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Apogee Consulting Inc

Missing CAS

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During the writing of our latest article on cost accounting practices we had an opportunity to visit the CAS Board website, which is under the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) website, which is under the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) website, which is under the White House website.

Only it isn’t there anymore.

There is no CAS Board website.

There is no OFPP website.

They are both gone.

Doing some more research, we found out that there is no CAS Board Chair. By statute, the Chair of the CAS Board is the OFPP Administrator.

There is no OFPP Administrator.

There is not even a person listed as “nominated” for the position and awaiting confirmation.

There is nobody responsible for CAS.

There is nothing.

And that’s the way it is, nearly six months after the current Presidential Administration came into office.

We are reminded, once again, of the DFARS Business System administration regime. The regime that everybody told the DAR Council would be unworkable because of a lack of government resources. As we’ve documented, the DAR Council simply did not care. They didn’t care that their oversight regime would be unworkable. They passed their DFARS rules over the objections of the public and now—more than five years later—we all know that the regime is unworkable. The only defense contractors subject to the DFARS requirements are the largest ones; the others have the same contract clauses but they know they’ll never be held to account for compliance with them.

Similarly, it has become clear over the past 10 or so years that the CAS regime is also unworkable. It’s overly complex. It’s ambiguous. It’s burdensome. It’s grounded in a viewpoint that’s more than 40 years old, where DOD acquired more goods than services. But in the past 40 years many things have changed and the CAS regulations and Standards have not kept up with the changes.

As we’ve noted from time to time, the CAS Board almost never met even when there was an OFPP Administrator to chair it. The published minutes reflected a situation where literally years would pass between meetings. The published list of CAS Board members included people who had left government service literally years before.

The current lack of anything official related to the CAS Board isn’t really anything new. The Federal government abandoned the Cost Accounting Standards years ago. We are just seeing that abandonment being documented.

Meanwhile, the Section 809 panel (Team 9) continues to move “with boldness” to reform an anachronism, an abandoned regulatory regime that once mattered but now is more of an historical curiosity.

Sure, people still follow the rules and people still submit Disclosure Statements, and if DCAA comes across something that looks like a noncompliance with one or more Standards they’ll do something about it. But we all know that we’re just following the letter of the rules.

The spirit is long dead.

 

Disclosed or Established

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If you are a CAS-covered government contractor, you already know a lot about cost accounting practices. You probably know about Disclosure Statements and how to prepare them, and how to revise them when cost accounting practices change. If you already know those things, it’s likely that you are not a small business.

While many small businesses are required to comply with individual Standards in order to make their costs allowable, those same small businesses are exempt from the CAS requirements pertaining to disclosing cost accounting practices and disclosing changes in cost accounting practice. To be clear: in addition to the 19 Cost Accounting Standards, there are other CAS regulations that large businesses have to deal with. There is also FAR language. And there are certain CAS clauses that come into effect for large businesses that win fully CAS-covered contracts. In sum, while small businesses have to deal with some aspects of CAS that are solely related to cost allowability, there is a whole ‘nother world out there that large businesses have to deal with.

We’re going to discuss that bigger world of CAS regulations in this article.

For many people, when they hear “CAS” the first thing they think of is “Disclosure Statement.” In our experience, that’s the bogeyman that small businesses fear when they think they have grown to the point when they may become subject to CAS coverage. We get that, we really do. If you haven’t seen a Disclosure Statement before, it can be a daunting challenge to fill one out. (Even if you have seen one, it can still be a daunting challenge: Word tables are no fun at all.) It’s an eight-part form with lots of topics and opportunities for “continuation pages” that require one to squeeze lots of diverse information into a single document.

But of course it is a form. The Disclosure Statement is nothing more than a standard government form. If you are a commercial organization you fill out Form CASB DS-1 and if you are an educational institution you fill out Form CASB DS-2. When you have completed your Disclosure Statement form, you submit it to your Cognizant Federal Agency Official (CFAO) and your local DCAA office, and you wait to see if anybody will review it and give you feedback. Meanwhile, your customers tell you that they can’t award that contract until your Disclosure Statement has been determined to be adequate. (See FAR 30.202-6(b).) In that case, the timely review of your CASB Disclosure Statement becomes very very important, and this becomes one government oversight activity that you actually push for.

Because it is a standard government form, it’s a one-size-fits-all form. Consequently, the Disclosure Statement does not require you to describe all of your cost accounting practices; it only requires you to describe what it requires you to describe. It is likely that your organization may have other, additional, cost accounting practices that the form doesn’t address.

That’s fine. That’s the way it is.

That’s why noncompliances can cover not only disclosed cost accounting practices, but also established cost accounting practices. The promulgators of the CAS regulations and Standards recognized that what your company does may not fit neatly inside their standard form, and they made allowances for that. Thus: you can be noncompliant with Standard 401 (“Consistency in Estimating, Accumulating and Reporting Costs”) because you were inconsistent with respect to your established cost accounting practices, even if you were consistent with respect to your disclosed cost accounting practices.

But the situation does make handling changes to cost accounting practice more challenging.

If you are subject to the CAS regulations then you are required to provide advance notice to your CFAO 60 days prior to making a change in cost accounting practice. You may have to submit a cost impact. If you are changing a disclosed cost accounting practice, you will have to submit a revised Disclosure Statement. Typically, along with the revised Disclosure Statement you include a matrix showing every single change and where in the Disclosure Statement it was made

But if you are changing an established cost accounting practice, one that doesn’t fit into the Disclosure Statement, then what do you do?

You don’t need to submit a revised Disclosure Statement, because nothing in the Disclosure Statement is changing. How do you then provide adequate notification to your CFAO and DCAA of the upcoming change(s)?

Our experience tells us that you still need to comply with the advance notification requirements found in your CAS-related contract clauses. You still need to submit a letter to the CFAO 60 days in advance of the change. It’s probably a good idea to have a Gross Dollar Magnitude (GDM) cost impact analysis ready to share with the CFAO and DCAA.

Our experience further tells us that the government folks who receive advance notification and a GDM impact analysis without a revised Disclosure Statement are going to be confused. They are going to be skeptical. They are going to be suspicious. They are not going to understand how a contractor can make a change to a cost accounting practice without also revising its Disclosure Statement. It is likely that they are not going to understand the difference between a disclosed cost accounting practice and an established cost accounting practice. Most people, both within and without government, believe that the Disclosure Statement is a comprehensive document in which the contractor is required to describe all of its cost accounting practices; they aren’t going to easily accept that it’s a government form with the same limitations inherent in all government forms. Therefore you are going to have a bit of a sales job on your hands. Some knowledge transfer will be required.

In the final analysis, if you look only at a Disclosure Statement and ignore cost accounting practices that haven't been disclosed, you may miss the changes to established cost accounting practices. If you are a government oversight official, you may miss changes that impact contract costs. If you are a contractor employee, you may similarly miss those changes, and that may lead to you violating the requirements associated with your CAS contract clause(s). Both parties need to look at the entire universe of contractor cost accounting practices holistically, so that all changes that affect contract costs can be identified and used to analyze the cost impact(s).

There’s also another way in which an undue focus on the Disclosure Statement can lead people down the wrong path: if you look only at a Disclosure Statement you may see more changes to cost accounting practice than are actually taking place. If you submit a change matrix along with the revised Disclosure Statement, the tendency is to count the number of changes in the matrix and to think that each change is a change in cost accounting practice.

That’s not necessarily the case.

And we’re not even talking about changes that don’t rise to the level of a change in cost accounting practice: the first time incurrence of a cost or the elimination of a cost, or treatment of a cost that had previously been immaterial but is now material. And we’re not talking about reorganizations, or pool splits or pool combinations. We’re talking about an actual miscount of the real changes to cost accounting practice because “both sides of the same coin” are being counted as two changes.

For example, if there is a change in a home office allocation that forces a change in the receiving segment in order to receive the new home office allocation, that is (in our view) one change, not two changes. The change is being made at the home office and then the segment is reacting to that change. If you look at the two Disclosure Statements, you see two changes. But if you look holistically at what is happening, there is one change with a “ripple effect” at the segment level.

This matters because of the government’s cockamamie approach to concurrent changes in cost accounting practice. We’ve written fairly extensively on this site about the government’s viewpoint—which was upheld by the ASBCA. (We haven’t written that many legal practitioners believe that aspect of the Raytheon appeal was wrongly decided. But that seems to be the case, from what we’ve heard.) In the government’s view the contractor cannot net concurrent changes against each other, since the FAR doesn’t permit that.

But one change that has ripple effects is not a set of concurrent changes; it is one change. To evaluate the impact of that one change, the impact at the contract level will have to be estimated. That means that the ripple effects will have to be netted against each other.

We are not here to argue that concurrent changes can be netted against each other. That argument has been made at the ASBCA and the Board didn’t buy it. But we strongly believe that an undue focus on the individual revisions to a Disclosure Statement (or set of Disclosure Statements) without a more holistic view of both disclosed and established cost accounting practices may lead one to seeing more changes than are actually present. That’s what we want to warn against.

CAS is hard. Disclosure Statements are hard. Changes to cost accounting practice are hard. Remembering that some cost accounting practices exist outside of a Disclosure Statement, while others cross multiple sections of a Disclosure Statement (or cross multiple Disclosure Statements), helps with the challenges inherent in CAS administration.

 

 

Goodbye DCAA?

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GovExec.com has an interesting article telling its readers what readers of this blog already knew: that Congress wants to have DCAA compete with private CPA firms for audit work. We discussed the proposed game-changing legislation here.

The GovExec article attempts to be balanced, but the weight of the article leans against the legislation as drafted. For example, most of the quotes are from those who think the legislation is a bad idea, including (of course) quotes from Ms. Anita Bales and from the Pentagon itself. It’s ironic how the same folks pleading for innovation in technology for the warfighter don’t want to see any innovation in the audits of the innovators.

Certain members of Congress also had reservations, according to the article. In particular, Congressman Adam Smith (D-Washington), thought a better approach would be “to give the DCAA director authority and tools to address the backlog, yet hold her accountable for progress. ‘That flexibility could be the ability to hire private contractors with appropriate oversight or the ability to hire civil servants expeditiously,’ he said.”

Congressman Smith was careful not to specify what that additional authority would look like, just as he was careful not to specify exactly how the SES-level Director of DCAA would be held more accountable than she already is.

Similarly, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) posted a blog article weighing-in against the legislation. (Welcome back, Nick!) The article is actually a rather nice recap of why audits matter to taxpayers, but it is fatally flawed by a lack of first-hand experience. For example, one example used to show the importance of DCAA audits is the case of Centerra Services International. (We used that case to discuss CAS 402 in this article.) The POGO blog article implies that the discovery of Centerra’s alleged misbilling originated from a DCAA audit finding; whereas the truth is that the origination was a whistleblower (qui tam) suit and DCAA had nothing to do with it. Contrary to the blog post’s assertion, this example is evidence of a lack of DCAA audit quality, since it took a whistleblower to bring the situation to the government’s attention.

Further, the POGO blog article endorses DoD’s policy position that DCAA is cheaper and more efficient that independent CPAs, by asserting that DCAA’s multiple audits create synergy. It states: “DCAA’s other auditing work with the same contractor and on the same contracts benefits from its incurred cost audits, and vice-versa. For instance, DCAA conducts audits of contractors’ billing, accounts, and internal control systems. The insights DCAA gains from those audits assists DCAA when it audits a contractor’s incurred costs.” Those of us with first-hand experience know that used to be the case, but that it stopped being true when Pat Fitzgerald took over and instituted an “every audit needs to stand alone” policy. Currently, DCAA auditors generally do not benefit from “insights” gained from other audit findings. Every risk assessment seems to result in the highest assessed risk, regardless of a lack of findings from prior audits.

The POGO blog article ends with DCAA’s chart showing a trending reduction in its embarrassingly large backlog of incurred cost audits. Left unmentioned is what readers of this blog already know: most of that reduction has come from calling audits “complete” without actually performing the audit procedures. Just as DCAA now completes nearly three-quarters of its “audits” without actually issuing an audit report or expressing a written conclusion that might be subject to GAGAS, DCAA also “completes” many “audits” without auditing a single taxpayer dollar.

And yet POGO, like Congressman Smith, thinks the status quo is just fine. The legislation’s attempt at radical reform should be repealed, according to them.

But there are other opinions.

The GovExec article has quickly gathered a number of comments, some pro and some anti the proposed legislation. One central point of contention has been whether or not DCAA audits are “inherently governmental.”

“Jack” says yes, but no. He posted “I agree it's inherently government but DCAA has proven it's inherently incompetent. DCAA has made Incurred cost audits impossible to do. No one with any sense of worth or common sense would want to work as an auditor. It's a nice gig for the layers of management who are never held accountable for anything. Common sense left the door years ago.”

“BKHCPA74” agreed, posting “… Outsource those babies! … Inherently governmental is a lie! Just saying that to keep the jobs! Outsource it all! I worked for DCAA and such a waste of taxpayer dollars. I could get quality audits out the door in a fraction of the time and better work! I am so fed up of the lie! Audits are NOT inherently governmental!! Too many levels of review and changes made that are majority wordsmithing that goes back and back for months wasting taxpayer dollars!!! If the public only knew the truth! It's quite sad really!”

“Modellsx” has a more balanced posting, writing “DCAA has many flaws, the main one being paralysis by analysis. But this is inherently governmental and private CPA's would not be protecting the taxpayers, they would be protecting the contractors.” (There was more to this post but we’re quoting the best bit.)

“Dennis J. Tisdale” posted “DCAA is held to a very high standard since 2009. It is almost impossible for a local office to issue a report because of the layers of review that the audits receive. Allowing only the Resident Auditor or Branch Manager to sign reports has created a totally unmanageable backlog in getting reports issued. The real problem that surfaced in 2009 was never addressed by the new policies. Managers were always working to beef up their productivity metrics and making the metrics harder to meet. This was the underlying cause of the problems.”

“Jack” and “BKHCPA74” started an illuminating thread. We’re going to quote at length because readers need to understand the insight that first-hand experience brings.

Jack:

DCAA is beyond fixing. The agency is so broken that the only way to fix it, is to blow it up. I worked at DCAA for many years but left because the insanity and dysfunction took a toll. Near the end of my career there, I wrote then Director Pat Fitzgerald an email on my DCAA email outlining the problems in detail. Within 10 minutes he responded and asked me to call him at an appointed time. I called and explained that the agency was ruled by the fear of being wrong and it had left everyone in a total state of paralysis for doing anything. After listening to me for 20 minutes, he agreed with everything I said and concluded by saying ‘What can I do to fix this?’ … Thank god I escaped and got a job at DCMA as a cost price analyst sitting 50 feet from where I used to sit. I now do the jobs DCAA used to do and more. Seven of my ex DCAA co-workers joined me in the exodus from DCAA. I love my job at DCMA because what I do is review proposals not document risk all day. It's actually fun to do work. DCAA can't save itself because it's culture is totally broken. They will never ever get the work done. My last supervisor at DCAA was more concerned that I claimed 61 miles to visit a contractor, yet he Googled it and got 60 miles. I was called to his office to explain what I did. This is the DCAA mentality!!!!!!! This supervisor was considered one of DCAA's best. Sad, sad, sad. They can't see the Forrest through the trees. Everyone knows DCAA is a joke.

BKHCPA74:

I have an audit practice, am a CPA, CFE and have over 15 years of financial statement, contracting and governmental audits! I worked as a senior auditor for DCAA at Lockheed for 3 years on F-35 program and have many years of Federal contracting experience. If the DoD privatizes the work, I am hiring. I have performed incurred cost, forward pricing, provisional billing rate, all kinds. I am service disabled vet and could lowball the competition. Hit me up for work! Business is good!

What’s our point of view? (Note that we are not in the audit business and have nothing to gain from the legislation, if passed.) Our recent article on DCAA audit quality and productivity statistics indicates that things are getting worse, not better. Something must be done. If radical change is what’s required, then so be it.

 

 

Quimba’s Long-Delayed Victory

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A search tells us that we’ve mentioned Quimba Software seven times on this blog. We were following Quimba’s Quixotic quest for redemption even before the company hired us to assist in one small aspect of its many pieces of litigation before the ASBCA and U.S. Court of Federal Claims. To us, Quimba typifies the story of a small business run by smart people who have to learn the hard way that government contract cost accounting compliance is something that should not be taken lightly.

In 2003 Quimba was awarded a $200,000 CPFF contract from the U.S. Air Force to perform “information technology research.” Quimba performed the work satisfactorily. Then, years after the contract was complete, DCAA performed an “incurred cost” audit of Quimba’s claimed 2004 direct and indirect costs, and disallowed claimed deferred compensation costs. But that was not the first issue that Quimba had with its government customer.

Pursuant to the terms of its contract, Quimba submitted invoices for its costs as it incurred them--i.e., as it performed the work. It had a single invoice (in the amount of $30,322) approved by DCAA and paid by the Air Force. And then everything went to hell.

Apparently, the issue was that Quimba’s accounting system “was not DCAA-approved” and its indirect rates were similarly “not DCAA-approved” and “Quimba was told that it ‘would not get paid until its indirect rates were approved by DCAA.’” It took almost an entire year for DCAA to approve Quimba’s provisional billing rates—even though that was clearly the contracting officer’s job. Regardless, Quimba was told that it wouldn’t be paid for its work until DCAA had approved its accounting system and its rates. And even after provisional billing rates had been agreed upon, “Quimba did not receive any additional payments for work completed in 2004 prior to the end of FY 2004, and the [DCAA accounting system] audit continued into 2005.”

Quimba completed its work in March 2005. It was only after the work was completed that DCAA was willing to approve Quimba’s invoices.

The inequity in the foregoing facts should be obvious. Quimba was treated shamefully but, unfortunately, that treatment is not unusual. Small businesses get bullied by government customers, and typically they lack the knowledge, experience, and resources to do anything about it.

Back to the story. “In May 2007, DCAA initiated an audit of Quimba’s FY 2004 ICP and an audit report was issued in July 2007.” (DCAA moved a lot faster then than it does today. We suspect the speed of the audit was helped by the fact that Quimba had only one government cost-type contract.) DCAA questioned $61,124 of Quimba’s claimed direct labor (charged to its one cost-type government contract) because “wages paid and deducted as compensation under IRS regulations to the two owners [were] significantly less than direct labor claimed on the government contract.”

The contracting officer took that finding and multiplied it, using some form of math unknown to people without Certificates of Appointment. The CO issued a Notice of Intent to disallow $148,684, because Quimba allegedly claimed costs made unallowable by the FAR compensation cost principle (31.205-6(b)(2)(i)) – “for closely held corporations, compensation costs . . . shall not be recognized in amounts exceeding those costs that are deductible as compensation under the Internal Revenue code and regulations under it.” In the Contracting Officer Final Decision (COFD), the claim was for $91,993. During arguments before the Court, the government admitted that figure was incorrect. The contracting officer knew it was incorrect but refused to revise or rescind the COFD.

And even though the government admitted the math was wrong, it still filed a counter-claim, demanding an additional $76,482—a figure that was later changed to $50,096.

Remember the original contract award was for $200,000. Basically, the government was demanding nearly three-quarters of the entire contract value, all related to Quimba’s claim of deferred compensation. And the Court was deciding the dispute a nearly 15 years after the costs had been incurred and claimed and billed and paid.

Quimba, readers may recall, was a small business. How many small businesses have the resources to maintain a fight with the U.S. Government for that length of time? Answer: Not many. Not very many at all.

Finally, nearly 15 years later, Quimba learned that, indeed, its deferred compensation costs were allowable, because they were deductible under IRS guidelines. The compensation costs were deductible because Quimba had no choice but to defer compensation costs. It had no choice but to defer compensation costs because its government customer refused to pay its bills. Quimba had no cash flow and was required to perform its contract work anyway, so it had to defer its compensation costs until the government got around to paying the bills.

According to the Court of Federal Claims, in a decision written by Senior Judge Loren Smith—

It is clear to this Court that, had the parties examined the C.F.R. more closely, the rebuttable presumption contained in 26 C.F.R. § 1.404(b)-1T would have resolved this case long ago. Quimba’s deferral of its FY 2004 compensation was unintended, unavoidable, and unanticipated. Furthermore, Quimba’s financial difficulty, which forced payment of the compensation beyond 2004, was unforeseeable throughout FY 2004. … While Quimba understood the company would be required to update its accounting system, there was no reason to believe that the updating and approval process would take the entirety of FY 2004 and continue through a significant part of FY 2005. This is not a case in which the company had a prior course of dealing with the government or an understanding of the elusive accounting system requirements. … As the government forced Quimba’s hand, it would be inequitable to find these deferred compensation costs unallowable nearly thirteen years after the fiscal year in question. The facts in this case make it clear that Quimba’s situation falls within this limited exception, and, had the government engaged in a more careful review of its own regulations, the parties could have avoided five years of unnecessary litigation.

(Emphasis added.)

Thus, Quimba emerged victorious. The government may still appeal the decision, but we suspect the government attorneys will read between the lines, and consider the matter resolved.

As for Quimba Software … it closed its doors long ago. The litigation was funded by the company owner(s), as a matter of principle and in an attempt to obtain some small measure of justice.

 

 

DCAA Audit Results Disheartening

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And once again we are back to tell you that DCAA’s productivity stats continue to fall, despite pressure from Congress.

This situation is an oft-repeated theme on this blog. DCAA audit productivity continues to fall and there is seemingly nothing that can be done about it, not even by Congress—who told DCAA to quit performing audit work for others until it can get its own house in order. DCAA either cannot or will not reform its audit procedures and review practices to get audit reports out the door and into the hands of users any faster. At this point, if productivity stats fall any further, we may as well call “game over” and find another function to assist contracting officers.

We’re talking about the latest DoDOIG Semi-Annual Report to Congress, covering the period October 1, 2016 through March 30, 2017. Appendices E and F discuss DCAA audit statistics for the period.

And boy, are they really not good statistics.

We are fond of comparing DCAA stats of today to those of yesteryear, the time before DCAA management created its unique interpretation of GAGAS and decided to implement multiple layers of review on every audit report. But we’re not going to do that in this article. Instead, we’re going to compare the first six months of GFY 2017 to the first six months of GFY 2016. We’ll perform a very simple year-over-year flux analysis.

Total number of assignments completed in Period 1, 2016: 5,057

Total number of assignments completed in Period 1, 2017: 4,634

Difference: 423

Percentage reduction in output: 8%

 

Total number of audit reports issued in Period 1, 2016: 1,480

Total number of audit reports issued in Period 1, 2017: 1,243

Difference: 237

Percentage reduction in output: 16%

 

Total dollars examined ($ millions) in Period 1, 2016: $96,807.2

Total dollars examined ($ millions) in Period 1, 2017: $95,354.1

Difference: $ 1,453.1

Percentage reduction in output: 1.5%

 

Total dollars questioned ($ millions) in Period 1, 2016: $3,224.4

Total dollars questioned ($ millions) in Period 1, 2017: $2,322.0

Difference: $ 902.4

Percentage reduction in output: 28.0%

To sum up, DCAA issued 16 percent fewer audit reports in the first half of GFY 2017 than it did in the same period last year, even though it examined roughly the same amount of costs in both periods. With respect to the audit reports it did issue, it questioned 28 percent fewer costs than it did in the same period last year. Looking beyond audit reports, DCAA “completed” eight percent fewer assignments than it did last year.

One bright spot is that contracting officer sustention of post-award audit findings is steady year-over-year. The comparable 2016 sustention rate was 26 percent, and the 2017 sustention rate was 25.5%. So DCAA is holding steady at a sustention rate of just a hair over one quarter of its audit findings, meaning that contracting officers are non-sustaining roughly 75 percent of DCAA audit findings. How’s that for an audit quality metric?

All this despite continuous internal reforms, rejiggering of audit programs and procedures, and the clear Congressional message that the status quo is not acceptable.

Indeed, DCAA is not resting on the status quo: it is continuing to get worse in pretty much every single audit metric that matters.

Again, we could have compared GFY 2017 status to much older stats – say, GFY 2007. Trust us: the comparison would have been far less flattering to DCAA than the one we published.

 


Page 70 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.