SBA Opens Mentor-Protégé Program to All Small Businesses
Did you see this final rule, published in the Federal Register on July 25, 2016? It’s kind of awesome. It expands the Mentor-Protégé Program to all small businesses.
Before now, the Program was limited to 8(a) Program participants. If you were an 8(a) participant, then you could be a Protégé to a large business Mentor. There were several advantages to both parties from program participation. With respect to DoD participants under the “pilot” Mentor-Protégé Program (which was initially established in 1991), Protégé firms can receive significant assistance from their Mentor firms in terms of management systems, help with proposal preparation, and other important areas. With respect to the Mentor firms, they can receive direct reimbursement from DoD for the costs of assisting the Protégé firms, or if not direct reimbursement, they can apply their costs towards small business plan credit for categories in which they are lagging their goals. And (perhaps most importantly) a Mentor firm can award a subcontract to a Protégé firm without competition.
We did our time in the Mentor-Protégé Program trenches in the 1990’s. Indeed, our team was awarded one of the earliest Nunn-Perry Awards for achievement in that area. But that was a very long time ago, and the new SBA rules signal a new chapter in the Program.
The new rule opens the Program to all small businesses. If your firm qualifies as a small business under a NAICS code, then it can qualify as a Protégé firm – assuming you can find a Mentor firm willing to help you out. If you are a large business, then any small business supplier you have—or are considering using—can become a Protégé firm. The benefits from the arrangement are noted above.
And SBA expanded the benefits as well as opening the program to all small businesses. It loosened the affiliation standards, such that a Mentor and Protégé could create a Joint Venture and pursue work as a small business. The new rule provides –
A firm that has an SBA-approved mentor-protégé agreement authorized … is not affiliated with its mentor firm solely because the protégé firm receives assistance from the mentor under the agreement. Similarly, a protégé firm is not affiliated with its mentor solely because the protégé firm receives assistance from the mentor under a federal mentor-protégé program where an exception to affiliation is specifically authorized by statute or by SBA under the procedures set forth in § 121.903. …
Two firms approved by SBA to be a mentor and protégé under § 125.9 of this chapter may joint venture as a small business for any Federal government prime contract or subcontract, provided the protégé qualifies as small for the size standard corresponding to the NAICS code assigned to the procurement, and the joint venture meets the requirements of § 125.18(b)(2) and (3), § 126.616(c) and (d), or § 127.506(c) and (d) of this chapter, as appropriate.
For purposes of this provision and in order to facilitate tracking of the number of contract awards made to a joint venture, a joint venture: must be in writing and must do business under its own name; must be identified as a joint venture in the System for Award Management (SAM); may be in the form of a formal or informal partnership or exist as a separate limited liability company or other separate legal entity; and, if it exists as a formal separate legal entity, may not be populated with individuals intended to perform contracts awarded to the joint venture (i.e., the joint venture may have its own separate employees to perform administrative functions, but may not have its own separate employees to perform contracts awarded to the joint venture). SBA may also determine that the relationship between a prime contractor and its subcontractor is a joint venture, and that affiliation between the two exists, pursuant to paragraph (h)(5) of this section.
So the ability to joint venture is not without limits, and we strongly recommend that any Mentor and/or Protégé firms seeking to take advantage of this change read the SBA rules in Title 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations very carefully.
Another change is that the SBA will permit a Mentor to invest in and own as much as 40 percent of its Protégé firms without changing the Protégé firms’ status as a small business. This would seem to be of a significant advantage to those large firms seeking access to small business set-asides.
In summary, it looks like the SBA has opened the floodgates and we expect quite a number of government contractors to be thinking hard about how to take advantage of the new environment.
DOD Pays Pension Cost Impacts
Ten years later, the piper is being paid. Liabilities created in 2006, which DOD refused to budget for at that time and, indeed, through most of the past ten years, are now coming due. We are talking about the cost impacts associated with contractors’ defined benefit pension plans.
It’s been quite a while since we had anything substantive to report on the issue. The most salient blog article is this one. There are others, some dating back to 2010. In other words, this is not a new issue. But the impacts are being felt in the current government fiscal year.
Legislative changes to pension plan accounting enacted in 2006 created ripple effects with respect to compliance with CAS 412 and 413. CAS-covered contractors with defined benefit pension plans claimed entitlement to the cost impacts associated with those ripple effects. DOD knew about the cost impacts, and at first did nothing but later issued some fairly bizarre guidance that contractors were sure to challenge. Meanwhile, the large defense contractors calculated their cost impacts, submitted them for audit and eventual negotiation, and prepared to file claims if the DOD failed to pay up.
And now the first payment (that we know of) has been made. Buried in the lower middle of the August 12, 2016 Defense Department’s list of daily contract awards is the following notice:
Boeing Co., Seattle, Washington, has been awarded a $22,598,000.00 contract action modification (P00100) to previously awarded contract FA8625-11-C-6600 to account for the impact of The Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L.109-280; Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. 112-14; the Highway and Transportation Funding Act of 2014, Pub. L. 113-159; and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-74, as identified in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement: The Boeing Company Request For Equitable Adjustment And Claim For Pension Protection Act Cost Impact, Amendment 01, dated July 5, 2016. This modification funds a portion of the equitable adjustment for costs incurred related to engineering and manufacturing development. Fiscal 2015 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $22,598,000.00 are being obligated at time of award. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the contracting activity.
Obviously we don’t know the details of the agreement with Boeing. We don’t know if this is the entirety of the adjustment to be paid to the contractor, or perhaps simply one of many. For example, it is conceivable that DoD would make one payment per affected military service (i.e., one for USAF, one for Army, one for Navy, etc.). The FAR gives the Cognizant Federal Agency Official (CFAO) discretion and wide latitude regarding how to reflect equitable adjustments stemming from CAS-related cost impacts. Still, $22.6 million is a decent chunk of change. Even if this represents 100 percent of the equitable adjustment, it’s not bad. Not bad at all.
And remember, Boeing is just one of the affected contractors. Other large contractors have also submitted REAs and claims for their calculated cost impacts. Any CAS-covered contractor with a defined benefit pension plan is a candidate for an equitable adjustment. So we don’t know the total bill to be paid with current DoD appropriated funds. But based on this figure, it’s going to be a fairly large figure. (Well, unless you are used to dealing with billions of dollars. In which case, it will be a small blip on the financial radar screen.)
Left out in the cold while the large contractors negotiate their claims with DoD are the smaller contractors, the ones that have defined benefit pension plans and cost-type contracts, but which are not fully CAS-covered. As we told readers, those contractors (whomever they are) have to comply with CAS 412 and 413 because there is a FAR Part 31 cost principle that requires them to do so. However, since they are not subject to CAS outside of the cost principle, the rules on changes to cost accounting practice don’t apply to them.
We wrote at the time—
We have long argued that it makes little sense to exempt contractors from the burdensome requirements of CAS coverage, only to condition cost allowability on compliance with certain aspects of the Standards. And now, once again, we see the inequity of that situation.
Sorry guys, you’re out of luck on this one.
And we think that assessment still holds true today.
In any case, while the little guys are getting shafted, the big guys are doing their negotiation dance with DoD and making bank. This was all foreseen ten years ago, and the can was deliberately kicked down the decade-long road so that it could be made somebody else’s problem – and that “somebody else” is today’s CFAO at Boeing and the Air Force program team and all the other current DoD employees impacted by these long-simmering claims. Sorry guys, but you’re out of luck on this one, as well.
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DoD Revisits Procurement of Commercial Items After Criticism of Past Efforts
On August 13, 2016, a proposed DFARS rule (DFARS Case No. 2016-D006) was published in the Federal Register. This is not DoD’s first attempt at such rule-making. For instance, readers may wish to review our comments on the prior attempt, which took place almost literally one year ago. We said at the time that the proposed rule was “… simply the return of the pre-FASA application of rigid mathematical formulae to determine commerciality.”
We weren’t the only ones to express concerns with the 2015 proposed rule-making. In a follow-up article, we noted critical comments from the Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA), as well as a critical letter written by Senator John McCain (R-AZ) and sent to SECDEF Ash Carter. In response, Frank Kendal (USD, AT&L) publicly walked back from the rule-making, and seemed to indicate that changes would be made in response to comments received.
So here we are, one year later, and we have an opportunity to gauge those promised changes. To that end, let’s review the comments received by the DAR Council and how they were dispositioned.
Comment: A number of respondents expressed concern that proposed rule 2013-D034 would exclude readily available data to determine commerciality.
Response: In accordance with section 831 of the NDAA for FY 2013, this rule will ensure that in cases in which uncertified cost information is required, the information shall be provided in the form in which it is regularly maintained by the offeror in its business operations. Further, in accordance with section 855 of the NDAA for FY 2016, this rule directs that market research shall be used, where appropriate, to inform price reasonableness determinations. Additionally, DoD is establishing a cadre of experts to provide expert advice to the acquisition workforce in assisting with commercial item and price reasonableness determinations.
We were interested to see that DoD has a “cadre of experts” who will provide “expert advice” to contracting officers faced with making a commercial item determination and in determining whether the price offered is fair and reasonable. We can’t help wondering how those experts were selected and what their qualifications may be. Does each individual have at least 10 years in making commercial item determinations under the current FAR 2.101 definition of “commercial item”? If not, what combination of experience and training confers their subject matter expertise? We think the rule-makers should have addressed that point.
Comment: A number of respondents took exception to the definition of “market-based pricing” in proposed rule 2013-D034.
Response: The definition of market-based pricing in proposed DFARS rule 2013-D034 has not been retained in this proposed rule.
Comment: A number of respondents took exception to the treatment of modified commercial items and catalog items in proposed rule 2013-D034.
Response: This rule focuses on obtaining appropriate data for determinations of price reasonableness, and provides for the consideration of the same or similar items under comparable and differing terms and conditions, and catalog prices, when regularly maintained and supported by relevant sales data, to serve as the basis for price reasonableness determinations.
Those are good things. Maybe the DAR Council listened to the comments received.
Comment: A number of respondents did not agree with the requirement for sales data to support a commerciality determination in proposed rule 2013-D034.
Response: This proposed rule does not address additional requirements for offerors to provide sales data to support a commerciality determination. This rule expands the use of FAR part 12 procedures. In accordance with section 853 of the NDAA for FY 2016, contracting officers may presume that a prior commercial item determination made by a military department, a Defense agency, or another component of the Department of Defense shall serve as a determination for subsequent procurements. Further, in accordance with section 857 of the NDAA for FY 2016, supplies and services provided by nontraditional defense contractors may be treated as commercial items.
More good things.
For those interested, the proposed rule seeks to add a definition of “nontraditional defense contractor” to DFARS 212.001 (Definitions). If implemented as drafted, a nontraditional defense contractor would be –
… an entity that is not currently performing and has not performed any contract or subcontract for DoD that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards … for at least the 1-year period preceding the solicitation of sources by DoD for the procurement or transaction
That’s a very interesting definition.
We noted that the proposed definition is different from the one used in implementing the pilot program for acquisition of “military-purpose nondevelopmental items” as described at DFARS 212.71. In that language, a nontraditional defense contractor is defined as a contractor that has not had –
--Any contract or subcontract that is subject to full coverage under the cost accounting standards prescribed pursuant to section 26 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 1502) and the regulations implementing such section; or
--Any other contract in excess of the certified cost or pricing data threshold under which the contractor is required to submit certified cost or pricing data.
See the difference? Obviously, the definition being proposed in the new rule is more expansive than the definition found in the old (2011) rule that implemented the pilot program for acquisition of military-purpose nondevelopmental items. We discussed that pilot program in this article. The DFARS language as currently drafted does not explicitly say that the definition found in 212.71 describes a “nontraditional defense contractor,” but if you review the interim DFARS rule that became the final DFARS rule (without changes to the interim rule) that became DFARS 212.71, it is quite clear what is being defined.
Will that be a source of confusion? Who knows? It depends on whether the cadre of DoD subject matter experts will connect the dots the way we have.
Finally, let’s point out that the new definition of nontraditional defense contractor, the one that says that any entity that is not fully CAS-covered, nor has been for at least one year, is extremely expansive. Since any small business is, by CAS regulation, exempt from CAS coverage, that means that every single small business in America is now suddenly a nontraditional defense contractor and is capable of supplying commercial items to the DoD. Is that what the rule-makers intended?
And it’s not just small businesses. Any contractor that is other than fully CAS-covered can be a nontraditional defense contractor under the proposed definition. That seems … counter-intuitive. We suspect the rule drafters simply forgot the second half of the 212.71 definition. But in case we are wrong about that, if implemented as drafted then many upon many contractors just become nontraditional defense contractors, even if their only customer has been the Department of Defense.
Have fun with that.
Delayed Audits Cause Ripple Impacts, Part 2
In the first part of this 2-part article, we discussed the interesting CBCA decision that Stephen Avery brought to our attention. As noted in Part 1, this was an acronym-filled decision and, if you didn’t start by reading Part 1, we expect you’ll get lost. So go read Part 1 now, please.
Let’s recap a bit: The dispute was ostensibly about claimed costs in a subcontractor’s termination for convenience settlement proposal but really seemed to center on the subcontractor’s lack of final billing rates. DCAA had audited the subcontractor’s ICS for its FYs 2003 through 2007 but it took until the actual filing of the claim before the CMS contracting officer got around to unilaterally establishing final rates for those years. Final rates for the subsequent years were never established, even though DHHS/CMS auditors spent at least two years auditing them.
The prime (GHI) claimed it could not reach a final settlement on the subcontractor’s (DCCS) termination settlement proposal without final billing rates. The subcontractor claimed on-going costs related to supporting the incurred cost audits and in supporting close-out of its subcontract. For its part, the government customer (DHHS/CMS) asserted that it had no role in negotiations between a prime contractor and its subcontractor while at the same time telling the prime contractor that the on-going costs claimed by DCCS were both unreasonable and unallowable.
Before the Board were dueling motions for summary judgment.
The government first argued that the post-termination costs claimed by DCCS were unreasonable and unallowable, because they were due to the “willful failure of the [sub]contractor to discontinue costs.” The government argued that it was “unreasonable” for DCCS to be put in a better position, financially speaking, than if the contract had been allowed to run its course. In this vein, the government noted that the contract, by its terms, ended in November, 2011. Thus, costs incurred after that date were unallowable.
The government’s second argument was that DCCS’ claimed costs were “not supported by accounting data and other information sufficient for review by the government.” The government asserted that DCCS’ alleged failure to provide required supporting documentation “interfered with CMS’s ability to consider which charges might constitute allowable charges.”
With respect to the government’s first argument, DCCS argued that it had “an unavoidable contractual obligation to support the Government’s audit of its termination settlement proposal and indirect cost rates for all open years.” DCCS argued—
Had CMS audited and settled the open contract years or negotiated the termination settlement proposal in a timely manner, DCCS could have placed all of the audited records in permanent storage and discontinued operations. However, CMS did not do either of these things. Instead, CMS required DCCS to undergo a protracted audit. As a consequence, DCCS was compelled to continue to incur costs in order to close out the subcontract in accordance with the requirements of FAR 52.216-7.
In addition, DCCS asserted that it was not seeking to better its financial position as the result of its claimed costs. Instead, DCCS argued –
Even if the subcontract had run its normal course, the post-completion costs incurred by DCCS in supporting the Government’s audit and settling final indirect cost rates would still be allowable and allocable to the subcontract. Contractors frequently continue to incur costs for this purpose after the end of a physically complete cost reimbursement contract since final indirect cost rate proposals are not submitted until after the end of each fiscal year.
With respect to the government’s second argument, DCCS countered that it had made all of its accounting data and other supporting information available for CMS review, but that the CMS auditor(s) “declined to review it.” Thus, DCCS argued that the government’s “real complaint” was that —
… DCCS declined to make copies of the supporting data, but nothing in DCCS’s subcontract or the FAR requires a contractor or subcontractor to incur the cost of copying voluminous records that are otherwise made available for the Government’s review and inspection. DCCS fully satisfied its contractual obligation by offering to make the records available for CMS’s examination, audit and reproduction
The CBCA resolved the parties’ arguments by ruling that DCCS was entitled to its post-termination costs. As Judge Goodman wrote for the Board—
First, respondent implies that DCCS’s costs continued after the effective date of the termination due to the willful failure of the contractor to discontinue costs. There is no evidence to support this allegation of willful failure to discontinue the types of costs sought by DCCS. Respondent also alleges that the magnitude of the costs claimed by DCCS is out of proportion to those incurred by subcontractor in responding to the audit of its indirect costs through 2011. However, respondent’s allegation focuses on DCCS’s response to the audit, and does not take into account the alleged costs for migration and storage of information after termination. Allegations as to magnitude of costs do not defeat entitlement to such costs, but only raise questions as to quantum
There will still need to be a trial to decide quantum, unless the parties are able to reach a settlement beforehand.
In the first part of this 2-part series, we related two lessons that Stephen Avery took away from this decision. We would like to add our takeaways, as well.
First, as we’ve written before, we believe that once a contractor (or subcontractor) has submitted a proposal to establish its final billing rates, then the government has a duty to audit that proposal in a timely manner. There is nothing in the FAR that establishes what “timely” means in this context, but we believe that the government has a duty to move with reasonable dispatch. In this case, the government had audit reports from DCAA for 4 years’ worth of incurred cost, but failed to do anything with those reports. That smells like negligence and a potential contract breach to us.
Second, we think GHI took an incorrect position, in that it assumed it could not finalize contract costs without a set of government-approved final billing rates. As we’ve written before, the government is not a party to negotiations between a prime and its subcontractors; the government’s determination of provisional and/or final billing rates is not dispositive with respect to those negotiations. What that means is that GHI could have always entered into negotiations with DCCS and established final billing rates with respect to the subcontract and with respect to the termination settlement proposal. The government audit of DCCS’ proposed final billing rates was irrelevant to the two parties’ discussions.
Yes, the prime contractor is taking some risk. It is taking the risk that the final billing rates it negotiates with the subcontractor may include costs found to be unallowable by the official government audit, whenever it is performed. But that risk can be mitigated. It can be mitigated through representations and it can be mitigated through indemnification.
More importantly, consider that—in this case if in no other—an early finalization of indirect cost rates and an early negotiation of the termination settlement proposal and an early close-out of the DCCS subcontract would have avoided nearly $1 million worth of costs. Not to mention it would have avoided a protracted dispute involving several sets of very expensive attorneys—costs that are very likely to be unallowable.
Taken as a whole, we think the correct answer is obvious and we hope our readers do better than GHI with respect to the issue of subcontractor rate finalization and close-out.
Finally, the third point is less black-and-white and more of an opinion based on many years of doing this work. A contractor (or subcontractor) has a choice regarding its cost accounting practices. Just because a cost can be allocated to a final cost objective as a direct cost doesn’t mean that it has to be treated as a direct cost. With respect to this particular case, DCCS could have chosen to treat audit support and contract close-out tasks as indirect activities, which means that they would be absorbed into overhead and not charged as direct costs to the subcontract.
When you charge audit support and contract close-out tasks as direct costs, you create several problems. First, you have to propose those costs and get them priced and funded. Second, you have to have funds left over after performance to cover those tasks. Finally, you create a never-ending cycle, because each year of audit support creates more direct costs that have to be billed and supported through audit. You never ever finish charging direct costs, unless you charge them as non-billable, which means margin erosion. Far better—in our mind at least—to stop the direct charges as soon as possible so that the final contract costs can be determined. Thus, we are strongly biased towards treating those tasks as indirect activities.
Assuming that DCCS had more than one cost-type contract and thus submitted an annual final billing rate proposal and support the audit of that proposal regardless of whether its GHI subcontract was active, then that approach would have gone a long way towards proactively solving the problems that ultimately led to the litigation in which it found itself—litigation that is apparently still ongoing. Obviously if the only cost-type contract DCCS had was its subcontract with GHI, then that logic really doesn’t work. But for many of our readers, that logic will work and it makes good sense to us to move in that direction.
So, to wrap up this 3,200 word deep-dive into one CBCA case, let’s recap the takeaways.
From Stephen Avery we should remember that, while cooperation with government auditors is of paramount importance, a contractor does not have to bend over backwards in order to support an audit. The contractual responsibility is to provide accounting records and other supporting information to the auditor(s) as requested; but there is no contractual responsibility to make copies of those records or to provide them in electronic format.
From Apogee Consulting, Inc., we hope you will remember that the contractor (or subcontractor) should make every effort to push the government into performing an audit of the annual final billing rate proposal, and should call-out unreasonable delays in performing those audits or in negotiating final billing rates once those audits have been completed.
In addition, we hope you will remember that the prime contractor (or higher tier subcontractor) is responsible for negotiating final billing rates with respect to its subcontracts, and the government is not a party to those negotiations. As a prime, you can—and you should—establish final billing rates for your cost-type subcontracts as quickly as possible, so as to avoid unnecessary costs. As a subcontractor, you should proactively push your prime to come to the negotiating table.
Finally, think about how you treat the activities such as preparation and audit support of the annual final billing rate proposal, and contract close-out. Consider whether it makes more sense to treat them as indirect activities. If it makes sense to do so, document that decision and follow it consistently.
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