising. If you read the FAR Part 42 direction quoted above, and look at the entire section to provide context, it’s quite clear that the statement “The prime contractor is responsible for managing its subcontracts” is directed to the government Contracting Officer and not to anybody else. It’s a reminder to a Contracting Officer not to get overly involved in the prime-subcontractor relationship, to limit any review to the types of contractor management activities specified in FAR Part 44. These contractor management activities are all about placing the subcontract and not about any kind of post-award administrative activities. According to FAR 44.303, the the types of subcontractor “management” activities subject to CO review include—

(a) The results of market research accomplished;

(b) The degree of price competition obtained;

(c) Pricing policies and techniques, including methods of obtaining certified cost or pricing data, and data other than certified cost or pricing data;

(d) Methods of evaluating subcontractor responsibility, including the contractor’s use of the System for Award Management Exclusions (see 9.404) and, if the contractor has subcontracts with parties on the Exclusions list, the documentation, systems, and procedures the contractor has established to protect the Government’s interests (see 9.405-2);

(e) Treatment accorded affiliates and other concerns having close working arrangements with the contractor;

(f) Policies and procedures pertaining to small business concerns, including small disadvantaged, women-owned, veteran-owned, HUBZone, and service-disabled veteran-owned small business concerns;

(g) Planning, award, and postaward management of major subcontract programs;

(h) Compliance with Cost Accounting Standards in awarding subcontracts;

(i) Appropriateness of types of contracts used (see 16.103);

(j) Management control systems, including internal audit procedures, to administer progress payments to subcontractors; and

(k) Implementation of higher-level quality standards.

And that’s about it. While there are some potentially fruitful areas of interest (e.g., “postaward management of major subcontract programs” and “management control systems … to administer progress payments to subcontractors”) the obvious focus of governmental review is on pre-award and award procedures—and not on what happens after a subcontract is awarded. (In a related note, we were unable to find any official definition of what a “major subcontract program” was or what differentiated a “major” subcontract from a “non-major” subcontract. That lack of definition kind of makes it tough for a CO to review much of anything, in our view.)

So why has the GAO told Congress that “The FAR emphasizes the prime contractor's responsibility in managing its subcontractors.” (See GAO-11-61R, Oct. 28, 2010) As we’ve seen, that’s a misleading statement. The FAR absolutely does not emphasize anything even close to what GAO was implying. More to the point, why does DCAA make such a big deal about a prime (or higher tier) contractor’s duty to manage its subcontractors?

Here’s a link to an official DCAA presentation to subcontractors that discusses the responsibilities of the prime (or higher tier) contractor. It states: The prime contractor is primarily responsible for subcontract award, technical and financial performance, monitoring, and payment to the subcontractor for the work accomplished under subcontract terms. That’s quite true and unobjectionable; but subsequently the presentation veers into new territory, stating that “common prime or higher tier subcontract deficiencies” include: “Failure to verify the subcontractor has an adequate accounting system” and “Failure to obtain an adequate incurred cost submission from subcontractor.” Those are interesting notions but, unfortunately for DCAA, they cannot be found anywhere in any contract clause.

More tellingly, our colleagues over at Redstone consulting believe that DCAA and DCMA are “rewriting” FAR 42.202 to require primes and higher tier subs to “audit” their subcontractors. Michael Steen wrote—

If and when DCAA audits a prime contractor indirect cost rate proposal, DCAA is now training its auditors to focus on any and all subcontract costs on any type of flexibly priced prime contract (cost-type, fixed-price incentive, T&M). If the prime contractor cannot demonstrate that it ‘audited’ the costs claimed by a subcontractor (cost-type) subcontract, DCAA is now questioning 100% of those subcontract costs (DCAA is not auditing the subcontract costs on behalf of the prime contractor because that is not DCAA’s responsibility). Virtually the same end-game for T&M contracts with T&M subcontracts; if the prime did not audit the subcontractor records, 100% disallowance. And if you think that a fixed price (FFP) subcontract mitigates prime contractor risk, not exactly if the FFP subcontract is under a cost-type prime contract. DCAA will likely second guess the sufficiency of the prime contractor cost or price analysis leading to a DCAA assertion that the FFP subcontract is not sufficiently documented as a fair and reasonable price; hence, the entire subcontract cost (price) is unreasonable under FAR 31.201-3.

We think this whole thing has gotten out of hand. A minor reminder to Contracting Officers that primes are responsible for managing their subcontractors (duh) has evolved into another way to question the adequacy of a contractor’s purchasing system, or to question incurred costs. Clearly, that’s not what the FAR drafters intended, but that seems to be where we are.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.