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Apogee Consulting Inc

(DCAA Wants) More, More, More!

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Testimony this week before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations indicated that DCAA has learned precious little over the past decade and continues the management approach proven time and time again to be significantly misguided.

Strong words, perhaps. Let’s discuss the basis for our assertion.

As a foundation, let’s all remember that DCAA intentionally created for itself a ginormous backlog of unaudited contractor proposals (called “final billing rate proposals” or sometimes “incurred cost proposals”) by intentionally, willfully, not performing audits on them. The pretext at the time was the audit work that needed to be performed in Southwest Asia as a result of the contractors supporting the Global War on Terror. Indeed, work needed to be done there, but several credible sources have noted that by creating such a backlog, DCAA was also creating a business case for adding more budget and more headcount. They have asserted—and we believe them—that this strategy was the real driver behind the management decision to stop performing audits.

But a couple of things got in the way of that cunning plan. First and foremost was the fact that while DCAA was busy not performing audits, it was revising its interpretation of Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS)—taking a unique approach that resulted in a dramatic drop in auditor productivity. A huge and unprecedented drop in output that we have documented on this site.

Second, the courts began to enforce the Contract Disputes Act (CDA) statute of limitations (SoL) against the government, finding that if DCAA didn’t perform its audits timely, then the government was prevented from asserting a claim against the contractor for improperly billed costs. While that strict interpretation has devolved in the years since its first establishment (thanks to Judge Dyk), DCMA and DOJ trial attorneys are still dealing with the fact that (generally, with many exceptions) the government has six years—no more—from the time the contractor submits its annual final billing rate proposal to assert a claim for improperly claimed costs. Given DCAA’s ginormous backlog coupled with a dramatic drop in auditor productivity, the government was looking at contractors reaping a potential windfall of improperly claimed costs.

And that’s not the only issue. We’ve documented here the “ripple effects” associated with DCAA’s decision to stop performing audits on contractors’ final billing rate proposals. For example, DCMA’s backlog of contracts awaiting closure has grown. The ability to deobligate excess funds has been hindered, because the contracting officers don’t know final contract prices. The ability of prime contractors to smoothly close-out subcontracts has been hindered. DCAA’s decision to stop performing audits was, effectively, a monkey-wrench thrown deliberately into the machinations of the defense acquisition system.

People began to become concerned. People such as the Under Secretary of Defense. People such as Congress. People whose concern could lead to some changes.

Notably, DCAA management was not among those people. Everything was okey-dokey over at Fort Belvoir. Peachy. Just swell.

To assist DCAA in addressing its management failure, Congress passed a law that prohibited DCAA from performing audits for any non-DoD agency until and unless it reduced its backlog to an “acceptable” number. Somehow, DCAA convinced people that an 18-month backlog was acceptable; we don’t know how that con-job was effectuated. Obviously, any backlog that can’t be performed in the following year should be unacceptable, but somehow we all forgot that obvious fact.

With that statutory prohibition staring it in the face, DCAA got busy. The audit agency got busy “risking-away” audits, claiming assignment completion without performing audits. They got busy deciding contractor proposals were “inadequate” and closing assignments, again without performing audits. These innovative management approaches for not performing audits and claiming assignment completion have been documented on this blog.

Now, back to the April 6, 2017, testimony before the HASC Subcommittee.

Ms. Anita Bales, DCAA Director, offered written testimony.

Ms. Bales’ testimony is congruent with the assertions we’ve made here. Let’s offer some quotes. (All italics have been added.)

For example:

First, it is important to understand the root cause of the backlog. Specifically, during 2000-2009, defense contract spending increased in support of the Gulf war, but DCAA resources remained the same … Because we didn’t have sufficient audit staff to perform all the new work, we dedicated our limited resources to high risk defense procurements and deferred incurred cost audits, the only audits that could be postponed without significant risk to the taxpayer or the warfighter.

Or:

DCAA’s inability to maintain a steady level of staffing has presented a major barrier and hindered our ability to successfully accomplish our mission. To perform and sustain the full complement of contract audits that pose the greatest risk to the government, DCAA needs to have a stable and well-qualified workforce that can deliver on its mission. … We repeatedly find that these staffing upheavals negatively affect workload projections, delay training plans, and disrupt the professional development pipeline critical for meeting the high risk needs of our customers. For example, based on our trajectory on eliminating the Incurred cost backlog … we were planning to be fully current by 2018. However, the passage of the 2016 NDAA (Section 893), which prohibited DCAA from receiving reimbursements from non-DoD agencies, necessitated a hiring freeze that interrupted our progress. Because of that hiring freeze, together with the additional hiring freeze for FY 2017, we are currently reassessing our projections to determine how these events will impact our target dates [for reducing the backlog of unaudited contractor proposals to an “acceptable” size].

Do you see the implicit threat and business case for adding more budget and auditor headcount? “Give us more funding or we will let the backlog grow back!” Hopefully the HASC Subcommittee staff will have sufficient spine to resist that implied threat.

There was more to Ms. Bales’ testimony but, at its essence, her testimony was a plea to be left alone and to be allowed to continue with the agency’s current strategies. “It ain’t broke and there’s no need to fix it” was the essence of her testimony. Which we think is sad, because it’s a denial of reality. Plus if it ain’t broke, why then does DCAA need more budget and more headcount?

In contrast to Ms. Bales’ call for continuing the status quo at a higher budgetary level, the two industry representatives told a story of historic mismanagement and an urgent need for innovative approaches to change the status quo.

More on that in Part 2, coming up in a couple of days. 

 

Straight Outta Compton … And Into His Pockets

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Sigh.

Another story of corruption by a public official. This time it’s about the (former) Deputy City Treasurer of the city of Compton, California. According to the LA Times story (written by Joseph Serna and Angel Jennings), Salvador Galvan “brazenly skimmed more than $3.7 million from City Hall, taking anywhere from $200 to $8,000 a day” over a six-year period starting in 2010.

Six years. That’s a long time to get away with stealing city money. How did Galvan execute his scheme? The LA Times story reported—

Galvan had worked since 1994 in the Compton treasurer’s office, where he was responsible for handling cash, city officials said. As part of his duties, he collected money from residents paying their water bills, business licenses, building permits and trash bills. While Galvan maintained accurate receipts of the cash he received for city fees, he would submit a lower amount to the city’s deposit records and, ultimately, on the deposit slips verified by his supervisors and the banks, federal prosecutors said in court documents.

Essentially, then, the cash being deposited didn’t match the recorded revenue. Seems kind of basic, like something any basic internal control might have prevented. Apparently, though, the discrepancies were “small enough” that they didn’t “trigger” any alarms. Kind of like designing a computer program to catch the rounding of pennies in payroll and deposit the rounding into one’s bank account. (And we know how that worked out.)

The amount allegedly stolen varied by month. Early on, Galvan was allegedly stealing $1,400 each month, but that amount grew. The story stated “Galvan is accused of stealing $395,824 in 2012 and $719,345 in 2013. The biggest loss was in 2015, when $879,536 was unaccounted for in the city’s books, court documents show.”

Apparently the discrepancy between reported and deposited cash receipts had grown to the point that it triggered an alarm. Another city worker noticed the discrepancy and reported it. Well, that and the fact that Galvan was living above his income. The LA Times story reported—

Colleagues told investigators that Galvan always had the newest cellphone and cash on hand. He paid for office parties, bought gift cards for cashiers and bought the office a Keurig coffee machine and boxes of K-cup coffee pods for it, documents show. They noted that Galvan started at work with an old Toyota and moved up to a black Audi sedan during his employment with the city, officials said. A search of Galvan’s home turned up 72-inch flat-screen TVs in three bedrooms and a living room, as well as 20 pairs of Ugg shoes that belonged to his wife and daughter, the criminal complaint stated.

Reportedly, Galvan was confronted and confessed.

The LA Times story quoted one “community activist” as saying “What were the checks and balances that he could pull something like this off? Was he alone? Did he have help? And what procedures have been put in place that the next man don’t do this going forward?”

We think those are excellent questions.

Segregation of duties, such that the person reporting cash receipts is not the same person making the bank deposits.

A two-person count of cash received.

A regular reconciliation between cash receipts and cash receipts deposited.

These are not hard things to do. These are easy things to do, when an organization has the intent to create internal controls to prevent or detect employee wrongdoing.

Apparently, however, it was too hard for the City of Compton. And now its citizens are $3.7 million poorer for the lack of effort.

 

 

Failure Analysis

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A not-for-profit (N4P) entity suddenly collapses into bankruptcy after 80 years of successful operation. Who’s to blame?

Just to be clear, the N4P entity we’re talking about today was a behemoth: running an annual budget of more than $250 million, employing roughly 4,000 people. How does an organization of that size suddenly announce it’s closing its doors, literally with no warning whatsoever?

We’re talking about Federation Employment and Guidance Services (FEGS), which was one of New York City’s largest social services entities, receiving roughly $250 million in state and city grants each year to work with “as many as 12,000 disabled people and other job seekers each day.” One report stated that FEGS administered “hundreds of government service programs.” But on January 29, 2015, FEGS announced it was closing its doors. A New York Daily News article quoted one FEGS staffer as saying, “It’s crazy. It’s an absolute mess. It’s historic mismanagement.”

But was it simply mismanagement that killed an 80 year-old institution?

A recent Law360 article (written by Rick Archer) shed some more light on the causes that led to FEGS’ demise. According to the article—

Chapter 11 papers blamed the bankruptcy on a confluence of factors, including failed expansions and fixed-cost increases that took revenues down to $264 million in the 2014 fiscal year against $285 million in expenses. FEGS … entered bankruptcy with $18.7 million in unpaid advances from city and state agencies on its books.

We look at those two sentences, quoted above, and we see nonsense. There is little substance there, although we couldn’t tell you whether that lack of substance comes from the filing papers or the author’s haste in summarizing them. Neither “failed expansions” nor “fixed-cost increases” would led to a decrease in revenues. Those are factors that might lead to an increase in expenses, but would have little if anything to do with revenue. FEGS’ revenue came from grants. If the grant revenue dried up, that would be a problem. If the grant revenue dried up at the same time management was investing in new service offerings, that would be a problem. If FEGS’ fixed costs (e.g., depreciation) had increased while its top line revenues decreased, that would be a problem. But perhaps all that was just too much to say, and so the author just summarized poorly. Or perhaps the Chapter 11 papers were poorly worded. We don’t know.

What we do know is that, one day, FEGS realized that its expenses exceeded its revenues—by $19 million, or about 7 percent of revenue. Apparently the entity had insufficient funds set aside for a working capital reserve, and so when it realized its income would not cover its expenses, it closed its doors. Was that situation because of mismanagement, or because of a “confluence of factors”?

The unsecured FEGS creditors have a different story to tell. They are pointing fingers at the FEGS auditor, who allegedly failed to warn anybody that the N4P entity was in trouble. According to the Law360 article—

… the creditors' petition blamed the bankruptcy specifically on [the] 2014 annual report showing an $18.3 million loss after years of reports showing the agency slightly in the black. … The petition said these losses include[d] the writeoff of doubtful accounts receivables … and bad debts going back as far as 2010. These were not reflected in the agency’s annual financial statements, which as a result overstated FEGS' revenues and understated its expenses by a significant amount, given the nonprofit’s low margins, the creditors said.

The creditors said Loeb & Troper’s annual audit reports to agency management from 2011 through 2013 did not warn of these mounting problems.

‘Each of these three management letters stated that Loeb & Troper did not identify any material weaknesses in FEGS’s internal controls; nor did the letters disclose any concerns regarding FEGS’s continued accrual of … receivables that should have been either classified as doubtful receivables or subject to a reserve for doubtful receivables,’ they said.

So according to the creditors, it was not mismanagement that killed FEGS—it was the auditor’s fault.

What do we think? Well, this is a bit of a puzzle. Normally we do not expect invoices to state, local, or Federal entities to go unpaid for three or four years. At a certain point—perhaps 90 or 120 days after receipt of the invoice—we expect the contractor to file a claim for unpaid invoices. We don’t know why FEGS let its billed A/R balance extend as long as it did; and certainly we would have expected the auditors to review billed A/R aging with management. But normally you just don’t expect bad debts from government entities. You expect to get paid, absent some allegation of wrongdoing. So we really need to understand the billed A/R story here.

It is possible that it was the unpaid invoices that killed FEGS, and nothing more. The invoices were not paid for a very long time, and that revenue would have covered some or all of the current year expenses. The story could be as simple as that.

We would add here that auditors are accountants, but they aren’t bookkeepers. They don’t do the entity’s bookkeeping (or they shouldn’t, if they want to remain independent). They are not responsible for determining which debts are bad debts; that’s management’s job. On the other hand, the auditors are required to express an opinion on management’s judgment. It would be interesting to have listened to the conversation between auditor and management regarding the aged billed A/R. Obviously the story told to the auditors worked, right up to the time when it didn’t work—and then the write-offs led to a very unfortunate situation.

If you are a government contractor, whether a for-profit or not-for-profit entity, we would expect you to worry about cash flow. We would expect you to review your aged billed (and unbilled) accounts receivable. We would expect you to take action if you had an invoice (or series of invoices) that remained unpaid long after they were due. If you didn’t worry about your cash flow, or didn’t review your A/R, or didn’t take action to collect moneys owed to you, then we would indeed call that mismanagement.

Over on WIFCON the usual suspects have been debating Requests for Equitable Adjustment (REAs) and claims. We’ve been toying with the notion of devoting an article to the topic here, since many people don’t understand the difference between the two contractual actions. It’s a general truism that most government contractors don’t like to file claims; but, in the case of FEGS, maybe that’s exactly what they should have done. Maybe filing a claim to recover invoiced funds that the entity was owed would have led to collecting the billed A/R, and maybe that would have been enough to forestall Chapter 11.

Obviously we don’t know the whole story here. But we’re pretty sure it wasn’t the auditor’s job to collect outstanding Accounts Receivable.

 

 

Thoughts About the FAR Cost Principles

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When are the allowability rules of the FAR Part 31 Cost Principles applicable to your contract or your modification? For example, let’s say you have just won a firm, fixed-price contract in a competition. As you incur costs and charge them to that contract, are those costs subject to the cost allowability rules? What about the indirect costs allocated to that contract via indirect cost rates—are they subject to the cost allowability rules?

Those questions are just the tip of the iceberg. There seems to be a decent amount of confusion surrounding when, and if, the Cost Principles apply. We’ll try to tackle some of those questions in today’s article.

Scope of FAR Part 31

Too many people just look at the principles covering selected areas of cost (at 31.205) without looking first at the scope and applicability rules. Let’s start with the scope, found at 31.000—

This part contains cost principles and procedures for—

(a) The pricing of contracts, subcontracts, and modifications to contracts and subcontracts whenever cost analysis is performed (see 15.404-1(c)); and

(b) The determination, negotiation, or allowance of costs when required by a contract clause.

Right off the bat, we see that the applicability of the Cost Principles does not turn on contract type. They are just as applicable to FFP types as they are to cost-reimbursable types. The Cost Principles are applicable “whenever cost analysis is performed.” In addition, they are applicable whenever a contract clause requires them to be used.

But when is cost analysis required? Looking at FAR 15.404-1(a), we see that cost analysis is performed by a contracting officer in order to reach a determination that the proposed price is fair and reasonable. In order to reach that determination, the CO will perform “price analysis” when certified cost or pricing data has not been required. However, if cost or pricing data (whether certified or not) has been required, then the price analysis must be augmented by cost analysis. The FAR states—

Cost analysis shall be used to evaluate the reasonableness of individual cost elements when certified cost or pricing data are required. … Cost analysis may also be used to evaluate data other than certified cost or pricing data to determine cost reasonableness or cost realism when a fair and reasonable price cannot be determined through price analysis alone for commercial or non-commercial items.

In a competitive acquisition, normally price analysis alone is sufficient to determine that the proposed price is fair and reasonable. In some cases, the CO may be prohibited from requiring certified cost or pricing data (see FAR 15.403-1). In addition, certified cost or pricing data “are not required” when a contract option is exercised at the price established at the initial contract award, or for proposals “used solely for overrun funding or interim billing price adjustments” (see FAR 15.403-2).

However, even if the CO is prohibited from requiring certified cost or pricing data, the CO is still permitted to require submission of (uncertified) cost or pricing data. In particular, the CO is encouraged to request “cost data” when “adequate price competition” has not been achieved (see FAR 15.403-3(a)(1)(iii)). Further, the CO may request “data other than certified cost or pricing data” when considered to be necessary to support the determination that the price is fair and reasonable—even if acquiring commercial items (see FAR 15.403-3(c)(1)).

The above may seem prescriptive, but the FAR gives the contracting officer wide latitude and discretion to determine when cost analysis is necessary, or when to require cost or pricing data to support that analysis. The FAR says (at 15.404-1(a)(1)) “The complexity and circumstances of each acquisition should determine the level of detail of the analysis required.”

Now we see that there is no “bright line” as to when the FAR Cost Principles apply. They apply whenever cost analysis is performed, and that is largely left up to the discretion of the contracting officer. The FAR cost principles may apply to a firm, fixed-price proposal. The Cost Principles may apply even to a proposal for commercial items!

But that is with respect to cost proposals, not actual costs. What that all means is that proposed costs will be evaluated in accordance with the FAR Cost Principles, when a CO uses cost analysis to examine the proposed price. When actual costs are incurred, the Cost Principles are irrelevant to certain contract types (e.g., FFP) or to certain types of acquisitions (e.g., commercial items) because the price has already been agreed to, and contractor costs after that point largely have no impact on the agreed-to price. For that reason, FFP contracts (and related contract types) do not have the Allowable Cost and Payment clause (52.216-7) included in them.

Applicability of the Cost Principles

The Applicability Subpart of FAR Part 31 (found at 31.1) establishes (and reiterates) much of what we discussed above, plus adds additional requirements with respect to application of the Cost Principles to the determination of reimbursable costs and calculation of indirect cost rates. One important aspect of the Applicability Subpart is how the Cost Principles are to be applied to negotiating a price for firm, fixed-price contracts and modifications thereto. The FAR states (at 31.102)—

… application of cost principles to fixed-price contracts and subcontracts shall not be construed as a requirement to negotiate agreements on individual elements of cost in arriving at agreement on the total price. The final price accepted by the parties reflects agreement only on the total price. Further, notwithstanding the mandatory use of cost principles, the objective will continue to be to negotiate prices that are fair and reasonable, cost and other factors considered.

That’s some important language, right there. We suggest you keep it handy for use in future negotiations.

With respect to the other applications of the Cost Principles, the prescription for use is fairly clear. The FAR states—

… the contracting officer shall incorporate the cost principles and procedures in Subpart 31.2 and agency supplements by reference in contracts with commercial organizations as the basis for—

(1) Determining reimbursable costs under—

(i) Cost-reimbursement contracts and cost-reimbursement subcontracts under these contracts performed by commercial organizations and

(ii) The cost-reimbursement portion of time-and-materials contracts except when material is priced on a basis other than at cost (see 16.601(c)(3));

(2) Negotiating indirect cost rates (see Subpart 42.7);

(3) Proposing, negotiating, or determining costs under terminated contracts (see 49.103 and 49.113);

(4) Price revision of fixed-price incentive contracts (see 16.204 and 16.403);

(5) Price redetermination of price redetermination contracts (see 16.205 and 16.206); and

(6) Pricing changes and other contract modifications

To wrap this up, there are many points in the contract lifecycle when the Cost Principles may apply. Companies doing business with the Federal government—even if selling only commercial items—should be familiar with the rules of applicability and be prepared to comply when required to do so. There is some wiggle room (as noted), but that doesn’t mean a contracting officer will give your company a pass when they are expecting submission of cost or pricing data and expecting to use the Cost Principles to evaluate that data.

In a future article, we’ll explore how a small business can be exempt from the Cost Accounting Standards, but still be required to comply with them.

 

Timekeeping Fraud, Mandatory Disclosure, and Consequences

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We’ve recently noticed a spate of DOJ press releases dealing with timekeeping fraud. To some extent, such stories have always been there; timekeeping misadventures are the background noise of government contracting. It’s always puzzled us why so many people think they will be the ones to get away with their little lies despite annual training and supervisory timecard reviews, and DCAA floorcheck audits, and ethics/business conduct policies and more required ethics training, and mandatory contractor disclosure requirements, and internal audits, and all the other stuff good contractors do to try to detect or prevent such shenanigans. No matter what we do, we seem to have a small group, about ~ 0.1 percent of the workforce, who seem to be determined to lie about their labor hours.

In a recent article on the topic, we suggested that one causal factor may be that the supervisory review/approval of an employee timesheet isn’t the robust control it’s been portrayed as being. Maybe it was a stronger control 50 or more years ago, when we had paper timecards and supervisors were co-located with their employees. But that’s not the case anymore; nor has it been the case for many years. Times have changed and we wonder whether the average company’s internal controls have adapted to the changed times.

Today most companies use electronic timesheets. Supervisors have the option (if they choose) to click their approval without actually looking at the timesheet being submitted. And even if they look, what does the timesheet tell them? In the average ERP system, a project number is just a group of numbers with little (if any) information. Ditto for the WBS number. The project number/WBS number combination typically doesn’t tell the supervisor much of anything regarding the project or the task being worked on. Consequently, even the best supervisory review is weakened to the point at which its value is questionable.

Today most employees are not co-located with their supervisors. Instead, they work in different buildings, perhaps in different geographic locations that may be hundreds of miles away from the supervisor’s location. How can a “supervisor” be expected to intelligently review and approve a timecard when that supervisor doesn’t know when the employee showed up to work, when the employee departed, and how long the employee took for a lunch break? If the employee takes a sick day or goes on jury duty, how does the supervisor actually know that happened—other than the employee’s recording of hours against a paid time-off account? Conversely, how does the supervisor actually know the employee was present in the workplace—other than the employee’s recording of hours against a project/WBS number?

As we asserted in that prior article, we think one problem is HR. HR is telling companies who the supervisors are, based on organizational structures and who performs annual performance reviews. But that logic doesn’t follow when you’re trying to establish sound internal controls and provide assurance that the supervisor is performing a knowing review of an employee’s timesheet when deciding whether or not to approve it. In our view, companies are far better off if they decouple the organizational hierarchy from the internal control hierarchy, and identify a timecard reviewer/approver who actually knows what the employee is doing on a day-to-day basis, even if that reviewer/approver is outside the employee’s organizational structure. In our view, companies need to identify timesheet supervisors who may well be independent from the employee’s “HR supervisor” because that’s what makes for a knowing review/approval and a solid internal control.

With that in mind, let’s discuss a recent timecard fraud matter over at Charles River Laboratories. Charles River Laboratories (CRL) is a publicly traded company that reported $1.4 billion in sales in its FY 2015. It employs about 11,000 at more than 50 locations scattered throughout the world, including roughly 40 locations within the United States. CRL “provides essential products and services to help pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, government agencies and leading academic institutions around the globe accelerate their research and drug development efforts.” If you think about it, that’s a fairly risky profile from a timecard review/approval point of view.

Among its many customers, CRL supports the National Institutes of Health (NIH) “for services relating to the development, maintenance, and distribution of colonies of animals as well as the provision of laboratory animals.” As a government contractor, CRL is subject to all the requirements of accurate timecharging and proper labor accounting and billing accuracy, the same as Lockheed Martin or Northrop Grumman, or (probably) your company.

Anyway, according to this DOJ press release, CRL employees from two geographically disparate locations (Raleigh, North Carolina and Kingston, New York) engaged in some kind of timecard fraud. The improper labor hours led to invoices that were inaccurate, because they contained hours that had not been worked. CRL apparently discovered the problem and reported it (as they were very likely required to do under the requirements of the contract clause 52.203-13).

For some reason, the government decided to pursue restitution via the False Claims Act, rather than through an administrative mechanism (such as a billing credit). We don’t know the rationale for doing so. (Sorry to be sketchy on the details; the DOJ never gives many details in its press releases.) It is possible that the rationale was the “reckless disregard” or “deliberate ignorance” standard. Perhaps CRL’s timekeeping and labor accounting controls were viewed as being susceptible to fraud. If management knew its controls were weak and did nothing to enhance them, that might be viewed as meeting the “reckless disregard” standard. If management did nothing to evaluate its controls, that might be viewed as meeting the “deliberate ignorance” standard. Obviously we don’t know what the rationale was; we’re just speculating here.

In our experience—and we have a lot of experience in this area—the government does not normally pursue a False Claims Act case where the contractor made a disclosure of its own volition. This case is a bit different from the norm, and nobody is really talking about why. We did Google an article from the Boston Business Journal (authored by Max Stendahl) and learned—

A spokeswoman for Charles River said that the company and its outside lawyers began an investigation in May 2013 into the inaccurate billing after an employee reported the issue to senior management. The probe confirmed that the company’s research models and services unit had overbilled the government for work related to ‘a small subset of our government contracts,’ the spokeswoman said.

That doesn’t necessarily tell us why the DOJ pursued an FCA suit. However, it does tell us that CRL’s internal controls failed. It took an employee report—via “hotline” or similar means—for CRL management to learn about the timecard fraud. We can speculate that the employee wrongdoing was ongoing for several years. At least, we can speculate that it could have been going on for several years, and would still be going on today without that report to management. Management was in the dark. When management learned about the problem it hired “outside lawyers” to investigate and scope the problem out. That effort led, nearly four years later, to a $1.8 million settlement with the DOJ.

We say it over and over. The business case is obvious. It’s a no-brainer. Internal controls are investments that pay for themselves many times over. In this case, CRL spent untold millions on attorney fees in order to reach a FCA settlement valued at nearly $2 million. What kind of internal audit/compliance function would that kind of money buy you?

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.