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Apogee Consulting Inc

Effective Subcontractor Management Built on Relationships

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Weakest_LinkThe relationship between a prime contractor and a subcontractor (or between a higher-tier subcontractor and its own subcontractors) is the key to effective program management. Most people know this and many preach it – but in our experience very few practice it.

We discuss program management a lot on this blog. For all the CAS and FAR and DFARS stuff we post, and for all the DCMA/DCAA audit stuff we post, we keep coming back to program management. Why? Because if the programs aren’t effectively managed then everything else is reduced in importance. Program schedule slips and cost overruns put the squeeze on company cash flow and profits. Program problems divert management’s attention from other matters. Program problems today often mean fewer programs tomorrow (thanks to CPARS reports). Therefore, effective program management is the bedrock of the company, both today and tomorrow.

And the bedrock of effective program management is effective subcontractor management.

This is especially true at the larger contractors, those that bill themselves as “system integrators” where 70% or more of program costs are incurred outside the contractor’s premises, by various subcontractors located in disparate geographical areas. These large companies have come to realize – too slowly, in the case of a few – that traditional subcontractor quality assurance and surveillance techniques are insufficient to manage the program risks in today’s environment. What worked in the 60’s and 70’s will not work in the second decade of the 21st century. New techniques are required to effectively manage a global supply chain; which is why Boeing had to significantly revamp how it was managing its 787 program suppliers.

So it’s funny, then, that Boeing has recently been in the news for screwing-over its suppliers. It’s funny (or ironic, if you will) that the company that had to figure out how to better manage its supply chain in order to get the 787 program back on track is the same company that is now (reportedly) working hard to piss-off those same suppliers. Yeah, a pissed-off supplier is not going to be your best supplier. Relationships matter.

We once heard the story about a helicopter manufacturer in Connecticut who had a very successful defense program. After 9/11 that program was deemed critical to kinetic operations in Southwest Asia. The customer wanted more product; it needed more flight capacity. The contractor, who was already working three shifts per day, seven days per week, couldn’t make any more product, and it would take 2 to 3 years to bring another factory online in order to increase capacity. What could they do?

Well, after consultations with the customer, the contractor decided to enter into a co-production deal with a smaller contractor up the street (metaphorically speaking). That smaller contractor had a factory and staff and engineers, and could be up and running in a matter of months. It was a win/win! The Presidents of two contractors met to hammer out an agreement-in-principle, shook hands, and then turned it over to the contracts folks to work up a contract that both parties would execute.

What happened after that is the moral of this little vignette. The Contracts folks from the big contractor decided to earn their salaries by screwing-over the little contractor. They negotiated hard and they negotiated from a position of strength, and they got concessions. After all was said and done, the FFP subcontract between the two contractors was priced so that the smaller contractor made very little profit. Obviously, all the new work reduced indirect cost rates and kept people employed and that was a tangible benefit, but the price was so low that any unexpected bump in the ramp-up of the new factory was going to cause cost problems (not to mention schedule slips).

So what did the smaller contractor do in response to the cost pressures imposed by the subcontract? It assigned its most junior personnel (i.e., the lowest-cost) to the project. It abided by the letter of the contract: no more. It took no risks and added no value and simply performed as directed.

What do you think happened?

Yep. The ramp-up of the new factory didn’t go well. There were delays. There were quality problems. And the smaller contractor didn’t worry too much about those problems, because it had contractual coverage. If the bigger contractor wanted something different --- well, that was a change order, wasn’t it? And change orders require proposals to identify cost and price impacts. And those proposals require fact-finding and negotiation. And those tasks took time and they took resources away from what actually mattered, which was getting the new factory up and running so that products could be shipped to the warfighters who desperately needed them.

Remember, the products being built were for flight. They carried people from Place A to Place B. They needed to work and work well and be safe. Quality escapes were not good. The government customer made its displeasure with the situation known via Corrective Action Requests (CARs). Including at least one Level 3 CAR.

Level 3 CARs are not good. At least one of them was leaked and was reported widely. That didn’t reflect well on management at either of the contractors.

So the moral of this little vignette is that prime contractors (and higher tier) subcontractors need to establish effective working relationships that supersede the contractual language under which they are working. If you damage those working relationships, if you screw-over your subcontractor, you are running the very real risk that your subcontractor is going to find a way to screw you right back. In this case, the smaller contractor screwed-over its bigger prime by following the letter of the subcontract instead of the spirit, by assigning qualified (but very junior) personnel to the program in order to live within tight price ceilings, and by sitting back and watching the trainwreck happen.

By the way, it was the new President of the bigger contractor that told us this story. The old President and several of his management team had “moved on” as part of the company’s corrective action plan implemented in response to that Level 3 CAR.

Relationships matter.

In contrast, Dr. Robert Carman told us about his supplier relationships. He told us about holding a competition to award a 5-year requirements contract. Several bids were received but not all approved suppliers bothered to submit bids. Several of the bids seemed lackadaisical but one stood out. And that one bidder received a subcontract award. Dr. Carman’s company agreed to award that one subcontractor its total requirements for that product for a period of five years.

And then Dr. Carman’s company won a major defense acquisition program. Huge. Lots of business for everybody, including suppliers.

And all that work went to the one successful bidder.

The other approved suppliers complained because they were losing significant amounts of business, but their complaints were baseless and they got nothing. Meanwhile that one supplier got record-setting levels of work.

Dr. Carman met with the senior leadership of that company every month for five years. They met and they reviewed status and they discussed issues of mutual concern. And they bonded. Relationships were forged.

Dr. Carman told us how those relationships overcame program challenges. His company needed a new product that involved new production techniques? No problem. The supplier initiated its own IRAD program to develop those new techniques. Those new techniques led to new orders – not only from Dr. Carman’s company, but from other A&D companies as well – because the supplier now had a competitive advantage in the marketplace. Dr. Carman’s company identified quality problems? No problem. The supplier deployed additional high-level resources; it hired consultants (on its own dime). It bent over backwards to help Dr. Carman out, because that’s what friends did for each other.

Contrast those two stories.

Now let’s look at Boeing and how it’s (reportedly) screwing-over some of its suppliers. Here is one link to many reports on the topic.

Apparently the problem started at Rockwell Collins, a publicly traded company. (In which we own a small number of shares of stock.) In its most recent quarterly financials, COL reported good numbers but degraded cash flow. According to Bloomberg: “While Rockwell Collins’s third-quarter profit of $1.63 a share beat estimates, analysts on a conference call focused on its disappointing cash receipts. The $138 million generated in the quarter was short of estimates, and the supplier’s earnings release predicted free cash flow would total about $750 million for 2016, the low end of its previous guided range.” That news didn’t help COL’s stock price (dammit!).

COL’s CEO told analysts “’In general, this is catching the supply chain off guard and it’s inconsistent with our contract.’ … While Boeing notified Rockwell Collins it was slowing supplier payments, ‘they’re delinquent for payments they had for the quarter.’” Bloomberg reports that Boeing is between $30 and $40 million behind in its contractually required payments.

And it’s not just Rockwell Collins. Boeing is also in the process of screwing-over GKN, another supplier. According to the Bloomberg article, “[Boeing] is negotiating a prolonged payment schedule with … GKN for parts including winglets, cabin windows and ice protection systems supplied across Boeing’s commercial fleet. Those changes have ‘already had an impact’ on working capital, GKN Chief Financial Officer Adam Walker said Tuesday ….”

For its part, Boeing admitted that it is in the process of changing its payment terms for large suppliers “to support [its] competitive position.” The Bloomberg article stated “Reuters reported earlier this month that Boeing was shifting supplier payments from 30 days to as many as 120 days.”

It’s a good thing this change of payment terms and alleged violations of subcontract agreements seems to be limited to Boeing’s commercial aircraft business. As we all know, if Boeing tried to do the same thing to its defense suppliers it would run afoul of certain FAR and DFARS requirements, and DCAA might find that it had a significant deficiency in its accounting system – which would lead to mandatory payment withholds. There are no such consequences on the commercial side of the house.

Unless, of course, you think about the two vignettes we related in this blog article. If you do think about them, you may realize that not all consequences are obvious. Some are stealthy and do long-term damage to the prime contractor (or higher-tier subcontractor) that maximizes its own results on the backs of its suppliers. Relationships matter, and decisions can damage relationships.

Maybe Boeing needs to relearn this lesson?

 

KC-46 Tanker Update

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For those keeping score.

Boeing announced on July 21, 2016 that –

The company will also recognize a $393 million after-tax charge ($0.62 per share) on the KC-46 Tanker program. This charge reflects higher costs associated with previously announced program schedule and technical challenges, including implementation of the hardware solution to resolve the refueling boom axial load issue identified during flight testing, delays in the certification process and concurrency between late-stage development testing and initial production. 

This brings the total program write-off (so far) to a hair under $2 billion. That’s $2 billion over and above the original development contract price of $4.8 billion. That’s $2 billion over and above the USAF’s $500 million share of the overrun.

There are not very many defense contractors that could have afforded to fund nearly half the development cost of a new aircraft. Fortunately for all concerned, one of them is Boeing.

Tell us again why fixed-price development contracts are preferred these days?

In related news, Boeing claims that it has successfully passed all testing necessary to receive a Milestone C Decision approval and proceed into the Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) phase.

Go Pegasus!

 

Apogee Consulting, Inc. to be at Navy’s Gold Coast Conference

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This is a semi-official announcement that Apogee Consulting, Inc. – your humble correspondent and blog writer – will be hosting a booth at the upcoming Navy’s San Diego Gold Coast conference, an annual conference aimed at small businesses.

Hosted by the Navy and the San Diego chapter of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), “Gold Coast provides a forum to educate, guide, and assist businesses, especially small businesses, in working with the government, primarily the Department of Defense.”

Allegedly. We’ve never attended before, so we’re not sure what to expect.

The Conference will be held August 23rd and 24th, at the San Diego Convention Center. (We expect most of the trash from the San Diego Comic Con will have been cleaned up by then.)

In keeping with the Conference’s theme of educating, guiding, and assisting businesses, Apogee Consulting, Inc. will be hanging around, looking to engage in discussions regarding government contracting and cost accounting and other related administrative issues.

Yes, that’s right. We are going to be offering free advice.

Okay. It will not be free. We lied about that. The advice will cost 5 cents.

But we will have nickels on hand to cover those who no longer carry cash.

So it will be kinda free.

We guarantee that the advice will be worth every penny and/or nickel paid!

If you should find yourself in the area, please come visit us at booth #217.

 

“Arising Under or Relating to” a Contract

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From time to time we pretend to be lawyers and we try to interpret a recent judicial decision. We’re not lawyers, though. We’re really not. Much of the legal jurisprudence that comes our way baffles us. So keep that in mind. If you want good legal advice, hire an attorney. If you want our layperson’s thoughts on legal stuff that impinges upon government contract cost accounting, administration, and compliance, then please keep reading this blog article.

Today’s discussion concerns the Contract Disputes Act (CDA) and what claims can be adjudicated by a court. The CDA confers jurisdiction to one of two types of fora: either the Court of Federal Claims or an appellate Board such as the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals.

But what is a claim?

The FAR defines a “claim” at 2.101; the definition states –

‘Claim’ means a written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract. However, a written demand or written assertion by the contractor seeking the payment of money exceeding $100,000 is not a claim under 41 U.S.C. chapter 71, Contract Disputes, until certified as required by the statute. A voucher, invoice, or other routine request for payment that is not in dispute when submitted is not a claim. The submission may be converted to a claim, by written notice to the contracting officer as provided in 33.206(a), if it is disputed either as to liability or amount or is not acted upon in a reasonable time.

Based on the FAR definition, a claim can be a demand for one of three things:

  1. The payment of money in a sum certain

  2. The adjustment or interpretation of contract terms

  3. Other relief

But whatever a claim may be, it must also arise “under” or “relating to” a government contract.

And therein lies the question we will explore today. What does it mean to arise under or relating to a contract?

This question was tackled by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) in its recent opinion on a government motion to dismiss a contractor’s appeal of its contracting officer’s final decision, based on an asserted lack of jurisdiction by the ASBCA. The decision, captioned “ABB Enterprise Software, Inc., f/k/a Ventyx" (ASBCA No. 60314), concerned allegations by a contractor that the Navy had violated its software agreement by using multiple copies of the contractor’s software. Eventually the contractor filed a claim with the contracting officer, who denied it because it was not a dispute covered by the CDA, in that it did not arise under and/or was not related to the contract. The contractor appealed that COFD and, during the appeal process, the government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, essentially repeating that same argument the contracting officer had used to deny the contractor’s original claim.

According to Judge Prouty’s recital of the facts, ABB Enterprise Software, Inc., which was formerly known as Ventyx, which was formerly known as Tech-Assist, Inc., held two contracts with the Navy. Each contract was awarded to acquire “a number of Electronic Shift Operations Management Systems (eSOMS) clearance and database software modules.” The contracts “also expressly required Tech-Assist to provide to the Navy licenses to use the software.”

Separately, the Navy and Tech-Assist executed a software license agreement for 268 copies of the eSOMS software. The dispute arose because Ventyx (Tech-Assist’s successor-in-interest) complained that the Navy had violated the software agreement. For its part, the Navy denied (in writing) that it had violated the agreement, but also stated that any disputes would need to be resolved pursuant to the requirements of the Contract Disputes Act. There was extensive correspondence over a period of at least 18 months, “culminating in a 28 June 2013 letter from a Navy attorney to Ventyx’s general counsel, suggesting that Ventyx file a CDA claim if it wished to pursue the matter further.” Apparently Ventyx was surprised when the contracting officer rejected its claim, using the rationale that a license agreement violation was not a CDA dispute.

In its motion to dismiss, the Navy argued that the “arising under or relating to” a contract requirement was not met, since the software agreement did not expressly reference any government contract. The Navy further argued that the language must be read narrowly, such that “only direct breaches of a contract” would qualify as meeting the test. Judge Prouty quickly dismissed the Navy’s arguments, writing that “the first argument is not consistent with binding precedent; the second is belied by the uncontroverted facts.”

In making his decision, Judge Prouty cited to a 2011 Federal Circuit decision, Todd Construction, L.P., in which the Federal Circuit “instructed that this phrase is to be read ‘broadly’ in the context of CDA jurisdiction.” As Judge Prouty wrote—

Put yet another way, to be related to a contract, a claim ‘must have some relationship to the terms or performance of [the] government contract.’” Accordingly, “we reject the Navy’s proposed construction of the CDA, which would limit our jurisdiction to only those claims involving breaches in the terms of the contract or matters encompassed in the disputes clause.

As for the Navy’s second argument, Judge Prouty wrote “execution of the license agreement was part and parcel with the performance of the contract. The contract was for acquisition of software along with the associated license agreement. … Thus, the license agreement … was required by the contract and related to performance of that contract.”

It is axiomatic that our system of justice is an adversarial one. We think, however, that the Navy’s arguments were a bit too adversarial, and verged on frivolity—wasting the Board’s resources and delaying a just decision.

But what do we know about such things?

 

DynCorp on Hook for Subcontractor’s False Claims

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Recently we took umbrage at the phrase “the prime is responsible for managing the subcontractor” – asserting that it had been taken out of context and inflated by DCAA and GAO into a meaning the rule drafters had never intended. Despite our strong reservations with what government folks had done with the language, we were careful to distinguish certain things with which we agreed. We wrote about an official DCAA presentation –

It states: The prime contractor is primarily responsible for subcontract award, technical and financial performance, monitoring, and payment to the subcontractor for the work accomplished under subcontract terms. That’s quite true and unobjectionable ….

Indeed, there is nothing unobjectionable about the idea that the prime contractor (or higher tier subcontractor) is responsible for managing its subcontractor. If you know anything about Apogee Consulting, Inc., you should know that we have long been vociferous advocates of subcontractor management.

Let’s list those prime contractor duties found above in the DCAA presentation:

  • Subcontract award

  • Technical performance

  • Financial performance

  • Monitoring

  • Payment for work accomplished

  • Compliance with subcontract terms

One sticks out a bit: “monitoring” the subcontractor. What does it mean to monitor the subcontractor? What efforts are sufficient in that regard?

Well, obviously the efforts deployed to monitor a subcontractor depend on the risks. If the contract is firm, fixed-price, then cost risks are minimal, since (except for contract changes) the price to be paid to the subcontractor is fixed and won’t change based on costs incurred. That means that cost allowability issues largely disappear after subcontract award (but need to be addressed when negotiating the contract price). If the contract is FFP, then the subcontractor may not need much in the way of an adequate accounting system; and thus the prime may not have to worry overmuch about monitoring what comes out of that system.

But the converse is also true. If the subcontract type is other than FFP – if, for example, it is T&M or cost-type – then the prime contractor (or higher tier subcontractor) must monitor costs being billed. The prime contractor must review each invoice submitted and exercise due diligence to ensure that only appropriate costs – that is to say, reasonable, allowable, and allocable costs – are being billed and reimbursed. The subcontractor needs to have appropriate infrastructure in place so that the prime can rely on its controls; or, failing that, the prime needs to deploy additional controls to make up for its subcontractor’s lack. It would not be unheard-of for the prime contractor to have a team of “auditors” – its own employees – review each monthly invoice and approve that invoice for payment, just to make sure unallowable costs didn’t inadvertently get reimbursed and then passed on to the government customer through the prime contractor’s own invoices.

The effort expended by the prime (or higher tier subcontractor) depends on a risk analysis. The risk analysis needs to be performed and then appropriate action taken. That’s what we think “monitoring” means.

If the prime (or higher tier subcontractor) doesn’t fulfill its responsibility for monitoring its subcontractors, then it ends up like DynCorp.

DynCorp was the subject of a False Claims Act suit brought by the Department of Justice. According to the DoJ press release

The United States filed a False Claims Act complaint against DynCorp International Inc. (DynCorp) alleging that it knowingly submitted inflated claims in connection with a State Department contract to train Iraqi police forces (CIVPOL contract) … in its complaint, the United States alleges that DynCorp knowingly allowed one of its main CIVPOL subcontractors to charge excessive and unsubstantiated rates for hotel lodging, translator, security guard and driving services and overhead expenses, and included these charges in the claims it submitted under the CIVPOL contract to the State Department. The complaint also alleges that DynCorp added its own markup to its subcontractor’s excessive charges, thereby further inflating the claims it submitted to the government.

What the allegations seem to say is that DynCorp failed at monitoring its subcontractor. It allegedly allowed the subcontractor to submit invoices, and receive reimbursement, for “excessive and unsubstantiated” costs. DynCorp paid the invoices and included them in its own contract costs (as one does) and then “marked-up” the costs (with some kind of indirect cost rate), which we assume included an element of fee as well. Now DynCorp is facing serious allegations and will have to hire some serious attorneys to defend it and (perhaps) negotiate a serious settlement.

This would seem to be a great illustration of the importance of monitoring subcontractors, which is an element of overall subcontractor management. Effective subcontractor management may be expensive, but we believe that ineffective subcontractor management is even more expensive.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.