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Apogee Consulting Inc

Government-wide Contracting Trends

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Biggest_LoserThe government contracts attorneys at Covington & Burling LLP recently issued a summary article discussing a GAO report analyzing FPDS-NG data over five years (2011 through 2015). (FPDS-NG is the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation. It is notorious for being filled with errors and for missing lots of required data. Nonetheless, GAO found it to be “sufficiently reliable” for analyzing trends.) GAO used the data to support several conclusions about government spending during that five-year period, some of which we found to be counter-intuitive.

Let’s start with Covington & Burling’s assessment of the GAO analysis:

Importantly, GAO reported that overall, spending on federal contracts decreased from FY 2011 to FY 2015 by nearly 24%. The primary reason for that decline was a 31% decrease in spending by the DoD agencies during that time, during which civilian spending decreased by less than 7%. GAO noted that the largest decreases occurred for both DoD and civilian agencies around sequestration in FY 2013. But following sequestration, civilian obligations rose back to near FY 2011 levels, while DoD obligations continued to decrease.

The trends identified in GAO’s report stand in direct contrast to the emerging details of the Trump administration’s proposed federal budget, which was released on March 16, 2017 by way of the Office of Management and Budget’s “Budget Blueprint.” That blueprint proposes a significant increase in DoD funding, at the (potentially significant) expense of a variety of civilian agencies.

The GAO report looked at (1) what goods and services were being acquired, (2) the rate of competition, (3) procurement methods/contract types used, and (4) the suppliers the provide goods and services.

As noted in the Covington & Burling summary, GAO found that DoD spending declined by almost one-third during the five-year period reviewed. To understand what happened, you need to understand “sequestration” and its impact to Federal spending. You can get the details in the Wikipedia article (link in previous sentence), but the gist of it is that, in order to resolve the 2011 “debt-ceiling crisis,” President Obama and Congress agreed to create a “Super Committee” with authority to cut Federal spending in order to create a $1.2 trillion reduction in the Federal deficit over 10 years. The Super Committee failed (some asserted that it was sabotaged) and thus automatic “across-the-board” spending cuts went into effect in January, 2013. The automatic cuts were to be split evenly (by dollar amounts) between defense and non-defense spending; however, certain programs (e.g., Social Security, Medicaid, Federal pensions, and veterans’ benefits) were exempted. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the impact of sequestration was to decrease GDP growth by about 0.6% annually. In other words, sequestration harmed the overall economy.

Unsurprisingly, the GAO study found that “the largest decrease in obligations for both defense and civilian agencies occurred around the time of sequestration in fiscal year 2013.” About one-quarter (26%) of the DoD sequestration reductions came from its procurement accounts; i.e., contracting activity. However (as Covington & Burling noted), “While defense obligations continued to decrease, civilian obligations increased to just under fiscal year 2011 levels.” What that seems to mean is that DoD bore the brunt of the sequestration impacts. Its budget was cut, and continued to decline relative to pre-2013 levels, while the civilian agencies’ budgets took a one-time hit and then began to climb back to previous levels.

Interestingly, the report found that services now make up 60 percent of government-wide contracting obligations. At civilian agencies, services make up 80 percent of contract spending. Looking at what services were being acquired, GAO found that the number one service (in both defense and civilian agencies) was “professional support services.” This category included engineering and technical support. In other words, as the agencies’ budgets (and headcounts) were cut, they outsourced the required efforts to the private sector. Nearly 20 cents of every obligated dollar went to such support services. GAO noted the “risk” of such contractors performing “inherently governmental work.”

With respect to competition, GAO found that the Federal government awarded contracts through competition about 65 percent of the time (DoD lagged with only 55% of awards being made through competition.) In 14 percent of the time, competitive solicitations resulted in receipt of only one offer.

Two-thirds of all contract awards were made on a fixed-price basis. Part 12 (commercial item) procedures accounted for about 25 percent of contract obligations for products and services.

There are many more details in the GAO report, and we suggest you may want to review it in full. However, we have attempted to provide a summary (in addition to the summary provided by Covington & Burling) because we think it’s an interesting study.

WARNING! We are about to talk about politics. We normally strive to avoid political discussions, because in today’s environment you really cannot expect to change anybody’s mind. If you don’t like political discussions or if you are going to get offended by a point of view that is not aligned with your point of view, we suggest you stop reading right now. You’ve gotten everything of value that this article has to offer you.

The counter-intuitive conclusion in the GAO report was how the civilian agencies recovered from the sequestration cuts. DoD’s budget was cut and stayed cut, but the civilian agencies’ spending started to trend back up. We don’t pretend to understand how that happened but, according to GAO, it did happen.

If you remember back to the “Super Committee” and its mission, most people expected it to work. The sequestration was intended to force a compromise. Many people expected that the Draconian budget cuts—the meat-axe across all Federal agencies—would be too unpalatable and thus a compromise would be found. Conservative Republicans would be unwilling to see cuts to defense spending and Liberal Democrats would be unwell to see cuts to civilian agencies such as the EPA. Sequestration was intended to get both sides to the table in order to reach a budget compromise.

As a 2012 Huffington Post article (written by Jason Linkins) stated—

The irony is that at the time of the Super Committee’s formation, it was widely believed that the sequestration was an awesome idea that would totally guarantee the Super Committee’s success. By hanging the sequestration over everyone’s heads like the Sword of Damocles, they reasoned, the members of the Super Committee would be Super Motivated to reach a Super Agreement. Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) heralded the sequestration as a victory of bipartisanship and a welcome change in Congress’ culture.

That plan failed.

Sequestration went into effect. Most observers at the time thought that non-defense programs were going to face the biggest cuts. See, for example, this 2015 article by David Reich and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. In it Mr. Reich concludes that “In short, the BCA [Budget Control Act], with its caps and sequestration, will soon mean that the federal government is devoting the lowest share of national income in at least five decades to the services and investments covered by non-defense appropriations.”

But it didn’t work out that way, according to the GAO study. The civilian agencies recovered from the sequestration cuts while the DoD did not. We do not pretend to understand how that happened, but it seems to be the reality of the spending data. If the analysis is correct then the Conservative Republicans were the big losers of the 2011 budget negotiations.

We say this because the threat of huge DoD cuts was supposed to compel those Conservative Republicans to a compromise, just like the threat of huge non-DoD cuts was supposed to compel the Liberal Democrats to a compromise. The compromise never happened but the DoD cuts were long-lasting while the non-DoD cuts were (seemingly) temporary. The Liberal Democrats payed a short-term price for failing to compromise while the Conservative Republicans paid a long-term price.

(Yes. We understand that we are painting with a broad brush. There are moderate and even liberal Republicans, and there are conservative Democrats. We get that. There’s really no need to write us emails pointing that fact out.)

End of political discussion. We now return you to the normal blog articles discussing government contracting and compliance matters.

 

Are You Smarter Than the Government?

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No. No you’re not.

And yet we keep hearing it. We keep hearing from clients—particularly from clients that are new to government contracting—how they have figured out things better than the Government has. If only the Government will listen to them…

We touched on this phenomenon in this article. We noted that several small business clients had become accustomed to doing business their way. Those clients tended to be a bit surprised when they failed their DCAA pre-award accounting system review because “their way” didn’t map well to “the Government’s way.”

As our old friend Brent Calhoon likes to say, “You can’t do business with the Government. The Government doesn’t do business. The Government does government. So when you do business with the Government, you have to do government.” Too many government contractors haven’t figured out that their cherished, innovative, approaches to government contracting just will not work. They haven’t figured out that the Government wants them to do government.

We worked for several years at a very successful multi-national engineering services corporation. Multiple billions of dollars of annual revenue—about five percent of which was from the Government. Being a 95 percent commercial contractor—and a much respected industry leader in its niche—the company tended to do things its own way. And it hired a bunch of people to come in after the fact and “scrub the books” to make them compliant with government requirements.

It worked, to an extent. Zero CAS noncompliances; zero questioned costs. But the fact of the matter is that you simply cannot audit every single transaction. Eventually one transaction slipped through and $35 million later the company’s False Claim Act suit was settled.1

Now that company generates about half its revenue from Government sources and all accounting is done in accordance with Federal cost accounting rules. Adjustments are made (where necessary) to meet commercial needs. The company has learned which of its customers had the bigger stick.

With all that in mind, let’s discuss the recent ASBCA decision in the appeal of Industrial Consultants, Inc. (DBA W. Fortune & Company). ICI was awarded a contract for HVAC work (that’s heating, ventilation, and air conditioning) at a government facility. ICI was the low bidder (by more than 35 percent) and was awarded the contract. ICI had not attended the pre-bid site visit; however, upon the first post-award visit, ICI “concluded … that the design provided by the government had significant problems [and] then began a campaign to redesign the work, which [it] refused to drop no matter how many times the Corps told [it] to build as designed.”

Discussions, as they say, ensued. ICI refused to submit required documents and insisted that the design was flawed. As the decision noted, “Reacting to this in an internal email, one Corps employee observed ‘He cannot seem to get over the idea that he cannot propose a system rather than simply execute the contract as agreed’.”

The contract was terminated for default.

Continuing its contentious approach to contracting, ICI requested that the T4D be converted into a Termination for Convenience. Among other things, “ICI contended that the government provided defective specifications, failed to cooperate in approving submittals in a timely manner, breached the government's implied warranty of design and violated international building codes.”

The Board was not impressed. The Termination for Default was upheld. We want to quote some more of Judge O’Connell’s decision because it speaks to those contractors who believe they are smarter than the government customer who hired them. He wrote—

We have already rejected ICl's contentions that the government delayed the project. Rather, the record makes it clear that ICI delayed the project because it disagreed with the government's design choices and failed to provide timely or complete submittals. The record strongly suggests that ICI has a basic misunderstanding as to its role as a contractor on a government project. Despite ICl's views to the contrary, and as we now discuss, government contractors must perform the contracts they execute and cannot require the government to rewrite the contract so that they can build some other project they like better.

It is well settled that the government is entitled to enforce its contracts so that it receives the work product provided for in the contract. The government enjoys considerable leeway in determining what to specify. The Federal Circuit has held in the context of selecting the performance of air conditioning equipment that the ‘government may require performance both in excess of, or below, the standard normally accepted in a trade.’

A number of cases from the Federal Circuit and the Court of Claims demonstrate that the contractor's role is to build the project for which it made a binding promise, not some contract that, in hindsight, it believes is more appropriate or makes more sense.

(Emphasis added. Internal citations omitted.)

There is a common misperception that government employees are lazy or unintelligent, and that if they were smarter they’d be working for a contractor. In our experience that’s simply not true. However, that belief is often used as a subtle (or unsubtle) foundation for an arrogance that “we know better than the customer what the customer really needs.” That’s just not the smart way to do government with the Government.

As this decision shows, a much smarter approach to government contracting is to give the customer exactly what you have promised to deliver. Deliver it on time and on budget. Arguing with the customer almost certainly isn’t going to change the bargain you made, and it might just result in a very upset customer.

1 Don’t be a fact witness if you can avoid it. Being deposed by an Assistant U.S. Attorney is not fun.

 

Accounting for IRAD Expenses

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Accounting for Independent Research & Development (IR&D or IRAD) expenses is hard to do. There’s a cost principle (31.205-18) that discusses the allowability of such costs, but that cost principle also discusses the allowability of Bids & Proposals (B&P) costs. IR&D and B&P expenses are treated similarly, but they are not the same. So the first thing to do is to parse out what parts of 31.205-18 apply to which expenses.

When you do that, you get a definition of the kinds of activities that qualify as IRAD expenses. But that’s not the end of the story, not by a long shot. At that point, the cost principle points you to CAS 420 and tells you that you need to comply with that Standard in order for your IRAD costs to be allowable. (This is a news flash to many small businesses that think they are exempt from CAS. If they have a cost-type contract that belief is (unfortunately) not true.)

IRAD expenses are “period” expenses, which means that in almost every circumstance they will be accounted for as “below the line” costs in the fiscal year in which they are incurred.

At its most fundamental level, proper IRAD accounting requires compliance with the requirements of both 31.205-18 and CAS 420. But that’s not the end of the story, not by a long shot. Because what about concurrent IRAD and contract work, where the end product of a successful IRAD project will be a technology that will be inserted into an active contract? You need to separate the two cost streams (direct contract work and IRAD work) for both financial reporting and government contract accounting purposes. That can get messy, to say the least.

You need to keep the costs separate because (as noted) IRAD expenses are period expenses, but direct contract costs are “costs of goods sold” or “costs of sales” which is something entirely different. Moreover, for government cost accounting purposes IRAD costs are recovered through the General & Administrative (G&A) expense rate whereas direct contract costs are recovered by charging them to the contract as incurred, dollar for dollar. It makes a difference; it makes a big difference.

And then you have manufacturing and production engineering costs, which are similar to IRAD costs but not IRAD. Take a look at the 31.205-25 cost principle (which almost nobody does because that’s one of those cost principles that you don’t need to know, until you really need to know it). That cost principle defines manufacturing and production engineering costs as (among other things) “developing and deploying new or improved materials, systems, processes, methods, equipment, tools and techniques that are or are expected to be used in producing products or services.” The development of new stuff sounds a lot like IRAD (that would be the “development” part of independent research and development), but in this case it’s not, because it’s manufacturing and production engineering costs. Generally speaking, such costs are charged to overhead, but there is also the possibility that they could be capitalized and amortized ratably over future years in accordance with the depreciation cost principle at 31.205-11. The key thing is that they are not subject to CAS 420 and they are not recovered through the G&A expense rate, so you need to keep them separate from IRAD expenses.

So now we have direct contract costs and we have overhead costs and we have G&A costs—and we could maybe have capital assets on the balance sheet—and the poor contractor is expected to keep all that straight and separate, even though the activities all kinda sorta look alike and may well be performed by the same people. It’s hard, surprisingly hard, to get this right. It’s easy to mistake one thing for another, especially if you are an engineer working on a complex development project that involves new tooling and new technology and some contract required stuff, and you have three or four charge numbers but you don’t have solid direction about which part of the complex development activity goes where. That situation can create inadvertent mischarging, which could be a problem if the mischarging is systemic and you have a large number of engineers putting the wrong hours to the wrong charge number, and the streams of costs, which are supposed to be kept separate, get crossed and you have direct costs in the IRAD costs or overhead costs in the IRAD costs. That’s a bad situation because, if that happens, from a financial reporting perspective you have screwed up your cost of sales and your period expenses.

But even worse than that is that, from a government contract cost accounting perspective, you have too many costs in your G&A expense pool and not enough costs in your G&A expense allocation base, which is a double-whammy that really jacks up the G&A expense rate higher than it should have been. (Mathematically you have increased the numerator while at the same time decreasing the denominator, which is really going to increase the resulting rate.)

Jacking-up your G&A expense rate is really bad news if you have been billing that jacked-up G&A expense rate to your government customers on cost-type contracts, and also using that jacked-up G&A expense rate in your cost proposals for firm, fixed-price contracts. In the former case you have billed more than you should have billed, and in the latter case you have bid more than you should have bid.

If the Government believes that you have jacked-up your G&A expense rate by failing to keep the separate activities separate and crossing the streams, and that your failure was large enough and systemic enough to warrant an allegation of “reckless disregard” or “deliberate ignorance” then you may well face charges that you violated the False Claims Act.

Which is very bad news indeed.

Which brings us to a recent Department of Justice press release, in which we learned that Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) recently paid $14.9 million to settle allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by “misclassifying certain direct contract costs and Manufacturing and Production Engineering costs as Independent Research and Development (IR&D) costs, and charging certain IR&D costs in the wrong cost accounting period.” According to the DOJ, "this improper characterization of costs artificially inflated General & Administrative overhead (sic) rates paid to SNC across its federal contracts and resulted in overcharging federal agencies.”

Okay, $14.9 million is a decent amount of money. But before you judge SNC, consider just how hard it is to get all this stuff correct. Consider how hard it is for that engineer in the lab to figure out which charge number goes with which part of their complex activities.

It is hard to do. Accounting for IRAD is a surprisingly difficult job.

But it (obviously) pays to take the necessary pains to get it right.

 

 

Commercial Items in a Cost-Plus Environment

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We have written several articles covering acquisitions of commercial items. This will be another! But if you are unfamiliar with commercial item contracting, please don’t start with this one. Instead, go to the site search feature (which is on the upper right corner of the home page), or else use the “Title Filter” on the top of the News Archive page, and search using the term “commercial”. You should see about four or five worthy starting points.

We have written several articles covering our concerns about the tendency of DCAA and DCMA to “push around” small businesses. This will be another! Again, there are three or four worthy articles that provide background and anecdotal evidence supporting our concerns in this area.

We have written a few articles covering the challenges faced by contractors seeking to properly value inter-organizational transfers (aka intercompany transfers, aka inter-divisional transfers, aka intracompany transactions, aka inter-company subcontracts—which we will simply acronymize as “IOTs”). This will be another! Here’s a link to a good starting point. In another brief article (posted in 2010), we noted that Bell Textron had resolved allegations of violations of the False Claims Act related to the pricing of its IOTs by agreeing to pay the U.S. Government some $16.6 million.

With all that as background, let’s assert a few opinions right off the bat.

  1. The Department of Defense has difficulty in dealing with commercial item determinations (CIDs). It has difficulty in accepting a contractor’s CID. It has difficulty accepting the lack of cost or pricing data that is part and parcel of commercial item contracting, since by definition the price is established by the marketplace. It has difficulty in accepting the profit inherent in commercial items. DoD COs, as a rule, just plain don’t like commercial items. (As Vern Edwards recently posted on the WIFCON forum: “Most of the problems with commercial item assertions have arisen in connection with DOD purchases of spare parts. … The main difficulty is COs who feel they must apply a ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard when making their commerciality determinations in order to avoid criticism. This is yet another reason why DOD needs its own acquisition regulation, if for no other reason than to free everybody else from the insanity of its [own] processes.”) In an attempt to stop “the insanity” DoD has recently created six Commercial Item Centers of Excellence to “advise Procuring Contracting Officers (PCOs) in their determinations of commerciality."

  1. Congress is aware of DoD’s difficulties in this area. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act contained an entire Subsection F, with multiple provisions intended to help DoD in its struggles with commercial items.

  1. DCAA has even more trouble dealing with commercial items than the COs do. They don’t like commercial items because there’s nothing to audit. About the only thing an auditor can do is to assert that a commercial item price is unreasonable—which is crazy if you think about it, because by definition the price paid in the free and open market is the essence of price reasonableness.

  1. We have seen (and written about) DCAA’s propensity for asserting that a contractor’s accounting system is inadequate when a contractor has the temerity to disagree with a DCAA position. It’s the biggest club DCAA has and, even if there are no payment withholds associated with the system inadequacy determination, the fact is that it is a body blow to the reputation and competitive position of a contractor. For a small business that is desperate for new contract awards, it may well be the action that puts that company out of business for good. The only defense to a DCAA attempt to run roughshod over a contractor is the “independent business judgment” of a CO; and that is a hit-or-miss proposition (at best). There seems to be no consequences to any Government party for a determination that a contractor’s accounting system is inadequate, even if it is later shown to have been a egregiously wrong determination without any rational basis whatsoever. That’s a shame, in our view.

Okay. At this point, you may well be asking, “where in the heck is this article going?” We have an answer: It’s going here.

“Here” is a link to an ASBCA decision, published 8 February 2017, in the appeal of A-T Solutions, Inc. (We are happy to report that the ASBCA website seems to have come back from the Error 403 land of the dead.) The decision was written by Judge O’Sullivan on behalf of the Board. ATS was represented by the firm Crowell & Moring, who said of the decision, “in rare litigation over the pricing of items transferred between a contractor’s commonly controlled subdivisions, C&M successfully appealed a Contracting Officer’s refusal to pay commercial prices for materials a contractor had transferred between its business units.”

As you can see from that one sentence summary, the Board’s decision involved commercial items, IOTs, and a CO’s decision that IOT’s valued at price, based on a CID, were unreasonable. What you didn’t see (but will!) is that ATS was a small business that was being unjustly pushed around by DCAA and, rather than stand up for the company, the cognizant CO simply rubber stamped the DCAA audit findings (which included a finding that the accounting system was inadequate because the company refused to agree that it’s commercial item IOTs should be valued at cost). Pretty much everything we recited above is found in this one decision.

You ready to dig into it? Good.

In 2009 ATS was awarded a contract to provide training for armed forces to help them defeat the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The contract type was cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF). It was to be awarded on a competitive basis. (Four proposals were received.) ATS was the incumbent contractor, previously having been awarded a firm, fixed-price on a sole source basis as well as a follow-on firm, fixed-price contract on a competitive basis. It was the successful bidder once again, being the low bidder while receiving top technical scores

In the prior contracts, “ATS provided its training materials and equipment as commercial items and was paid for them at its catalog prices.” Its proposal for the cost-type contract was summarized by Judge O’Sullivan as follows:

ATS proposed to bill direct labor, consultants, and subcontractors at cost plus a fixed fee calculated at 9% of estimated cost. ATS proposed to bill travel at cost (no fee). ATS proposed to charge for its commercial item training materials and equipment at the catalog prices attached to the proposal … Finally, consumable items bought locally would be billed at incurred cost (no fee).

ATS’ proposed price was accepted by the government “without further negotiations,” based on the price analysis performed as well as the cost realism analysis, and the finding that its price was “realistic, fair and reasonable.”

Starting in October 2009, ATS began to invoice for training materials and equipment at its catalog prices. The invoices were paid “promptly and in full.” This all changed when, a few months later, DCAA showed up at the small business to conduct an audit of “contract costs.” As Judge O’Sullivan wrote, “Because DCAA did not accept ATS's position that it need not provide cost information for items that had been proposed and accepted at price, and the Army deferred to DCAA, ATS suspended its billing for the training materials and equipment in February of 2010 …” That was the first injustice done to ATS. DCAA’s position that it had magical access into commercial item costs, instead of simply accepting the catalog pricing as a given, led to a decision by ATS to forego a significant portion of its due cash flow—potentially crippling the small business. It would not be the last injustice.

Note that the Army “deferred to DCAA” instead of exercising independent business judgment as required. It would not be the last deferral and refusal to exercise independent business judgment.

The DCAA audit report was damning. It stated—

In our opinion, ATS' accounting system is inadequate for accumulating and billing costs under Government contracts. Our examination disclosed a significant deficiency that is considered to be a material weakness in the design or operation of the accounting system. We determined the contractor is not currently billing material at cost as required under a cost reimbursable contract. In our judgment, this deficiency could adversely affect the organization's ability to initiate, authorize, record, process, and/ or report costs in a manner that is consistent with applicable Government contract laws and regulations. As a result, we recommend you pursue suspension of a percentage of reimbursement of costs in accordance with DFARS 242.7502.

We determined ... the contractor is billing costs associated with its training aids at catalog price rather than at actual unit cost. During discussions with [the] chief financial officer, we determined the contractor is continuing a practice started under the original firm-fixed-price contract. However, the contractor's current contract, which began in late 2009, is cost-plus-fixed-fee. Cost reimbursable type contracts require materials to be tracked and billed at the base cost level, unless otherwise stated in the subject contract.

Let’s stop right there and review the bidding. ATS had established the commerciality of its training aids and that commerciality had been accepted by the government. ATS had established a cost accounting practice of transferring those items at price, rather than at cost, in its previous contracts. ATS had proposed those items at price and expressly called attention to its practice in its proposal, which had been accepted without further negotiation or discussion, because the price was obviously fair and reasonable.

Now DCAA was expressing the opinion that the CPFF contract type required ATS to change its established cost accounting practices. DCAA was expressing the opinion that ATS was required to account for costs in a manner different than it had proposed them. DCAA was expressing the opinion that government acceptance of the commerciality of the costs and acceptance of the resulting price somehow didn’t matter anymore.

We are at a loss to understand where in existing audit guidance those positions came from. We are fairly sure there’s nothing anywhere that would have supported those positions. We are confident that any reasonable supervisory or higher level review would have noted that the position(s) were untenable and based on nothing more than legal conclusions regarding how commercial item accounting was supposed to work. There is nothing in the quoted pieces, above, that support the notion that the audit report was compliant with Generally Accepted Government Audit Standards (GAGAS).

Yet DCAA issued that adverse audit report anyway.

In the spirit of fairness, we have to tell you that DCAA did have one piece of evidence. The auditors had a report from ATS’ Deltek CostPoint accounting system that showed the inter-organizational transfer at cost. However, had the auditors’ done a lick more of work, they would have seen that the report had been issued at the enterprise level—i.e., including consolidation and elimination of intercompany profit as required by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). But the auditors were satisfied that their single report—a report that they had wrongly interpreted—was sufficient evidence to support their legal theory. And no amount of protestation from ATS was going to change their minds. (Which is another GAGAS violation, but whatever.)

As noted, DCAA not only refused to listen to ATS’ arguments, it told ATS (and the contracting officer) that ATS “would have to prove it was capable of accumulating costs on the JATAC contract to prevent its accounting system from being found inadequate. … ATS thereafter, in order to avoid an adverse determination of inadequacy, submitted a ‘Corrective Action Plan’ to provisionally bill its products at fully burdened cost until the dispute could be resolved.” In other words, the price for disagreeing with DCAA’s legal theory was an inadequate accounting system. If this weren’t the government, we would be throwing around words like “extortion” and “bad faith” and “fraud in the inducement” but, of course, this is the government so Hanlon’s Razor applies. (Look up that reference.)

And where was the contracting officer in this Charlie Foxtrot? Nowhere to be found.

In March, 2014, ATS submitted a certified claim to the CO, asking for the $9.8 million that it had wrongfully withheld from the small business. It was denied. The CO—

... observed that using catalog pricing ‘to support a proposed estimated cost in a competitive acquisition’ was ‘appropriate’ but would not influence ‘how payments are actually disbursed on a CPFF contract.’ She also found the commerciality of the materials not relevant, since the government's requirement ‘as a whole’ was non-commercial. While commercial materials could be provided under the contract, she stated, ATS's accounting for the cost of materials must conform to the cost principles and procedures of FAR Part 31 and the terms of the cost-type contract.

The CO also agreed with DCAA that the IOTs of the commercial items had been made at cost, not price—as well as using “the misimpression” that “DCAA had ‘determined ATS's accounting system [to be] inadequate’ to meet the FAR requirement for billing at price” as additional justification for the denial.

Calling that a “misimpression” was a kindness on Judge O’Sullivan’s part. In our view, it betrays a complete misunderstanding of so many things that we think the CO should have her warrant pulled. First, DCAA does not get to make determinations of accounting system adequacy—that’s the CO’s job. The fact that she didn’t get that speaks volumes to her level of knowledge and expertise. Second, an accounting system is either adequate or it’s not. There’s no “adequate for this but not that” in this area. It was a fact that DCMA had found ATS’ accounting system to be adequate (because it had caved to DCAA’s legal position)—and that was all that mattered. The CO seemed to have forgotten that “adequate means adequate” in her haste to support her COFD.

As Judge O’Sullivan wrote for the Board, FAR 31.205-26(e) provides an exception to the normal requirement that IOTs must be based on cost. IOTs may be based on price “when (1) it ‘is the established practice of the transferring organization to price interorganizational transfers at other than cost for commercial work of the contractor or any division, subsidiary or affiliate of the contractor under a common control’; (2) the item being transferred qualifies for an exception to the requirement to submit cost or pricing data under FAR 15.403-l(b); and (3) the contracting officer has not determined the price to be unreasonable.” In this case, the government conceded that ATS met requirements (2) and (3) but argued that it didn’t meet the first requirement.

The government advanced two theories supporting its argument that ATS didn’t meet the first requirement. “First, because ATS's transfers of training materials … lacked ‘economic substance’ and therefore do not qualify as transfers within the meaning of the relevant cost principle. Second, because even if the transfers qualify as such under the cost principle, the transfers were at cost, not price.”

Judge O’Sullivan quickly disposed of the first “economic substance” theory, writing—

… the cost principle does not impose a requirement that the transfers in question have ‘economic substance,’ and the government's support for urging us to adopt such a test is thin: a bare citation to a section of a cost accounting treatise that purportedly lists examples of interorganizational transfers (neither the text of the treatise nor the context was supplied to the Board) and a citation to a Cost Accounting Standards regulation that addresses when transfers between affiliates will be deemed ‘subcontracts’ for purposes of CAS coverage. We decline the government's invitation to read an ‘economic substance’ requirement into the cost principle at issue. The government has failed to establish the existence of such a requirement or to suggest how a court or Board could tell if it had been met in a particular case.

(We note that Judge O’Sullivan could have also mentioned that the government’s reference to CAS was inapposite, since ATS was a small business and therefore exempt from CAS coverage.)

Judge O’Sullivan wrote further—

The fact that training materials never left the Logistics and Production division at anything other than price, and that there were valid business reasons for crediting that division with a sale at commercial price whether the transaction was external or internal, carries great weight. Additionally, we do not see how the accounts receivable amount for sales of training materials could be posted to the Training division account rather than the Logistics and Production account if there had not been a transfer of the materials. That the transfer may be essentially pass-through in nature does not prevent its recognition.

The government's argument that the transfers were recorded at cost rests on the proposition that any transfer between divisions would have had to take place before ATS sold the materials and issued the invoice, but since the first and only time the transaction is recorded at price is when the sale is made to the customer, ipso facto, if a prior transfer occurred at all, it must have occurred at cost. The government produced no evidence or law in support of this proposition. To the contrary, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recognized in its United Technologies decision that more than one valid transaction may take place simultaneously, and ATS has produced credible evidence that such transfers were recorded by the transferring division at commercial catalog price.

(Emphasis added. Internal citations omitted.)

So there you have it.

Literally eight years after contract award, ATS was permitted to bill its commercial item IOTs in the way it had consistently accounted for them, in the way it had proposed them, and in the way that the government had accepted when it agreed on the contract price.

Our opinion of the government’s actions in this fiasco have not exactly been hidden. The role of a DCAA auditor to render an impartial and independent opinion has been called into question. The role of the DCAA supervisory auditor and higher-level reviewers, who allegedly ensure that the audit report complies with GAGAS, has been called into question. The role of the contracting officer, who is not supposed to defer to DCAA but, instead, to render an impartial decision using independent business judgment, has been called into question. Nobody on the government’s side has been covered with glory, in our view.

And what of ATS, that small business who kept on providing important training services to the warfighter while being denied a significant amount of cash flow it could have used to support its operations? That company who patiently pointed out DCAA’s errors until faced with a Draconian penalty for failing to cave in? In our view, that company seems to be the only entity in this story that did the right thing for the right reasons. In a perfect world, DCAA Director Bales and DCMA Director Lt. Gen. Masiello would proffer written apologies to ATS and subject their employees to disciplinary action.

But the world of government contracting is far from perfect, isn’t it?

 

“Lowest Available Airfare”—What Does That Even Mean?

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Cool dude ERMan writes with a question. He asks—

… the new airfares the airlines are coming up with called Economy Basic. Travelers purchase tickets that are cheaper than regular economy but the tickets don’t come with overhead bin use privileges and are only allowed one small carry-on that fits under the seat in front of you. How does this impact the lowest airfare available requirement of FAR 31.205-46? Is this new airfare class the new low benchmark? 

Premium_AirfareIn December, 2009, the FAR Councils—in their boundless wisdom—saw fit to issue a final rule revising the 31.205-46 cost principle “to ensure a consistent application of the limitation on allowable contractor airfare costs.” Like many similar cost principle revisions, the language was distorted and stretched and taken out of context by government auditors. (We’re looking at you, DCAA. See MRD 10-PAC-10 for an example of creating requirements where none exist in the regulation.) As a result, contractors and compliance practitioners collectively have scratched their heads regarding what the revisions actually meant and how they were to be implemented in practice.

For a rule that was intended solely “to ensure a consistent application,” the actual application has been anything but consistent.

Let’s quote from the promulgating comments of the final rule (link above)—

The travel cost principle at FAR 31.205-46(b) currently limits allowable contractor airfare costs to ‘the lowest customary standard, coach, or equivalent airfare offered during normal business hours.’ The Councils are aware that this limitation is being interpreted inconsistently, either as lowest coach fare available to the contractor or lowest coach fare available to the general public, and these inconsistent interpretations can lead to confusion regarding what costs are allowable.

The Councils believe that the reasonable standard to apply in determining the allowability of airfares is the lowest priced airfare available to the contractor. It is not prudent to allow the costs of the lowest priced airfares available to the general public when contractors have obtained lower priced airfares as a result of direct negotiation.

Furthermore, the Councils believe that the cost principle should be clarified to omit the term ‘standard’ from the description of the classes of allowable airfares since that term does not describe actual classes of airline service. The Councils further believe that the terms ‘coach, or equivalent,’ given the great variety of airfares often available, may result in cases where a ‘coach, or equivalent’ fare is not the lowest airfare available to contractors, and should thus be omitted.

(Emphasis added.)

Looking at the public comments and FAR Councils’ responses to those comments we see:

4. Comment: How will the Government determine the lowest priced coach class airfare available to the contractor versus the lowest priced coach class airfare available to the general public if the contractor does not have a negotiated airfare agreement with air travel providers and, therefore, only has available to it the same airfare that is available to the general public?

Response: In the situations described by this commenter, the lowest priced coach class airfare available to the contractor and the lowest priced coach class airfare available to the general public are the same. In this regard, the revision promulgated in this FAR case has no effect on the contractor. This amendment is intended to prohibit the contractor's practice where it has negotiated airfare agreements with travel providers and uses those agreements to purchase first class or business class seats but does not use the lowest priced airfare available under the agreements to determine the allowable cost baseline for the first class or business class seats, but instead determines the allowable cost based on the lowest airfare available to the general public instead of the lowest airfare available to the contractor under the agreements. This amendment will require the contractor to use the lowest airfare available to the contractor.

(Emphasis added.)

In response to another comment, the FAR Councils stated—

The amendment is not intended to guide contractors through the decision-making process of selecting the most economical airfare with the lowest net cost when multiple corporate airfare agreements are in place, as this is properly addressed in the contractor's policies and procedures that should be applied appropriately and reasonably in the circumstances of each travel mission and its associated scheduling requirements. In relying on the contractor's procedures to select the most economical airfare appropriate in the circumstances, this amendment only seeks to clarify for the contractor that it should use the lowest airfare available to the contractor that meets the schedule requirements of the trip rather than considering only airfare available to the general public for the same flight. This amendment makes explicit that the lowest of the two should be selected as the appropriate baseline.

(Emphasis added.)

Let’s summarize all that stuff above.

The contractor is not required to choose the lowest airfare available to it. The contractor is required to choose the “most economical airfare with the lowest net cost,” considering “the circumstances of each travel mission and its associated schedule requirements.” That is the requirement. That is the entirety of the requirement.

The purpose of the revision to the cost principle was to clarify that when calculating the amount of unallowable airfare associated with premium fares (business or first class) the baseline for the allowable fare was not the standard coach fare available to the general public but, instead, the actual fare available to the contractor when the contractor had negotiated fare discounts with certain airlines. Big contractors negotiate fare discounts based on their volume of travel and then they tell their employees to travel with the airline(s) that have the agreements in place. Small contractors have no opportunity to negotiate those volume-based fare discounts and thus were not affected by the rule revision. (Notwithstanding DCAA’s creation of allowability requirements where none in fact exist.)

As noted in the FAR Councils’ comments, quoted above, a savvy contractor will create travel policies and procedures (aka, “command media”) that establish the decision-tree to be used that will result in the “most economical airfare with the lowest net cost” considering “the circumstances of each travel mission and its associated schedule requirements.”

In the situation raised by ERMan, the question to be answered (for each contractor) is whether or not it is reasonable to have travelers book a fare that does not permit use of an overhead bin. For some trips—e.g., a day trip with no associated lodging—it may well be prudent and reasonable to book the lower fare. However, for most other travel it would not be prudent and reasonable to book that fare because the traveler would be carrying luggage that would need to be stowed in an overhead bin. The alternative—checking the luggage—might result in an additional fee or might result in a schedule delay as the traveler is forced to wait for the luggage to be retrieved. (There is also the risk of lost luggage.) All of these issues need to be addressed in the contractor’s decision-tree embedded in its travel-related command media.

To summarize, the imposition of the new airfare type creates a need for contractors to revisit their travel policies and procedures. There are some circumstances where it would be prudent to use the new, lower-cost fares; and there are many circumstances where it wouldn’t be prudent to use them. The trick is to delineate those different circumstances so that the travelers (and DCAA auditors) understand the contractor’s practices in this area.

Thanks ERMan for asking this question!

If you have questions of your own that might have wider applicability, feel free to email them in.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.