1,000 and Counting
So we’ve now passed 1,000 individual articles on this blog site. It’s not an exact count, because there are a couple of comments left posted after we eliminated the comment feature. But we are over 1,000 now for sure. Assuming an average of 1,000 words per article—which is about right—that’s a million words of alleged wisdom and news about government contracting and government contract costs and government contract compliance.
One million words.
One million words about technical topics, allegedly asserting a point of view that adds value. We decided long ago that simply posting links to stories and judicial decisions without comment—as many others do—was not interesting nor was it showcasing our potential as consultants. That decision was a two-edged sword, of course, since some of our opinions have been controversial and certainly turned-off some of the more buttoned-down clients who may have otherwise hired us. But in the end, I (the author) decided that I was going to be myself and report my honest feelings and emotions about what I saw happening around me. Like us or hate us (as some do), you get our honest opinion.
DCAA auditors, in particular, seem to have issues with our opinion about DCAA auditors and their audit guidance. That doesn’t keep several of them from sending us emails from time to time, often giving us leads and otherwise hidden audit guidance. (Thanks for those!) The emails tend to get nicer the closer the auditors are to retirement, or to moving on in their careers. Those auditors who’ve already left the audit agency for greener climes (e.g., DCMA) tend to agree with our thoughts, according to the emails. Some auditors prefer to stay silent but then feel free to send a nice goodbye email on their way out the door, thanking us for the articles—as one (now former) Supervisory Auditor at the Pax River Suboffice recently did.
One million words is more than ten novels worth of stuff. And we do it for free. (Or should I say I? It’s tough to keep a consistent point of view, as I once discussed.)
The first article is dated 19 May 2009. In the seven and a half years since then, we’ve done our best to record the evolution (some might say devolution) of the world of FAR and CAS and DCAA audits and DCMA Instructions and DoDOIG audit reports and GAO reviews and a whole host of stuff that makes up this crazy world of Federal government contracting.
Interspersed among the other, more mundane, articles are articles on project management and workforce management, and other topics—including a couple of articles about investing that really have no business being here. But in the main, we’ve focused on the world of our clients, the defense contractors and the AbilityOne contractors and the NFP grant recipients and the construction/engineering firms. We’ve tried to translate the arcane rules and regulations into actionable recommendations. Whether we’ve succeeded or not is up to you, our readers.
So here we are at 1,000 articles and about 1,000,000 words, and we will keep going for as long as we have the stamina and you have the interest. Maybe one day we’ll organize some of the articles into a book and see if anybody wants to buy it; but until then, it’s all free for reading and downloading and sharing (so long as we get proper attribution).
Actually we just removed one article. As you may recall, we asserted a while ago that we never removed articles. Instead, we offered to post any opposing point of view, unedited. Unsurprisingly, nobody ever took us up on that offer. (It turns out that writing is hard work. Who knew?)
Well, we recently received an email that was almost good enough to post as an opposing view article. We are going to edit it for reasons that should become apparent, but here it is—
Please remove your article that referenced a felony plea/conviction that was published on …
I started a company in Baghdad, Iraq and I am a … Air Force Veteran. I provided direct contract support to the U.S. Government for 2 ½ years overseas and then worked with two partners to open a business. … We were only in business for a period of three [six?] months, three of which we actually worked on the government contract in which my felony conviction was attached. … To try to support this contract, my partners and I made the decision to acquire the funds to complete the job in which they were asking us to do. To do so an invoice was submitted which was legal. The problem came into play when the Government Contracting Officer asked us to submit documentation to support the invoice stating we had paid out almost a million dollars within three days of award. We were in no position to do so as we needed the funds to complete the job. The Contracting Officer told us to submit ‘something’ (aka, false invoice) to represent the fact that it was spent or we would lose the contract. We decided to create the invoice for the large items that would be purchased. As the money was not spent at this time, this was considered a fraudulent action upon investigation. As I was the Contracting signature authority for our company, my signature was the only one listed on the contract. … The work was performed on this contract and every dime was applied to the contract, but the way in which we received the funds to do the job was not appropriate. The Government attorneys stated that even though the work was done on the contract, the way in which the funds were acquired were illegal and anything thereafter was required to be repaid. I was solely charged, as my partners’ names were not on the submitted invoice, and I am required to pay the entire amount back; even when valid invoices were provided for all products and services provided to the government.
After a 30-month sentencing, in which I spent 18 months in a federal minimum-security prison and a six-month halfway house stint, with four additional months on home confinement, and now three years of probation (I am over halfway done), I am working towards earning my good name back and securing future employment. … I do my best to focus on the positive and worked through several years of therapy. … As you can see, I am steadily working towards my next steps in life and trying to become the person I was before all of this took place, and I am asking for your help!
The information posted is limiting my chances of employment, as recruiters take one look and move on with merely seeing the negative search engine results. I have worked diligently to build a positive and professional Internet presence in the last year, but I would truly appreciate it if you would take a moment to assist me. This would mean so much to me and my potential future.
And so the article has been removed, which is a first for this site. We trust our readers will understand. Further, we think the email is a great example of how individuals can make mistakes in this complex world of government contracting, even if perhaps they had no intent of profiting from their poor decisions. We hope this individual is able to find gainful employment and have a second chance to succeed.
1,000 articles minus one. Doesn’t quite have the same ring to it, does it? But that’s where we are in the first month of 2017.
DoD Continues to Fumble IRAD Management
We are not known for our shyness at expressing critical opinions of various aspects of DoD’s contractor management. In fairness, we’re not shy at calling out contractor mismanagement either. We tell it like we see it, and that often means pointing the finger at the civilian leaders who manage DoD, the so-called “Fourth Estate” that makes up the Pentagon’s “overhead”.
The Honorable Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) has been a frequent target of this blog; not because we dislike the man (How would we know? We’ve never met him) but because he seems to typify the kind of “leader” who gets appointed (and confirmed) to a position of responsibility within the DoD—a man who takes credit for various initiatives without being able to actually point to any tangible improvements that resulted from those initiatives.
The kind of bureaucrat who splashes a lot in the pool, without actually moving any water.
Which is normal for a bureaucracy. If it can’t measure any output, it will focus intensely on measuring its inputs in order to justify itself. That’s just organizational psychology 101.
Again, we don’t know Mr. Kendall and he’s probably a fine man. It’s his policies we despise. And they may not even be his policies; but he’s certainly taking credit for them. So to us, that makes them his policies.
We have had cause to write many articles about Mr. Kendall’s efforts to reform DoD’s management of contractor’s independent research and development (IRAD or IR&D) efforts. We have been quite critical of those efforts. Among the many criticisms we have made, the most recent has been about DFARS rule changes that mandate a contractor must communicate its R&D intentions with a knowledgeable person within the DoD bureaucracy and then document that communication. Failure to communicate or to document the communication will lead to the DoD’s refusal to accept the contractor’s R&D expenditures as being allowable indirect costs used to calculate billing rates.
We were fairly scathing in our criticism, but we noted we were not alone in criticizing the rule. We predicted problems.
And then our predictions were confirmed as DCMA issued guidance to its contracting officers helping them deal with an apparent deluge of contractor questions, since certain technical fiefdoms within the Pentagon Fourth Estate refused to cooperate with the new rule’s implementation, even though the DAR Council had promised the public that they would do so.
And then another Fourth Estate fiefdom published a DFARS Class Deviation that acknowledged the new rule wasn’t working. Even though the rationale for the Class Deviation said contractors needed more time to implement the new requirements, anybody with half a brain understood the real problem was within DoD.
The DAR Council had promulgated a half-baked rule with requirements that could not be implemented. The DAR Council ignored public input that told them that would be the case. The DAR Council rushed through the rule-making process and ignored public input because Mr. Kendall had a policy initiative that he wanted to execute, and many if not most of the DAR Council reports (in one way or another) to Mr. Kendall. They were just following the boss’ orders.
And so here we are: Mr. Kendall just issued a personal letter defending his pet policy initiative and clarifying what he really meant. Let’s do some quoting, shall we?
By law and DoD policy, contractor IR&D investments are not directed by the Government. The intent of this rule is to promote transparency, communication, and dialog between IR&D participants and DoD, ensuring that both IR&D performers and their potential DoD customers have sufficient awareness of each other’s efforts and to provide industry with some feedback on the relevance of proposed IR&D work. To fulfill the technical interchange requirement, contractors should communicate with a knowledgeable DoD Government employee who is cognizant of related ongoing and potential future opportunities in the area of interest. Appropriate DoD Government employees include, but are not limited to, scientists/engineers or other subject matter experts working similar science and technology projects, acquisition officials working similar projects, and/or operators who might use the technology in a future fight, such as a Combatant Command official.
You can almost feel the exasperation, can’t you? Who cares what the rule says or your problems with implementation, it seems to say. Here’s what I meant it to say.
And yet … notice one key phrase in the above paragraph that seems to signal what’s really going on here. That phrase is “proposed IR&D work”. Mr. Kendall seems to assume that the contractors are “proposing” to undertake R&D efforts, which means that somebody, some “DoD Government employee” is reviewing a proposal and judging it. Well, that ain’t it at all. The reason that IRAD is “independent” is because contractors do not propose projects; they do not submit them for judgment. They undertake projects to advance their technology. Certainly, they do so with the expectations that their efforts may result in a future contract award; but oftentimes that doesn’t happen. Yet they do so anyway.
And here’s a little secret: when budgets are tight and contract awards don’t materialize as planned, contractors may not want to lay off their best and brightest scientists and engineers. Instead, they give them some IRAD money and tell them to get to work. It may work out or it may not, but the technical folks were kept busy doing something technical until the next contract materialized. How do you explain that fact to some Fourth Estate bureaucrat who’s protected by the civil service and the MSPB?
Here’s another quote from Mr. Kendall’s memo:
I would like to stress that this new IR&D rule merely codifies a long-standing practice that many Services and DoD agencies already use to engage industry on IR&D projects …
And that’s a ... misleading statement, of course. It’s a ... misleading statement because the new rule imposes new requirements and also imposes a penalty for failing to meet the new requirements, in the form of a cost disallowance. There is nothing “merely” about such a new rule and it’s disingenuous (at best) to suggest that’s the case.
Finally, Mr. Kendall admits that his fellow Fourth Estate colleagues aren’t cooperating with contractors seeking to comply with the new rule. He states that “we are developing an additional approach using the existing IR&D database hosted in the Defense Innovation Marketplace (http://www.defenseinnnovationmarketplace.mil/). By no later than 31 January 2017, DoD will implement an electronic process to facilitate this approach.”
Left unspoken is how contractors’ IRAD project information will be protected. Mr. Kendall’s memo didn’t address that concern.
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Subcontractor T&M Billings, Audit Findings, and Legal Problems
Oh, this is a good one. We love it when some of our assertions and opinions end up being supported, after the fact, by legal decisions.
A couple of caveats first. One: we are neither lawyers nor attorneys, neither barristers nor solicitors; we have no legal training whatsoever and we are not offering legal advice in this article. If you want legal advice, pay for it. Don’t get it from this blog. Second: we are going to discuss a recent Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) decision. Because we are not any kind of legal practitioners, we might be misinterpreting it. If you want a higher-confidence legal interpretation, see our first point. Also, because it’s an ASBCA decision, it is subject to appeal. The points we are about to discuss could be reversed by a higher court. Thus, while we think this is an important decision that reinforces and supports some of the assertions and opinions we’ve previously published on this blog site, keep in mind that it all might change months (or even years) from now.
Okay, then. On to the recent ASBCA decision in the matter of the appeal of Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems, Inc., ASBCA Nos, 59508 and 59509, decided 20 December 2016.
Bottom-line up-front: Lockheed successfully had the government’s demand for $116.8 million dismissed, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” As we will discuss, it was kind of like getting off on a technicality. The government’s reliance on the DCAA’s audit findings and audit positions fatally impaired its case. Had DCAA and the contracting officer done a better job of articulating their position(s), the result might well have been different.
This appeal concerned two LMIS contracts “CR2” and “S3”. (It was actually two appeals but they were consolidated. In fact, there seem to be three other appeals that were consolidated, for a total of five appeals, but those other three were “suspended pending the Board’s decision on the motions to dismiss” with respect to the two appeals at issue here.) The CR2 contract was a multiple-award ID/IQ contract that “contemplated the issuance of time-and-materials task orders and included on-site and off-site fully loaded labor rates for each Lockheed Martin segment and for each non-Lockheed Martin subcontractor.” It incorporated the T&M payment clause (52.232-07, 2002). The S3 contract was also a multiple-award ID/IQ contract that contained “time-and-material, cost, and firm-fixed-priced contract line item numbers (CLINs)” and provided for “fully loaded labor rates for each category of service.” The S3 also incorporated a T&M payment clause but it was the 2005 version of 52.232-7. Although the clause dates were different, Judge O’Sullivan, writing for the Board, found that “in relevant part” the two clauses were identical.
The Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) started auditing LMIS’ 2007 proposal to establish final billing rates (popularly but incorrectly called an “incurred cost submission”) in January 2014. The proposal was submitted for audit in August, 2008—meaning that DCAA waited nearly five and a half years to start the audit. (Note: the Contract Disputes Act gives the parties no more than six years after “claim accrual” to assert a claim; this was cutting it very close.) DCAA issued the audit report at the heart of this dispute a scant four and a half months after starting it—a startlingly quick turn-around time, given DCAA’s well-publicized statistics that indicate an average incurred cost audit takes the audit agency about three years to complete. How they completed their work in such record time is simple: they only audited part of the proposal—the least important part. The auditors only examined the LMIS’ claimed direct costs on its “flexibly priced” contracts. In other words, they looked at direct costs and issued a report in advance of opining on the allowability of claimed indirect costs, even though the entire freakin’ purpose of the annual proposal is to establish final billing rates, and the allowability of direct contract costs has absolutely no impact on the calculation of the indirect cost rates. But there you go. DCAA performed its (partial) work in record time and issued an audit report finding literally more than a hundred million dollars in “questioned” and “unresolved” costs related to LMIS’ subcontractor costs on the CR2 and S3 contracts.
Here’s the quoted DCAA audit finding:
We questioned $103,272,918 of claimed direct costs attributable to subcontracts and considered $173,623,920 of additional subcontract costs to be unresolved. The questioned amounts represent costs claimed at the subcontractor level that were questioned within assist audit reports received or as a result of the prime contractor's noncompliance with FAR 42.202, Assignment of Contract Administration, Paragraph (e), Subsection (2). These costs represent amounts incurred by the subcontractors and claimed by LMIS in its FY 2007 incurred cost submission.
Let’s break that down, as Judge O’Sullivan did:
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$102.5 million of CR2 subcontractor costs claimed by LMIS in its final billing rate proposal, consisting of $18.55 million of costs questioned in 29 individual assist audits (audits performed by other DCAA branches) on LMIS CR2 subcontractors plus $83.751 million of claimed subcontractor costs because LMIS failed to comply with the (alleged) requirements of FAR 42.202(e)(2), in that LMIS failed to obtain and or retain sufficient information to permit DCAA to perform meaningful audits of those subcontractors. (DCAA specifically identified subcontractor personnel resumes and timesheets as two pieces of information that LMIS failed to obtain and/or retain.) More on this latter point to follow ….
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$14.495 million of S3 subcontractor costs claimed by LMIS, consisting of $978,026 in questioned costs stemming from LMIS failure to comply with the alleged requirements of FAR 42.202(e)(2) and $13.5 million in “unresolved costs” that, apparently equated to questioned costs for some unstated reason.
Naturally, LMIS rebutted the audit findings. In its rebuttal, it noted that a single contractor was responsible for $13.9 million of the questioned costs but, because DCAA provided no details regarding exactly what costs were being questioned, LMIS could not comment on the appropriateness of the originally claimed or the auditor-questioned costs. With respect to differences between amounts claimed by LMIS in its annual proposal and amounts claimed by the subcontractors in their individual final billing rate proposals, LMIS also could not comment. As it noted, DCAA had refused to share any of the details because those details were considered by the subcontractors to be proprietary. With respect to differing amounts, LMIS commented:
Without insight into the values used in making this assessment, it is impossible to comment on the nature or validity of these values. DCAA also did not opine on what the differences may be; however, they also acknowledged that fiscal year timing could be a factor since the auditors did not have direct access to the submissions and relied solely on the values shown in the summary assist reports conducted by other DCAA offices. Based on the available facts, it is unreasonable to conclude that these costs are in any way inappropriate and unallowable.
DCAA tied much of its questioned costs to a position that LMIS failed to comply with a term of its contract, this falling afoul of the requirements of FAR 31.201-2(a)(4). The term that DCAA alleged LMIS failed to comply with was FAR 42.202(e)(2). As DCAA wrote—
Since the prime contractor did not properly manage its subcontracts in accordance with the FAR, we questioned the cost accordingly. The contractor failed to maintain necessary documents to substantiate they reviewed (i) resumes to assure for compliance with contract terms, and (ii) timesheets to assure the number of hours invoiced were supported.
Further, the contractor did not provide any records demonstrating that they attempted to cause the subcontractor to prepare an adequate submission or any requests to the Government for assistance if the subcontractor refused. A literal interpretation of FAR 42.202 requires the prime contractor to act on behalf of the Government and serve as both the Contracting Officer (CO) and the Contracting Administrative Office (CAO) for each subcontract that it awards under a Government flexibly priced contract. This includes the requirement for the prime contractor to audit their subcontracts or request audit assistance from the cognizant DCAA office when the subcontractor denies the prime contractor access to their records based on the confidentiality of propriety [sic] data. Since the Government did not have contract privy [sic] with the subcontractors, the Government could not force or compel the subcontractors to comply with the requirements set forth in their contract with the prime. …
Further, our audit evaluation determined that the prime contractor did not have proof of submissions or proof of requests for audit for any of the subcontractors we determined did not submit incurred cost submissions. Without an incurred cost submission from the subcontractor, the prime and DCAA are unable to audit their costs claimed. If the costs are not audited, we are unable to determine if the costs are allowable, reasonable, and allocable in accordance with FAR 31 … Since it is the prime contractor's responsibility to manage their subcontractors, we determined they are not properly managing subcontractors.
We could summarize DCAA’s audit position thusly: The auditors came in against the CDA Statute of Limitation time pressure. The auditors performed a half-assed job for which they, their Supervisory Auditors, and all levels of DCAA Management should be deeply embarrassed to have approved as a GAGAS-compliant audit report. They couldn’t do their actual auditing job as (DCAA’s unique interpretation of) GAGAS required them to, and so they took out their frustrations on the contractor. They cooked up a cockamamie theory that, somehow, every prime government contractor in America must require all subcontractors to submit annual proposals to establish final billing rates and then audit those proposals, or ask the Government to audit them. Notably, this was a legal conclusion made by an auditor regarding a regulatory interpretation not found in any DCAA audit program nor found within the DCAA Contract Audit Manual. Implied but not stated in DCAA’s manufactured theory of contractor management is that the subcontractors must obtain annual proposals from their lower-tier subcontractors, and so on and so forth, ad infinitum. It’s a clearly ridiculous theory and we wonder if LMIS had trouble writing their rebuttal as diplomatically as they did. LMIS wrote—
By the very nature of the incurred cost submissions, they often are developed at a business unit or segment level to substantiate indirect rates. As a result, that is not something we request from our subs due to the broad and proprietary nature of the data. Rather, we flow down the requirements to all applicable subcontracts and advise them of their responsibility to submit to DCAA all applicable schedules for compliance. Our management and due diligence over our subcontractors is related to their cost and performance relative to a specific program, as detailed in the procedures we previously provided. …
DCAA has not cited any FAR provisions, contract clauses, precedent or case law that counters this position to provide the basis for why they have determined this to be insufficient or a basis to question 100% of the subcontractor costs.
Three months after receipt of the DCAA audit report (and exactly one day before the CDA Statute of Limitations would come into play regarding submission of the proposal), the contracting officer issued a couple of Contracting Officer Final Decisions (COFDs), essentially slapping a cover letter on DCAA’s audit reports. The CO accepted DCAA’s position and rationale at face value. There was no evidence that the CO had weighed LMIS’ rebuttal, which was characterized as being “extensive.” Further, as Judge O’Sullivan noted, no rationale was provided in the COFD “for claiming entitlement to costs that the audit categorized as unresolved.” In other words, the “independent business judgment” that DCMA likes to think its contracting officers bring to the table was evidently missing in this case. (We note that independence in adjudicating disputes between government and contractor is a required element of the CO’s decision-making process, according to the Supreme Court of the United States. We have written about this situation here.)
LMIS appealed the COFDs, as any sane person would expect them to. You can hire quite a few attorneys when there is $100 million at stake. LMIS’ legal fees likely will be unallowable. That’s money that could have gone into LMIS’ IR&D programs to develop innovative technology for the warfighter, or that could have gone into hiring more subcontractor project management staff. Instead, it went to external attorneys. Sad. (We note that LMIS was very ably represented by the skilled government contracts attorneys at Dentons. We mean them no disrespect.)
And make no mistake, the whole notion that FAR 42.202(e)(2) means something as broad and far-reaching as DCAA and the DCMA contracting officer asserted is just nonsense. In fact, we wrote about the overreach in interpretation of that FAR sentence in this article. We wrote at the time—
We think this whole thing has gotten out of hand. A minor reminder to Contracting Officers that primes are responsible for managing their subcontractors (duh) has evolved into another way to question the adequacy of a contractor’s purchasing system, or to question incurred costs. Clearly, that’s not what the FAR drafters intended, but that seems to be where we are.
Judge O’Sullivan seemed to agree with our opinion, at least as the government presented it in this case. We are going to quote from her Decision extensively, because it is so important to understanding a prime’s duty to manage its subcontractors and we expect our readers may need to use some of her language in their own rebuttals to similar DCAA audit findings. She wrote—
The [Government’s] complaint offers no legal theory for its claim of disallowance nor does it provide any allegations of fact. It states conclusorily that there were questioned costs and some variances that entitle the government to disallow subcontract costs. Our pleading standard requires factual assertions beyond bare conclusory assertions to entitlement. The audit report, which was incorporated into the complaint, states that some assist audits questioned costs but does not explain on what grounds. It also states there were differences between amounts in LMIS's proposal and costs under subcontracts but provides no facts regarding these differences. More importantly, the COFD does not cite a single actual fact, only the audit report's unsupported conclusions. Neither the complaint nor the COFD contain sufficient factual (or legal) allegations, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. …
Notably, nowhere in either complaint or COFD does the government cite to a contract term giving rise to a contractual obligation or duty. As the government conceded in its briefs, FAR 42.202 is not a term of the contract. … Even though the government has conceded that FAR 42.202 is not a term of the contract, we find it to be relevant to this inquiry because the audit report, the COFDs, and the complaints (in other words, 100 percent of the documents that articulate the government's claim in both appeals), all rely on FAR 42.202 in describing the duty that LMIS allegedly breached. …
The subcontracts clause does not impose any express responsibility on the prime contractor to manage subcontracts after they are awarded. Nor do FAR Parts 42 and/or 44 impose any specific responsibilities on LMIS to manage its subcontractors, foremost because they were not incorporated by reference in either the S3 or the CR2 contract. But even if they had been, by their plain terms they do not impose the duties that DCAA, the CO, and the government in this appeal allege were breached. For instance, the alleged duty to maintain documents to substantiate that the contractor reviewed resumes to assure compliance with contract terms and timesheets to assure the number of hours invoiced were supported exists, but not as described by the government. The duty stems not from FAR 42.202(e) or any implied contract duty, but from FAR 52.232-7, the Payments under Time-and-Materials and Labor-Hour Contracts Clause … [but] there is no allegation in these appeals that LMIS did not comply with the requirements of FAR 52.232-7 which, we observe, does not require the contractor to maintain these kinds of substantiating records until DCAA is finished conducting incurred cost audits seven or so years after the costs were first billed and paid. …
The other duty alleged by DCAA and the government generally in these appeals to have been breached by LMIS is a duty to cause its subcontractors to submit incurred cost submissions directly to LMIS for audit, and request audits from DCAA if the subcontractors refuse. This duty is not to be found in any express term of the contract; nor is it to be found in FAR Parts 42 or 44. … the Board's reading of FAR Part 42 reveals no requirement (literal or implied) that a prime contractor act as both CO and CAO with respect to its subcontracts. Moreover, as we noted … the enumerated responsibilities of the CO and CAO in FAR Part 42 do not involve receipt or review of incurred cost submissions. That duty is reserved to DCAA or other cognizant audit agency by FAR 42.201. …
We reiterate here that the issue to be decided in these appeals is not whether a prime contractor has a generalized duty to manage its subcontracts. The issue is whether LMIS under the two contracts at issue in these appeals had the particular duties alleged by the government: to (1) retain documentation substantiating its 2007 invoices for subcontract direct labor hours; and (2) retain documentation showing it had caused its subcontractors to make incurred cost submissions and either audited those submissions or called on DCAA to audit those who refused to submit, so that the documentation could be reviewed by DCAA when it conducted its audit of FY 2007 incurred costs in 2014. …
In this case, we are presented with a claim based on a legal theory, originated by an auditor, that LMIS, as a prime contractor, had a contractual duty to retain for purposes of an incurred cost audit the same documentation that it used to substantiate its billings during the course of performance of the contract and, moreover, had a duty to initiate audits of its subcontractors' incurred costs and be able to prove during the course of an incurred cost audit that it did so. LMIS's ‘breach’ of these non-existent duties is the government's only basis for asserting that the subcontract costs for which it has reimbursed LMIS are unallowable costs. … [The Government] has gone forward with a claim for over $100,000,000 that is based on nothing more than a plainly invalid legal theory.
[Emphasis added.]
Government’s claim dismissed.
We realize this has been a long one but, before we move on, we need to discuss some other thoughts.
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Why did DCAA question more than $100 million of costs? Have they no shame? Well, if you think back a couple of years to 2013/2014/2015, you may recall that DCAA leadership was busy justifying its startling lack of productivity by touting the “quality” of its audits, as measured by questioned costs. The more costs questioned, the better the quality—at least, according to Fort Belvoir. We strongly suspect that the average DCAA auditor quickly got the message: management likes to see lots of questioned costs and never mind the evidentiary basis. Our explanation is speculative, of course. Still, it would explain why the Supervisory Auditor(s) and other DCAA management were happy to approve the audit report, even though it was largely based on a “plainly invalid legal theory.” We had some first-hand experience with that type of situation at about the same time; but that’s a story for another day.
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How can we reconcile our position that 42.202(e)(2) doesn’t impose a broad and far-reaching duty on the prime contractor to act in the government’s stead with respect to managing its subcontractors with our oft-stated position that the prime contractor is responsible for managing its subcontractors, and may be held liable for failing to take reasonable steps to assure subcontractor invoices are accurate and compliant? Easy. We are talking about program risk management. The prime must manage risks in its supply chain. Some of those risks involve invoices and payments and compliance with accounting and other administrative requirements imposed by the subcontract agreement, including flow-down clauses from the prime contract. As Vern Edwards recently posted in a public forum, a well-drafted subcontract will be based on all the requirements of the prime contract (not just the flow-down clauses); for every prime contract requirement imposed on the prime contractor that could be impacted by a subcontractor action or failure to act, there should be a subcontract term that imposes a duty to comply on the subcontractor. The responsibility to effectively manage subcontractors does not come from the FAR; it comes from the fact that the prime is responsible to its government customer for the outcome of the contract.
Further, we never asserted that the prime contractor has a duty to review a subcontractor’s final billing rate proposal; that’s just stupid. As Judge O’Sullivan noted, the only entity with that duty is DCAA or other government auditor. We never asserted that the prime has a duty to retain subcontractor invoice support documentation beyond the periods described in FAR Part 4. Of all the specific issues that DCAA raised, we never asserted that any of them were a part of the prime contractor’s duty of compliance.
Instead, we strongly believe that the prime contractor has a duty of risk management to assure the contractual outcomes to which it committed when it signed its government contract. Yes, it needs to make sure that any T&M invoices or cost-type vouchers submitted by its subcontractors comply with subcontract terms; but that is not at all the same as reviewing (and retaining) subcontractor resumes. One might address that risk through appropriate certification language, among other approaches.
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Finally, let’s note (as we did in the beginning) that LMIS got off on a technicality. It got off because the contracting officer slapped a cover page on the DCAA audit report without (apparently) thinking things through. Sure, there was a potentially looming CDA SoL deadline, but that should be no excuse for a shoddy COFD. As Judge O’Sullivan noted, had the government based its disallowance on a failure to comply with the requirements of the 52.232-7 T&M payment clause, it may have had a stronger case—perhaps strong enough to survive a motion to dismiss. But nobody, not the auditors or their supervisors, not the contracting officer, not the government attorneys—nobody thought to base their disallowance on an actual clause in the LMIS contracts. Sad.
Thanks for taking the time to read this article; we know it was a long one. We trust it was worth it.
The 2017 NDAA—What You Need to Know
From the public law that is the annual National Defense Authorization Act, signed by President Obama on 23 December 2016, springs future FAR and DFARS rule-making. Thus, a review of the NDAA gives some forewarning about future rules and rule revisions to come. As always, we rely heavily on Bob Antonio’s WIFCON analysis of Title VIII.
And as always, it’s a challenge to reconcile the House and Senate versions. Bob’s analysis provides them both. Any mistakes in interpretation are ours.
What is our opinion of the new public law? Well, let’s be diplomatic about it.
This year’s NDAA is a mixed bag. It contains much really bad law drafting, which is sure to lead to really bad future rule-making. It also has some nuggets of goodness mixed in with the bad. Overall, though, it’s not a good thing at all.
Remember that we are not reporting on the whole thing; the entire piece of legislation is massive. These are just the provisions that leap out at us, mostly from Title VIII and one bit at the end from Title IX. There are many more issues in the final document that is the formal public law, but it would take us a long time to wade through it all.
With that out of the way, let’s hold our collective noses and get started, shall we?
Section 820 establishes a new Defense Cost Accounting Standards Board. We agree that the current CASB, housed in the OFPP (which is housed in the OMB, which is under the White House), has been pathetic over the past four or more years. We’ve posted our opinion on the CASB’s inaction more than once. Still, WTF? Do we really need two of these things?
The duties of the Defense CASB include:
(1) ensure that the cost accounting standards used by Federal contractors rely, to the maximum extent practicable, on commercial standards and accounting practices and systems; (2) within one year after the date of enactment of this subsection, and on an ongoing basis thereafter, review any cost accounting standards established under section 1502 of this title and conform such standards, where practicable, to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles; and (3) annually review disputes involving such standards brought to the boards established in section 7105 of this title or Federal courts, and consider whether greater clarity in such standards could avoid such disputes.
Yeah, there’s no conflict of interest there. We are sure that the new DCASB and the old CASB will align and collaborate well together. (Note: That was sarcasm.)
The House version included the following amendment, which we believe would be carried forward into the final public law:
The House … would … improve the government-wide Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) and require that Federal Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) be reconciled, to the extent possible, with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The amendment also would require the CASB to hire an executive director and meet at least quarterly to reduce inconsistencies between CAS and GAAP, as well as address problems identified by cases presented to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals and Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. … the head of a Federal agency [may] waive the application of the CAS for contracts valued at less than $100.0 million. The amendment also would retain the Senate proposal to create a Defense Cost Accounting Standards Board, but would authorize the new board to advise the CASB, oversee implementation of CAS within the Department of Defense, and ensure that managerial cost accounting is appropriately implemented for commercial functions performed by employees of the Department. The conferees also encourage the Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to examine the potential for electronic quality management systems to improve the ability of DCAA to conduct thorough and timely audits.
[Emphasis added.]
See that part in italics, the part we emphasized? What does that even mean? What does “oversee the implementation of CAS within the Department of Defense” mean and how is that any different from the now long-defunct DoD CAS Working Group?
None of the above is any good for contractors, except perhaps for the creation of a new CAS exemption for any/all contracts valued at less than $100 million. We’ll have to see whether it will be the new Defense CASB or the old OFPP CASB that takes the lead in revising the FAR Part 99 CAS regulations as Congress directed. As the old OFPP CASB (henceforth: “OCASB”) has done nothing in the past several years, we expect the new DCASB to take the lead, because somebody has to.
Section 822 does something to competition requirements. Based on the Section title, one assumes the intent was to enhance competition. Let us know if you see how the following language will enhance competition.
FAR 15.403-1(b)(1) currently establishes that a contracting officer is prohibited from obtaining certified cost or pricing data when certain listed circumstances are present. Among those listed circumstances is the following: “The contracting officer shall not require certified cost or pricing data to support any action (contracts, subcontracts, or modifications) … to support a determination of a fair and reasonable price or cost realism) … When the contracting officer determines that prices agreed upon are based on adequate price competition ….”
The phrase “adequate price competition” is a term of art that is defined at FAR 15.401-1(c)(1). That FAR subparagraph identifies various circumstances that would create “adequate price competition”. Thus, to know if you have adequate price competition you have to read that subparagraph to see if your circumstances qualify. If they do qualify, then not only are you exempt from the requirement to provide certified cost or pricing data, but the contracting officer is actually prohibited from requiring it.
The 2017 NDAA directs the FAR Councils to revise the current language of FAR 15.402-1(b)(1) as follows:
“Submission of certified cost or pricing data shall not be required … in the case of a contract, a subcontract, or modification of a contract or subcontract for which the price agreed upon is based on … competition that results in at least two or more responsive and viable competing bids …. “
In other words, the term of art “adequate price competition,” which previously had been defined by the FAR, has been replaced with a single set of circumstances. The other circumstances previously defined by FAR 15.401-1(c)(1) no longer seem to lead to a determination that there is adequate price competition. If we’ve interpreted the change correctly, this is really bad news for contractors. On the other hand, the other listed circumstances may continue to apply, and the changes may only apply to the first set if circumstances. That would be better. We’ll have to see which way it goes.
In addition, Section 822 also clarifies that the prime contractor is responsible for applying the FAR criteria to its subcontract awards, and thus determining whether or not it needs to obtain certified cost or pricing data for its own cost/price analyses. The language also clarifies that the government has the right to review those determinations. Frankly, we don’t see this as much of a change. From our point of view, the prime was always responsible for those determinations and the government always had the right of review (through CPSR, if nothing else).
Section 823 appears to clarify when the executive compensation ceiling amounts are to be applied. If we are interpreting it correctly, it eliminates the retroactive implementation. That’s some good news.
Section 824 requires both contractors and DCAA to separately report IR&D and B&P expenses—i.e., separately from other claimed allowable costs. In addition, it requires the DoD to establish a goal that limits reimbursement of contractor B&P expenses on cost-type contracts to not more than 1 percent of that contractor’s revenue; however, the DoD cannot accomplish this by making excess B&P reimbursements unallowable. Instead, if the DoD finds itself reimbursing excessive contractor B&P costs, it must figure out why. This language is going to require contractors to do separate reporting on their expenditures—in addition to the current burdens placed on them in 2016 (which we have written about fairly extensively).
Section 831 reinforces the FASA concept that the DoD should be using performance-based payments instead of cost-based progress payments as the preferred form of contract financing. That’s a bit of a joke, isn’t it? The DoD has worked very hard to move away from PBPs over the past few years and we don’t see any reason that’s going to change in 2017, no matter what Congress may direct.
Section 851 establishes that the DoD may count first and second tier subcontract awards in reporting progress in meeting its socioeconomic reporting goals. To us, this means that contractors will have some additional reporting burdens.
Section 861 directs the DoD to establish “program management” as a separate discipline from “acquisition management” – which is a very very good thing indeed.
Section 893 makes significant changes to the contractor business system rules. As we interpret the language, it establishes the following:
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Publicly traded contractors that must comply with Sarbanes-Oxley, for which they hire external CPAs to test compliance with SOX Section 404, may also use their external CPAs to test their compliance with contractor business system requirements. If the external CPAs express an opinion that the contractor meets the requirements, then those business systems need not be further audited by the DoD.
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Contractors not subject to full CAS coverage have long been exempted from compliance with the contractor business system requirements. In addition, contractors that generate less than one percent of sales from the U.S. Government are now also exempted.
If we interpret the foregoing correctly, it means that certain contractors may benefit but other contractors will still be in the same business system boat.
Finally, as we reported would be the case, it seems that the 2017 NDAA has directed the disbandment of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics). Section 901 replaces the existing OSD organization with two new Under Secretariats: the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD R&E) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD A&S). There is also a new Chief Management Officer (CMO).
We have no fondness for the current USD (AT&L). We have tracked Mr. Kendall’s initiatives for some time, for at least six years. In particular, we noted his attempts to take credit for the “S2T2” initiative, which turned out to be nothing at all. See our opinions of that effort here. More recently, his role in killing efforts to save as much as $125 billion in Pentagon overhead costs was well documented by the Washington Post, and we commented on it as well. Still, we wish him well in his new endeavors.
Similarly, whatever respect we may have once had for the Directorates reporting to the USD (AT&L) has withered away over the past 15 years or so. Pretty much since the time when DPAP refocused its mission on “procurement and acquisition policy” instead of acquisition reform. We look to DPAP and other Directorates for leadership; but what we find instead is bureaucrats defending the existing status quo. See our article on the many recent acquisition reform disappointments for more on this topic.
The USD (AT&L) organization has made token efforts over the years to improve acquisition outcomes. “Should-cost” and “Better Buying Power” are two initiatives that come to mind. Yet, in our view those efforts have been much about trying and not very much about doing. In other words, the taxpayers haven’t received much in the way of promised benefits. So we say: let’s try this again with a new organization. Perhaps we’ll get a different, and better, outcome.
There is much more to say about the 2017 NDAA but this is enough words for now. As always, we encourage readers to go see the legislation for themselves.
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