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Apogee Consulting Inc

More General Misconduct

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As we wrote a while ago, “Nobody should be surprised that employees will abuse company credit cards. It’s a known thing….” By no means is the abuse limited to corporate employees. Indeed, we’ve written several articles on the misuse of credit cards by both contractor employees and government employees. It’s an equal opportunity phenomenon.

We’ve also written before about abuse of privileges by the highest ranks of senior military leadership. For example, this article described how Major General William Ward “engaged in multiple forms of misconduct related to official and unofficial travel, misused a Government vehicle, misused Official Representation Funds [by distributing them to persons not authorized to receive them], wasted Government funds, and misused his position [by permitting staff members to perform personal services for him].” Not to be outdone, other military services—including both the US Air Force and US Navy—have had their own share of high-rank misdeeds.

Today’s story, however, is brought to you by the US Army and the Department of Defense Inspector General. Not to mention Major General Ronald Lewis, who served as Senior Military Assistant (SMA) to the Secretary of Defense.

The DoDIG investigated three allegations made about MG Lewis, including that he—

(1) misused his government travel charge card (GTCC) for personal expenses;

(2) made false official statements regarding his GTCC misuse;

and (3) engaged in a course of inappropriate behavior that included patronizing an establishment off-limits to U.S. military personnel, drinking to excess in public, and improper interactions with females.

The DoDIG substantiated all three allegations.

We are not going to delve into the salacious details of the DoDIG report. We included a link (above) so you can find them out for yourself, if you have a mind to.

What’s interesting (to us) is that MG Lewis was alleged to have made false statements. Specifically, the IG found that –

… MG Lewis violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Article 107, which prohibits individuals from making false statements related to their official duties, when he made false official verbal statements to subordinates and a false official written statement to Citibank regarding his GTCC use in Itaewon, Seoul. His GTCC statement and receipts confirm that he visited the off-limits Candy Bar club, where he charged $1,121.25 in personal expenses to his GTCC, and received some form of services or benefits from those transactions. When Office of the Secretary of Defense staff asked MG Lewis if he made the charges, he denied doing so. He then executed a digitally signed declaration to Citibank attesting that he did not make the charges to his GTCC at the Candy Bar club or receive services there. MG Lewis’ verbal statements to subordinates and written statement to Citibank denying that he made charges to his GTCC at the Candy Bar club were false. He knew that he used his GTCC there and received services. His false statements violated UCMJ Article 107 because preparing a voucher for official travel reimbursement and executing a report to the GTCC issuer relate to his official duties. The false statements caused Citibank to remove all the Candy Bar club charges from MG Lewis’ GTCC account, causing financial loss to Citibank.

We always make it a point to tell our clients that they must not lie or mislead government auditors in any manner. We now note that a similar prohibition applies to military personnel when conducting official duties; or, in this case, when making official statements about conduct that was definitely not a part of their official duties.

 

 

It’s Not Called “Post-Award Audit” Anymore

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For a long time we have demonstrated subject matter expertise by translating phrases with specific meanings in the government contract environment into phrases that could be more readily understood by businesspeople. One example of such translations is “post-award audit.” That phrase had a specific meaning to DCAA auditors; it meant “defective pricing audit”. Then we explained that “defective pricing” means a proposal that was negotiated in noncompliance with the requirements of the Truth-in-Negotiations Act. And then we would explain TINA, and so forth.

No longer.

They are not called “post-award audits” anymore.

Sometime between after April, 2016, DCAA changed the name of the 42000 audit program to “Truth in Negotiations Audits”.

As the audit program states—

This standard audit program assists the auditor in planning and performing a Truth in Negotiations audit to determine if a negotiated contract price was increased by a significant amount because the contractor did not submit or disclose accurate, complete, and current cost or pricing data.

The irony here is that it’s not called Truth-in-Negotiations anymore. It hasn’t been called that for more than two years. It’s now called “Truthful Cost or Pricing Data”.

Another irony is that the Truthful Cost or Pricing Data requirement distinguishes between “cost or pricing data” and “certified cost or pricing data”. (It also distinguishes between those two categories and “data other than certified cost or pricing data”.) The FAR was revised to make these changes six years ago.

The audit program purpose statement does get one thing correct. It correctly states that a violation is not predicated on use, but rather nondisclosure. We noted this distinction here.

That’s not all, of course. The audit program also correctly lists the five requirements associated with a violation. They are:

  1. The information in question fits the definition of [certified] cost or pricing data.

  2. Accurate, complete, and current data existed and were reasonably available to the contractor before the agreement on price or other date agreed upon by the parties.

  3. Accurate, complete, and current data were not submitted or disclosed to the contracting officer or one of the designated representatives of the contracting officer and that these individuals did not have actual knowledge of such data or its significance to the proposal.

  4. The Government relied on defective certified cost or pricing data in negotiating with the contractor.

  5. The Government’s reliance on defective certified cost or pricing data caused an increase in the contract price.

(We note that the points above largely make the correct distinction between “certified cost or pricing data” and “cost or pricing data”.)

In related news, we have reported (several times) that DCAA seems to have gotten out of the defective pricing audit business. As the agency has focused on catching up on its backlog of unaudited contractor proposals to establish final billing rates, it has let this risk area go.

No longer.

The GFY2017 program plans call for an increase in such audits. Interestingly, they may be performed by Headquarters teams that don’t report to the local FAO. We’ll have to see what the results of this renewed focus will be.

 

 

Accounting for Offsets – New Proposed DFARS Rule

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We note, for the record, that the interim DFARS rule we wrote about here has been reissued as a proposed rule. This is interesting. In our experience the vast majority of interim rules proceed directly to a final rule. Indeed, the issuance of an interim rule (i.e., one promulgated without the “benefit” of public input) is typically justified based on some type of urgency. (As this one was.)

Apparently that urgency has decreased since promulgation of the interim rule, and now there is time to walk back into the normal rulemaking process.

Accordingly, you will have an opportunity to provide your comments on the proposed rule, in addition to comments already submitted on the interim rule. If you don’t sell internationally you likely won’t care; but if you do then you probably will care about the rule quite a bit. We suspect you’ll like it.

The proposed rule would make it easier for contracting officers to find that the costs of “indirect offsets” are fair and reasonable. The DFARS would be revised to state (in part)—

Indirect offset costs are deemed reasonable for purposes of FAR parts 15 and 31 with no further analysis necessary on the part of the contracting officer, provided that the U.S. defense contractor submits to the contracting officer a signed offset agreement or other documentation showing that the FMS customer has made the provision of an indirect offset a condition of the FMS acquisition. FMS customers are placed on notice through the LOA that indirect offset costs are deemed reasonable without any further analysis by the contracting officer.

It also exempts contractors from having to provide certified cost or pricing data with respect to indirect offsets. (If you don’t know what an indirect offset is, you can check out our earlier article on this topic. Or you can read the proposed rule, because it now defines the term with some specificity.)

As we noted in our previous article, offsets are hard to account for. This proposed rule won’t make it any easier, but it will reduce the burden contractors will face when trying to price and negotiate them.

 

 

Equal Access to Justice

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A while ago we published an article about a small business that was forced to choose between accepting a very bad deal and spending the money to litigate. We were rather hard on the Navy contracting officer who, quite explicitly and intentionally, forced that small business into such a difficult decision. We wrote—

For those small businesses that may be reading this article, you do not have to let yourself be bullied by a prime contractor or by a government contracting officer. You can, and you should, choose to litigate when you believe you are correct. You can win and you may be able to get your attorney’s fees paid for by the opposition. (See: Equal Access to Justice Act.)

Soon after we wrote that bit, we came across a decision at the Court of Federal Claims that reinforced our advice. The problem with the decision is that, in order to really appreciate it, you need to have followed the long and tortuous road that got the parties there. We have neither sufficient time nor patience to detail the journey. Here’s a summary—just a taste—of that journey.

The contractor, SUFI Network Services, initially filed 28 claims to its contracting officer, together worth more than $130 million. The CO agreed to pay SUFI $133,000 and denied the rest of the claims. SUFI appealed to the ASBCA, amending its claim to ask for $163 million. The ASBCA found merit to some of SUFI’s claims but only awarded $3.8 million. Upon reconsideration, the Board increased its award to $7.4 million. SUFI appealed the ASBCA decision to Court of Federal Claims (CoFC), who found legal errors and awarded SUFI $118.8 million. The Government and SUFI both appealed to the Federal Circuit, who upheld the CoFC’s reasoning but vacated the award and remanded back to the ASBCA to determine the proper quantum. The ASBCA awarded SUFI $111.8 million.

The Government appealed that decision to the CoFC. The CoFC dismissed the appeal because it found that the Government didn’t have appeal rights from the decision of its own Board. The Government appealed that decision to the Federal Circuit, who affirmed the CoFC’s decision.

Having been through 10 years of litigation, SUFI requested that its attorney fees be reimbursed under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). As Judge Wheeler, writing for the Court, stated—

The Government disputes nearly every aspect of SUFI’s claim, including its liability to pay for any fees at all, the hourly rate at which fees can be recovered, whether interest applies to any fee award, and even whether this Court has the authority to grant SUFI’s fee application.

Judge Wheeler also discussed the purpose of the EAJA, writing—

The primary purpose of … the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), is to reduce a potential plaintiff’s economic deterrents to contesting unreasonable government action by holding the Government liable for attorneys’ fees and expenses when the Government’s position was not substantially justified. … In addition, Congress noted that the Government has greater resources and expertise than the average civil defendant and so the ‘standard for an award of fees against the United States should be different from the standard governing an award against a private litigant.’

Judge Wheeler found that SUFI was entitled to recovery of its attorney fees. He wrote “The Court finds that SUFI is entitled to an award of its attorneys’ fees and expenses under either subsection of [EAJA] because the Government acted in bad faith and also advanced a position that was not substantially justified.”

Importantly, the government’s conduct, both before and after SUFI commenced litigation, was deemed to be evidence regarding the government’s bad faith. Judge Wheeler wrote—

The facts of this case demand a finding similar to that in Vaughan v. Atkinson because the pre-litigation Government conduct literally left SUFI with no choice but to seek formal adjudication. Following the Air Force’s willful breach of the contract, the Government continued to delay and obstruct SUFI’s every attempt to recover its losses. The contracting officer denied all of SUFI’s substantial claims despite the Board later finding that the Air Force’s breach was willful and material. … The Air Force took nearly seven months to enter into the Partial Settlement Agreement (‘PSA’), and then later argued before the Board that the PSA was unenforceable. … The contracting officer’s decision, despite the unequivocal breach, and the Air Force’s resistance to entering a PSA, forced SUFI to seek judicial review. In order to obtain judicial review, SUFI was required to first appear before the ASBCA pursuant to its contract with the Air Force.

(Emphasis in original. Internal citations omitted.)

Judge Wheeler had more to say but we believe the point has been made. If you are a small business and your contracting officer puts you in the difficult position of having to choose between accepting an unwarranted profit degradation or hiring an attorney to litigate your claim and appeal, you can be confident that your attorney fees will be reimbursed by the government. (This assumes, of course, that you prevail and you qualify for attorney’s fees under the provisions of the EAJA.)

More to the point, when your contracting officer tells you—

I am prepared to offer $5,164.00 to cover the portion of the claim that we have determined to have merit. That amount probably will not satisfy you though, as I understand that you feel you are due the full $22k. I have also heard that it can cost more than $100K to go through the ASBCA appeal process. If that is true, the economics of it don't make much sense to me, but of course you have the right to do so.

--then you can confidently reply, “It may indeed cost me $100K to go through the ASBCA appeal process; but when I win, you will be paying my attorney’s fees in addition to the $17,000 you are trying to screw me out of .”

 

 

DOD Attacks IRAD

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We already wrote about the final DFARS rule that conditions the allowability of contractors’ Independent Research & Development (IR&D or IRAD) costs on having “informal technical exchanges” with unspecified DOD officials prior to incurring those costs. At the same time, a proposed DFARS rule change was issued that would also impact contractors’ IRAD projects. The proposed rule, if finalized as drafted, would dramatically affect how Source Selection Teams evaluate offerors’ prices during a competition.

The proposed rule is simple. But the impacts are not simple at all. The proposed rule states (in part)—

If the Offeror, in the performance of any contract resulting from this solicitation, intends to use IR&D to meet the contract requirements, the Offeror's proposal shall include documentation in its price proposal to support this proposed approach.

For evaluation purposes only, the Contracting Officer will adjust the Offeror's total evaluated cost or price to include the amount that such future IR&D investments reduce the price of the proposal.

We must (once again) tell you we saw this one coming long ago, and warned our readers about it. When the DAR Council issued its Advanced Noticed of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM) we commented as follows—

… the value of any related future IR&D projects is an estimated value. It is subject to change based on the financial fortunes of the company and the whims of management. … If a contractor puts those notional values into its proposal, does that make those estimates certified cost or pricing data? If those notional values are certified cost or pricing data, then if the contractor spends less than ‘promised’—is that somehow defective pricing? (Well, no. Because cost or pricing data are facts, not estimates. But you wait and see how many auditors assert those notional IR&D project values are actually cost or pricing data. You heard it here first.)

Additionally, if this proposed methodology is implemented we’ll all have to deal with the fact that IRAD projects are allocated to final cost objectives using the same base as is used to allocate G&A expense. (It’s commonly held that IR&D and B&P costs are part of G&A. That’s not strictly true. But it’s close enough for government work.) Thus, the value of any IRAD projects, for price evaluation purposes, is not the value of the IRAD projects—the value for price evaluation purposes is in fact the value of the IRAD projects that ends up being allocated to the awarded contract after it is awarded.

To figure out the correct value of the IR&D projects, for price evaluation purposes, you will need to know not only the value of the related IR&D projects, but also the percentage of the G&A allocation base that the proposed contract will end up being, after award. That means not only knowing the contract value of the proposed contract, but also knowing the contract values of all the other contracts that will comprise the cost input base used for G&A expense allocation.

In the future. Perhaps years in the future. For the entire period of performance of the contract for which the contractor is submitting its proposal. …

This is a bad idea and you should tell the DoD that it’s a bad idea.

And you should tell the policy makers and rule-makers why it is a bad idea.

The proposed rule ignores much of the cost accounting challenges associated with implementing it. Essentially, it says “we don’t care what the impact to the estimated contract price will really be. Instead we’ll simply add the gross IRAD project expenditure amount to the submitted cost estimate.” Thus, the proposed approach inflates the true cost of the IRAD project expenditure amount with respect to the individual proposal being offered.

Interestingly, the ANPRM notified us of a public meeting to be held March 3, 2106, to accept public input. The proposed rulemaking notification acknowledges that the meeting was held. And yet there is nothing in the background section of the proposed rulemaking notification that discusses the input received. It is almost as if the DAR Council wants to ignore any input. Indeed, since the proposed rule is almost exactly what was described in the ANPRM, it seems fairly obvious that the DAR Council did ignore any negative comments received at the public meeting.

If that’s the way the DAR Council considers input, we have to ask why they bother to go to the time and expense of holding such meetings. Seems like a big waste of taxpayer dollars.

Readers will have another opportunity to be ignored by the DAR Council, because comments are being solicited as part of the rulemaking process. Feel free to submit your comments so that they can be ignored, as has been the case with similar IRAD initiatives.

Why has the DAR Council consistently ignored negative input on these topics?

Well, we’ve recently called out one reason: Better Buying Power 3.0. It calls for these IRAD initiatives. Therefore the DAR Council must implement them. As we recently wrote—

… because BBP 3.0 called for this, it must be correct and its benefits must outweigh the costs. Forget public input. Forget an objective analysis of initiative. Just do it, because it must be done. This kind of magical thinking is reminiscent of religious cults. Please pass the Kool-aid.

All snark aside, we have to realize that the DAR Council is made up of individuals. It might be fair to characterize those individuals as career bureaucrats; you don’t get to that level without dedicating your professional life to the goal. And those career bureaucrats report up a chain of command, and many of them report into OUSD (AT&L). In fact, the Chair of the DAR Council is the Deputy Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP), which reports into OUSD (AT&L). So it should be obvious why an important OUSD (AT&L) initiative such as BBP is going to be rammed through the rulemaking process, regardless of any public input received.

It’s an inherent conflict of interest, and one that works to the disadvantage of most contractors. (Yes, we’re saying the system is rigged.)

In another sense, the way the DAR Council has treated public input on these topics is a symptom of a bigger problem, which is that DoD wants to take contractors’ intellectual property. We wrote about this conspiracy theory right here. We think that article established the ulterior motive for this seeming war on contractors’ IRAD spending. We wrote—

This is not about leveling the playing field by reducing ‘games’ that some contractors can play—tactics that are perfectly permissible under the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of CAS 402 and 420 in the ATK Thiokol decision. No. Instead, this is about obtaining contractors’ intellectual property rights via subterfuge, in the guise of adjusting price evaluations. It’s about taking away the ‘independent’ in IRAD and thereby weakening contractor protections of their IP rights. As we think we’ve shown, the Pentagon has a long history of trying to obtain those IP rights, and the latest DFARS ANPRM fits perfectly into those historical efforts.

If you were to go read that “conspiracy theory” article, you would see that we are not alone in asserting there’s something else going on here. We quote several other—perhaps more respected—sources that make essentially the same argument. Perhaps there might be something to it?

In any case, here we are. DoD is moving forward on its BBP 3.0 plans to better deal with contractors’ IRAD expenditures. You will have an opportunity to go on record with your concerns and objections. They will be ignored. Then, years from now, you can point out that you were right and they should have listened to you.

That’s what we will be doing.

 

 


Page 84 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.