DoD Tells Lockheed Martin What the F-35 Should Cost, and Means It
It’s been a while since we weighed-in on the DoD’s “should-cost” initiative. Frankly, there hasn’t been much to write about recently. We expressed our early concerns but since then we’ve also experienced two “should-cost” reviews – and they turned-out much better than we thought they would. Much of our passion about why “should-cost” was a wrong approach kind of melted away. (It also helped that the DoD participants seemed to lose their early zeal for the initiative as well.)
Despite saying all that, of course we did keep our eyes on “should-cost” and other related DoD initiatives. For example, we published an article on GAO’s study giving the Better Buying Power initiative a failing grade. Better Buying Power, like “should-cost” is one of those OUSD (AT&L) initiatives that sound great in a PowerPoint briefing, but that don’t work out as well as predicted in the real world outside the Pentagon.
Our point being: these initiatives permit senior leaders to give great testimony before Congress, but we should all be rightly skeptical that they will really ever amount to much. Indeed, sometimes they fail completely.
This may be one of those times.
The Hartford Courant (link above) reported that Lockheed Martin and Pentagon negotiators failed to reach agreement on the price for the next batch of F-35 aircraft. Normally when parties to a contract fail to agree, that would constitute a dispute that would require resolution. Not in this case, though.
Instead, the Pentagon used a “rarely invoked” contract clause to unilaterally establish the contract price at its last offer to Lockheed Martin.
According to the newspaper story—
That deal represented a 3.7 percent price decrease from the last batch of F-35s the Pentagon purchased, and Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, the program's executive officer, hailed it as ‘a fair and reasonable deal.’
We all know that, of course, the deal must be “fair and reasonable” because the contracting officer has an affirmative duty to determine that the price is fair and reasonable. In other words, it was fair and reasonable because the government determined it to be so.
On the other hand, we might reasonably wonder whether Lockheed Martin viewed the deal in similar terms.
Twelve minutes after the Air Force announcement, Lockheed Martin issued an announcement of its own. According to the Hartford Courant story—
[Lockheed said] the contract was not ‘mutually agreed upon,’ and that the company was ‘obligated’ to produce the aircraft under ‘previously agreed to items.’ It said that it was ‘disappointed’ in the government's action and that while it would ‘continue to execute’ on the program, it would also ‘evaluate our options and path forward.’
Meanwhile, back inside the Beltway, USD (AT&L) Frank Kendall has been under fire by Congressional lawmakers who want to eliminate his position. In response, he recently touted reductions in cost growth associated with major defense programs.
We are forced to wonder how much of the reductions in cost growth came from unilaterally established prices with which the contractor was in no position to disagree.
Regardless, Mr. Kendall says he should keep his job because of BBP and “should-cost” and other initiatives that have led to improvements in the cost of major weapon systems. Even if you think he might be a bit biased (because his job is on the line) you have to give the man props for his chutzpah.
In related news, the 2016 report entitled “Performance of the Defense Acquisition System” was published and Mr. Kendall is using that report as the basis for his personal initiative to keep his job. But that’s not what interests us.
The report also discusses progress made by DCAA.
DCAA is considered to be a part of the defense acquisition system. Perhaps that’s a counter-intuitive thing to say to most of us who deal with DCAA auditors on a routine basis, or to DCMA folks who have had to pick up work formerly performed by DCAA auditors in the past, but nonetheless it’s true.
So let’s see what the official assessment is of DCAA’s performance as part of the defense acquisition system.
With respect to pre-award surveys of contractor accounting systems, the report states that it now takes DCAA an average of 58 days to issue its reports, and that it finds contractors to have acceptable accounting systems 91% of the time. (See page 137.)
With respect to incurred cost audits, the report states that DCAA has significantly reduced its backlog to only 5,700 reports awaiting audit. (Interestingly the report perpetuates the fiction that DCAA is permitted to have two years’ worth of unaudited proposals—some 11,000—as “regular inventory” as if somehow that was okay.) The report states “As part of DCAA strategic initiatives and in support of BBP 2.0, substantial progress has been made since 2011 on reducing the backlog of these audits.”
Speaking of chutzpah, we admire the attempt to give BBP credit for the reduction in audit backlog at DCAA. Readers of this blog know the reality of how the backlog was reduced, and we all know it had exactly zero to do with BBP 1.0, 2.0, 2.1, or 3.0.
But we suppose a man fighting for his job will say just about anything in order to keep it. Who would blame such a man? Not us.
It was an Employee Morale Gathering, not a Christmas Party!
That time when you have to explain to your client that just because the expense is deductible for tax purposes, doesn’t make it allowable for government contract cost accounting purposes. . . . In other words, there are a lot of government contractors who don’t even know about FAR Part 31 and its cost principles, let alone what those cost principles say and how to apply them.
We probably should be writing about the new proposed DFARS rule dealing with government property, but today it just doesn’t seem as important as writing about the FAR Part 31 cost principles. (Sorry property people, No disrespect intended.) Instead, let’s talk about 31.205-13 and 31.205-14. In our experience, people get those two cost principles confused and that confusion leads to audit findings.
Contractors like the way 31.205-13 reads. It says (in part) “Aggregate costs incurred on activities designed to improve working conditions, employer-employee relations, employee morale, and employee performance (less income generated by these activities) are allowable, subject to the limitations contained in this subsection.”
That seems to say that any expenses incurred for purposes of improving employee morale or improving employee performance are allowable. We’ve seen employers claim expenses of employee barbeques as allowable expenses, citing to this cost principle. (After all, the employees were a lot happier after chowing ribs and brisket, weren’t they?) Similarly, we’ve seen Christmas parties (or as they are called today, “holiday parties”) claimed as being allowable expenses under a similar rationale—even though those parties were quite lavish and included alcohol and entertainment. We’ve seen entire departments head to the bowling alley after work, where somebody submits an expense report claiming allowable employee morale expense. We’ve seen one-on-one supervisor/employee lunches and dinners claimed as being allowable “performance reviews” (which meant they were claimed to be allowable because they were intended to improve employee performance). Quite honestly, we’ve seen it all and most of it was claimed as an allowable expense under this cost principle.
But the cost principle is not as permissive as it may seem as first glance. In contains some restrictions, including—
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“Costs of recreation are unallowable, except for the costs of employees’ participation in company sponsored sports teams or employee organizations designed to improve company loyalty, team work, or physical fitness.”
Thus, those bowling alley “morale improvement” gatherings are clearly unallowable, because bowling is a recreational activity, and the costs of recreation are expressly unallowable. Similarly, those season tickets you handed out to employees are also unallowable, either under the “no gifts” language or under the “no recreation” language.
However, costs of sponsoring employee after-work sports teams are clearly allowable under this cost principle, as are costs of employee gyms/fitness centers. So, in theory, you could sponsor an employee bowling team if you could assert (with a straight face) that it led to improved employee fitness.
Having said all that, we need to now turn our attention to 31.205-14 (“Entertainment Costs”). You need to read the permissive language of 205-13 in conjunction with the language of 205-14 in order to make the right call on cost allowability. The 205-14 cost principle is simple. It states—
Costs of amusement, diversions, social activities, and any directly associated costs such as tickets to shows or sports events, meals, lodging, rentals, transportation, and gratuities are unallowable.
Importantly, the 205-14 cost principle also states “Costs made specifically unallowable under this cost principle are not allowable under any other cost principle.” Thus, the language in the 205-14 cost principle overrides the language in the 205-13 cost principle. (You can thank ICF Kaiser for the additional language. ICF Kaiser is a no-longer-in-existence government contractor whose Christmas parties were legendary and who used the 205-13 cost principle language to justify the allowability of the costs.1)
What this all means is that you can’t make your parties at the local bar allowable by calling them “employee morale activities” under the 205-13 language because all “social activities” are already made expressly unallowable by the 205-14 language. Similarly, you can’t make your year-end program reviews allowable if they are held at a venue whose purpose is entertainment or amusement. We mean: you can try. But your auditors are rightfully going to be extremely skeptical.
How does one successfully navigate this minefield? How does one maximize the cost allowability of legitimate employee gatherings whose primary purpose is to really, honestly, to improve employee morale, communication, and performance?
First, if you are going to hold an employee gathering offsite (no matter where) you need to have an agenda that supports your business purpose. And we’re not talking about a 15 minutes speech by the Division President, followed by a general cry of “the bar is now open!” There needs to be an agenda and it needs to support the concept that the purpose of the meeting is other than entertainment, amusement, or an open bar social activity.
Second, you need to keep an attendee list. The attendee list supports the notion that the offsite meeting was business related. And if the attendees include spouses or significant others, that’s going to be a red flag to the auditors that there was more going on here than a business meeting. Similarly, if the attendees include subcontractors or suppliers, that’s going to be a different red flag.2 Finally, if the attendees include your customers (e.g., government employees), that’s going to be a different red flag—one you really don’t want to wave unless you have really, really, researched government employee ethics rules. The perfect attendee list is filled only with employees (but of course you want the attendee list to be accurate).
If you have “red flag” attendees, you will want to develop a ratio of the unallowable attendees to total attendees, so that a pro rata share of otherwise allowable costs can be moved to unallowable.
With respect to the costs of the meeting, you will want to segregate “entertainment” and other unallowable costs from costs such as food and non-alcoholic beverages, which are allowable. The DJ? Unallowable. The open bar? Unallowable. Et cetera. The facility rental and general wait service will more than likely be allowable, but watch gratuities for the bartenders, which of course are unallowable.
Finally, watch the communications. If your employee email and check requests call the gathering a “Christmas Party” or “Holiday Party” then you’ve shot yourself in the foot and you may as well not worry about all the analysis discussed above. You’ve declared your purpose—and it’s an unallowable purpose. All costs are now unallowable as well. If you really believe that the purpose of your employee gathering is in line with what the 205-13 cost principle says is allowable—and not what the 205-14 cost principle says is unallowable—then make sure all your communications reflect that purpose. Don’t permit people to be lazy with respect to describing the gathering.
One more thing: timekeeping. If you are going to claim the employee gathering as an allowable meeting, then it’s business-related and you are going to have timekeeping issues. You can’t say on one hand the gathering is an employee morale/performance improvement event while on the other hand saying people are attending on their own time. That might work with your exempt employees, but you are running a big risk with respect to your non-exempt and hourly employees. And what about expense reports for local mileage and parking?
The point is, you had better think this through. It might be easier and cheaper to call a gathering a voluntary party and write all expenses off to unallowable, as opposed to trying to claim a percentage of the expenses as allowable costs while having to deal with the timekeeping and directly associated travel expense aspects.
Now let’s talk about reasonableness. There’s another cost principle (31.201-2) that requires a cost to be reasonable in amount in order for it to be allowable. There’s yet another cost principle (31.201-3) that discusses how to determine if a cost is or is not reasonable in amount. You can do all the math in the world to identify what you believe to be allowable costs, but if the auditors believe the costs to be unreasonable you will have to justify why they are reasonable—and the burden of proof will be on you, the contractor. Government employees are going to have a hard time with a party at the Ritz Carlton or the Four Seasons hotel as being reasonable in amount. They are going to have a hard time with lobster and prime rib being viewed as reasonable meals at employee offsite meetings. Think about the concept of reasonableness before you decide to start claiming costs as being allowable.
But if you’ve done your homework and are ready to support your costs through government audit, there’s no reason you shouldn’t claim reasonable bona fide expenses that are intended to improve employee morale and/or performance as being allowable.
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New IRAD Cost Allowability Rule
And then this happened …
The DFARS cost principle at 231.205-18 was revised to require a contractor and a DoD official to engage in an “informal technical interchange” before the contractor spends any money on its IRAD project. The contractor must document the technical interchange in its DTIC submission. (The DTIC submission was already a requirement.) If the contractor does not hold the technical interchange prior to incurring the IRAD project cost, or does not document that technical interchange in its DTIC submission, then its IRAD costs will not be accepted as being allowable costs for purposes of billing DoD.
We told you this was coming, right here.
Actually, we told you way before that article that this was coming. In September, 2015, we wrote—
Contractors who fail to ‘brief’ the unspecified and unidentified DoD technical personnel run the risk that their IR&D expenditures will be determined to be unallowable.
Among the myriad problems associated with this proposed approach is the sheer volume of individual IR&D projects that will need to be ‘briefed’ via technical interchange. Some of the larger contractors have literally hundreds of such projects going on at any given time. For those large contractors, the current requirement to input their project information into DTIC has become a bureaucratic process that adds no value but requires labor—labor that is charged to overhead and passed right back to the DoD buying commands via the contractors’ indirect rates. This approach, if implemented, will make things worse.
For example, who pays for the labor and materials associated with the technical interchange briefings? We don’t think it should be IR&D, because the IR&D effort could take place whether or not the briefings are made. We don’t think the effort should be charged as a direct contract cost—even though the effort would be required by the DoD contracts that contain the new requirement. But we don’t think the buying commands will want to pay for such non-value-added labor that is neither engineering nor manufacturing. Instead, we suspect it will be good ol’ overhead that pays for the briefings. And so the overhead rates will go up and up, and DoD will (once again) pay more for goods and services, because it insists on micro-managing its contractors.
All the foregoing is in addition to the basic problem, which is that DoD will be slowing down contractors, who must now wait to schedule their individual briefings before starting work. So much for agility and innovation.
If you were a reader of our blog, you would have been warned more than a year ago that this was coming. You would have seen our concerns with the approach. You could have submitted your comments to the DAR Council for consideration, parroting our comments or submitting your own concerns. You could have tried to influence the final rule, since the DAR Council is required to consider public comments in the rulemaking process.
Not that any of that would have mattered.
Apparently the DAR Council was determined to issue this revision regardless of public input expressing concerns with it.
For example:
Comment: Several respondents stated that the proposed rule will adversely impact innovative ideas. Another respondent cautioned that the rule will create a barrier to innovation and entry to the marketplace.
Response: DoD believes that this rule supports and promotes innovative ideas and technologies, and will incentivize entry into the marketplace by ensuring that IR&D performers and their potential DoD customers have sufficient awareness of each other's efforts and that DoD can provide industry with feedback on the relevance of proposed and completed IR&D work.
Thus, in the views of the DAR Council, requiring a technical interchange prior to initiating an IRAD project will “incentivize entry into the [defense] marketplace.” Um, no.
Another example:
Comment: A number of respondents stated that the rule will cost taxpayers more. One respondent stated that the rule will impose an administrative burden on contractors, administrative contracting officers (ACOs), and DoD personnel. Another respondent expressed concern with the significant costs associated with planning and conducting technical interchanges and the costs accrued prior to the technical interchange.
Response: While acknowledging that this rule imposes a slight administrative burden on contractors, ACOs, and DoD personnel, such burdens are overshadowed by the net benefit of ensuring that IR&D performers and their potential DoD customers have sufficient awareness of each other's efforts and that DoD can provide industry with feedback on the relevance of proposed and completed IR&D work. Moreover, the long-term priorities outlined in Better Buying Power 3.0 are a strategic imperative for DoD.
Thus, because BBP 3.0 called for this, it must be correct and its benefits must outweigh the costs. Forget public input. Forget an objective analysis of the initiative. Just do it, because it must be done. This kind of magical thinking is reminiscent of religious cults. Please pass the Kool-aid.
Or consider this example:
Comment: A number of respondents expressed concern with DoD responsiveness to requests for technical interchanges, citing that the rule fails to outline DoD's obligations and unfairly saddles contractors with the full consequence of DoD's failure to take part in a technical interchange. One respondent is concerned that the proposed rule creates practical, time, resource, and data disclosure challenges for conducting technical interchanges, and that DoD Components will not have an adequate number of personnel designated to conduct the technical interchanges in the time mandated. Another respondent questioned the recourse contractors will have if DoD personnel refuse to engage.
Response: To assist contractors in ensuring that technical interchanges take place in a timely manner, the rule has been revised to identify the primary DoD focal point for technical interchanges as OASD R&E. Contact information for this office is available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/rd/contacts/. If a Contractor experiences difficulties scheduling a technical interchange, or does not have a point of contact for the technical interchange, the contractor may contact OASD R&E.
In other words, if you have a problem scheduling the technical interchange because DoD lacks sufficient resources to support it, please feel free to send an email expressing your concerns to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, who will immediately drop whatever else was on his plate and attend to your concerns. Yeah, right. Not addressed is what happens in the next Administration, when it is a very real possibility that Congress might not confirm Presidential appointments for a very long period (if at all). To whom do contractors address their concerns if that situation should arise? Guess we are all SOL.
But of course this requirement will not impede contractor IRAD projects whatsoever. Nope. In fact, adding this requirement makes things better! Just ask the DAR Council.
This blasé indifference to the question as to whether or not DoD has sufficient resources to actually implement the rule is quite reminiscent of the DAR Council’s cavalier treatment of similar contractor concerns expressed during consideration of the Contractor Business Systems regulatory revisions. And we all know how that turned out. (Poorly.)
One final example:
Comment: Two respondents stated that the rule will require contractors to establish multiple accounting costs bases and pools.
Response: This rule does not impose new cost accounting requirements. The IR&D cost principle at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 31.205-18(b) states, ‘The requirements of 48 CFR 9904.420, Accounting for independent research and development costs and B&P costs, are incorporated in their entirety. . . .’ The cost accounting standard at 48 CFR 9904.420-40, Fundamental requirement, paragraph (a) states, ‘The basic unit for identification and accumulation of IR&D and B&P costs shall be the individual IR&D or B&P project.’
In this final example, the DAR Council’s response is seemingly based on utter ignorance of government contract cost accounting principles. Either that or the author of the DAR Council response is being deliberately obtuse and misleading. Why do we say that? Because the new rule requires the technical interchanges to take place prior to IRAD costs being incurred. Ergo, the costs of supporting the technical interchange are not IRAD costs.
All that arm-waving about CAS 420 is simply inapposite. It is wrong because the costs in question are not IRAD costs and thus they are not subject to the requirements of 31.205-18 or CAS 420. Anybody who spent more than 15 seconds thinking about the situation would never have responded in the manner the DAR Council did.
If the costs are not IRAD costs, then what are they?
Nobody knows.
Thus the basis of the concerns expressed by two commenters. Are the costs overhead? Certainly it appears that they cannot be direct costs. If they aren’t IRAD project costs then they must be vanilla G&A or overhead. But from a purely beneficial or causal relationship point of view (i.e., a CAS point of view) the costs of conducting the technical interchanges are most directly associated with the IRAD projects that form the subject of the interchanges. But they can’t be IRAD costs. Therefore we all have a quandary from a cost accounting perspective.
And this matters. It matters because some of the larger defense contractors have literally hundreds of individual IRAD projects, some large and others small (in terms of costs). The cost of supporting technical interchanges, no matter how informal, may well run into the tens (or even hundreds) of thousands of dollars. If you put that cost into G&A or overhead, it gets allocated to all active customers. If you only sell to DoD, fine. But if you sell to multiple Federal agencies, you will end up with the civilian agencies paying for this unique DoD requirement. That doesn’t sound right.
Thus, we are pointed toward some type of special pooling and allocation method, to make sure that DoD pays for its poorly thought-out requirement. That was the basis of the comments.
But the DAR Council ignored those valid concerns and so here we are.
The good news, the silver lining in this dark cloud of bureaucracy, is that the rule only applies to “major defense contractors,” and if you are not one of them you can skate on by. The majors will figure this one out, and they will figure out how to stick DoD with the bill—as they always do. The small businesses, the ones that are not positioned to handle this rule, are not subject to it. That’s the best nugget of news we can offer to our readers.
Otherwise, this rule is going to be problematic for those entities that are subject to it.
Risk Management in M&A Activities
Apogee Consulting, Inc. has done some M&A stuff before. We’ve participated in due diligence activities, we’ve briefed lawyers and investment firms on results, and we’ve participated in post-merger integration activities (including contract novations, business system integration, and post-award indirect rate structuring). All of which is to say: while we don’t claim to be M&A experts, we’ve done enough to have some insight into what can go wrong.
Rule #1: Due diligence findings are rarely enough, by themselves, to affect the deal. If enough people want the deal to happen then it’s going to happen regardless of the due diligence efforts. (This situation tends to happen when one or more corporate officers have “do a successful deal” in their annual performance plans, and their incentive comp is riding on the deal getting done.) Conversely, if enough people don’t want the deal to happen then it’s not going to happen regardless of the due diligence efforts. (We’re thinking here of Lockheed Martin’s proposed merger with Titan Corp., which cratered because Titan couldn’t clear itself fast enough from its FCPA problems. Lockheed Martin walked and eventually L-3 acquired the company but there’s a reason you don’t hear much about the former Titan Corp. anymore.1)
Rule #2: There is never enough time or money to perform the due diligence you would like to perform. Instead, you perform the due diligence that’s budgeted and your results are in line with what is being paid for. You can never identify all the risks. You can never verify all the contract ETCs and you can never look at all the purchasing files and you can never examine all the accounting transactions. You simply have to do the best job you can, while hoping the attorneys have structured an escrow or some similar protection into the deal.
So if Rule #1 and Rule #2 are correct, then why bother? That’s a good question. The best answer we’ve been able to come up with is that due diligence efforts often uncover risks that need to be mitigated post-merger. In addition—and this may be the more important reason—the time to start post-merger integration planning is on Day 1 of the due diligence effort. Key questions, such as “Will the acquired entity be left as a stand-alone or will it be fully integrated?” can be addressed during due diligence. The merging of business systems can be addressed. Potential issues with security clearances and government property and any backlog of contracts (and subcontracts) awaiting closure can be addressed. The meting-out of billed and unbilled receivables can be addressed. Reserves for litigation can be addressed. In sum, there’s a whole host of issues – most of which really don’t impact whether the deal happens or craters – that can be discussed during the due diligence process.
Even so, certain risks are going to escape scrutiny. Either they are too hidden to surface, or they do surface but are minimized or ignored during the rush to consummate the deal. Example: somebody looks at the target’s timekeeping system and writes a report saying it’s weak and there could be mischarging going on. That report doesn’t identify any specific mischarging (because there’s no time and/or budget for such an investigation), but it does identify a specific risk. That report is buried in the avalanche of due diligence data and forgotten. Until two years later (well after the merger) when members of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the Army Criminal Investigation Division show up at one site and allegations of multiple millions’ worth of time mischarging are dropped on the heads of the integrated entity, seemingly out of nowhere.2
Today we are going to address two somewhat hidden risks.
The first risk is what happens to proposals in the pipeline as of the date of the merger/acquisition/ divestiture. Do those proposals continue under the name of the entity that started them, or do they get submitted under the name of the post-merger entity? And how will the government view the post-merger entity?
In a very recent bid protest decision, the GAO found that the US Army Corps of Engineers had reasonably excluded a proposal submitted by Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems (LMIS) because it was about to merge with Leidos (the spin-off that used to be a part of SAIC). It was appropriate for the awarding agency to conclude “that it could not determine the realism of the protester’s costs and identified other risks associated with the anticipated transaction.” The Source Selection Advisory Council concluded that—
It is unknown, and unknowable, what impacts the new LM-Leidos corporate structure will have on future performance, whether past performance is still a predictor of future performance of offerors, and how small business will be utilized. Therefore, there are potential risks associated with the delivery of the technical capabilities proposed. Based on the above, LMIS’s proposal should therefore not be considered for award.
Similarly, the merger between Engility Corp. and TASC created uncertainty in the mind of the contracting officer and Engility was found to be non-responsible because its facility security clearances were in the name of TASC. (See this protest.) In this case, Engilty’s bid protest was upheld, because there was evidence that Engility had submitted the required paperwork, and updated its CAGE Codes. Thus, the nonresponsibility determination was unreasonable. Note, however, that Engility had to file a bid protest to overcome its exclusion from the shortlist.
To sum up, the impact of the proposed merger/acquisition/divestiture on proposals in the pipeline must be addressed during the due diligence phase. This activity includes running indirect rate simulations, figuring out novations, updating CAGE Codes, and making sure facility and personnel clearances are handled well in advance of the actual effective date of the activity. Also the CAS implications must be considered if one entity is less than fully CAS-covered. (Note: If you don’t know whether you are going to run the post-merger entity as one integrated entity or two stand-alone entities, this is going to be a challenge.)
Now on to the second risk. It’s a bit more subtle and, frankly, we don’t see any practical mitigation strategies at the practitioner level. But let’s talk about it anyway.
It’s about insider trading.
When two publicly traded entities are in discussions regarding a potential merger, acquisition, or divestiture, it’s obvious that there is some money to be made. The company about to be acquired is going to be acquired at a premium from the current share price; that’s a given. If you knew about the transaction in advance you could buy up shares of the entity to be acquired, and then sell them at a handsome profit a short time later when the deal took place.
Now, we’re sure your people would never stoop so low. They are obviously of the highest integrity to start with, plus they signed a special NDA in connection with the due diligence activities, plus they know there’s a downside to being caught. But suppose, just suppose, that they thought they were smarter than you. Suppose they thought they had figured out a fool-proof way to pass on insider information and to hide the proceeds from the use of that insider information. If that’s the case, then maybe they are like this former Global Vice President for SAP, who was just indicted (along with two others) in a “scheme to commit insider trading and money laundering that allegedly resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars in profits.”
According to the (obligatory) DoJ press release—
The indictment charges all defendants with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and securities fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and one count of conspiracy to structure currency transactions involving a financial institution for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements. In addition, Salis is charged with four counts of wire fraud and five counts of securities fraud; Douglas Miller is charged with six counts of wire fraud, five counts of securities fraud and one count of making false statements; and Edward Miller is charged with one count of wire fraud, one count of securities fraud, one count of witness harassment and one count of obstruction of justice.
According to allegations in the indictment, while Salis was employed as a SAP global vice president, he obtained material, non-public information about SAP’s acquisition of Concur, which he disclosed to Douglas Miller in violation of a duty of confidentiality. Douglas Miller, Edward Miller and others then allegedly purchased securities in Concur based on this information for the purposes of profiting from these transactions and returning a portion of the profits to Salis. Following the acquisition, the indictment alleges that Douglas Miller and Edward Miller sold the securities and Douglas Miller made approximately $119,000 and Edward Miller made approximately $149,000. Other traders who allegedly used the information profited a total of approximately $237,000. In order to conceal the nature of the proceeds, the Millers allegedly used cash, money orders and checks to transfer some of their trading profits to Salis. In total, Salis allegedly received nearly $90,000 from his co-conspirators.
Note that nobody has pleaded guilty to those allegations and that people are presumed to be innocent until convicted. Nonetheless, the indictment reminds us all that people will bend their ethics for money, and that confidential information related to a potential merger, acquisition, or divestiture can be perceived to be a path to some easy ill-gotten loot. You probably need to remind your people involved in such confidential deals that, if they decide to sell-out for some cash, they will be caught and prosecuted to the full extent of the law.
We have lots to write about M&A activities but let's start with this one. We trust you enjoyed it!
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