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Apogee Consulting Inc

Fraud and Investigations

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UK_SFOWe recently received an email urging us to write about government contractor SallyPort and the salacious allegations made by a couple of ex-employees. The email stated “Wow. Gov't contractor run amok!! Your column will write itself on this one.

Actually, not so much.

We did some Googling and, indeed, the allegations are headline-grabbing. There are many news reports available, all based on an original Associated Press investigation. One report stated “An American company that was paid nearly $700 million to secure an Iraqi base for F-16 fighter jets turned a blind eye to alcohol smuggling, theft, security violations, and allegations of sex trafficking -- then terminated investigators who uncovered wrongdoing ….”

Sounds like a government contractor running amok, all right. Except that the contractor “strongly disputes” the allegations made by the employees. One article (link in previous sentence) reported that SallyPort stated—

New management was installed at Sallyport in January 2016 and immediately undertook a review of all policies and procedures at Balad. This review resulted in several changes, including the appointment of high ranking former military professionals to oversee Sallyport operations at Balad, the installation of a Corporate Ethics and Compliance Officer, and the replacement of many managers at the base. … ‘Unfortunately, these employees presented a selective narrative when speaking to the media which resulted in the ensuing coverage omitting many key points,’ [CEO] Stuckart added. For example:

  1. The same employees quoted in the Associated Press story taking issue with how allegations of prostitution were handled signed and submitted a supplemental report last October concluding that these allegations were ‘UNFOUNDED’ and based on rumors and innuendo. See attached Documents #1 and #2 (names redacted for privacy and security reasons).
  2. Sallyport's new management issued a policy expressly banning alcohol and tobacco at Balad. The company has not received any allegation that personnel have violated that new policy.
  3. When the company's new management learned that the company's own investigators were supposedly told to shut down their investigation into alcohol and prostitution, the new Corporate Ethics and Compliance Officer instructed the investigators to complete those investigations. The new company management would never shut down an internal investigation into serious allegations like prostitution. As noted above, the renewed inquiry by the former employees handling those inquiries found that the allegations of prostitution were unsubstantiated.
  4. An internal investigation into a claim that a vehicle breached the airfield at Balad showed that the breach took place on a service road outside of the airfield, well away from any Iraqi F-16. Sallyport submitted its investigation report to the Base Commander. See attached Document #3 (names redacted for privacy and security reasons).
  5. The article reported on an aircraft being affected in operation, allegedly due to a large amount of smuggled alcohol in water bottles. Standing alone, the allegation that such a large number of water bottles were being smuggled such that it affected the operation of the aircraft is improbable. The company did not receive any reports that an aircraft was compromised.
  6. The article blamed the company for failing to prevent the removal of Iraqi-owned generators from a location on the Balad base that Sallyport does not control or is assigned to protect. The incident was promptly reported to both the Iraqi Base Commander and US government contracting officials. See attached Document #4 (names redacted for privacy and security reasons).
  7. Sallyport never instructed the dismissed investigators to keep two sets of books in order to deceive auditors. The investigators were specifically told to continue keeping a log, available to the U.S. government, of every investigation but not to include any attorney-client privilege information on that log – a standard practice. The dismissed investigators incorrectly interpreted this directive as an attempt to deceive the government.

So this is the thing: We are not going to report allegations without doing some level of research into those allegations. While this is a blog, not a news site—and thus we do not hold ourselves out as journalists—the fact is that we strive to tell the truth. (Or as much of the truth as is publicly available.) In this case, while the allegations are disturbing, we judge that the company’s response is strong. At this point, we don’t know why the investigators were “dismissed” and sent back home during the middle of a fairly routine “floorcheck” audit. We don’t know how many other employees—former and current—will come forth to corroborate and/or refute the initial allegations. We don’t know what the government will do with the allegations. (We note that, normally, people with salacious allegations don’t make their case to the press; instead, they file qui tam suits under seal and try to persuade the government to intervene.) There is a lot we don’t know at this point.

Which is why initial allegations should never be taken at face value. Further investigation is always warranted. Usually, there are at least two sides to every story. As we wrote once, allegations are easy to make. Providing sufficient evidence to convince a judge of the accuracy of those allegations is a lot harder.

Allegations received via internal hotline should be logged. Then they should be investigated. The findings of the investigation should be summarized and the matter should be dispositioned by an independent party in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and company procedures. Then – and this must always happen – the company must “close the loop” by reporting back the disposition to the employee who made the original hotline allegations. (Obviously if the original reporter was anonymous, that’s not going to happen.)

What happens if the investigators are terminated and then become the source of further allegations (as seems to have happened to SallyPort)? Well, in that case we hope the company keeps really excellent records documenting exactly why the investigators’ employment was terminated. And we trust the rationale for termination was unrelated to any ongoing investigation. In this case, we’ll have to wait and see what facts come to light as this “scandal” moves forward.

In related news, we see that KPMG, the auditor of Rolls-Royce, is under investigation in the United Kingdom regarding the quality of its audits and “oversight,” according to the BBC. The investigation into KPMG follows a recent Deferred Prosecution Agreement between Rolls-Royce and the UK’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO), and a settlement of £671 million (approximately $940 million). The settlement and Agreement related to “12 counts of conspiracy to corrupt or failure to prevent bribery in seven countries - Indonesia, Thailand, India, Russia, Nigeria, China and Malaysia.” Importantly, the company self-reported the wrongdoing in 2012 after an internal investigation.

Now, some five years later, the company’s auditor is under investigation. We don’t know what prompted the investigation, but we can speculate that the UK’s Financial Reporting Council (FRC) wants to understand how Rolls-Royce was able to hide corrupt payments from its auditor, and whether it was reasonable to expect KMPG to have detected such payments through normal audit procedures.

According to the BBC news report (link above)—

KPMG, one of the world's largest accountancy firms, said: "It is important that regulators acting in the public interest should review high profile issues. We will co-operate fully with the FRC's investigation, which follows the SFO's investigations into Rolls-Royce.

‘We are confident in the quality of all the audit work we have completed for Rolls-Royce, including the 2010-2013 period the FRC is considering.’

The firm has audited Rolls-Royce for 26 years, but is due to replaced next year by PwC.

You can bet PwC will be on the lookout for corrupt payments when it takes over from KPMG next year. We assume the additional audit procedures will be baked-in to the audit fees that PwC will be charging Rolls-Royce and its shareholders.

Meanwhile, KPMG will have to support the FRC investigation, for as long as it takes. Just like SallyPort will have to support investigations into allegations made by its former investigators, for as long as it takes to resolve them.

 

 

Expressly Unallowable Costs – Raytheon Wins Again

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Three separate appeals of Contracting Officer Final Decisions (COFDs). Five separate issues. Four clear-cut victories. Raytheon proved, once again, why contractors that have the gumption to litigate when they believe they have been wronged tend to prevail in litigation.

To be fair, it’s not sufficient to merely believe you have been wronged by a DCAA audit report and/or erroneous COFD. You also need to have a strong case, based on regulations and legal precedent. And you also need to have the financial wherewithal to hire the best attorneys.

Raytheon had all that, and won. At stake was some $1,120,000 in assessed penalties and interest applied to allegedly expressly unallowable costs.

What’s the story on assessment of penalties for expressly unallowable costs? See this article for background.

For a link to the actual ASBCA decision in the matter, here you go.

The decision devotes considerable discussion to the nature of expressly unallowable costs, and which party bears the burden of proof with respect to (1) identification of such costs, and (2) waiver of penalties when such costs are identified.

There were multiple issues, many of which were settled before the Board issued a decision, when Raytheon agreed to withdraw the costs and the government agreed to withdraw imposition of penalties. At the end of the day, there were five issues left to be determined. For each issue, the Board had to decide whether the disputed costs were, in fact, expressly unallowable costs, and, if so, whether the government should have waived penalties.

Here’s a summary of the results:

  • Raytheon’s appeal of penalties and interest associated with $336,900 in fractional airline expenses was sustained, meaning that the Board found those costs were not expressly unallowable.

  • Raytheon’s appeal of penalties and interest associated with $63,000 in other executive airplane costs was sustained, meaning that the Board found those costs were not expressly unallowable.

  • Raytheon’s appeal of penalties and interest associated with $200,000 paid to a software firm to design and build a Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) database was sustained, meaning that the Board found those costs were not expressly unallowable.

  • Raytheon’s appeals of penalties and interest associated with roughly $395,000 in consultant costs were sustained. The costs were alleged to be expressly unallowable because of a lack of work product (see 31.205-33(f)). In this instance, the Board went out of its way to find that the consultants’ costs were not only not expressly unallowable, but also both reasonable and allowable.

  • Raytheon’s appeals of penalties and interest associated with roughly $225,000 in lobbyists’ salaries was denied, because the Board found that such expenses were expressly unallowable.

All in all, Raytheon won on roughly $900,000 of the $1,120,000 in dispute.

But more importantly (to us), Judge Scott, writing for the Board, listed certain facts that addressed how Raytheon identified and segregated unallowable costs. As we noted in our previous article on expressly unallowable costs (see link at top of page), a contractor seeking to persuade a contracting officer to waive penalties must do certain things. We wrote “Seems like a lot of effort, right? Well, it >is> a lot of effort. Obviously the efforts listed above need to be proportionate to the company’s size and to the risk of inclusion of expressly unallowable costs. However, often the efforts can pay for themselves ….”

What kind of efforts did Raytheon undertake?

  • At all relevant times Raytheon Corporate maintained a Corporate Government Accounting Office, which reported to the A&S Controller, and whose primary responsibilities were to oversee a government contract compliance program at Raytheon's segments and to provide guidance regarding application of the FAR and the CAS.

  • Raytheon has an extensive library covering compliance with government contract laws and regulations, including those at issue.

  • Raytheon's Government Contract Compliance Policy applied to all of its organizations doing business with the government. It provided that all segments … were required to ‘maintain adequate internal controls necessary to ensure compliance with’ the FAR and the CAS, and that the ‘Raytheon Corporate Office’ was covered by the policy for applicable compliance program areas. Among guidelines for an effective compliance program, the policy provided that each segment have a documented procedure for preparing and submitting the final indirect cost rate proposal; its processes for screening and scrubbing for unallowable costs were adequate; and it have procedures to identify and segregate unallowable costs and directly associated costs such that they were excluded from billings to the government.

  • Raytheon's Corporate Government Accounting Office also developed a detailed handbook to guide its personnel, at Corporate and throughout its business segments … in the preparation of incurred cost proposals. For example, Raytheon's ‘GUIDELINES-ACCOUNTING FOR SELECTED COSTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH FAR PART 31’ (FAR Part 31 Guidelines), revision 1, was issued in June 2003. The handbook has been updated about annually.

In addition, personnel involved in preparing the corporate final billing rate proposal were well-trained in FAR and CAS matters. Raytheon’s expert witness (D. Oyer) opined that Raytheon’s tiered processes and controls, combined with the qualifications of its personnel, made the company an industry leader in government compliance.

Now, it’s not at all clear that any of the foregoing influenced the Board’s decision. However, contrast Raytheon’s findings of fact with those of Exelis. (Again, link to the article discussing Exelis at top of page.) The contrast between the two contractors’ approaches to compliance is stark. One invested heavily in processes, procedures, and personnel. The other did not come close.

While Raytheon’s investments in contract compliance may not have directly contributed to the clear victories it won at the ASBCA, we are quite sure they influenced its decision to litigate. As we noted at the beginning of this article, filing an appeal is not simply a matter of feeling wronged: you also need to feel confident in your legal position. We believe that Raytheon’s compliance investments contributed to its confidence and, thus, contributed to the willingness to litigate. Without that willingness, it would be looking at nearly a million dollars of penalties and interest.

We say it over and over: investments in contract compliance processes and controls and personnel tend to pay for themselves. This is yet another piece of evidence supporting that assertion.

 

 

Allowability of Supplier Conferences and Other Incentives

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We received some positive feedback on our article that discussed the allowability of conferences and seminars. Another article on entertainment versus employee morale gatherings was similarly well received. In that latter article we touched on supplier conferences. We said such conferences, when convened for purposes of communication and performance improvement, may well be allowable—but we noted some special issues with such conferences and promised a future article, to be devoted specifically to the topic of supplier conferences.

This is that promised article.

We are going to assume you read the prior articles on employee gatherings (or that you refreshed your knowledge through following the links in the first paragraph). Thus, we are not going to rehash the 31.205-13 versus 31.205-14 details, nor are we going to repeat our admonition to support the reasonableness of claimed costs. We’re going to start moving forward from those points, so if you didn’t read those articles, why don’t you just go follow those links right now, because otherwise you may miss something.

The first thing we want to acknowledge is that there is no cost principle that squarely addresses the topic. There is no cost principle entitled “supplier conferences” or even “supplier incentives” so we don’t have a lot of actual regulatory support for our positions. What we are about to assert is based primarily on experience, not a reading of the regulations.

Supplier conferences are typically convened by the larger prime contractors. The more that program execution has been pushed outside the prime’s factory walls and into the supply chain, the more the (perceived) need for such conferences. In general, there are two business drivers cited for the conferences: (1) communicate business needs, recognize high performance, and otherwise incentivize the existing suppliers, and (2) show substantive efforts to attract and retain small businesses in the appropriate socioeconomic categories1

A single conference may address both needs, but typically that is not the case. Instead, there is one conference devoted to the existing supplier base and another conference devoted to attracting new suppliers.2 The second type of conference must be held, because of the requirements of contractors’ small business plans, which require good faith outreach efforts. So while we don’t think much of them (based on experience) we don’t have too much to say from a cost allowability concern. We’re going to focus, then, on the first type of conference—the Supplier Conference to Honor High-Performing Suppliers (or whatever you call it).

The first type of conference is typically a relatively lavish affair, held at a local hotel’s ballroom, with nice lunches or dinners served at cloth-covered tables. Alcohol is not served, nor is drinking alcohol encouraged; however, often there are post-conference parties—billed as “networking events”—where alcohol is available. So what’s the problem?

Well, the first problem (or “concern” really) is the ostensible business need. What purpose does such a conference fulfill? We hear you now, yelling at your screens, telling us that they fulfill the purpose(s) listed above—to communicate business needs, to educate the suppliers. The conferences are held to recognize high performers, and by providing public recognition thus to incentivize the supplier base towards better performance.

Yeah, we’ve heard that before. We ain’t buyin’ it.

Let’s take the first ostensible business objective: education of suppliers. Yes, certainly there are several contract clauses that mandate supplier education. If you have actually read those clauses and are focusing your messaging at those specific areas, then we doff our hat at you to signify respect, because you would be the first in our experience actually to do so. More often—much more often—we see that supplier “education” is about informing the supplier base about how great the prime contractor is, about how programs are doing and about year-over-year growth statistics. The real message being conveyed is “how great it is to be a supplier of [INSERT COMPANY NAME HERE].” If that’s the real message then you risk having the business purpose declared to be unallowable pursuant to the cost principle at 31.205-1.

With respect to the second ostensible business objective (performance improvement) we fail to see how public recognition of high performing suppliers stimulates better performance. We fail to see how the giving of a plaque and a taking of a photograph creates any real incentive—either for the supplier being honored or for the other suppliers in the audience. DoD has tried a similar tactic (called the “Superior Supplier Incentive Program” or SSIP) as part of Better Buying Power 2.1 “to incentivize contractor performance by recognizing the contractors that provide the greatest value to the DoD through superior performance and by informing those who perform below average.” Which is nice but, as we noted at the time, there is no actual incentive for making the list. Originally, BBP 2.1 stated that “SSS-level” contractors were to “receive more favorable terms and conditions in contracts” but anybody with experience in government contracting knew right away that wasn’t going to happen. Instead, in July, 2014, when the Navy announced its “Superior Suppliers,” Frank Kendall said that “DCAA has agreed to coordinate the results of the low-risk sampling initiative as a potential incentive element of DoD plans to implement a SSIP. DCAA has agreed to work with the Navy to incorporate low-risk sampling into the SSIP and will provide a recommendation on incorporating low-risk sampling into the DoD SSIP incentives for presentation to the BSIG [Business Senior Integration Group] by October 1, 2013.” We don’t know what DCAA did nor did not report to the BSIG, but we are fairly sure that no adjustments were made to DCAA’s audit program as a result. For that matter, how could DCAA do so and still maintain the façade that their audits were objective, independent, and GAGAS-compliant?

The point of the foregoing is that public recognition may be a strong incentive for individuals, but it’s not at all a good incentive for companies. Companies are motivated, generally, by profit. You give your high performing suppliers a bonus of 1 percent of their contract award values, that’s a real incentive right there. But you don’t do that. You don’t do that because it violates a number of contracting rules, not the least of which is contract type. If you award a FFP contract, you don’t get to give additional profit for on-time or on-spec performance. The supplier is already contracted to do that. If you award a CPFF contract, the fee is fixed so you can’t modify that. And if you have awarded some type of incentive contract, the monetary incentive is already baked-in to contract terms, so that won’t work. In point of fact, there is no extra-contractual incentive you can provide within the FAR rulebook3

Therefore, if upon close examination the business rationale for conducting supplier conference(s) seems very thin, are such conferences in fact an allowable activity? They may be. We are not saying they are unallowable; we’re saying that contractors who spend money holding them should be careful. Just because we are cynical doesn’t mean the government auditors will be equally cynical—especially if they’ve been blessing the costs consistently for several years (or decades).

But that’s not the only concern.

Other concerns include cost allocability, payment challenges, and timecharging issues. Let’s take them one-by-one.

  1. Cost allocability. Where do the costs of these conferences get charged? Who pays for them? Typically they are charged to the same indirect cost pool where subcontract management/procurement charges, but is that really the right place? What if all the suppliers were associated with one and only one program? Would that make the cost of the conferences legitimate direct charges? Probably not, because you didn’t bid the costs into your original cost proposal—but from a strict beneficial or causal relationship analysis, that’s probably the right answer in that circumstance. In the other circumstances (i.e., general conferences not associated with one program), the answer is probably somebody’s departmental overhead. Now all active contracts are paying for the conference through the normal indirect cost allocation methodology, which may be fine. But if you buy the notion that either the purpose of the conference is really general image enhancement (unallowable per 31.205-1) or that the “incentivization” of suppliers is really a bit of a sham, then you have to wonder whether the cost of the conference should be coming out of the prime’s profit rather than being charged to customers as a cost. This is especially true if the prime is under some type of incentive contract (e.g., CPAF) where better supplier performance would be expected to lead to a higher contract profit. Hey, we’re just sayin’.

  1. Payment challenges. This is a bit different from the allocability question. You are going to be dealing with a stream of payments, spread out over time. First, somebody is going to need to make a hotel deposit to hold the space. Maybe another deposit for catering. How are those transactions recorded in the accounting system? What General Ledger account or Cost Element will you be using? Probably they are going to be initiated by a check request. Who is going to review/approve that request? And that’s not the end of it. Eventually the full cost will come in—the catered meals, the snacks and beverages, the waitstaff and their gratuities. How will that be handled? Who will review to assure that the costs are reasonable and for allowable things? Finally, employee expense reports should arrive, for things like local mileage and parking at the hotel. Who reviews those to provide some level of assurance that employees are being consistent—i.e., that the mileage from the office to the venue is correct and that everybody is paying the same amount for parking4 (And let’s not forget that suppliers are incurring costs, as well. Are you going to let them bill you for attending your conference? How will you know if they do so? What subcontract term prohibits them from doing so? Think about it.)

  1. And speaking of consistency, let’s talk about timekeeping. Your personnel will be attending the event. Are they doing so on their own time?5 So they will need a charge number—which, as noted above, is likely to be an indirect labor account number. Is that indirect labor charged to one single department/cost center, or do you let each employee charge their labor to their home department/cost center? You have an attendance list, of course. Good job. Now pull the time reports for every single employee on that list and compare how many hours they each charged for attending the supplier conference. That’s right. They aren’t going to be consistent. Mary and Joe charged 4 hours each, while Eric and Jane charged 3.5 hours and Marty and Michelle each charged 4.8 hours each. And what about Gary and Glen, who charged 8.0 hours each? Where they really there all day, or did they take off early to play golf? Arthur charged 4.0 hours for attendance, and he charged another 1.5 hours for “networking” at the hotel bar afterwards. Phoebe and Bernice each charged 8.0 hours a day for the entire week—because they were the planners and ran the registration table—you think. (You hope!) Everybody’s labor charges are different. There’s no consistency. The employee labor charges aren’t consistent because (a) you didn’t issue good labor charging direction before the event, and (b) everybody showed up at different times—and your attendance log doesn’t show arrival/departure times because that seems to be overkill, even though now you wish you had required it, because you have no way to measure the accuracy of the labor charging. And if you didn’t specify exactly where the labor should have been charged, and if you didn’t figure out a way to capture it in your labor accounting system for subsequent review, then you will find, to your chagrin, that the labor is buried in general indirect labor accounts and there’s absolutely no way to identify it to even start the comparison. And if you didn’t issue good charging guidance, you will find that certain direct-charging employees charged their attendance to their programs as direct labor, even though other direct-charging employees charged their attendance to overhead, and now you have a CAS 402 concern because you weren’t consistent between direct and indirect labor charges. Listen to us: this is the voice of experience talking. Unless you plan for compliance, you will find that proving compliance is damn near impossible.

Hey! But don’t let all that stop you. Go ahead and hold your supplier conferences, the same way you have been doing year after year. Ignore all the risks we’ve identified. Your auditors have never questioned anything and everybody has been very satisfied with the events. The Vice Presidents who make the speeches have come to expect the annual events, and the suppliers have as well. Everybody is happy with the status quo, except for those cranks at Apogee Consulting, Inc., who think these supplier conferences are rife with compliance challenges and risks—and who think companies would be far better off if they were never held.

 

1 We say “perceived need” because in our experience there is little, if any, evidence to show that supplier conferences actually accomplish either objective.

2 We say “one conference” for simplicity, knowing full well that the larger primes may have multiple conferences held at different locations at various times in the year.

3 That doesn’t keep the military services from continuing to designate superior suppliers, and from continuing to proclaim that the rationale for doing so is to improve performance—even though the most recent Navy announcement (July 2016) admitted that the Superior Supplier rating will not, and cannot, be used in future award decisions.

4 You aren’t going to let your employees use valet parking, are you? If so, what’s your rationale for doing so? More importantly, how will you detect such charges?

5 Ha! Rhetorical question, of course. No, they’re not attending on their own time—don’t be foolish. With respect to hourly and/or non-exempt personnel, you can’t let them do so. With respect to exempt personnel, if you’re on total time accounting and you claim the expenses as bona-fide allowable business expenses, then the associated labor must also be bona fide allowable labor. If you’ve decided that the expenses are unallowable (or partially unallowable) then the labor may well be a directly associated unallowable cost. Think this one through. You’ve got to be consistent between labor and expenses.

 

DCAA’s Annual Report to Congress, GFY 2016 Edition

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Recently we devoted an entire article to the current state of DCAA publications. We noted quite a bit of activity in revising audit programs, but considerably less activity with respect to updated audit guidance via MRDs. In particular, we noted that the GFY 2016 Annual Report to Congress was late—as measured against publication dates in prior years. Within a week of our article’s publication, DCAA had remedied its problem, issuing the GFY 2016 Annual Report to Congress on its website.

This annual report, like the previous five annual reports, paints a rosy picture in which all signs point to an effective audit agency that’s on an uninterrupted course of improvement. For example, the annual report points out that sustainment of questioned costs (QC) in GFY 2016 matched the historic high set in GFY 2013, with nearly 53% of all QC being sustained. In another example of good news, the annual report states that the backlog of (adequate) incurred cost submissions awaiting audit was at an historic low of 4,677, down from last year’s backlog of 7,380. And the time it takes to perform incurred cost audits, according to the annual report, has dropped from 406 days in GFY 2012 to a quick 138 days in GFY 2016—a reduction of 66 percent!

Seems like very good news, indeed.

The only problem is that the numbers don’t seem correct.

As readers may know, we maintain a database of historic DCAA statistics, collected from the DoD IG’s Semi-annual Report to Congress and the more recent DCAA Annual Report to Congress. We track those stats and, from time to time, we publish them along with our thoughts on what they may mean for government contractors. For example, our most recent discussion of audit statistics can be found here. In that article, we asserted that the sustention rate was closer to 24 percent, in contrast to the DCAA report that claimed it was north of 50 percent.

The DoD OIG Semi-Annual Report to Congress is published, as you may well guess, every six months. Thus, to cover the same ground as the DCAA Annual Report to Congress, you need to look at two reports. Let’s do that!

The first report covered the period 01 October 2015 through 31 March 2016 (first half of GFY 2016). Looking at Appendix F (“Status of Action on Post-Award Contracts”) we see that, at the end of the period, there were 1,714 open audit reports with questioned costs worth $11,557.8 million (call it $12 billion). The audit reports cover the gamut of DCAA audit activity, from defective pricing to CAS compliance to incurred costs. Thus, the purpose of Appendix F is to put a value on DCAA audit reports for which a contracting officer follow-up action is required. The reports are aged, so that readers can see that 1,099 of the open reports are languishing and that the cognizant COs are late with their dispositions. The information regarding reports and dates and status is pulled from DCMA’s Contract Action Follow-up (CAFU) database.

More importantly, the Appendix F statistics also show closed reports—i.e., reports that were dispositioned within the reporting period. With respect to those closed reports, we see that 412 audit reports, cumulatively worth $1.7 billion, were closed in the first half of GFY 2016. We also see that the amount of QC that was sustained was $447.4 million—for a sustention rate of 26.0 percent. Footnote 9 reinforces the analysis. It states, quite clearly—

Contracting officers sustained $447.4 million (26 percent) of the $1,722.3 million questioned as a result of significant post-award contract audits during the period. The contracting officer sustention rate of 26.0 percent represents a decrease from the sustention rate of 31.3 percent for the prior reporting period

Okay. But that was only one half, not the whole year. So let’s look at the next Semi-Annual Report to Congress, the one covering 01 April through 30 September 2016. Appendix F tells a similar story. In the reporting period, 458 audit reports cumulatively worth $2.1 billion were closed—with a sustention rate of 22 percent. Again, Footnote 9 states—

Contracting officers sustained $468.9 million (22 percent) of the $2,140.2 million questioned during the period as a result of post-award contract audits. The contracting officer sustention rate of 22 percent represents a decrease from the sustention rate of 26 percent for the prior reporting period.

We did a rough average of the two reports (without weighting) and came up with a GFY 2016 sustention rate of 24 percent, not 52.5 percent as reported in the DCAA Annual Report to Congress. Where is the difference coming from?

DCAA is counting pre-award (“forward priced”) sustentions in its statistics.

Remember, the DoD OIG statistics only track “post-award” audit reports—i.e., the audit reports issued after a contract has been awarded. The statistics are not tracking pre-award audit reports, such as reviews of contractor cost proposals that may lead to a contract award. As DCAA itself notes, “forward pricing audits net the highest rate of return.” Thus, by including QC identified prior to contract award, DCAA is inflating the sustention rates.

Assuming for a moment that it would be correct to conflate pre-award QC with post-award QC, why would the sustention rates between the two be so radically different?

The answer to that question is easy: the COs have little or no incentive to disagree with DCAA. The COs are using DCAA’s audit reports as the basis for their negotiations, and they can (and will) use any QC to negotiate a lower price. There is little or no downside for them—no contractor is going to litigate a pre-award argument about QC. In contrast, once a contract has been awarded, the Contract Disputes Act comes into play. Contractors have the right of appeal, and COs know that. Further, there is more peer review and management oversight regarding disposition of DCAA audit reports in the post-award environment. The DCMA CAFU database tracks and ages only post-award audit reports. For all of these reasons (and perhaps more) the sustention rate of pre-award QC is going to be dramatically higher than the sustention rate for post-award QC.

Clearly, DCAA should be reporting the two sets of statistics separately. Until it starts doing so, the sustention rates reported by DCAA will always be inflated, and will never match the sustention rates reported by the DoD OIG. We suspect, however, that DCAA will be most reluctant to separate the two datasets unless Congress forces it to do so.

We also want to point out that DCAA has rejiggered the incurred cost audit duration statistics. Did you notice that the numbers look weirdly lower than they ever have before? What’s going on?

According to Figure 9 of the annual report, “The time to complete an incurred cost audit is the time between the entrance conference date and report issuance.” No, it’s not. For the previous five annual reports, incurred cost duration has been measured from the time the assignment was started to the time it was completed. However, starting in GFY 2016, DCAA changed the measurement. The new measurement is misleading, because (as every contractor knows) the period before the entrance conference is when the DCAA “risk assessment” takes place. That risk assessment is hard to differentiate from an actual audit, isn’t it? It’s filled with Request for Information (RFIs) and data calls and auditor questions—and it seems to take forever. By rejiggering the audit start date, DCAA has dropped its audit duration from nearly three years to a matter of a couple of months. The Note to Figure 9 states—

Had we maintained our previous measure to calculate elapsed days based on receipt day, our elapsed time would still reflect a 25 percent reduction from FY 2012 to FY 2016 (FY 2012: 1184 days, FY 2016: 885 days).

That Note doesn’t state that the incurred cost audit duration reported in GFY 2015 (Table 3) was 883 days—so it actually took DCAA two days longer in GFY 2016 to complete its incurred cost audits (on average). Granted, two days is a de minimis difference, but we think it’s important to note that fact.

Another DCAA-reported statistic that’s strange is the backlog of final billing rate proposals (“incurred cost proposals”) awaiting audit. In the GFY 2015 Report to Congress, DCAA stated (page 7) that its backlog at the end of GFY 2015 was 11,758 submissions, comprised of 8,979 “adequate” proposals and 2,779 proposals for which adequacy had not yet been determined. However, in the GFY 2016 Annual Report, DCAA stated (Figure 5) that its backlog at the end of GFY 2015 was 7,380 submissions. Clearly, some metric changed, because both figures cannot be true—but we can’t tell what magic DCAA did that made the numbers change. However, we are sure that some magic was performed, because the values reported in GFY 2016 Figure 5 do not match the numbers that we’ve been reporting over the years.

DCAA concluded its GFY 2016 report with a request for more auditors. The agency noted—and we agree—that headcount is down. At the end of GFY 2016, the audit agency had 4,023 auditors, down from GFY 2015’s level of 4,304. That’s a significant headcount drop. DCAA noted that the current hiring freeze imposed by the new Presidential Administration imperils its ability to continue to work down its audit backlog.

We here at Apogee Consulting, Inc., are not worried about that. Not in the slightest.

Regardless of headcount, we have confidence in DCAA’s ability to manipulate numbers, change metrics, and execute other bureaucratic tricks to make the audit agency seem like it is a great value for the U.S. taxpayer.

 

More Problems for SBIR Firms

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We have often warned companies about the increased risks that come from growth in the government contracting space. In that regard, one of the specific areas we’ve noted is the acceptance of SBIR (Small Business Innovative Research) awards that require compliance with accounting regulations. We’ve pointed out that recipients of such awards are too often unaware of the increased requirements that come along with them, and are thus ill-prepared to comply with those requirements.

They are surprised when the auditors come calling. They are surprised when they are asked to provide supporting documentation for time and expenses for which they’ve billed the government customer. They are surprised when costs are questioned, or disallowed. The questioning and/or disallowance of costs can significantly disrupt those small businesses. Just supporting an audit is disruptive enough, but hiring outside attorneys to argue against the findings in court can be even more disruptive. Finding sufficient cash to make refunds associated with alleged overpayments can be a serious challenge. In extreme cases, the end result of the process is bankruptcy.

Unfortunately, by definition those companies are all small businesses. Small, innovative, businesses. Thus, contractors that may have offered promising technology to the government are financially harmed or bankrupted, and the government ends up with nothing.

We have argued that such companies should not be subjected to the full panoply of government compliance regulations. It is unrealistic to expect them to have sophisticated accounting systems and to have the kind of documentation maintained (and retained) by the biggest contractors. It is, however, what it is. Those small businesses that receive Federal funds (of any type) are expected to comply with contract terms and conditions. Period. There is no free pass.

We were reminded, once again, of this lesson, courtesy of a recent Department of Energy (DOE) Inspector General (IG) audit report.

The DOE IG reviewed eight grants and one cooperative agreement awarded to small businesses by the DOE under the SBIR and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. According to the report, the IG found (among other things) that—

Three recipients had not properly accounted for, or maintained adequate supporting documentation for, a portion of their project expenses [and] the Department had not ensured that three recipients met all terms and conditions of their awards. Specifically, we identified instances where recipients had not obtained required audits, had not ensured adequate participation by a nonprofit research institution, or had not adequately documented involvement of the principal investigator, as required by their awards.

The IG reported that the root cause(s) of the findings were (1) ignorance and (2) limited oversight. The IG reported—

The issues that we identified were primarily due to recipients having a lack of awareness of regulations and specific award terms and conditions and, at times, Department officials providing limited oversight. We identified several areas in which the Department could improve, including additional training for recipients and reevaluation of staffing needs. … Considering that many small businesses with limited Department program experience are receiving funding, it is important for the Department to ensure that recipients are fully aware of Federal and Department requirements that were designed to help the SBIR and STTR programs meet their intended goals and objectives in an efficient and effective manner.

(Emphasis added.)

What were the specific findings? Quoting from the IG’s audit report:

  • Light Foundry LLC, which had received an award of over $1.1 million, provided a full list of expenses; however, the recipient had comingled award expenses with other business expenses. From this list, we sampled several project-related expenses and asked the principal investigator to provide us with specific invoices; however, the principal investigator had to search through his email accounts for each invoice, some of which he could not locate. Therefore, we concluded that Light Foundry LLC did not have a sufficient records management system in place to maintain award documentation. While it appeared the majority of the expenses were project-related, we could not reasonably determine or verify which expenses were specifically paid for using Science funds. As a result, we were unable to make a determination on the allowability, allocability, and supportability of the $1.1 million in funds charged to the award.

  • SixPoint Materials, Inc., an ARPA-E [cooperative agreement] recipient, required employees to record actual hours on a monthly timesheet, but instead of using those recorded hours, it charged a fixed percentage of each employee’s time when charging labor against its award. As a result, our analysis showed that of about $357,000 in labor, fringe, and indirect expenses through August 2015, SixPoint Materials, Inc. had overcharged ARPA-E by approximately $42,000, an amount we questioned as unallowable.

  • Atmospheric Observing Systems, Inc., a Science [grant] recipient, had not maintained adequate support for subcontractor labor charges of $4,050 charged to its award. Atmospheric Observing Systems, Inc. hired a former employee as a subcontractor to complete work on its project. The subcontractor, however, did not provide any invoices for work completed. Rather, there was an informal arrangement between the recipient and the subcontractor regarding compensation. Accordingly, we question these contractual expenses charged to the award as unsupported.

  • Stratton Park Engineering Company, Inc. and Tech-X Corporation, had not ensured that annual audits had been conducted as required by the terms and conditions of their awards and Federal regulations on financial assistance awarded to for-profit organizations. Federal requirements in place at the time the awards were administered, and incorporated in the terms of the agreement, mandated an independent audit on any recipient that expended Federal awards of $500,000 or more in a year. These audits are intended to determine whether the recipient has an internal control structure that provides reasonable assurance that the recipient is managing its award or awards in compliance with Federal laws and regulations as well as the terms and conditions of the award. We found that both recipients had expended over $500,000 per year for FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014, but neither had arranged to have the required audits performed.

  • Stratton Park Engineering Company, Inc. had not been properly charging labor hours for its principal investigator and, therefore, was unable to show that it met a grant requirement that the principal investigator devote no less than 3 hours on average per week for the duration of the project. The principal investigator had not charged time to the award during the last 2 years. Based on his presentation of the project and our discussions with the principal investigator during our site visit, we believe that he had been substantially involved but mistakenly had not recorded his time. Further, the principal investigator indicated that he was unaware of the requirement to track his time on the project. Had we not visited this company, it would have appeared to us that this individual had no involvement with the project during the last 2 years.

Small businesses are vital to the economy and they are a vigorous source of innovation. For those reasons, there are special Federal programs to help them move forward. However, too often those businesses are focused on technical achievement and do not devote sufficient attention to accounting and other administrative requirements associated with their Federal awards. As this recent DOE IG report shows – once again – those small businesses ignore those non-technical requirements at their own peril.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.