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Apogee Consulting Inc

Sanders Presenting at Joint NCMA/AGA Educational Seminar

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Nick Sanders, Principal Consultant of Apogee Consulting, Inc., is pleased and honored to once again present at an upcoming educational seminar jointly sponsored by the San Diego Chapters of the National Contract Management Association (NCMA) and the Association of Government Accountants (AGA).

On Wednesday, October 19, 2015, Nick will be leading a discussion entitled “Properly Categorizing Your Suppliers—It Matters! Subcontractors, Temps, Consultants, and Other Suppliers”. This is a seemingly trivial topic but one that is surprisingly difficult to get right; and one that has unpleasant consequences if you get it wrong. We’ll spend three hours on the topic, and we probably won’t have time to discuss all of its ramifications.

Location: Four Points by Sheraton Hotel, San Diego, CA

Cost: $60 for NCMA/AGA members, $80 for non-members

Register online at www.ncmasd.org

(Registration deadline is October 14th.)

 

DCAA All Caught Up!

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The big news right now is that DCAA has formally notified Congress, through the DoD Comptroller, that it has reduced its backlog of unaudited incurred cost submissions to a more acceptable 18 months' of inventory. Thus, DCAA may now resume providing full audit support for non-DOD agencies, such as NASA and the Department of Energy (DOE).

That’s good news for DCAA and its auditors.

As readers may well know, DCAA was prohibited by statute for performing audit services for non-DoD agencies until it certified it had reduced its embarrassing backlog to more acceptable levels. As we reported, at the end of GFY 2011 DCAA had a backlog of 24,000 unaudited contractor proposals to establish final billing rates. 15,000 of those 24,000 had been determined to be adequate and 9,000 had not.

Similarly, at that time (GYF 2011) DCAA was reporting almost unbelievable drops in auditor productivity. In that year DCAA issued 7,390 audit reports – in total. It became clear that the drop in auditor productivity was systemic, as we discussed in this article. We wrote at the time—

In GFY 2008, DCAA had 4,200 employees and roughly 8,064,000 work hours available (assuming that each auditor had 1,920 audit hours available per year (which may be overstating the situation, but not materially.) That year, DCAA issued 30,352 reports. So DCAA spent an average of 265.7 hours per report and issued about 7.23 reports per employee.

In GFY 2011, DCAA had 4,777 employees, and thus roughly 9,171,840 work hours available. That year, DCAA issued 7,390 reports. So DCAA spent an average of 1,241.1 hours per report and issued about 1.5 reports per employee. Comparing GFYs 2008 and 2011, DCAA had 577 more staff, but spent nearly 1,000 more hours on every completed audit report (975 more hours per report, to be exact). In GFY 2011, DCAA was only 21 percent as productive as it was in GFY 2008—meaning that the audit agency was 89 percent less efficient. [Note: Math error in original post. Should have been 79 percent not 89 percent.]

And subsequent articles confirmed that the drop in auditor productivity was not only systemic, but it seemed to be permanent as well. True, the stats varied a bit, but the trends and results were quite clear. For example, we wrote (in yet another article devoted to this topic) the following about DCAA’s published GFY 2014 statistics—

DCAA reported that it still takes the audit agency more than 1,000 days to perform an incurred cost assignment and to issue an audit report to a cognizant Federal agency official (CFAO) for negotiation with a contractor. That means it still takes DCAA nearly three full years to perform an audit on one year’s worth of contractor costs. … Despite those problematic numbers, DCAA reported that it had managed to ‘close’ 11,101 incurred cost assignments during the year, leading it to report that the agency had worked down its backlog of incurred cost audits to a year-end balance of 18,185 – for a reported reduction of 21 percent during GFY 2014.

Thus, our confusion. How could DCAA have reduced its backlog so dramatically without changing the underlying productivity metrics? If the agency is taking three years to audit one year, how could it ever have improved at all—let alone reached the point where it had less than two years’ worth of backlog?

Our readers already know the answer to that question. We all know how DCAA was able to have the Comptroller certify to Congress that the backlog was down to 18 months.

DCAA didn’t hire busloads of new auditors.

DCAA didn’t improve auditor productivity.

DCAA didn’t revise its approach to performing incurred cost audits.

Instead, DCAA simply redefined its backlog to exclude enough proposals so that the backlog could be reported to be at acceptable levels.

It was a bureaucratic trick. And we all saw it coming.

In May, 2012, DCAA split its “incurred cost” audit program into two: one for “major” contractors and one for “non-major” contractors. We posted comments from self-identified DCAA auditors that indicated this was the start of a larger strategy to focus on big-dollar audits and to “risk-away” or waive audits on small dollar contractor incurred cost proposals.

One commenter wrote—

Concerning the incurred cost workload, the plan for getting current is to sample the submissions that are less than $250M. Those that are less than $1M will likely never be audited because HQ views those audits as cost losers, which is no wonder given the amount of prepatory work (the risk assessment, increased transaction testing, and the greater number of reviews) now required. HQ is talking about more and more sampling (leaving more submissions completely unaudited), which will certainly incentivize some contractors to push the envelope when it comes to questioned costs. …

Another commenter wrote—

… DCAA wants to waive all possible incurred cost audits under $1 million too. And the metrics will show that we actually completed these audits. Waiving 1 low dollar incurred cost = completing 1 (only in DCAA does 0 = 1). Then there's our audit guidance - all of our audit guidance is being written for the largest contractors. Does our upper management get the risks at the nonmajors especially at a time when there is less spending and companies are going out of business or being bought out?

Indeed, those assertions proved to have merit. They were spot-on.

Just a few months later, we told readers that DCAA had developed a “risk-based” approach to determining which proposals to establish final billing rates it would choose to audit. Proposals determined to be “high risk” would be audited, while proposals determined to be “low risk” would be audited on a sample basis—and the sample would be based on the auditable dollar value of the submission. For example, only one out of 5 low risk submissions with an ADV of between $50 and $250 million would be audited by DCAA. The other 4 submissions would not be audited. Ever. Nor would they be counted in the backlog statistics reported to Congress.

For another example of how risk-based audits were to work only one percent of submissions with an ADV of $1 million or less will be selected for audit. Of all contractor submissions with an ADV of $1 million or less, only one out of a hundred would be audited. The other 99 would not be audited. Ever. Nor would they be counted in the backlog statistics reported to Congress.

Brilliant plan, no? Only it didn’t work.

In December, 2012, GAO Report No. 13-131 told DoD that DCAA’s cunning plan wasn’t working, because not enough contractors were being categorized as being “low risk.” GAO wrote “Of 13,522 risk assessments completed, DCAA determined that 7,815 proposals were high risk, or about two-and-a-half times more than it had initially anticipated.” (Emphasis added.) [Note: we predicted this would be the case.]

Only a few months into the plan, it was already clear that DCAA needed to change course. And so they did.

In October, 2013, MRD 13-PPD-021 directed auditors to put more contractors into the “low risk” category. It changed the definition of “low risk” to help auditors with the categorization but, more than that, the tone of the MRD made it very clear as to what the expectations were. For example, the MRD stated—

If the last incurred cost audit performed found no significant questioned costs, all proposals with less than $5 million in ADV should be considered low-risk unless significant relevant risk material to the incurred cost proposal exists, such as fraud referral (Form 2000), “unacceptable” opinion from a pre-award accounting review, no previous experience (e.g., voucher processing, forward pricing effort, pre-award accounting systems, etc.), or specific relevant risk with the contractor that has material impact to the incurred cost proposal (identified by the contracting officer or auditor).

And: “There will be no sampling for low-risk proposals with ADV <$1M.” (And no auditing, either. And no counting of such proposals in the backlog numbers reported to Congress.)

Basically, effective with GFY 2013, any contractor who submitted a proposal to establish final billing rates that had an auditable dollar value of less than $5 million could be confident that DCAA would never, ever, audit that proposal, except to check that the formatting of the proposal was “adequate.” If it looked good then it was good. And so the proposal would be passed and not counted in the backlog of unperformed audits.

But DCAA wasn’t yet done tinkering with its risk-based approach to waiving incurred cost audits. Earlier this year, we noted that DCAA’s MRD 16-PPD-06 (5/27/2016) had once again helped audits put more contractors into the “low risk” bucket. Proposals with less than $250 million in auditable dollar value would be risk-assessed using more relaxed standards (baked into the “Low-Risk Determination Tool” and proposals with less than $5 million would be determined to be “low risk.” Period. The MRD stated—

FAOs shall reassess all assignments that are classified as high risk with an adequate proposal with ADV less than $5 million where fieldwork has not been started using the revised policy and procedures and the Low Risk Determination for Contractor Years with Less Than $5M in ADV Tool. FAOs will need to obtain Regional Audit Manager (RAM) approval if performance of an audit is warranted based on significant relevant risk ….

If that HQ direction didn’t get the message to auditors that nobody wanted to spend time auditing incurred cost proposals valued at less than $5 million, nothing would.

And finally, we should note that DCAA also issued guidance that contractor proposals that were deemed “inadequate” would excluded from its backlog values, as well as proposals that were “delinquent.” In both cases, DCAA would close its audits assignments as being completed and turn the matter over to DCMA for further action.

And so, here we are at the end of GFY 2016 and the beginning of GFY 2017. DCAA has told the DoD Comptroller that he can certify to Congress that the backlog of unaudited contractor incurred cost proposals is now at acceptable levels. How did it get there without hiring more auditors, increasing auditor productivity, or radically changing its approach to incurred cost audits?

This article tells the story of how DCAA accomplished its feat.

 

CAS 404 Doesn’t Apply to Leases, According to ASBCA

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Recently the ASBCA ruled on Exelis’ appeal of a Contracting Officer Final Decision (COFD) and government demand for $3.8 million, based on Excelis’ alleged noncompliance with the requirements of CAS 404. Judge D'Alessandris, writing for the Board, partially sustained the appeal and partially dismissed it.


According to the decision, Exelis (and its predecessor entity, ITT Corporation) leased the Summit Park Building in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Exelis, as many readers may know, was acquired last year by Harris Corporation. According to news reports, Harris has already closed the facility that may have formed the basis of this dispute.


Anyway, ITT Corporation, or Exelis, or Harris, treated its facility lease as an operating lease. In 2007, during it audit of Exelis’ FY 2004 proposal to establish final billing rates (aka incurred cost submission), DCAA questioned the lease costs, asserting that “the building lease was a capital lease, and that Exelis could only include building depreciation in its indirect cost pool rather than the entire lease cost.” Questions and discussions between the contracting parties ensued, and in June, 2015, the contracting officer issued the COFD, finding that Exelis failed to comply with the FAR cost principle at 31.205-11(m) as well as the requirements of CAS 404. “The final decision found that Exelis improperly accounted for the Summit Park Building lease as an operating lease when it should have been treated as a capital lease because the present value of the lease payments, at the inception of the lease, was greater than 90 percent of the fair market value of the building.” Because the CAS noncompliance opened up fixed price contracts to price adjustment—which led to a greater damage quantum—the government used the CAS noncompliance cost impact method to calculate its damages, which extended back to 2003.


Yes, the government asserted 12 years’ of damages.


Yes, the government waited eight years to assert its damages. (We don’t know when or if the Contract Disputes Act Statute of Limitations will be asserted as an affirmative defense. But in our non-attorney viewpoint, it should be.)


Because the government asserted 12 years’ of damages and because it waited eight years to assert its claim, the quantum included $806,000 of compound interest. Had the government asserted its claim earlier, the interest amount would have been significantly decreased.


Because the government asserted its claim in the form of a CAS noncompliance, it was able to calculate damages on firm-fixed priced contracts. (This accounted for nearly 85 percent of the damages before interest.) Had the government asserted its claim solely in the form of a violation of the applicable FAR cost principle (i.e., as an unallowable cost), the amount of its claim would have been not more than $429,459 before interest.


Judge D’Alessandris dismissed the government’s CAS noncompliance case, finding that “by its terms” CAS 404 “applies only to ‘tangible capital assets’ and does not apply to a lease because a lease is an intangible asset.” Thus, “at most, the mischaracterization of a capital lease as an operating lease would create a FAR allowability issue.”


Although the Judge found the government’s claim to be overstated because of its flawed damage calculation methodology, he did not dismiss the case entirely. The parties will have a chance to brief and to argue about the FAR-based damages. That being said, the government’s case loses a lot of momentum since it has been whittled down by some 85 percent—at a minimum. The government will need to calculate its damages in an entirely new way, since its CAS noncompliance argument failed.


And how will those FAR-based damages be calculated?


Providing a hint of the required methodology, the Judge quoted Darrell Oyer: “"The rule is that any capital lease costs in excess of the prescribed depreciation charges are unallowable." Thus, the government will have to calculate the difference between Exelis’ claimed facility lease expenses, year by year, and the amount of depreciation that Exelis should have claimed, had it properly claimed depreciation only.


But that’s not the end of the matter.


The unallowable difference needs to be input into Exelis’ model for calculating its indirect rates.( Many contractors use the DCAA ICE Model, but they were not required to do so until 2011.) The delta difference needs to be input into Exelis’ model, reducing claimed allowable lease expense for each year. Then the resulting indirect rates need to be recalculated, and then the rates need to be reapplied to each of Exelis’ contracts. The aggregated amount by which contract costs are reduced as the result of that exercise is the measurement of the government’s damages, before interest. We strongly suspect that value will be significantly less than $429,459. It might even be immaterial in amount.


Some might argue that Exelis should be subject to the penalty provisions of FAR 42.709-1. The FAR provides that if a contractor claims an indirect cost that is expressly unallowable under a cost principle in the FAR, or an executive agency supplement to the FAR, the contractor must pay a penalty equal to (a) The amount of the disallowed costs allocated to contracts that are subject to this section for which an indirect cost proposal has been submitted, plus (b) interest on the paid portion, if any, of the disallowance. We don’t think so.


First, the penalty provisions only apply to cost-type contracts, which are about 15 percent of the Exelis’ total activity. Second, there is a real question as to whether the claimed cost in question were “expressly unallowable” as that term is defined. (We wrote about that topic here.) Expressly unallowable costs are a small subset of unallowable costs. Given that the parties here took some eight years to conclude the costs were unallowable, we strongly suspect it’s going to be difficult to convince a Judge that the costs in question were expressly unallowable.


In any case, Exelis, like Raytheon, disputed a COFD with which it disagreed. That COFD was based on an audit report prepared by DCAA, an audit report whose methodology was so flawed Exelis was able to have the vast majority of claimed damages tossed without a trial on the merits.


We are forced to wonder: if the DCAA auditors had been in less of a rush to question millions of dollars of costs, if the auditors and Supervisory Auditors had simply stuck to the FAR instead of zooming into CAS noncompliance land, would the resulting quantum have been worth litigating? Maybe the contracting officer and Exelis could have negotiated a settlement acceptable to both sides? We will never know.


In any case, let’s note that any reports regarding DCAA questioned cost sustention rates need to be modified. In addition to noting when questioned costs are not sustained by the contracting officer, the taxpayers also need to know when sustained questioned costs are laughed out of court.



 

New FAR Rule Discusses Executive Compensation Ceilings

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On 30 September 2016 a final rule was published in the Federal Register that implements the new executive compensation ceilings in the 31.205-6 cost principle. What can we say now that we haven’t said before on this topic? It’s not like we haven’t devoted several articles to various aspects of the cost principle’s focus on executive compensation.

For the record, let’s stop calling it “executive compensation” because the ceiling no longer applies to the top five highest-paid executives of every business segment; the ceiling now applies to all employees. So it’s not a limit on unequal C-Suite pay: it’s a limit on compensation. Period. Forget the free market. Forget that most (if not all) Federal competitions have to list price as one evaluation factor. Forget Low-Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) awards. Congress has directed the executive agencies (all of them) to put a limit on how much contractors can pay their employees.

Of course, we can hear the rebuttal now: “It’s not a limit on compensation; it’s a limit on allowable compensation. Contractors can pay their employees whatever they want, but this limits how much of that compensation the Federal government will reimburse contractors.” Yeah, right. That rebuttal may make sense if the contractor is like Apple or Oracle, and only a very small percentage of sales are to the Federal government. In other cases, such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and many others, the vast majority of sales are to the Federal government, and so this rule effectively limits compensation.

But wait! Isn’t there an exception built into the rule? Sure. The rule provides—

An agency head may establish one or more narrowly targeted exceptions for scientists, engineers, or other specialists upon a determination that such exceptions are needed to ensure that the executive agency has continued access to needed skills and capabilities. In making such a determination, the agency shall consider, at a minimum, for each contractor employee in a narrowly targeted excepted position—

(A) The amount of taxpayer funded compensation to be received by each employee; and

(B) The duties and services performed by each employee.

As if that’s ever going to happen.

The final rule clarifies that the date of contract award controls the compensation allowability test. That part is helpful.

Not much more to say about that.

However, speaking Oracle, did you hear that it has decided to end participation in GSA’s Schedule 70? As the report (link in previous sentence) tells readers:

It’s not going to just stop selling directly through the IT schedule, but the software giant will no longer use third-party resellers either, according to multiple sources. … Sources said Oracle decided the GSA schedules just weren’t worth the hassle any longer — the compliance requirements, the potential and real threats of False Claims Act lawsuits and the new Transactional Data Reporting (TDR) rule, all played into this decision.

We’d like to opine that maybe rules such as the “executive” compensation ceilings don’t make companies feel happy about selling to the Federal government. Maybe some companies – especially those like Oracle whose Federal sales are a very small percentage of total sales – are so fed up they are ready to take a walk. Who knows?

In related news, we hear through the grapevine that DCAA has taken an “interesting” position with respect to auditing the “blended rate” method of calculating allowable compensation. We hear that DCAA incurred cost auditors are telling certain contractors that they must use the blended rate method. (Which is wrong because it’s an option, not a requirement.) We hear contractors are being told that if they don’t use the blended rate method, DCAA will apply the most current (lowest) compensation ceiling, regardless of the year in which the contractor's contracts were awarded. The (alleged) DCAA approach will maximize questioned costs, of course.

In related news, the new DCAA reorganization seems to have resulted in Compensation Teams for each of the new regions. It would be nice if each Compensation Team took the same approach to evaluating contactor compensation. Experience tells us to be skeptical. But we can hope.

 

DCAA’s New Cost Allowability Guidebook

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A while ago we noted that Darrell Oyer believed DCAA was going to do away with its Contract Audit Manual (CAM). For those who don’t know, the CAM has been the “go-to” manual for government contracting compliance practitioners—as well as Federal contract auditors—for (quite literally) many decades. It has been the Number One resource for quite a while. To hear that it might disappear causes us to wonder what resources the next generation of practitioners is going to use.

That’s not to say that we always agree with the CAM. Many times we use the CAM as but one (probably biased) data point in our analysis of a thorny problem. But it’s been nice to have. We have used it extensively when researching DCAA’s probable position on certain types of transactions (e.g., uncompensated overtime). We have used it when preparing to rebut an audit report with adverse findings, to make sure that the auditors followed their own guidance in reaching those findings. We know it’s been used by auditors of other, non-DOD, agencies. In short, it has been an invaluable resource and we hope its sticks around for some time.

In what Darrell might view as another piece of evidence to support his assertion, CAM Chapter 7 (Selected Areas of Cost) was recently removed—or, to use DCAA’s phrase, it was “reserved”. In its place, DCAA created a new resource, the Selected Areas of Cost Guidebook. DCAA describes its new Cost Guidebook as follows (sic - misspelling in original)—

This Guidebook addresses FAR 31.2 and other areas of cost audited. In this first edition of the guidebook, we have expanded what used to be included in Chapter 7 by adding 23 additional chapters to address FAR 31.2 cost principals that had not previously been included in CAM. Initially, many sections of the guidebook are a replica of what was in Chapter 7; however, we have rewritten and updated 13 areas of cost. We will be continuing to rewrite the other chapters in this guidebook and will publish them as completed. 

Right now, the intent is to have 75 individual Chapters in the Guidebook. As the blurb above states, the starting point of the Guidebook is the former CAM Chapter 7. But there will be 23 new “selected areas of cost” addressed in the Guidebook that were not addressed in the former CAM Chapter 7. Further, the guidance with respect to 13 areas of cost that were covered in the former CAM Chapter 7 has been “rewritten and updated.” In many cases, the revisions add FAQs to assist the audit teams.

Those 13 revised areas are:

  • Alcoholic Beverages (Chapter 2)

  • Bonus and Incentive Compensation (Chapter 7)

  • Consultants (Chapter 58)

  • Depreciation (Chapter 19)

  • IRAD/B&P (Chapter 33)

  • Legal Costs (Chapter 41)

  • Patents (Chapter 52)

  • Royalties (Chapter 64)

  • Pensions (Chapter 53)

  • Manufacturing and Production Engineering (Chapter 45)

  • Joint Ventures and Teaming Arrangements (Chapter 37)

  • Insurance (Chapter 34)

  • Idle Facilities/Idle Capacity (Chapter 32)

We are not going to critique the new Guidebook, no more than we would have critiqued the CAM chapter by chapter. But rest assured, as issues arise during audits we’ll make sure to refer back to the Guidebook and, if appropriate, we’ll discuss here in this blog.

That being said, here are some chapters in the Guidebook that looked interesting to us. We suggest you consider reviewing them in more detail. The “interesting” chapters include:

  • Banked Vacations (Chapter 5)

  • Correction of Internal Control Deficiencies (Chapter 17)

  • General Services Administration Schedule Contracts (Chapter 29)

  • Mentor-Protégé Program Costs (Chapter 47)

  • Military Operations—War Hazard, Reserve Supplements, and Celebrations (Chapter 48)

  • Weather-Related Closure (Chapter 74)

  • Workforce Investment Act (Chapter 75)

(Also, we noted the Chapter 9 title is incorrect on the website. Somebody may want to look into that.)

To sum this all up, the new Guidebook generally seems like a good idea. While we have already noted several areas where we would disagree with the guidance provided (see, e.g., Chapter 17), we do appreciate the effort that has gone into this new resource, and we believe it will be beneficial for all contracting parties.

Which is exactly how we feel about the CAM.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.