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Apogee Consulting Inc

Delayed Audits Cause Ripple Impacts, Part 1

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Respected practitioner Stephen A. Avery, leader of DCAA Compliance (headquartered in New Mexico), recently published an article that focused on a decision by the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals (CBCA). You should follow the link and read his thoughtful article.

Stephen drew two conclusions from the CBCA decision: (1) A contractor under audit has no obligations to make copies of documents for the auditor(s), and (2) A contractor under audit has no obligations to make electronic copies of documents available to the auditor(s), except for certain documents related to electronic billings. Stephen emphasized the obligation to support the audit and to respond to auditors’ reasonable requests, and to make documents available to an auditor. But he also encouraged contractors to “stand up for your rights.”

We read Stephen’s article and wanted to look at that CBCA decision for ourselves. When we looked at it, we saw other lessons we wanted to share with our readers.

But first, the acronyms. You gotta know the acronyms because there are a lot of acronyms in the decision. The prime contractor was Group Health Incorporated (GHI) and its subcontractor was Douglas Consulting and Computer Services (DCCS). GHI had a contract with the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Part of GHI’s contract related to management of Initial Enrollment Questionnaires (IEQs).

Got all that? Let’s check. How well do you understand the following?

DCCS had previously developed IEQs, which were paper documents, in another CMS contract. GHI’s prime contract with DHHS required that DCCS be a subcontractor, in order to handle the IEQs. Thus, pursuant to its prime contract, GHI entered into a subcontract with DCCS on November 1, 1999.

How did you do? Did that make sense? If not, go back and review the acronyms. If you got all that, then let’s rock on.

Now for the facts, which come from the CBCA decision. On May 18, 2011, DHHS partially terminated GHI’s prime contract to eliminate paper-based IEQs. In response, GHI terminated its subcontract with DCCS in its entirely, on May 20, 2011. “On June 8, 2011, DCCS submitted to GHI a termination settlement proposal in the amount of $1,608,278. GHI provided a copy of DCCS’s proposal to CMS on June 13, 2011, and requested a meeting with CMS and DCCS to resolve the open cost issues.”

What were the “open cost issues” to be discussed? According to the decision, the open cost issues were related to audits that had been performed in 2011 by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). DCAA had performed Incurred Cost audits on DCCS for the years 2003 through 2007. Although the audit had been performed, the indirect cost rates for those years had not yet been “finalized”—that is to say, CMS had not yet issued a determination as to whether the final rates would be the rates that DCCS had submitted, the rates that DCAA had recommended, or somewhere in between. Without those final rates (which FAR 52.216-7 calls “final billing rates”) DCCS couldn’t close out its contracts. More to the point, without those final rates, DCCS and GHI could not reach agreement on DCCS’ proposed termination settlement costs.

Let’s note here that the lack of final billing rates was identified by GHI as an issue impeding timely negotiation and resolution of DCCS’ termination settlement proposal within one week of its receipt. Despite early identification, apparently there was never any discussion of the open cost issues. Instead, DHHS/CMS then started to audit DCCS’ incurred costs for the years 2008 through 2010. Granted, those years needed to be audited, but there was no apparent nexus between finalizing rates for FYs 2003 through 2007 and the completion of audits for other years. Each year needs to stand on its own (absent a dispute) and the decision to audit later years instead of using the existing audit reports to finalize the earlier years is … puzzling.

Another puzzle is why didn’t DCAA continue to perform the audits on DCCS’ claimed costs? Why did DHHS/CMS suddenly decide, in 2011, that it should perform contract audits with its own resources? The decision didn’t say.

The DHHS/CMS audit approach was somewhat puzzling, as well. As noted in the decision, “At CMS’s request, DCCS on September 9, 2011, submitted its incurred cost proposals for 2003 through 2010 to the CMS auditors, even though the incurred cost proposals for 2003 through 2007 had already been audited by DCAA.” (Emphasis added.) We are unable to conceive of any reason to expand audit scope to encompass previously audited years, unless the reason is that DHHS/CMS was simply rejecting the DCAA audit findings for some unstated reason. Or, perhaps, DCAA did the type of "audit" that it's now doing for "low-risk" contractors--which is to say, no audit at all. It's possible DHHS/CMS had to "reperform" DCAA's audits because DCAA didn't actually do any audits. (Obviously we don't know the actual reason.)

Anyway, the expanded audit continued for some period of time; the parties differed as to when it actually started, but seemed to agree that that audit ended in October 2013. (We suspect the differences in start dates relate to the performance of risk assessment activities versus audit procedures. To a contractor being audited, an auditor Request for Information is a Request for Information, regardless of the auditor’s purpose in asking. And, as we’ve noted before, the line between risk assessment and performance of audit procedures is really rather blurry.)

Interestingly, even though DHHS/CMS spent years auditing DCCS’ claimed costs, the one thing it didn’t audit was DCCS’ proposed termination settlement costs. The proposal was not within scope, apparently.

Meanwhile, DCCS kept a small staff on hand to support the DHHS/CMS audits and to support final contract close-out. On May 7, 2012 (nearly a year after termination) the following communication was noted by the CBCA—

… in response to an inquiry from the CMS contracting officer, GHI stated that while ‘all DCCS operational work under the contract has been completed, DCCS was continuing to incur costs to support final closeout.’ GHI’s email message further stated: ‘We are awaiting CMS’s determination as to whether these costs are allowable. Therefore, the termination settlement costs have not been fully paid. In addition, the costs for 2003-2007 have not been finalized and the costs from FY 2008 on are still awaiting audit and settlement.’

On May 11, 2012, GHI “requested the contracting officer extend the one-year period for submission of GHI’s final termination settlement proposal until completion of the audit of DCCS’s indirect cost rates for 2008 through 2011.” In other words, GHI believed it couldn’t submit its own termination settlement proposal (which would be for a partial termination for convenience from its point of view) until it could negotiate a final settlement with DCCS; and it couldn’t negotiate a final settlement with DCCS until DHHS/CMS finished the ICS audits and finalized DCCS’ rates.

Was that a valid position? The CMS contracting officer didn’t think so. He wrote to GHI –

I have been advised that the final settlement of termination and the audits are two separate items. We do not have privity of contract with DCCS other than to audit and settle their rates. … I cannot provide you an estimate when the audits will be complete. After the audits are complete then we have to settle the results of the audits.

GHI interpreted the CMS contracting officer’s response as expressing an intention to disallow any continuing DCCS costs. Among other things, GHI requested from DCCS “an explanation for DCCS’s position that the costs incurred since cessation of work under the subcontract are allowable, as well as an explanation why those costs are reasonable.”

Perhaps the GHI interpretation was correct, because the CMS contracting officer subsequently notified GHI that “costs submitted on behalf of DCCS associated with maintaining staff after the termination for the purpose of [supporting] the DHHS indirect rate audits would be deemed unreasonable and unallowable.”

Meanwhile DCCS was submitting interim payment requests (as one does when terminated for convenience) and most of those were getting paid. However, two payment requests were denied reimbursement. To be clear: CMS wasn’t going to reimburse GHI for two payment requests and therefore GHI told DCCS that it wasn’t going to pay DCCS.

Long story short: GHI submitted a sponsored claim in the amount of $815,128 and the CMS contracting officer denied it. GHI and DCCS appealed the denial to the CBCA. It was a this point that the CMS contracting officer “unilaterally” established final billing rates for DCCS for the years 2003 through 2007. The CBCA decision didn’t discuss whether or not that was a valid determination and, apparently, DCCS was not disputing that unilateral determination. In any case, that still wasn’t sufficient to move the termination settlement forward, because final rates were still lacking for 2008 through 2012, and there was still a dispute regarding the propriety of who needed to pay for the delayed audit support.

Before the CBCA were cross-motions for summary judgment. We’ll discuss the parties’ arguments and resolution of the issues in the next article.

 

 

DOE Establishes Process for Contract Audits Through Private Sector

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PathfinderWe’ve been watching this coming for some time and now here we are. The Department of Energy has established an official process for contracting officers of non-M&O contracts to use “an alternative to Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audit support.”

DOE Policy Flash 2016-37, dated July 28, 2016, revised DOE Acquisition Guide Chapter 42.101 (“Audit Requirements for Non-Management and Operating Contracts”) to advise DOE contracting officers that there is an alternative to using DCAA. As the revised Chapter notes alternative approaches are necessary because, “DCAA’s services are not always readily available in a timely manner for audits of final indirect cost rate proposals (sometimes referred to as incurred cost proposals).”

Yep. DCAA’s audit services are not always readily available. Some might even say that DCAA is prohibited for performing audit services on behalf of DOE. Prohibited by Public Law. DCAA would like to believe that it will once again be permitted to perform audit services on behalf of non-DOD agencies, and perhaps it will—but not today. Today those non-DOD agencies that had come to rely on DCAA auditors have to make do without them. DOE is one of those affected agencies and they are signaling clearly that they are moving forward—at least in the near-term—without DCAA. This DOE Policy Flash makes it official.

What is the alternative to using DCAA? It’s the private sector, as we’ve suspected it would be. According to the new policy guidance—

As an alternative to DCAA audit support, DOE/NNSA Contracting Officers may obtain audit services from a private sector provider of audit services. One available option is a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) for audit services that is currently in place with CohnReznick, LLP. Orders for audit support can be placed by any DOE/NNSA Contracting Officer through individual awards issued against BPA DE-MA0011836. Each order placed against the BPA is awarded and administered by the field site Contracting Officer placing the order. For further information regarding placing orders for audit support with CohnReznick, LLP, please contact the BPA Contracting Officer's Representative (COR), Salem Fussell, at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .

Thus, DOE is moving on without DCAA. It has at least one private sector CPA firm available to assist its contracting officers with proposal audits, Disclosure Statement reviews, business system reviews, and incurred cost submission audits. This is a watershed moment for those involved in government contract cost accounting and compliance.

Will NASA follow the trail that DOE is blazing? It remains to be seen.

 

 

KC-46 Tanker Update

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For those keeping score.

Boeing announced on July 21, 2016 that –

The company will also recognize a $393 million after-tax charge ($0.62 per share) on the KC-46 Tanker program. This charge reflects higher costs associated with previously announced program schedule and technical challenges, including implementation of the hardware solution to resolve the refueling boom axial load issue identified during flight testing, delays in the certification process and concurrency between late-stage development testing and initial production. 

This brings the total program write-off (so far) to a hair under $2 billion. That’s $2 billion over and above the original development contract price of $4.8 billion. That’s $2 billion over and above the USAF’s $500 million share of the overrun.

There are not very many defense contractors that could have afforded to fund nearly half the development cost of a new aircraft. Fortunately for all concerned, one of them is Boeing.

Tell us again why fixed-price development contracts are preferred these days?

In related news, Boeing claims that it has successfully passed all testing necessary to receive a Milestone C Decision approval and proceed into the Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) phase.

Go Pegasus!

 

Effective Subcontractor Management Built on Relationships

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Weakest_LinkThe relationship between a prime contractor and a subcontractor (or between a higher-tier subcontractor and its own subcontractors) is the key to effective program management. Most people know this and many preach it – but in our experience very few practice it.

We discuss program management a lot on this blog. For all the CAS and FAR and DFARS stuff we post, and for all the DCMA/DCAA audit stuff we post, we keep coming back to program management. Why? Because if the programs aren’t effectively managed then everything else is reduced in importance. Program schedule slips and cost overruns put the squeeze on company cash flow and profits. Program problems divert management’s attention from other matters. Program problems today often mean fewer programs tomorrow (thanks to CPARS reports). Therefore, effective program management is the bedrock of the company, both today and tomorrow.

And the bedrock of effective program management is effective subcontractor management.

This is especially true at the larger contractors, those that bill themselves as “system integrators” where 70% or more of program costs are incurred outside the contractor’s premises, by various subcontractors located in disparate geographical areas. These large companies have come to realize – too slowly, in the case of a few – that traditional subcontractor quality assurance and surveillance techniques are insufficient to manage the program risks in today’s environment. What worked in the 60’s and 70’s will not work in the second decade of the 21st century. New techniques are required to effectively manage a global supply chain; which is why Boeing had to significantly revamp how it was managing its 787 program suppliers.

So it’s funny, then, that Boeing has recently been in the news for screwing-over its suppliers. It’s funny (or ironic, if you will) that the company that had to figure out how to better manage its supply chain in order to get the 787 program back on track is the same company that is now (reportedly) working hard to piss-off those same suppliers. Yeah, a pissed-off supplier is not going to be your best supplier. Relationships matter.

We once heard the story about a helicopter manufacturer in Connecticut who had a very successful defense program. After 9/11 that program was deemed critical to kinetic operations in Southwest Asia. The customer wanted more product; it needed more flight capacity. The contractor, who was already working three shifts per day, seven days per week, couldn’t make any more product, and it would take 2 to 3 years to bring another factory online in order to increase capacity. What could they do?

Well, after consultations with the customer, the contractor decided to enter into a co-production deal with a smaller contractor up the street (metaphorically speaking). That smaller contractor had a factory and staff and engineers, and could be up and running in a matter of months. It was a win/win! The Presidents of two contractors met to hammer out an agreement-in-principle, shook hands, and then turned it over to the contracts folks to work up a contract that both parties would execute.

What happened after that is the moral of this little vignette. The Contracts folks from the big contractor decided to earn their salaries by screwing-over the little contractor. They negotiated hard and they negotiated from a position of strength, and they got concessions. After all was said and done, the FFP subcontract between the two contractors was priced so that the smaller contractor made very little profit. Obviously, all the new work reduced indirect cost rates and kept people employed and that was a tangible benefit, but the price was so low that any unexpected bump in the ramp-up of the new factory was going to cause cost problems (not to mention schedule slips).

So what did the smaller contractor do in response to the cost pressures imposed by the subcontract? It assigned its most junior personnel (i.e., the lowest-cost) to the project. It abided by the letter of the contract: no more. It took no risks and added no value and simply performed as directed.

What do you think happened?

Yep. The ramp-up of the new factory didn’t go well. There were delays. There were quality problems. And the smaller contractor didn’t worry too much about those problems, because it had contractual coverage. If the bigger contractor wanted something different --- well, that was a change order, wasn’t it? And change orders require proposals to identify cost and price impacts. And those proposals require fact-finding and negotiation. And those tasks took time and they took resources away from what actually mattered, which was getting the new factory up and running so that products could be shipped to the warfighters who desperately needed them.

Remember, the products being built were for flight. They carried people from Place A to Place B. They needed to work and work well and be safe. Quality escapes were not good. The government customer made its displeasure with the situation known via Corrective Action Requests (CARs). Including at least one Level 3 CAR.

Level 3 CARs are not good. At least one of them was leaked and was reported widely. That didn’t reflect well on management at either of the contractors.

So the moral of this little vignette is that prime contractors (and higher tier) subcontractors need to establish effective working relationships that supersede the contractual language under which they are working. If you damage those working relationships, if you screw-over your subcontractor, you are running the very real risk that your subcontractor is going to find a way to screw you right back. In this case, the smaller contractor screwed-over its bigger prime by following the letter of the subcontract instead of the spirit, by assigning qualified (but very junior) personnel to the program in order to live within tight price ceilings, and by sitting back and watching the trainwreck happen.

By the way, it was the new President of the bigger contractor that told us this story. The old President and several of his management team had “moved on” as part of the company’s corrective action plan implemented in response to that Level 3 CAR.

Relationships matter.

In contrast, Dr. Robert Carman told us about his supplier relationships. He told us about holding a competition to award a 5-year requirements contract. Several bids were received but not all approved suppliers bothered to submit bids. Several of the bids seemed lackadaisical but one stood out. And that one bidder received a subcontract award. Dr. Carman’s company agreed to award that one subcontractor its total requirements for that product for a period of five years.

And then Dr. Carman’s company won a major defense acquisition program. Huge. Lots of business for everybody, including suppliers.

And all that work went to the one successful bidder.

The other approved suppliers complained because they were losing significant amounts of business, but their complaints were baseless and they got nothing. Meanwhile that one supplier got record-setting levels of work.

Dr. Carman met with the senior leadership of that company every month for five years. They met and they reviewed status and they discussed issues of mutual concern. And they bonded. Relationships were forged.

Dr. Carman told us how those relationships overcame program challenges. His company needed a new product that involved new production techniques? No problem. The supplier initiated its own IRAD program to develop those new techniques. Those new techniques led to new orders – not only from Dr. Carman’s company, but from other A&D companies as well – because the supplier now had a competitive advantage in the marketplace. Dr. Carman’s company identified quality problems? No problem. The supplier deployed additional high-level resources; it hired consultants (on its own dime). It bent over backwards to help Dr. Carman out, because that’s what friends did for each other.

Contrast those two stories.

Now let’s look at Boeing and how it’s (reportedly) screwing-over some of its suppliers. Here is one link to many reports on the topic.

Apparently the problem started at Rockwell Collins, a publicly traded company. (In which we own a small number of shares of stock.) In its most recent quarterly financials, COL reported good numbers but degraded cash flow. According to Bloomberg: “While Rockwell Collins’s third-quarter profit of $1.63 a share beat estimates, analysts on a conference call focused on its disappointing cash receipts. The $138 million generated in the quarter was short of estimates, and the supplier’s earnings release predicted free cash flow would total about $750 million for 2016, the low end of its previous guided range.” That news didn’t help COL’s stock price (dammit!).

COL’s CEO told analysts “’In general, this is catching the supply chain off guard and it’s inconsistent with our contract.’ … While Boeing notified Rockwell Collins it was slowing supplier payments, ‘they’re delinquent for payments they had for the quarter.’” Bloomberg reports that Boeing is between $30 and $40 million behind in its contractually required payments.

And it’s not just Rockwell Collins. Boeing is also in the process of screwing-over GKN, another supplier. According to the Bloomberg article, “[Boeing] is negotiating a prolonged payment schedule with … GKN for parts including winglets, cabin windows and ice protection systems supplied across Boeing’s commercial fleet. Those changes have ‘already had an impact’ on working capital, GKN Chief Financial Officer Adam Walker said Tuesday ….”

For its part, Boeing admitted that it is in the process of changing its payment terms for large suppliers “to support [its] competitive position.” The Bloomberg article stated “Reuters reported earlier this month that Boeing was shifting supplier payments from 30 days to as many as 120 days.”

It’s a good thing this change of payment terms and alleged violations of subcontract agreements seems to be limited to Boeing’s commercial aircraft business. As we all know, if Boeing tried to do the same thing to its defense suppliers it would run afoul of certain FAR and DFARS requirements, and DCAA might find that it had a significant deficiency in its accounting system – which would lead to mandatory payment withholds. There are no such consequences on the commercial side of the house.

Unless, of course, you think about the two vignettes we related in this blog article. If you do think about them, you may realize that not all consequences are obvious. Some are stealthy and do long-term damage to the prime contractor (or higher-tier subcontractor) that maximizes its own results on the backs of its suppliers. Relationships matter, and decisions can damage relationships.

Maybe Boeing needs to relearn this lesson?

 

“Arising Under or Relating to” a Contract

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From time to time we pretend to be lawyers and we try to interpret a recent judicial decision. We’re not lawyers, though. We’re really not. Much of the legal jurisprudence that comes our way baffles us. So keep that in mind. If you want good legal advice, hire an attorney. If you want our layperson’s thoughts on legal stuff that impinges upon government contract cost accounting, administration, and compliance, then please keep reading this blog article.

Today’s discussion concerns the Contract Disputes Act (CDA) and what claims can be adjudicated by a court. The CDA confers jurisdiction to one of two types of fora: either the Court of Federal Claims or an appellate Board such as the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals.

But what is a claim?

The FAR defines a “claim” at 2.101; the definition states –

‘Claim’ means a written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract. However, a written demand or written assertion by the contractor seeking the payment of money exceeding $100,000 is not a claim under 41 U.S.C. chapter 71, Contract Disputes, until certified as required by the statute. A voucher, invoice, or other routine request for payment that is not in dispute when submitted is not a claim. The submission may be converted to a claim, by written notice to the contracting officer as provided in 33.206(a), if it is disputed either as to liability or amount or is not acted upon in a reasonable time.

Based on the FAR definition, a claim can be a demand for one of three things:

  1. The payment of money in a sum certain

  2. The adjustment or interpretation of contract terms

  3. Other relief

But whatever a claim may be, it must also arise “under” or “relating to” a government contract.

And therein lies the question we will explore today. What does it mean to arise under or relating to a contract?

This question was tackled by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) in its recent opinion on a government motion to dismiss a contractor’s appeal of its contracting officer’s final decision, based on an asserted lack of jurisdiction by the ASBCA. The decision, captioned “ABB Enterprise Software, Inc., f/k/a Ventyx" (ASBCA No. 60314), concerned allegations by a contractor that the Navy had violated its software agreement by using multiple copies of the contractor’s software. Eventually the contractor filed a claim with the contracting officer, who denied it because it was not a dispute covered by the CDA, in that it did not arise under and/or was not related to the contract. The contractor appealed that COFD and, during the appeal process, the government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, essentially repeating that same argument the contracting officer had used to deny the contractor’s original claim.

According to Judge Prouty’s recital of the facts, ABB Enterprise Software, Inc., which was formerly known as Ventyx, which was formerly known as Tech-Assist, Inc., held two contracts with the Navy. Each contract was awarded to acquire “a number of Electronic Shift Operations Management Systems (eSOMS) clearance and database software modules.” The contracts “also expressly required Tech-Assist to provide to the Navy licenses to use the software.”

Separately, the Navy and Tech-Assist executed a software license agreement for 268 copies of the eSOMS software. The dispute arose because Ventyx (Tech-Assist’s successor-in-interest) complained that the Navy had violated the software agreement. For its part, the Navy denied (in writing) that it had violated the agreement, but also stated that any disputes would need to be resolved pursuant to the requirements of the Contract Disputes Act. There was extensive correspondence over a period of at least 18 months, “culminating in a 28 June 2013 letter from a Navy attorney to Ventyx’s general counsel, suggesting that Ventyx file a CDA claim if it wished to pursue the matter further.” Apparently Ventyx was surprised when the contracting officer rejected its claim, using the rationale that a license agreement violation was not a CDA dispute.

In its motion to dismiss, the Navy argued that the “arising under or relating to” a contract requirement was not met, since the software agreement did not expressly reference any government contract. The Navy further argued that the language must be read narrowly, such that “only direct breaches of a contract” would qualify as meeting the test. Judge Prouty quickly dismissed the Navy’s arguments, writing that “the first argument is not consistent with binding precedent; the second is belied by the uncontroverted facts.”

In making his decision, Judge Prouty cited to a 2011 Federal Circuit decision, Todd Construction, L.P., in which the Federal Circuit “instructed that this phrase is to be read ‘broadly’ in the context of CDA jurisdiction.” As Judge Prouty wrote—

Put yet another way, to be related to a contract, a claim ‘must have some relationship to the terms or performance of [the] government contract.’” Accordingly, “we reject the Navy’s proposed construction of the CDA, which would limit our jurisdiction to only those claims involving breaches in the terms of the contract or matters encompassed in the disputes clause.

As for the Navy’s second argument, Judge Prouty wrote “execution of the license agreement was part and parcel with the performance of the contract. The contract was for acquisition of software along with the associated license agreement. … Thus, the license agreement … was required by the contract and related to performance of that contract.”

It is axiomatic that our system of justice is an adversarial one. We think, however, that the Navy’s arguments were a bit too adversarial, and verged on frivolity—wasting the Board’s resources and delaying a just decision.

But what do we know about such things?

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.