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Apogee Consulting Inc

This ASBCA Decision is Interesting

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Technology Systems, Inc. (TSI) was a small business. (We say “was” because the company is no longer operating.) It had been a government contractor since 1987. It received and performed cost-type contracts. Accordingly, it was required to invoice only allowable direct and indirect costs. Further, TSI was required to calculate its invoices using provisional billing rates that were intended to approximate the billing rates it would calculate at year end, when the books closed. Additionally, TSI was required to submit a proposal to establish final billing rates; that proposal would be audited by DCAA and eventually DCMA would negotiate the final billing rates based on the audited proposal.

(This is all rather humdrum. It’s how these things work. But we note them because some small businesses simply do not have a clue about it. For them, the foregoing may well be a revelation.)

The DCAA audit history of TSI’s annual proposal to establish final billing rates is interesting. DCAA conducted a “full audit” of Fiscal Years 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. With respect to FY 2001, DCAA questioned some claimed consultants’ costs because TSI failed to provide the auditors with “actual work product.” However, no costs were questioned—none at all—with respect to TSI’s FY 2002 and 2003 proposals. Based on the lack of questioned costs (which meant that TSI was considered to be a low-risk contractor), DCAA performed a “desk review” of TSI’s FY 2004 and 2005 proposals instead of a full audit. (We have voiced our opinion regarding this innovative DCAA audit approach several times on this blog.) With respect to FY 2006, DCAA performed another “full” audit and, again, found no questioned costs.

Which brings us to FY 2007.

TSI submitted its proposal to establish final billing rates on time, in June, 2008. The DCAA audit began a couple of months later. (This was back in the time when DCAA performed timely audits of such proposals; within a year from TSI's submission date, DCAA would make a management decision to stop performing “incurred cost” audits for several years, resulting in an embarrassingly large audit backlog. Again: something we’ve discussed many times on this blog.) Apparently one of the two auditors assigned to TSI was difficult to work with and TSI requested that she be replaced with somebody more “objective.” The request was declined. (This was back in the time when a contractor complaint about an auditor was considered to be somewhat of a merit badge. See our discussion of that situation—and how it has evolved—here.) Which is neither here nor there, because the audit was completed and a draft report was submitted in April, 2009, for a “peer review.” It had been less than one year since TSI had submitted its proposal. That’s how quickly DCAA worked back then.

The draft report, as submitted, questioned more than $360,000 in direct and indirect costs. TSI’s claimed overhead rate had been reduced by more than one-third. TSI’s claimed G&A rate had been reduced by more than one-third. And TSI’s claimed Material Overhead rate had been reduced to zero. Yes, that’s correct. 100 percent of the claimed Material Overhead indirect costs had been questioned by DCAA. That seems unusual. It would be interesting to see how the draft audit report fared in its “peer review.”

But by that time, DCAA had stopped performing such audits and the “peer review” was never completed. The draft audit report languished in limbo for a full four years, until April, 2013. Another auditor was assigned at that time, and spent another four months reviewing the work papers, before concluding that more information was required.

Then another DCAA auditor was assigned. (For those keeping count, this would now make four individual auditors assigned to this single ICP audit of a small business.) Another eight months passed.

Finally, in March 2014—five years and nine months after TSI had submitted its original proposal—DCAA formally notified DCMA that it was withdrawing from the audit, primarily because it was unable to complete additional transaction testing of TSI’s direct labor rates by the agreed-upon audit due date. The expanded testing was a result of TSI’s complaint to its Congressional Representative and/or Senator about DCAA’s conduct. This would seem to be a rather punitive response. Regardless, the testing was expanded but that meant that the audit would not be completed in time, so DCCA admitted failure and handed the resolution over to DCMA.

As part of its hand-off, DCAA provided the DCMA contracting officer with a “Decrement Memo” that expressly was not based on anything that complied with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS). Apparently that was an okay thing to do: once DCAA had withdrawn from its audit assignment it was (apparently) no longer required to comply with GAGAS.

The Decrement Memo that was not compliant with GAGAS requirements recommended indirect rates that DCMA should use to negotiate TSI’s FY 2007 final billing rates. The recommended rates were higher than those in the draft audit report. Among other things, no costs were questioned with respect to TSI’s claimed Material Overhead rate. Yes, that’s correct. Instead of questioning 100 percent of the claimed indirect costs, DCAA was now questioning zero percent. Almost as if the draft audit report had been wrong. Indeed, the fourth auditor explained to DCMA that he was not taking the same “hard line” that the original auditor had taken. Almost as if the original auditor had been less than objective, as TSI had feared she might be.

DCMA opened negotiations by offering not to assess any penalties on TSI if it would accept DCAA’s decremented rates. TSI declined and attempted to rebut DCAA’s position by claiming, among other things, that DCAA was questioning costs that had never been questioned in the past. DCMA’s position was established as follows:

We understand your argument that DCAA has historically not questioned these costs; however, that does not mean DCAA deems those costs to be allowable. We here at DCMA cannot speak for the DCAA auditor(s) that performed the reviews, nor can we speak for the sampling methodology used by DCAA. Our job will be to address the audit as written. If you are able to substantiate the costs with the required documentation, we will reinstate the costs. If not, we have to sustain the costs.

(Emphasis added.)

See that part in italics above? See how DCAA’s “Decrement Memo” that was expressly not an audit nor an attestation opinion, and expressly did not comply with GAGAS, became an audit in the mind of the DCMA contracting officer? That right there is one of the big problems in this business. Contracting officers aren’t trained to know the difference between an audit and a non-audit, and so they treat all opinions by DCAA as being of equal weight. To be sure, it was incumbent on TSI to point that out to the CO, but it was also the CO’s responsibility to understand that the recommended rates in that Decrement Memo had about as much substance behind them as a Potemkin village. (Go look up that reference.)

Negotiations ensued but the parties could not reach agreement. Finally, in late June, 2014—literally five days before the CDA Statute of Limitations would come into play—the contracting officer issued a COFD and asserted a government claim for $159,303. TSI appealed to the ASBCA.

What makes this story so interesting is that there was a dissenting opinion at the Board. Judge Clarke—the individual who actually heard the appeal—dissented from the majority decision. We’ll discuss the different viewpoints in the remainder of this article.

There were many elements of cost questioned by DCAA and, ultimately, sustained by the DCMA contracting officer. We are not going to recite all of them; instead, we are going to focus on the ones that may present lessons to our readership.

Consultants

Expenses for two marketing consultants were disallowed because of a lack of work product. (See FAR 31.205-33(f). This is a common finding that requires some good audit support tactics to overcome.) To be clear, there was an agreement in place and there were detailed invoices. However, the third prong of the requirements was allegedly missing. The majority decision found that the work was performed via telephone and no work product should have been required. (In fairness, had the executive receiving the marketing support kept notes from the conversations, this never would have been an issue in the first place.) The majority also found that “the details contained in the … invoices are adequate to support a finding that [the consultant] worked the hours charged.” The questioned costs were found to be allowable by the majority because the FAR requirements were complied with.

In his dissent, Judge Clarke stated that he would have sustained TSI’s appeal, based on a “course of conduct” between DCAA and TSI that had been established in the previous audits. Suddenly, DCAA changed its mind with respect to the required transaction support, without giving TSI adequate notice. This sudden change, he found, was equivalent to a prohibited retroactive disallowance. On the other hand, the majority rejected that finding, and stated that the retroactive disallowance prohibition was based on an estoppel argument that required evidence of bad faith on the government’s part. (Apparently the documented animus exhibited by the first DCAA auditor was insufficient to show bad faith.)

We think that contractors who engage consultants need to be aware of the FAR requirements in that area, and be prepared to show a government auditor how they are complying with those requirements. Indeed, we’ve written about those requirements.

Executive Bonuses

Three TSI executives were paid bonuses in FY 2007, pursuant to a one-page incentive compensation plan. However, the company failed to track the metrics discussed in the plan, and thus the awards lacked support. The majority decision found that the executive bonuses were unallowable. The majority wrote—“We agree with the government that TSI's executive bonus plan was too amorphous in its criteria for bonus award and subject to too unfettered discretion in its application to permit the inclusion of its costs in the ICP. … when an executive bonus plan lacks measurable metrics and is essentially subject to the unfettered discretion of those who would benefit from it … its costs are not compensable.”

The dissent by Judge Clarke would have allowed the bonuses. He found that there was a bona fide bonus plan—albeit of one page—and that it was reasonably followed. He found that TSI’s course of conduct with respect to its executive bonuses was reasonable for a company of less than 20 employees.

Unfortunately, the lesson to be learned here is that the requirements of the compensation cost principle at 31.205-6(f) will be strictly enforced, even as applied to small businesses. Companies that have incentive compensation should have a written plan that is consistently followed. Incentive compensation awards should be documented and supported. There should be no question as to why Employee A received the award she did and why Employee B received a different amount. This is a hard thing to understand and to do, because it’s such a closely-guarded process at most companies. How much IC is given to any individual is something that is simply not shared, except within the smallest possible group. That fact being acknowledged, somebody within that group needs to document and support the actual award amounts.

Subcontract Costs

TSI awarded several T&M subcontracts without first obtaining consent from the contracting officer, as required by the FAR contract clause 52.244-2. Because advance consent was never obtained, and because the information supporting TSI’s determination that the prices it was paying to its subcontractors was fair and reasonable was not available, the costs were disallowed by the majority.

As was the case with the consultant costs, Judge Clarke would have allowed the subcontractor costs because of the parties’ prior course of dealing, in which such costs had never been disallowed even though TSI had similarly failed to obtain advance consent for them.

The majority decision is a bit murky in this area, but apparently a failure to obtain consent was equated by DCAA, DCMA, and the Board as being equal to a CO challenge that the awarded price was not fair and reasonable. We don’t really understand that equivalence; to us it seems to be conflating two separate concepts. Can the costs be questioned solely on the basis that the contractor failed to comply with the advance consent requirements? We don’t see why not (though there may be a quantum meruit defense available). In other words, a contractor can have airtight documentation regarding price reasonableness, but if it fails to obtain advance consent when required to do so, it may be putting those costs at risk. We do not understand how the majority got from consent to price reasonableness—though that could just be our lack of understanding, since we lack legal training. Regardless, we have warned our readers that DCAA will challenge subcontractor costs when the price reasonableness is not supported—and here is another example of that principle in action.

Statute of Limitations

There was some discussion about the CDA Statute of Limitations. As noted above, the COFD was within the six-year clock—assuming the clock started when the FY 2007 final billing rate proposal was submitted. In fact, many recent ASBCA decisions tend to elide that date in favor of the date when the government had notification that disputed indirect costs were actually incurred and claimed as allowable indirect costs—i.e., when transaction detail is provided. That does not need to be the date of the audit commencement. For instance, if the contractor submits general ledger transaction detail along with the proposal, that would seem to be sufficient to start the SoL clock. That being said, both the majority and the dissent found that the COFD was issued within the CDA Statute of Limitations.

What was not discussed was whether the disallowance of the subcontractor costs was time-barred. This is a curious omission, because recent ASBCA decisions have distinguished direct from indirect costs with respect to the start of the Statute of Limitations. See, e.g., Sparton deLeon Springs. That appeal involved a disallowance of intra-organizational transfer costs (i.e., direct costs) that were insufficiently supported. Judge McIlmail, writing for the Board with no dissent, found that the SoL clock started running when the government paid the interim vouchers that included the disputed direct costs. He wrote: “… the government's overpayment claim is based upon the contention that Jackson costs were ‘insufficiently supported’, and that, according to the contracting officer, there is no proof that [the contractor] paid those costs in connection with any government contract. However, if that is true, it was no less so … when the government paid those costs pursuant to the interim vouchers.” It is puzzling, if not disturbing, to see that line of reasoning not being addressed by either the majority or the dissenting opinion.

To wrap this article up, there is much to criticize about the story of the DCAA, DCMA, and TSI. The approach taken by DCAA was, to our eyes, unprofessional at best. DCMA’s reliance on a non-GAGAS non-opinion as a Bible-solid position that could not be ignored without irrefutable evidence from the contractor was, in our view, misplaced. The DCMA contracting officer had much more discretion available; though of course many contracting officers are afraid to use their discretion these days, since DCAA has a tendency to whine to the DoD Inspector General when their positions are not sustained. Finally, this decision may really undercut the previously solid doctrine that the government cannot engage in retroactive disallowance.

This is another important ASBCA decision that merits close scrutiny by those engaged in the practice of government contract compliance.

 

Internal Control Breakdown

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nci-logoIt is a recurring theme on this blog that internal controls are investments that pay for themselves. In fact, we often assert that internal controls have a return on investment that is easily quantifiable and shows that they are a very smart investment. Today, we return to that theme with further evidentiary support for our assertions.

We want to talk about NCI, Inc., a Beltway IT service provider that generates north of $300 million in annual sales. Revenues are 100 percent sales to the US Government. Defense and Intelligence Agencies make up 60% of sales, while other Federal civilian agencies make up the other 40 percent. 92% of revenues come from prime contracts. (Source: 2015 Annual Report.) You might say that NCI, Inc. is the quintessential government contractor.

NCI, Inc. is also a publicly traded company. It trades on the NASDAQ; ticker symbol NCIT. As such, the company is subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and is thus required to comply with Section 302 of that Act. Pursuant to Section 302, the 2015 Form 10-K included the following statement:

Management is responsible for establishing and maintaining adequate control over financial reporting. Management used the criteria established by COSO in Internal Controls—Integrated Framework (2013) to assess the effectiveness of our internal controls over financial reporting. Based upon the assessments, our management has concluded that as of December 31, 2015, our internal control over financial reporting was effective.

Further, pursuant to Section 404 of that Act, the 2015 Form 10-K included the following statement from the company’s auditors (Deloitte & Touche LLP)—

In our opinion, the Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2015, based on the criteria established in Internal Control—Integrated Framework (2013) issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.

All of which is precursor to the very recent press release by NCI, Inc., announcing that it had begun an internal investigation into the actions of its (now former) controller. Let’s quote from the press release:

… based upon preliminary findings, [NCI, Inc.] has discovered that its controller, acting alone, embezzled money from the Company. The employment of the controller has been terminated, and the Company has commenced an internal investigation with the help of outside counsel and forensic accountants.

While the investigation is ongoing, the Company believes that its former controller embezzled approximately $18 million over the last six years. NCI is working with legal counsel and cooperating with federal authorities to determine the best course of action from a legal, regulatory and recovery perspective, and will provide further information as soon as practicable. …

Of the estimated $18 million of embezzled funds, the Company believes that approximately $5 million was taken during 2016 and the remaining $13 million was taken over the prior five years. The Company’s preliminary findings indicate that these funds were reflected as expenses in the Company’s financial statements. These expenses were treated as allowable indirect costs on its government contracts but should have been classified as unallowable costs. …

In addition, as part of the investigation, the Company is reviewing its internal controls over financial reporting. Although the investigation is ongoing, the Company believes that material weaknesses existed in its internal controls during the relevant periods during which the embezzlement occurred. As a result of these weaknesses, investors, analysts and other persons should not rely on management’s reports on internal controls over financial reporting or the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm’s audit reports on the effectiveness of the Company’s internal controls over financial reporting filed with the Company’s Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2015. The Company is implementing steps to strengthen its internal controls and to remediate the weaknesses that it has identified.

(Emphasis added.)

On the day that NCI, Inc. reported the news its share price dropped from a high of $13.95 per share to $12.50 per share, a decrease of more than 10 percent in one day. (It has since rebounded back to $12.65 per share, which is hardly good news to investors.)

This is clearly a disaster for the company. It cannot possibly reflect well on management or on the auditors. (We should note here that we don’t yet know how this scheme came to light. It might well have been discovered by management or by the auditors during their 2016 reviews.) The company may be facing shareholder suits as well as SEC fines and penalties. That internal investigation, which includes outside counsel and forensic accountants, is going to be expensive. Deloitte may have to face some tough questions from the PCAOB. It’s not going to be fun for anybody, to include the ex-controller, who may well end up facing criminal charges.

But that’s not the real problem here. The real problem is the government contract compliance issues that come along with this story.

The story in the press release is that the controller (allegedly) embezzled $18 million over a period of six years, and recorded the embezzled funds as allowable indirect expenses. Those allowable indirect expenses became the basis of the company’s billing rates. Those billing rates were used to prepare invoices to the US Government. (Remember, 100 percent of the company’s sales were to US Government Agencies.) Each one of those invoices was prepared with billing rates that were inflated (to some unknown extent) by imaginary allowable indirect costs—indirect costs that did not exist in reality. Thus, each one of those invoices submitted over a six year period is a potential false claim. This situation could end up being very expensive for the company (though we expect they will end up settling for some percentage of the liability).

Further, those rates were used to price contracts. Some of those contracts were firm, fixed-price. Thus, to some (unknown) extent, those firm, fixed-price contracts were priced using inflated rates. That means they were over-priced and should be adjusted downwards. That will be expensive.

But that’s not all.

In order to receive cost-type contracts, NCI, Inc., is required to have an adequate accounting system. DCAA may have performed a pre-award or post-award accounting system review on NCI, Inc.--it would be surprising if they had not done so. A company's accounting system’s adequacy is documented on a form SF 1408. According to the SF1408 (and DCAA's accounting system evaluation audit program) one of the key requirements of an adequate accounting system is to segregate allowable from unallowable costs. Thus, NCI just put its accounting system adequacy at risk. If the accounting system goes, the ability to win future cost-type contracts is at risk.

At a minimum, we expect DCAA to be making a number of visits to this contractor in order to evaluate the company’s internal controls and other procedures, in order to assess the risk of a future recurrence. The company may need to hire additional staff to support the audits.

We do not know how the controller executed his scheme. However, the fact that he got away with the scheme for more than five years points to one or more internal control weaknesses that existed despite management’s assertion to the contrary, and despite the external auditor’s independent review. It’s going to be very, very, expensive to remedy those weaknesses, to deal with investigators and auditors and attorneys, and to make the government whole from inflated bids and invoices.

As an alternative to the pain about to be experienced by NCI, Inc., may we suggest investing in making sure your company’s internal controls are top-notch?

In related news, on January 25, 2017, Lockheed Martin reported that “it expects to report a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation in its 2016 annual report at the end of February.” According to the report (link above), Lockheed Martin reported that—

… its management had determined that Sikorsky did not ‘adequately identify, design and implement appropriate process-level controls for its processes and appropriate information technology controls for its information technology systems.’ Its internal control over financial reporting was, therefore, ‘ineffective’ as of Dec. 31, 2016 …”

Readers may remember that LockMart purchased Sikorsky from United Technologies Corporation in 2015. When Sikorsky was part of UTC, the external auditors (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP) did not report any material internal control weaknesses.

Internal controls: a wise investment in avoidance of many problems.

Think about it.

 

 

Stuff We Forgot to Say

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The recent article about Lockheed Martin Integrated System’s appeal of an egregiously bad Contracting Officer’s Final Decision, which was based on an egregiously bad DCAA audit “finding,” proved to be a fairly popular article, even though it was egregiously long and included lots of commentary. We suggest you follow the link and read that article before continuing with this one, since we will be making points that assume familiarity and knowledge of that decision.

For those of you who are just too lazy to click on the link and read the article—or who did but gave up because it was so freakin’ long—then here’s a quick summary of the issues:

DCAA did what was obviously a half-assed audit of LMIS’ claimed subcontract costs. Because DCAA waited nearly six years to perform its audit, much of the records and supporting data that it would have liked to use didn’t exist anymore (if they ever had). DCAA issued an audit report that claimed LMIS had overstated its claimed subcontract costs on “flexibly priced” prime contracts by $103.3 million, mostly because of a “legal theory, originated by an auditor,” that LMIS had somehow violated some contractual duty that was not actually in its contract. The DCAA auditor’s legal theory was accepted and approved by their Supervisory Auditor, even though there was no basis in the DCAA Contract Audit Manual for taking such a position. The audit report was reviewed and approved by the Branch Manager and perhaps by the Regional Audit Manager (and perhaps by others) as being a legitimate and GAGAS-compliant audit report, even though there was zero evidentiary support for “conclusions” being expressed. The cognizant ACO accepted the DCAA audit report as being correct, even though LMIS provided an “extensive” rebuttal that should have persuaded a reasonable and reasonably independent adjudicator, and even though the ACO decided (for some unexplained reason) that “unresolved costs” somehow equated to “questioned costs.” The attorneys assigned to the case thought they had a winnable position. The entire cast of characters on the government’s side of the case was … mistaken in their beliefs.

As Judge O’Sullivan wrote in her decision: The Government “has gone forward with a claim for over $100,000,000 that is based on nothing more than a plainly invalid legal theory.” (Emphasis added.)

We added some thoughts of our own at the end of the original article and we thought that was that. But upon reflection, we think we should have said more. There was too much stuff we left unsaid. Thus, this article corrects the omissions, and says more stuff.

About DCAA

  1. The audit report in question is problematic. It is really, really problematic. If you remember back to 2008 and 2009, DCAA was under fire by GAO and DoDOIG for really bad audit reports. The quality of the audit reports was poor and there were Congressional hearings discussing how bad they were. Since then, DCAA has worked hard to improve its audit quality. This particular audit report shows how far DCAA still has to go. There were a number of issues raised in the GAO and DoD OIG reports, but the main issue—the most fundamental issue—was that DCAA was reaching conclusions (and changing conclusions) without sufficient evidentiary support. GAGAS required evidentiary support for conclusions. Ergo, DCAA was not complying with GAGAS. This particular LMIS audit report was issued in the middle of 2014—a full five years (at least) after the audit agency refocused its efforts on audit quality. The audit report contained conclusions without sufficient evidentiary support. As Judge O’Sullivan wrote: “The [Government’s] complaint offers no legal theory for its claim of disallowance nor does it provide any allegations of fact. It states conclusorily that there were questioned costs and some variances that entitle the government to disallow subcontract costs. Our pleading standard requires factual assertions beyond bare conclusory assertions to entitlement. The audit report, which was incorporated into the complaint, states that some assist audits questioned costs but does not explain on what grounds. It also states there were differences between amounts in LMIS's proposal and costs under subcontracts but provides no facts regarding these differences. More importantly, the COFD does not cite a single actual fact, only the audit report's unsupported conclusions.” (Emphasis added.) In a nutshell, this is the same complaint expressed by GAO and DoDOIG regarding DCAA audit quality in 2008. It is the same complaint aired in Congressional hearings at that time. It is the same complaint that DCAA vowed to fix. It is the same complaint that led to the revamping of DCAA’s entire approach to audit procedures. Given the obvious fact that this audit report was egregiously non-compliant with GAGAS, how can DCAA leadership claim, with a straight face, that anything has changed at the audit agency?

  2. The math is wrong. Assuming, arguendo, that DCAA was correct and that LMIS had overstated its claimed subcontract costs by $100 million or so, then that would mean that LMIS’ G&A expense allocation base was overstated by that same amount (assuming that LMIS allocated G&A to its subcontract costs, which it would under a Total Cost Input allocation base). If LMIS reduced its G&A expense allocation base by $100 million, that would increase its G&A rate. (Numerator stays the same; denominator shrinks; indirect cost rate goes up). That increased G&A rate, allocated to the exact same “flexibly priced” government contracts from which DCAA was questioning claimed subcontractor costs, would tend to offset some of that $100 million. So the correct government claim would be less than $100 million because of the offset of the G&A allocation increase. How much less? We don’t know. But some; perhaps a lot. Apparently, the DCAA audit report didn’t calculate such an offset. Either LMIS didn’t allocate G&A expense to its subcontractors (possible), or else DCAA was in such a hurry to generate questioned costs for HQ to report to Congress that nobody stopped to think about the math.

About Prime Contractors

  1. We have reported several issues connected with T&M subcontracts. Prime contractors have been accused of violating the False Claims Act (along with their subcontractors) when subcontractor personnel failed to meet the labor category qualifications of the T&M subcontract. Here, we have unfounded DCAA allegations that amounted to a lot of money and that required litigation to solve, connected with T&M prime and/or subcontracts. As Judge O’Sullivan correctly noted, there are very specific, expressly listed, support requirements connected with T&M prime and subcontractors. (See 52.232-7.) A prime contractor can avoid substantial audit and litigation risk—not to mention burdensome compliance requirements—simply by avoiding issuance of T&M subcontracts. At this point, if a prime is going to be issuing a T&M subcontract, there had better be a compelling business reason. Because if there is no compelling business reason then it would seem to be a really bad idea.

  2. Further to that thought, it would seem to be less risky to issue a pure cost-type subcontract than it would be to issue a T&M type subcontract. But wait! Doesn’t issuance of a cost-type subcontract require the subcontractor to have an adequate accounting system? Yes; sure. But what makes you think issuing a T&M type subcontract alleviates that need? Bottom-line is that the subcontractor needs to have an accounting system adequate to meet the requirements of the subcontract; T&M subcontracts carry their own requirements and therefore the subcontractor’s accounting system needs to be adequate to meet them. More to the point, the accounting system requirements for a T&M subcontract would not seem to be significantly different from the requirements for a cost-type subcontract. If you are going to be issuing T&M subcontracts you had better make sure that the subcontractor can meet the requirements. All of them. And you had better be prepared to manage that subcontractor to ensure that it is meeting them.

So that’s all the stuff that we remembered we forgot to say. We are now at some 4,500 or so words on one legal decision. We trust it’s been worth the read(s).

 

At Hanford, It Must be Something in the Water

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Readers may recall one or two articles discussing allegations of endemic and systemic timekeeping fraud at the Department of Energy’s Hanford site. A website search of our News Archive using the term “Hanford” yields 10 results. They are not all about timekeeping/labor charging issues. Still, the $19 million settlement payment by one contractor related to allegations of timekeeping fraud led to more than one story.

Well, today we are back with yet another story of a legal settlement related to allegations of timekeeping fraud by a Hanford site contractor. We’re convinced it must be something in the water up there that leads to such issues. Certainly it can’t be the culture, can it?

Washington River Protection Solutions LLC (WRPS) was awarded a contract from DOE for environmental remediation work at Hanford in October, 2008. Allegedly, at the time of contract award, “WRPS was advised by law enforcement of specific concerns about systemic timecard fraud being committed by the previous contractor at the Tank Farms, many of whose employees and procedures were retained by WRPS.”

Let’s stop right there.

You are the new contractor at a DOE facility and you are taking over the incumbent workforce. This is a common thing; it happens frequently. We all know how to do this. You rebadge the employees and you tell them things are going to be different now. (Hopefully better, but you never know.) You introduce them to your systems and your procedures and, with a lot of hard work and a bit of luck, you get them to be productive employees doing their jobs with a certain amount of morale.

What you don’t do is retain the same procedures that got the last contractor in trouble. Those are the ones you target for immediate change, because if they didn’t work for the last guy, they are not going to work for you.

And yet, according to the story, WRPS (allegedly) kept in place the same timekeeping and labor charging procedures that brought the previous contractor to law enforcement’s attention.

Think about that for a moment.

Okay, back to the story.

Well, that first part was not exactly completely 100% accurate. WRPS did change its timekeeping procedures, in July, 2013—nearly five years after it inherited the incumbent workforce and its timekeeping procedures. So, yes. It did make changes. It just took five years to make them. As a result of the rather lengthy delay in implementing revised procedures, “the government alleged that WRPS knowingly charged DOE for overtime for busy work or for work that was not actually performed and premium emergency call-in pay that was not authorized by the Tank Farms Contract.”

That was a problem, according to the U.S. Department of Justice.

But that was not the only problem.

The DOJ alleged that WRPS installed a fraudulent Internal Audit function. Apparently it was a contract requirement that the contractor have a bona fide internal audit function. “The government alleged that this knowing violation of an important safeguard in the contract enabled the extensive timecard fraud.” The interesting thing about this alleged sham Internal Audit function was that it was headed by the WRPS General Counsel for the first three years of the contract. According to the DOJ: “WRPS allegedly installed as the head of the contractually required Internal Audit Department for the first three years of the Tank Farms contract its own general counsel, who allegedly had no auditing experience and failed to provide any meaningful oversight of the Audit Department.”

Now we’ve heard of Internal Audit functions that report to the General Counsel before. Companies do this for a reason: It’s a handy way to put problematic internal audit reports under privilege, and thus protect them from discovery. However, this is the first time we’ve heard of that practice having such repercussions.

Recently I attended ethics training and received my Certified Compliance and Ethics Professional (CCEP) designation. During that training we were told that the best practice is not to have the Chief Ethics Officer report to the General Counsel, because there is somewhat of a tension between what must be discussed and disclosed, and what should not be. (FYI: The best practice is to have the Chief Ethics Officer report directly to the Board of Directors.) And now we have tangible proof that the same principle applies to the Internal Audit function as well.

To conclude the story: “WRPS … agreed to pay the United States $5.275 million to settle allegations that WRPS knowingly submitted false claims to the DOE for overtime and premium pay and also failed to comply with the contract’s internal audit requirements.”

Is $5.3 million a lot of money to WRPS? We don’t know. But it seems like a decent amount of money to us. You could hire quite a few really well-trained internal auditors for that kind of money.

 

 

DCAA Productivity Stats

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Every so often we like to look at the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General’s Semi-Annual Report to Congress. It is published twice per year; the latest was published in December 2016. Appendices E and F of that report give us quantitative insight into DCAA’s audit productivity. We’ve been recording the published contract audit statistics since 2006 on a spreadsheet, which gives us the ability to analyze trends and to compare year-over-year numbers.

Here are some relevant statistics from the just-completed GFY 2016 (12-month period ending 30 September 2016). The statistics encompass four major categories: (1) incurred cost/special audits, (2) forward pricing/proposals, (3) Cost Accounting Standards, and (4) Post-Award/Truth-in-Negotiation audits.

In GFY 2016:

  • DCAA issued 4,269 audit reports, slightly down from the prior year, in which 4,546 reports were issued. This is consistent with the data trend, wherein DCAA issues fewer and fewer audit reports each year, regardless of staffing levels. For comparison purposes, in GFY 2007 DCAA issued 33,801 audit reports. Importantly, looking only at audit reports issued does not tell the complete story. Many audit assignments are completed without issuance of an audit report. Some audit assignments (e.g., MAARs) are dispositioned with a Memorandum for the Record, while others (e.g., incurred costs) are incorporated into an umbrella assignment. Still other assignments are closed because DCAA decides the audit dollars are not large enough to warrant spending auditor labor; these are the “low-risk” incurred cost audits we’ve been ranting about for a long time, where an assignment is opened and closed as if an audit had been performed, but no audit procedures were actually completed. Other statistics—including dollars examined and assignments completed—tell a more accurate story of auditor activity during the year.

  • DCAA examined $286.8 billion, up from the prior year, in which $257.5 billion was examined. This is roughly the same level as the agency examined in GFY 2009. For comparison purposes, in GFY 2008 DCAA examined $458.4 billion; however, that value is a bit of an anomaly, in that the average value for most years is approximately $300 billion. Thus, DCAA is trending back to its historical mean in terms of dollars examined.

  • DCAA completed 13,520 assignments, significantly down from the prior year, in which 15,715 assignments were completed. Interestingly, if DCAA completed 13,520 assignments while issuing 4,269 reports then 9,251 assignments were completed and/or closed without issuance of an audit report. Further, that means 68 percent—more than two-thirds—of all DCAA assignments were closed without issuance of an audit report. (See our comments above regarding causal factors for this situation.)

  • DCAA questioned $9,981.1 million (~$10 billion, which includes $4 billion in forward pricing “funds put to better use”), down from the prior year, in which $11 billion was questioned. Doing a bit of math tells us that DCAA questioned 3.5 percent of every dollar examined. That value is down from the prior year, in which DCAA questioned 4.3 percent of every dollar examined. In fact, it is consistent with a recent trend showing lower percentages of questioned costs each year since a high-water mark in GFY 2013, in which 9.8 percent of every dollar examined was questioned.

  • Contracting Officers sustained (roughly) 24 percent of questioned costs. Admittedly, this statistic is a little rough. The statistic is reported every six months and it’s a solid value, but we are reporting a mathematical average of two reported values rather than a weighted average. Further, the sustainment/non-sustainment decision might address costs questioned a year or more ago. Thus, take this one as nothing more than a trend indicator. To help with trend analysis, we’ll tell you that the “post-award” sustention rate was about 31 percent in GFY 2015 and 34 percent in GFY 2014. It was about 52 percent in GFY 2013. Note: these are CO sustention rates with respect to DCAA audit findings; they exclude what happens in litigation if a contractor appeals a CO decision.

In addition to the statistics reported above, we also noticed that “post-award” audits (also known as “defective pricing” or “truth-in-negotiation” audits) are trending back up. DCAA issued 35 such audit reports in GFY 2016, up significantly from the past couple of years. While this value in no way compares favorably with historical numbers (for example, DCAA issued 485 such audit reports in GFY 2006) it confirms what we’ve been hearing: DCAA is getting back into the defective pricing audit business.

We are carefully not expressing any opinion regarding the statistics, preferring instead to let them speak for themselves. That being said, if we were to chart the values and publish them (as we’ve done before) it would very likely not be seen in a positive light.

And we are not done with our analyses. When DCAA’s own Annual Report to Congress is published in a couple of months, we’ll update our numbers and we’ll have statistics to report on a per-auditor basis. So stay tuned for that.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.