Paying the Pension Piper
Lockheed Martin has recently received $13.2 million from the US Air Force to compensate it for impacts to pension plan accounting.
No big deal, right?
What’s $13 million compared to the half-a-trillion overall defense budget?
We get that. We really do. From a pure materiality perspective, this is hardly worth reporting.
But from another perspective—looking at bad decision-making and failed leadership—this is an event worth noting.
This blog has reported, several times, on the liability created more than 10 years ago when CAS 412 and 413 were revised to address the impacts of the Pension Protection Act. For example, here’s a link to an article we published in 2012—more than five years ago!—reporting that DoD had failed to account for contractor pension liabilities potentially worth billions of dollars. We quoted from various news sources, some of whom were themselves reporting quotes from then-DoD Comptroller Robert Hale, who implored contractors to “work” with the DoD in “tight fiscal times” to minimize impacts from the pension accounting rule changes.
The key point of this story is that DoD was aware, from the beginning, that the rule changes were going to result in an increase in pension plan costs. DoD was aware and not only did nothing about it, but actively prevented contractors from including estimates of the increased pension costs in their cost proposals. Thus, liabilities that could have been covered via obligation using funds from 10 years ago must be covered with today’s current period funds.
As if funds were somehow going to be less tight in 2016 and 2017 than they were in 2006 and 2007.
There’s some good news here, not that anybody at DoD should try to claim credit for it. The good news is that the stock market has done extraordinarily well since the financial meltdown in 2007 and 2008. Thus, by kicking the can down the road for a decade, the impact was minimized. Instead of an impact measured in billions of dollars, we are seeing one measured only in millions.
How lucky for us all—especially the warfighters who would otherwise have been significantly impacted by this bureaucratic tomfoolery.
Last year we reported that Boeing received $22.6 million from the US Air Force to cover its additional pension plan costs.
Now Lockheed has received $13.2 million—also from the US Air Force—for its additional pension plan costs. In the words of the Pentagon announcement, “This sum reflects the total of the individual contract adjustment to which the contractor is entitled as result of the impact of the PPA on its affected contract with the U.S. government and Air Force Space Command.”
Interestingly, the announcement stated that the payment amount was being funded from “missile procurement; and research, development, test, and evaluation funds” related to Government Fiscal Years 2010, 2011, and 2012. We didn’t know you could do that. We didn’t know you could obligate funds 5 or more years after the close of the Government Fiscal Year!
But apparently one can, because that’s what was done. We assume it was done via “no-year” money previously authorized for those GFYs, but obviously we do not know the details.
In any case, DoD has now “paid the piper” with respect to two very large defense contractors. There may well have been other payments that we simply missed, or perhaps there are still some payments to come. We would expect Raytheon to receive a payment, given that it is a fully CAS-covered contractor and has an (inactive) defined benefit pension plan (which are the two qualifications necessary to submit a claim). Obvously smaller, non-CAS-covered contractors will not qualify, even if they have a defined benefit pension plan and were otherwise impacted by the Pension Protection Act. (See our article on that issue if you are interested.)
We have other articles on this topic to be found via use of the keyword search feature, for those individuals who are interested in reviewing the history of how we got here. (Search using “pension”.) Our first article was posted in 2010.
Thus, the DoD has been deferring action for a long time. It’s notable that the pension piper is being paid today, and it’s also notable that the payment amount(s) are much smaller than many (including us!) had feared.
H.R. 2511 – Defense Acquisition Streamlining and Transparency Act
Normally we don’t discuss pending legislation. Most bills that are introduced don’t get past Committee, and those that do are amended. Then there are further amendments during the floor vote. In the case of a National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), both the Senate and House of Representatives have to reconcile their individual versions of the bill in order to arrive at the final public law language. So it’s almost always premature to get torqued about somebody’s bill, and normally we refrain from torqueing our readership.
Normally.
But as everybody knows, we are not living in normal times (if we ever were) and what was normal yesterday is no longer the norm.
So let’s discuss H.R. 2511, introduced by Representative Thornberry, Chair if the House Committee on Defense Reform. What makes this bill stand out from others recently introduced is the fact that Thornberry has issued similar bills over the past two years—and the language in those bills survived a lot of challenges and attempts to amend and House/Senate reconciliation meetings to arrive (relatively intact) in those NDAAs. Thus, we should take this bill seriously.
And what a bill!
Basically, it has three parts that caught our eye (Sections 101, 102, 103). There are other Sections but those are the ones we want to discuss here. The first Section would require the DoD to “contract with one or more commercial online marketplaces for procurement of certain commercial-off-the-shelf [COTS] products.” DoD would be required to accept the standard commercial terms and conditions offered by each marketplace. Contracts with the online marketplaces would be exempted from competition requirements.
The third section would modify statutory requirements to obtain certified cost or pricing data, raising the floor to $2.5 million for new contract actions, including modifications and subcontractor awards. It would also change the thresholds to index them to inflation. In addition, the third section would impose additional reporting requirements on DCAA. It would require DCAA to submit an annual report that reported separate statistics for different audits, including number and associated dollar value of audits performed and audits pending, sustained questioned costs, the costs of performing audits, and the return on investment of performing those audits.
But the second Section is the killer. Section 102—
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Requires DoD to adopt “commercially accepted standards of risk and materiality” with respect to performance of “performing an incurred cost audit of costs” associated with a DoD contract.
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Requires DoD to accept “without performing additional audits or reviews” a summary of audit findings on indirect costs of a contractor that “were prepared by a commercial auditor,” if the contractor is not peforming on a majority of cost-type contracts.
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Gives DCMA the authority to select either DCAA or “a qualified private auditor” to perform audits of contractors’ indirect costs, and requires that no less than 25 percent of such audits be performed by those private auditors.
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Requires that DCAA’s current “multi-year” audit approach be limited to contractor final billing rate proposals current in backlog as of the date of the final legislation.
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Requires DoD to award at least two ID/IQ contracts by 2020 to “qualified private auditors” to perform “incurred cost audits” of DoD contracts, and permits DCMA contracting officers to issue task orders under those contracts.
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Prohibits DCAA from performing any audits or reviews of “incurred cost audits” performed by private auditors pursuant to task orders awarded under those DoD-wide ID/IQ contracts.
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Prohibits DCAA from issuing unqualified audit opinions after 2022, unless the audit agency is peer reviewed “by a commercial auditor” and passes that review.
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Clarifies that the cognizant contracting officer—and no other entity or individual—has the sole authority to accept or reject an audit finding related to direct costs charged to a contract.
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Establishes that materiality standards (effective 2020) for an “incurred cost audit of costs” of an amount less than $100,000 will be 4 percent. Period.
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For amounts between $100,000 and $500,000, the materiality standard will be $2,000 plus 2 percent of costs between those values.
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For amounts between $500,000 and $1,000,000, the materiality standard will be $5,000 plus 1 percent of costs between those values.
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For amounts between $1,000,000 and $5,000,000, the materiality standard will be $8,000 plus 0.9 percent of costs between those values.
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For amounts between $5,000,000 and $10,000,000, the materiality standard will be $13,000 plus 0.8 percent of costs between those values.
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For amounts between $10,000,000 and $50,000,000, the materiality standard will be $23,000 plus 0.7 percent of costs between those values.
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For amounts between $50,000,000 and $100,000,000, the materiality standard will be $73,000 plus 0.6 percent of costs between those values.
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For amounts between $100,000,000 and $500,000,000, the materiality standard will be $153,000 plus 0.52 percent of costs between those values.
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For amounts greater than $500,000, the materiality standard will be $503,000 plus 0.45 percent of costs between those values.
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Requires DoD to perform “incurred cost” audits in a “timely manner,” including providing an adequacy determination within 30 days after receipt, and issuance of audit reports within 1 year after receipt. Failure to issue audit findings within 1 year of receipt shall mean that the DoD has accepted all contractor claimed costs.
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Requires (by 2025) the Comptroller General to issue a report evaluating performance of such audits by both DCAA and the private sector, to include the costs that contractors incur in supporting those audits.
Whew!
Somebody in Congress is seriously concerned about DCAA’s performance of its “incurred cost” audits, and they are fixing to do some serious reform on the audit agency. We are fascinated by the concept of DCAA competing in the open market against public accounting firms. We are interested to see how the two approaches to conducting and performing such audits play out (though it seems we may have to wait a long time for the official decision).
One is tempted to feel a bit sorry for DCAA leadership right now. But the temptation passes swiftly. In point of fact, it is the decisions made by DCAA leadership—many of whom are still in place after the 2008/2009 agency criticisms—that have put the agency squarely in the crosshairs of acquisition reformers. It’s not like we haven’t seen this coming for a long time. If you’ve been reading this blog, you surely know we’ve been complaining about DCAA leadership for years. Along with many, many others.
So here we are. Will the bill as drafted become part of the 2018 NDAA? We shall have to wait and see. But in any case, you cannot have a clearer and louder shot across the bow warning Fort Belvoir that the status quo is completely unacceptable, and that radical reform is required.
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First Interim Report of the Section 809 Panel
You review the NDAA in great detail because it tells you what’s coming.
Each year we post an article linking to Bob Antonio’s WIFCON analysis of the NDAA, and we point out things we believe to be of interest.
What’s the NDAA? It’s the annual National Defense Authorization Act, a piece of legislation passed every year that tells the Department of Defense what Congress expects and requires it to do. In Government Fiscal Year 2016, the NDAA (at Section 809) directed the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L)—a position that was subsequently eliminated by the GFY 2017 NDAA—to establish “an advisory panel on streamlining acquisition regulations.” We noted this requirement in our article on that NDAA, and we wrote that we hoped it went better than other recent USD (AT&L) efforts at acquisition reform.
The quality of the panel’s results will be largely driven by the quality of panelists. With that thought in mind, let’s provide a link to the Panel’s team. The Panelists, aided by a professional staff, have established nine Teams to address acquisition reform ideas—the nine teams are described here. (For example, Team 9 is focused on “modernizing” the Federal Cost Accounting Standards.
The Section 809 Panel has been active for roughly eight months, and just issued its first Interim Report. Along with the Interim Report came a Supplemental Report containing four recommendations at regulatory roll-backs—four “quick wins” or four pieces of “low-hanging fruit” if you will.
We have provided a number of links in this article so that you can see for yourself what the Section 809 Panel is up to. Here are a couple of quotes from the Interim Report that readers may find to be of interest (all emphases in original, internal footnotes omitted):
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DoD’s focus must be on mission readiness and performance results. The current acquisition system is designed to achieve too many competing ancillary good policies, sacrificing innovation and technological dominance yet adding complexity, cost, and time.
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The time for superficial conversation and insubstantial changes to regulations and statutes has passed. The global threat is rapidly changing, the relevance of the unique defense industrial base is waning, the processes for acquisition are no longer efficient or effective, and implementing these processes is left to a workforce that is mired in constricted thinking and risk aversion.
Sounds like quotes taken directly from this blog—but they are from the official Interim Report.
Obviously, we shall all have to wait and see what recommendations the Panel ultimately puts forward, and which ones are accepted. We will be looking for those recommendations that create the most push-back from the DoD bureaucracy, which has a strong history of resisting change. We will also keep our eyes on the Team 9 Sub-Panel, to see if they can assist in untangling the Gordian knot that the Federal Cost Accounting Standards have become.
More to follow on this ....
Dynamic Delegations of Authority
A Google search of “delegation of authority” leads to many upon many results. It’s a complicated topic and one that is too broad and too deep for a blog. But if we focus our attention on the delegation of authority for a government contractor, assuming a corporate structure—and ignore the issues associated with a LLC, or with a JV, or with a partnership, and then also ignore all the myriad matters within the government itself—we can hopefully fit our thoughts into one article.
In general, a delegation of authority is a formal assignment of somebody’s authority to a subordinate. Officially, only corporate officers can bind a corporation, and the authority of the corporate officers is itself delegated from the Board of Directors. Typically the BoD delegation is quite specific; it identifies what agreements may be signed by which officer without BoD approval. Often, the BoD delegations come with certain dollar thresholds, in order to protect the corporation (and its shareholders) from an overzealous officer who takes on more risk than the BoD is comfortable with.
In turn, corporate officers can, and almost always do, delegate certain parts of their authority to other individuals. Again, the delegation is almost always tied to certain types of agreements and to dollar thresholds—such that the delegated authority is specific and limited. For example, perhaps a Purchasing Manager can sign a standard Purchase Order for supplies up to (but not exceeding) $25,000 in value. Any purchasing action over that value requires a higher-level signature. Any purchasing action that deviates from standard P.O. terms and conditions requires a higher-level signature, regardless of dollar value. Any purchasing action other than firm, fixed-price may require a higher level signature. Any purchasing action that involves financing payments (e.g., progress payments) may require a higher level signature. Et cetera, et cetera.
The authority continues to be delegated downwards to the organization’s lowest level, where perhaps somebody has authority to use a P-Card or to make a petty cash transaction up to, but not over, a certain dollar value for certain things.
Quite often the delegation of authority is a formalistic document, maintained on a company intranet. That document identifies authority levels for different transactions as well as associated dollar value thresholds. In some cases, authority to approve decisions is also identified. For example, perhaps the approval authority for an employee to attend an external training seminar is retained at the Vice President level; and thus managers and directors lack the authority to send their employees to external seminars without first obtaining an approval from a VP. For another example, perhaps the approval authority to fly at other than lowest available airfare is retained at the CFO level, and thus nobody can fly business or first class (at cost) without first obtaining that approval. At some companies, delegations of authority are reviewed and refreshed every year, even if nothing has changed.
Delegations of authority are common, but very few look alike. If you want to understand a corporation’s culture, check out what authority has been delegated and what authority has been retained. If you think you have an entrepreneurial spirit, you may not enjoy working at a company where all authority has been retained at the highest levels. Conversely, if authority is delegated then that implies some level of accountability for how that delegated authority is used. Some people may not be comfortable making decisions, knowing they will be held accountable for negative consequences that spring from those decisions.
In our view, too many of the delegations of authority we’ve seen have been overly rigid. Too many are based solely on dollar value, without considering other factors. The better ones take into account various corporate risks, and reserve (or delegate) authority based on those risks. We like to call the risk-based delegations of authority “dynamic” delegations of authority, because the delegation analysis is based on the circumstances and risks, and can vary depending on how those circumstances and risks change.
For example, a firm, fixed-price Purchase Order using standard Terms and Conditions may be judged to be low risk, and thus authority is delegated to a low level. However, consider a firm, fixed-price Purchase Order issued under a development contract whose design is not yet complete. Because of anticipated engineering changes, that P.O. may well be subject to considerable post-award modification activity, and potential requests for equitable adjustment that could ripen into disputes/claims. Thus, perhaps that P.O. is not as low-risk as it first appears.
Further, standard corporate Ts & Cs may not be sufficient to address the impact(s) of engineering changes. They may need to be tailored, if only to flow-down prime contract clauses. Who has the authority to tailor standard corporate Terms & Conditions? Where is that delegation of authority documented?
We are reminded of a major development program at one of our clients. (This is a decade ago, though the program is still extant.) The program was in trouble – a significant “watch program” – and every two weeks the executive leadership team reviewed program status in a major program review. (We’ve all been through those, right? Think 50 or more people in a room, with those program managers in the “hotseats” gathered around a table to present their slides, and the rest of the supporting cast of characters sitting in chairs against the walls, just in case a question might be asked that requires some level of detailed knowledge.) Every two weeks the executive leadership team grilled the PM team, reviewing actual costs by WBS, CPI/SPI, at-completion estimates, etc. It was painful. (“The beatings will continue until morale improves.”)
One significant pain point was the lack of subcontractor EV data. The executives were upset that they were getting old data at their reviews. “The values are always the same!” they complained to us, and told us to go figure out why the PM team couldn’t deliver good subcontractor data at the executive reviews. It didn’t take us long to realize the answer: the subcontracts specified that EV data was to be refreshed monthly, not every two weeks as the executives desired.
What was to be done? If the subcontracts were modified to require EV data refreshes every two weeks, then that was going to be expensive (assuming it could even be done, since many contractors don’t refresh actual costs until the books close). An alternate choice – one that we recommended – was to dial back the executive reviews to once per month, and time them to take place after fresh subcontractor EV data had been received and incorporated into the program’s tracking system. (Do we have to tell you that our recommendation was not accepted?)
The point of that anecdote is that things change, and the “standard” approach to P.O.’s and subcontracts may not actually be the better approach. A dynamic delegation of authority tries to take into account risks and executive “wants,” and bases authority on the situation at hand.
Obviously, no delegation of authority can take into account every situation. But there are common situations that can (and should) be addressed.
On the buy side:
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If direct, nature of prime contract and risks. A development contract is riskier than a stable production contract. A program without sufficient reserves to cover problems is riskier than one that has them. An incrementally funded contract is riskier than a fully funded contract. A contract with negative CPARS is riskier than one with positive CPARS.
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If indirect, P.O. type and purpose. A T&M award to a consultant is riskier than a catalog purchase from a commercial manufacturer. Any award for an unallowable purpose is riskier than one for an allowable purpose. Any award to a foreign concern is riskier than one to a domestic concern.
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Payments to outside entities can be risk-ranked based on such factors as (1) cost object to be charged, (2) purpose of payment, and (3) budget environment. For example, an accountant taking a required CPE class, charged to their home department’s cost center, is probably low risk. Whereas an engineer attending a technical seminar in Europe, charged to an IR&D project, is probably a higher risk. Technical seminars charged to customer contracts in Q4 (when indirect budgets are tight) may need to be scrutinized more than in Q1 (when indirect budgets are loose).
On the sell-side:
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Development is riskier than production. But a cost proposal submitted “with sharpened pencils” may lead to a riskier program, regardless of type or purpose. If the customer is tight on funds, there is less margin for error.
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Selling an immature product is riskier than selling a mature one. What’s the maturity level?
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What’s the story on obsolescence and/or diminishing sources? Can you sell the product at the historic price point, if you have to find new parts or new sources? A program facing obsolescence challenges is riskier than one with a robust supply chain of current parts.
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A $10 million project is not as risky as a $500 million project, in terms of potential impact to the bottom line if things go south. But a $10 million project with a $10 million overrun can be a huge problem.
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A contract with a commercial entity is less risky than a contract with a Federal entity, from a compliance standpoint. But a contract with a commercial entity may have more financial risk than a contract with a Federal entity. Some of the biggest write-offs we’ve seen have some from state/local programs.
A dynamic delegation of authority attempts to address the true risks of the contractual action, and reserves authority when risks are higher. These are hard things to create, but companies that are trying to manage risk should perhaps consider moving in that direction.
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