Inspector General Criticizes DCMA CAS Administration
Because of course it does.
The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General has a long and illustrious pedigree, reaching right back to von Steuben and his critical impact on the readiness of the Continental Army. But of late it seems that the DoDOIG exists to offer criticism of its sister DoD components, without actually addressing root causes and making recommendations that would proactively fix the underlying problem(s).
The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is often in the DoDOIG’s crosshairs, because DCMA makes it harder on its own people than it needs to be, and therefore creates an easy target. DCMA’s own ill-conceived policies (called “Instructions”) actually create a situation where it is nearly impossible to be in compliance with them, and thus DoDOIG is able to easily report “findings” of contracting officer failure to comply.
Between DoDOIG’s focus on literal compliance with rules, and DCMA’s insistence on creating arbitrary and unreasonable rules, you get audit reports that seem to indicate vast levels of waste and abuse; whereas the reality is somewhat different than what’s pictured.
Today’s example of the phenomenon: DoDOIG Report Number DODIG-2017-032, published 8 December 2016, with the catchy title “Evaluation of Contracting Officer Actions on Cost Accounting Standard Noncompliances Reported by Defense Contract Audit Agency.”
According to the Objective section of the report, the DoDOIG reviewed 27 DCAA reports alleging that a contractor compliance with the Federal Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). The OIG reviewed contracting officer actions taken after receiving those reports to see whether those actions “complied with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 30.6, ‘Cost Accounting Standards Administration,’ DoD Instruction 7640.02, ‘Policy for Follow-up on Contract Audit Reports,’ and applicable agency instructions.”
Even before getting to the content, we can be fairly confident that the OIG is going to find problems. A recent ASBCA decision, discussed here, already found that a contracting officer failed to comply with FAR 30.602. From our informal research, we have reason to believe that individual CO was not in any way an outlier. In fact, we believe that many—if not most—DCMA contracting officers do not understand FAR 30.6 and are ill-prepared to comply with it. So when we see that the OIG will be evaluating a DCMA CO’s compliance with FAR 30.6, we are pretty sure there will be lots of findings.
Indeed, out of the 27 instances reviewed, there were 15 noncompliances with the requirements of FAR 30.6. In addition, DoDOIG found 16 instances of noncompliance with DoD Instruction 7640.02 and 8 instances of noncompliance with DCMA Instruction 108.
Whatever.
As per usual, the OIG failed to do any root cause analysis and the recommendations were superficial. The recommended corrective actions were:
We recommend that the Director, DCMA, and the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), provide training on the requirements for processing CAS noncompliances in a timely manner.
We also recommend that the Director, DCMA:
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develop effective controls for helping to ensure that contracting officers adequately document their rationale when concluding that a noncompliance is immaterial, and
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remind contracting officers of the requirements for obtaining legal and management reviews of CAS determinations.
And there you have it.
When you think about waste and abuse, consider whether an OIG report that fails to consider root causes and make effective corrective action recommendations should fall into that category. Ask yourself whether such a report is consistent with the high standards established by von Steuben … or if such a report is simply another example, in a long line of examples, of bureaucratic infighting on the taxpayer’s dollar.
Affordability and Efficiency—Or: How Ash Carter and Frank Kendall Foiled Robert Gates
Six or more years ago we published many blog articles discussing an initiative started by then-SECDEF Bob Gates. In a 2010 speech at the Eisenhower Library Gates called for an initiative to drive $102 billion of waste and inefficiency out of Pentagon “overhead costs” and transfer those savings to the warfighters. A good starting point for a review of Gates’ intention can be found here.
Within six weeks from the speech, Gates’ Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), Dr. Ash Carter, had met with leaders of major defense contractors and had demanded savings of $66.3 billion dollars over five years, to be created by cost reductions to current programs.
Astute readers might notice what we pointed out at the time: somehow the drive to reduce a bloated Pentagon bureaucracy had been turned into a drive to reduce contract costs. Funny how that little change in direction happened ….
It was at that time that Dr. Carter announced an initiative to “restore affordability and productivity in defense spending”—an initiative that quickly became known as “Better Buying Power” (or BBP). That was BBP 1.0. Over the next six years, the defense acquisition workforce would receive additional direction via BBP 2.0, 2.1, and 3.0. Over the next six years, Gates moved on and was replaced by Chuck Hagel—and then by Ash Carter. Carter moved up and so did Frank Kendall, who became the next USD (AT&L). Later incarnations of BBP were issued under Kendall’s imprimatur.
Thus, Gate’s attack on Pentagon overhead, which we dubbed the “efficiency” initiative, was overtaken by the Carter/Kendall attack on program costs, which we dubbed the “affordability” initiative. BBP got all the press (for good or ill) and the efficiency initiative seemed to fade away—as do so many well-meaning attempts to streamline the incredibly challenging defense acquisition environment by reducing the bureaucracy. The entire initiative just … died. We never heard anything more about it over the intervening six years.
Until now.
The Washington Post reported that the Defense Business Board actually studied the issue. It hired McKinsey to help understand how the Pentagon spent money on the “Fourth Estate”—which is what the military services call the defense agencies—mostly staffed by civilians—that support the military branches. According to WaPo, the McKinsey study found the following:
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DOD spends 23 percent of its budget on “overhead and core business operations such as accounting, human resources, logistics and property management.” Those Fourth Estate functions employ 1,014,000 people. WaPo reported “The Pentagon has almost as many people working desk jobs as it does active-duty troops.”
The DBB concluded that the Pentagon could save taxpayers some $125 billion over five years by better managing its enormous Fourth Estate bureaucracy.
The bureaucrats pushed back.
Frank Kendall was the first to push back, according to the WaPo story, which reported “Kendall put up a stiff fight. He challenged the board’s data and strenuously objected to the conclusion that his offices were overstaffed.”
Next, according to WaPo, Ash Carter—by then SECDEF Carter—killed the study by ignoring it. The DBB chair was quoted as saying: “Unfortunately, Ash — for reasons of his own — stopped this.” A SECDEF spokesperson responded by saying “the Pentagon chief was busy dealing with ‘a long list of national security challenges.’ He added that [Deputy SECDEF Bob] Work and other senior officials had already ‘concluded that the report, while well-intentioned, had limited value.’”
To our way of thinking, it is no surprise that the two biggest detractors of the study were Carter and Kendall. It seems to us that those two individuals aligned on the attack on contract/program costs and consistently ignored any efforts to attack internal Pentagon overhead. History seems to show that Carter, in particular, was never a champion of the “efficiency” initiative and his focus—from the very beginning—was on the “affordability” initiative. Kendall took over the “affordability” attack (called Better Buying Power)—whether out of a sense of loyalty or opportunism we couldn’t say—and ran with it, making it a key accomplishment of his (soon to be ended) tenure as USD (AT&L). Therefore, it should come as no mystery why those two individuals were at the forefront of the bureaucratic pushback. Their positions on the DBB study were consistent with every other position they had taken on the topic since 2010.
In the end, the results of the report were “suppressed” and “The Pentagon imposed secrecy restrictions on the data making up the study, which ensured no one could replicate the findings.” Except The Washington Post found the study and published it. We taxpayers owe them a debt of gratitude.
All in all, a good example of why significant reform of the defense acquisition environment is so difficult.
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Perpetual Audit
The Defense Contract Audit Agency performs a variety of audits, many of which the average contractor never experiences. For most contractors, their experience of DCAA is gained through an audit of a cost proposal submitted in the hope of winning a contract. The auditor shows up, looks at the proposed costs (both direct and indirect), looks at the support for the proposed costs, and then expresses an opinion on whether or not the proposed costs were adequately supported. Then the auditor departs and the next time the contractor hears about the audit is during negotiations.
Some contractors have their proposals audited well after contract award, in order to validate that the contractor complied with the requirements of what used to be called the Truth-in-Negotiations Act (TINA) but which is now called by some other name. Those audits used to be called “post-award audits” or sometimes “defective pricing audits”—but they are now called “Truth in Negotiation audits” because that’s what DCAA is calling them these days.
Contractors with cost-type (or perhaps T&M) contract types know that DCAA audits a different type of proposal: the annual proposal to establish final billing rates (commonly known as the “incurred cost proposal”). These contractors often submit provisional billing rate proposals to establish the indirect rates to the used for contract invoicing until final billing rates can be established. Still other contractors submit forward pricing rate proposals that are audited, negotiated, and (hopefully) become forward pricing rate agreements.
Thus, speaking in a very broad sense, the average DCAA auditor spends most of their time auditing some form of contractor proposal; and the average contractor’s experience of DCAA is having some form of proposal being audited. But that’s not all DCAA does.
DCAA reviews contractor business systems, of course. At least three of the six business systems formalized in the DFARS fall under DCAA’s cognizance. Contractors’ business systems were a big deal five or six years ago; but by now the ritual Kabuki Dance between auditor, contractor, and contracting officer is well known and it’s a rare event when a business system is failed. That’s not to say that pre-award accounting system reviews—which are performed by DCAA—are easy to pass; indeed, they are not easy to pass and too many new contractors fail their first (or second) pre-award reviews. But once that hurdle is passed the DFARS contractor business system oversight regime is pretty much a paper tiger at this point. It’s not even enforced at any but the largest of the defense contractors.
In addition to all the activity listed above, DCAA also performs what it terms “mandatory annual audit requirements” (MAARs). Each MAAR audit is to be performed each year. (Thus: “annual audit”.) For a long time, MAAR audits used to be performed on an individual basis, but that didn’t always work out. It became clear that DCAA was deferring the required MAAR audits—even though they were “mandatory”—because of “resource constraints”. That posed a problem because an audit performed in 2014 has little relevance to an audit of a contractor’s 2007 incurred costs; yet, that was how the audit agency was applying the findings. It was a problem because the MAAR testing results were supposed to give the auditors assurance that the systems that fed incurred costs (such as purchasing and labor accounting) were working adequately. Without that assurance, it was difficult to support a valid conclusion on the accuracy of a contractor’s claimed costs.
A couple of years ago somebody at Fort Belvoir figured out that there would be a higher probability of the MAARs being performed timely if they baked the requirements into the incurred cost audit program. So now the MAARs are linked to that audit. At about that same time, somebody else decided that “mandatory annual audits” were only mandatory, on an annual basis, at “major” contractors. MAAR audits would only be performed at non-major contractors once every 3 years. Those two decisions helped MAAR audits get back into sync with incurred cost audits.
There are eighteen individual MAAR audits, but often some are performed in the background (so to speak) and the contractor is barely aware of them. Other MAAR audits, on the other hand, require contractor participation and support.
The two most obvious “in your face” MAAR audits are MAAR 6 and MAAR 13. MAAR 6 is commonly known as a labor “floor check” audit and MAAR 13 is known as a “purchase existence and consumption” audit. (We should note that, technically, the MAAR 6 audit can be either a floor check (observation) or an employee interview. But everybody calls it a floor check even if it’s chock-full of employee interviews.) Both those two audits are labor intensive and can take significant contractor resources to support. And both those two audits can take a long time to perform.
In fact, we believe that those two MAAR audits are now at the point that they are never, ever, completed.
From the auditor’s perspective, of course the audits are completed; they have to be. If there are no findings the auditor prepares a Memorandum for the Record and that ends the annual exercise. But that’s not what a contractor experiences.
First, when the auditor prepares a Memorandum for the Record to document the work performed and lack of findings, there is no requirement for an exit conference. There is no formal feedback. From the contractor’s perspective, there is only silence. Is the audit over? The contractor may never know.
Second, in order to comply with DCAA’s interpretation of GAGAS (Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards), auditors are directed to select their transaction samples from throughout the year. In earlier times, the MAAR random sample was selected at a single point, or perhaps the samples were selected from a quarter’s worth of transactions. No longer. Nowadays auditors are told to select their sample so that the entire year is covered. This means that the auditors are requesting multiple transaction universes as the year progresses, and making multiple sample selections for testing. Which means that the contractor has to support the audit throughout the entire fiscal year.
In other words, the audit never, ever, stops.
Each month, or each quarter, the auditor requests a transaction universe and makes a selection. The contractor provides the supporting documentation. Questions are asked and answered. Then the next month (or quarter) arrives and the cycle repeats. If all goes well, the auditor prepares a Memorandum for the Record at year-end.
And then the cycle starts again the next month, or quarter, for the next year’s MAAR coverage.
Remember, the contractor doesn’t see the Memorandum for the Record. From the contractor’s perspective there is an endless cycle of transaction universe requests and transaction samples to be supported. There may or may not be a new year’s entrance conference, but there is no other indication that there is a new audit. For the contractor, it must seem like a never-ending audit.
It must seem like a perpetual audit.
We Never Talk – And Why
Our previous article was about various attempts to get contracting officers to communicate with industry. We noted that the attempts had a fairly long pedigree, reaching back at least five years to the efforts of Dan Gordon, then OFPP Administrator. We concluded that if Mr. Gordon’s efforts were ineffective, it was doubtful that revising the FAR at the direction of Congress was going to be any more effective.
We shared the article with a couple of folks we know, including Vern Edwards. Vern had some thoughts of his own that he was kind enough to share and to give permission for us to document in this follow-on article. In our 15-minute-plus discussion, it became clear that we agreed on all points. Indeed, Vern’s thoughts echoed the article that we intended to write, before we got caught up in the idea of an acquisition leadership that kept doing the same thing over and over while expecting different results—and an acquisition workforce that had learned to ignore leadership direction.
Those thoughts:
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Vern noted that the original Dan Gordon Memo was vague and offered little in the way of concrete direction. It’s tough to get people to follow your direction when it’s not specific. It’s tough to determine whether or not your direction is being followed when you aren’t measuring any results. Further, Vern noted that the original focus seemed to be on market research, to get contracting officers to perform better market research by actually communicating with the industrial base. That is a different emphasis than having COs perform better communications (and/or discussions) with bidders during the solicitation and evaluation phase of a procurement. (More on this point in a bit.)
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He also noted that there are many good and valid reasons why a contracting officer would be reluctant to have open communication with industry.
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First and foremost among those reasons was a lack of time. Vern stated (and we agree) that the majority of COs are overworked and stressed with the intricacies of making the broken Federal acquisition system work. They simply do not have time to meet with and/or chat with every potential bidder. They don’t have time to explain the basics of Federal procurement to companies that want to enter the Federal marketplace, but don’t know how. (Plus that’s not their job, anyway.) Lack of time and an overwhelming workload keep most COs from communicating with industry.
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The current acquisition system is rife with lawyers scrutinizing every step of an acquisition. There are internal lawyers as well as external lawyers. Every one of them is looking to criticize a CO’s decisions. Every disappointed bidder is looking to find grounds for a protest. In such an environment, everything a CO says can and will be used against them. Vern pointed to the published answers to questions submitted by potential bidders after reading solicitations as a good example of how COs and lawyers act together to say as little as possible in order to minimize grounds for a bid protest. Much better, in Vern’s view, to say the minimum required and avoid legal entanglements.
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COs are afraid of misleading bidders. According to Vern, requirements are changing at a furious rate throughout the acquisition cycle, often right up to the issuance of a formal solicitation. Vern invited me to look at FedBizOpps and see all the solicitation amendments, changing requirements after issuance of the solicitation and right up to the proposal deadlines. Vern noted that COs are afraid that what they say will be “overcome by events” and might end up being grounds for a bid protest.
We both agreed that the recent proposed FAR revision perpetuates the problems with the Dan Gordon OFPP Memo and does nothing to address the points raised above. In addition, Vern noted some real concerns with the proposed rule. For clarity, let’s quote the proposed FAR verbiage:
The Government must not hesitate to communicate with the commercial sector as early as possible in the acquisition cycle to help the Government determine the capabilities available in the commercial marketplace. Government acquisition personnel are permitted and encouraged to engage in responsible and constructive exchanges with industry as part of market research (see 10.002), so long as those exchanges are consistent with existing laws, regulations, and promote a fair competitive environment.
Vern noted that the term “communicate” has a very specific meaning in the FAR (see 15.306), which is—“communications are exchanges, between the Government and offerors, after receipt of proposals, leading to establishment of the competitive range.” Is that what is meant by the proposed revision to FAR 1.102-2? Neither Vern nor I thought so, yet that is what the rule-drafters came up with. They are supposed to know this stuff, but apparently they didn’t see any issues with using a very specific term of art in a different manner elsewhere in the FAR. And they can’t blame Congress for the misstep, because Congress used the correct term (“exchanges”) in the 2016 NDAA. It’s just bad rule-making.
Another potential problem in the proposed rule is the use of the phrases “the commercial sector” and “the commercial marketplace”. Those phrases might be interpreted to mean that the direction only applies to acquisitions of commercial items, rather than to a basic business practice that applies to all acquisitions. This possible interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the proposed revision also adds some language just after the part we quoted above—“The Government will maximize its use of commercial products and services in meeting Government requirements.” Truly, when you add both parts of the proposed rule together it would be entirely reasonable to interpret the new “performance standards” to apply only to acquisitions of commercial items. Neither Vern nor I thought that was the intent of the rule-drafters. Again: bad rule-making.
In addition, the proposed rule suffers from all the defects of the Dan Gordon OFPP Memo. It lacks any way to measure compliance. Because there’s no means of measuring compliance, there’s no accountability for non-compliance. Speaking only for Apogee Consulting, Inc. (and not for Vern), we lack any confidence that COs will change the habits of a lifetime when there is no “stick” to be applied for continuing with the status quo. This is especially true given the impediments to open communication cited by Vern, above. The proposed FAR rule is window-dressing; nothing more.
The proposed rule also suffers from vagueness. Where in the acquisition cycle is it supposed to apply? As noted above, Vern thought the original Gordon Memo applied to market research and not to exchanges with offerors before or after issuance of a solicitation. The same lack of specificity is found in this proposed rule.
And the rule-drafters seem to openly acknowledge the aimlessness of the rule. In Section III of the Federal Register notice, the following language is found—
The Councils specifically request information regarding the following:
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Which phase(s) of the Federal acquisition process—i.e., acquisition planning/market research; solicitation/award; post award—would benefit from more exchanges with industry and what specific policies or procedures would enhance communication during these phases?
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Is there a current FAR policy that may inhibit communication? If so, what is the policy, and how could this policy be revised to remove barriers to effective communication?
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Might it be beneficial to encourage, or require, contracting officers to conduct discussions with offerors after establishing the competitive range for contracts of a high dollar threshold? If so, what would be the appropriate dollar threshold?
Thus, the rule-drafters are quite open about the vagueness of the proposed rule and they are asking for public input to help them out. As always, you can submit comments and suggestions, and perhaps this time the rule-makers might actually listen. It could happen!
Here’s another link to the Federal Register notice. If you want to submit comments, follow the link and you can find all the details, including deadlines.
Finally, we want to wrap up this article the way we originally intended to wrap up the prior article. We wanted to offer a word of advice to individuals and companies who believe that COs need to talk more.
Don’t.
Vern and I agreed that there are basically two types of folks who want to bend a CO’s ear: (1) people who know their way around and have a very specific question or issue that they’d like to resolve informally, without going through the disputes route, and (2) people without a clue (PWACs). PWACS don’t know what they want, they don’t know what the COs can do for them, and they have some strange notion that building a relationship with an individual CO can somehow help them win government work. They don’t have any agenda; instead, they want to meet in person and get a primer on Government Contracting 101.
If you are a PWAC, then don’t. It’s a waste of the CO’s time and it’s a waste of your time. If you want a primer, go attend a seminar. Hire a consultant. Visit your local PTAC. (And if you don’t know what a PTAC is, that’s prima facie evidence that you are a PWAC.) Attend local industry days sponsored by your local Executive Branch agency and/or military base. Identify the local SBLO and find out about interested bidders’ lists. Register in the appropriate databases. In other words, there are many more effective ways of positioning yourself to win Federal business than meeting with an individual CO in order to build a relationship. (By the way, if the CO used any relationship to steer work your way, that would be a very big problem for the CO and, perhaps, for you as well.)
So don’t.
Thanks again to Vern for the typically trenchant discussion. You need to know that we didn’t solicit his input. We sent him our original blog article because I thought he’d be interested. He was. He was so interested that he called me the next day and spent nearly 30 minutes discussing the issues. That’s the level of his dedication to this field. I hope I represented his thoughts accurately. Any errors are mine.
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