It’s Complicated But Northrop Won
People who don’t know very much about government contract cost accounting and associated compliance rules think it’s just a matter of reading FAR and CAS, and there you go. Just read the rules and follow them. How hard can that be?
People who know more about the topic realize that it’s not only a matter of an individual’s interpretation of the regulations. You also need to have a basic familiarity with judicial decisions that have supplied the official interpretation. You need to understand how judges (particularly those at the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals and the Court of Federal Claims) have interpreted those regulations and rules. And you probably need to know whether the U.S. Court of Appeals (Federal Circuit) has sustained or remanded those decisions. You don’t need to be a lawyer but it helps to have read a few legal decisions.
People who know a lot about the topic realize just how complex it is. It’s not just all of the foregoing; there are new issues constantly being raised. The truth of the matter is that reality is more complicated than the regulations can possibly envision, and so new issues arise and need to be addressed. It’s a never-ending cycle and people who do this for a living understand just how complicated some of the issues that arise can become.
Today’s article is about one such issue. It’s so complicated that we skipped writing about it in 2014, when the first ASBCA decision was issued. It’s so complicated that we debated for some time before writing about it today, just after the latest ASBCA decision was issued. Finally we decided to acknowledge the decision without getting into the (complex and complicated) details, just as a lesson regarding how deep the government contract cost accounting rabbit hole can go.
At stake was some $253 million dollars. As we’ve stated before, when the government decides to question big dollar costs, contractors will lawyer-up. They will fight. The stakes are too high. This is one of those times where there was so much money at stake that Northrop had to litigate the issue.
Note that we are not lawyers, we are not actuaries, and we are not experts in the accounting requirements associated with Post Retirement Benefits (PRBs). Northrop Grumman was represented by the top-tier inside-the-Beltway law firm of Crowell & Moring, and if you want better information we suggest you reach out to the attorneys who litigated the matter on Northrop’s behalf.
All that being said, here is a brief summary of the facts as we understand them.
- Prior to 1995, Northrop Grumman (NGC) accounted for the cost of its PRB expenses using a method that conformed to the requirements of the 1984 Deficit Reduction Act (DEFRA), using generally accepted actuarial principles.
- In 1995, the FAR was revised at 31.205-6(o). The government’s position was that the revised FAR required NGC to change its PRB accounting methodology, and to fund its PRB liability before filing of Federal income tax returns.
- Between 1995 and 2006, NGC continued to account for its PRB costs using the DEFRA methodology. “NGC documented its accrual costing method in the company's cost accounting standards (CAS) Disclosure Statement that was reviewed and approved by the government. No allegation was made during that period that NGC's accounting for the Plan's PRB costs using the DEFRA method was noncompliant with NGC's disclosed practices or with CAS. Further, during that period, no unallowable Plan costs were identified by DCAA in any audit of the NGC Corporate Home Office final indirect cost submissions for any period between 1995 and 2005 (the last year audited).”
- In 1990, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued FAS 106, which required a different PRB accounting method than was permitted by DEFRA. NGC implemented FAS 106 for financial reporting purposes (as it had to), but continued to use its DEFRA methodology for government contract cost accounting purposes until 2006. Importantly: “NGC's PRB costs calculated during this period were less than the costs would have been had NGC instead used FAS 106 to measure and assign costs.” (Emphasis added.)
- Starting in 2006, NGC entered into discussions with DCMA regarding its PRB accounting methodology. NGC initially proposed continuing to use its DEFRA methodology but, after that approach was rejected, it proposed transitioning to the FAS 106 methodology. NGC attempted to obtain an Advance Agreement for its practices, but DCMA declined.
- The government asserted that, had NGC used the FAS 106 method after 1995 (as it contended FAR 31.205-6(o) required), it would have had higher PRB expenses in those years. In the government’s view, NGC’s methodology shifted PRB costs from past years to future years. Because NGC hadn’t funded its PRB liability in the current period, those future costs were unallowable. “If NGC had used the FAS 106 method instead of DEFRA, the costs assigned to that period [1995 to 2006] would have been approximately $253 million more (the amount of the disallowance) than were assigned under DEFRA.”
- Importantly: “At some future point, costs calculated using the DEFRA method would exceed FAS 106 calculated costs, barring reduction in Plan benefits. NGC's position is that when and if the cross-over occurred, allowable costs would be limited to the amounts calculated using FAS 106 (pursuant to FAR 31.201-2(c)).”
- In the first decision, addressing entitlement only, the Board found that “for government contract accounting purposes, NGC failed to measure, accrue, assign and fund its PRB costs in accordance with FAS 106 and FAR 31.205-6(o) allowability criteria during FYs 1995-2006, prior to NGC's 2006 ‘transition’ to the FAR-compliant methodology.”
- However, in the second decision, addressing quantum (the amount NGC would owe the government for its failure to comply with the regulatory requirements), the Board found that “the government unreasonably interpreted the cost principle and ultimately suffered no damages as a result of appellant's use of DEFRA from 1995-2006 for government accounting purposes because of appellant's 2006 Plan amendment implemented concurrently with NGC's transition to FAS 106.”
See? We told you it was complicated.
Another important point is that DCMA’s own Contractor Insurance/Pension Review experts disagreed with the position taken by DCMA and, ultimately, the government at trial. The DCMA’s own actuarial experts were fine with the methodology that NGC used, and they were not at all worried about cost-shifting.
So where did the disallowance come from? Where did the DCMA’s initial disallowance and Contracting Officer Final Decision come from?
You guessed it.
DCAA.
From the (second) ASBCA decision—
NGC discussed the possible changes with the DCAA auditor who had been primarily responsible for auditing NGC's PRB costs during most of the period at issue. In those conversations, the auditor suggested that the DEFRA method was not compliant with the FAR and that NGC might have created a pool of ‘forever unallowable’ costs by failing to accrue and charge the maximum amount permitted by the FAR.
This is not the first time a DCAA theory has been rejected by a Court, as documented on this blog. When will DCMA contracting officers stop relying on DCAA auditors for anything other than audit findings? We noted that Northrop tried several times to avoid this dispute, but DCMA (possibly spurred on by DCAA) was having none of it. We’re sure that $253 million in questioned costs looked great to Fort Belvoir and was a nice addition to the DoD OIG Semi-Annual Report to Congress, but the fact of the matter is that the auditor’s flawed legal theory—which was contrary to the findings of the DCMA actual experts—wasted millions of taxpayer dollars.
Anyway, let’s wrap this up by quoting at length from the Board’s decision, written by Judge Peacock.
We consider that FAR 31.205-6(o), properly construed, establishes a cost allowability ‘ceiling,’ and focuses on whether the contractor overcharged the government for PRB costs in its relevant cost-related submissions. There is no dispute that for more than a decade preceding the ‘transition’ NGC did not. From the onset of the FAR requirement in 1995 through 2006, NGC's use of the DEFRA method resulted in the contractor annually charging the government less than it could have claimed had it elected to use the FAS 106 methodology for government accounting purposes during those pre-transition years. For that decade, the government unsurprisingly did not object. In fact, the government was well aware that appellant continued to use the DEFRA methodology but repeatedly approved its use as being in compliance with regulatory criteria. …
Interpretation of the provision with respect to ‘quantum’ was not even clear and uniform within the government. The CIPR team's analysis and interpretation differed from that proffered by DCAA and ultimately adopted by the DCE. We consider that the CIPR team correctly interpreted the principle in the first instance. …
The government interpretation advocated in this appeal regarding the pre-transition years also contradicts the general rule regarding the quantum consequences of noncompliance prescribed in FAR 31.201-2(c). That provision states, ‘When contractor accounting practices are inconsistent with this Subpart 31.2, costs resulting from such inconsistent practices in excess of the amount that would have resulted from using practices consistent with this subpart are unallowable.’ Here, NGC failed to comply with the FAR requirement that allowable costs be accrued in accordance with FAS 106 criteria where an accrual methodology was used by the contractor to determine its allowable PRB costs. Although appellant failed to use the proper accrual methodology, there is no evidence or government contention that the amount accrued by appellant pursuant to DEFRA in the pre-transition years exceeded the amount of costs that would have been allowable applying FAS 106 or even an amount calculable for the Plan using the ‘pay-as-you-go’ methodology. In fact, precisely the opposite is true. …
The requisite PRB funding levels (and costs flowing therefrom) are for NGC to determine. … It is illogical and shortsighted for the government to interpret the provision in a manner dictating that appellant must charge or should have charged the government the full FAS 106 amount, where the contractor determines it is not necessary to pay that full amount to attract and maintain a quality workforce. If NGC had done so, presumptively the excess compensation cost would also be unreasonable as beyond its agreement with covered employees as reflected in the Plan. The assignment and funding requirements are designed to protect the government from paying excessive costs. Any ‘failure’ to assign and/or fund, whether the result of the contractor's best business judgment or other factors specific to the contractor, benefits the government. …
Company-specific PRB costs in this appeal are not ‘incurred’ for government contract accounting purposes based on generic FAS 106 requirements established for purposes of cross-corporate financial comparisons and standardized public reporting. Nor is the amount of cost ‘incurred’ for government contract accounting purposes determined by, or equal to, allowability maximums calculable under the FAR. The regulation does not dictate PRB benefit levels and costs contractors must incur. It simply and solely sets a ceiling limiting the PRB cost allowable and payable under flexibly-priced government contracts. …
The government myopically alleges that appellant should have ‘assigned’ more than required by the Plan to each of those years. However, if PRB costs are not incurred, there is no requirement to assign, much less fund, ‘phantom’ costs. There is no evidence or allegation that a major contractor such as NGC would be unable or otherwise fail to fund properly incurred, measured and assigned costs. NGC funds what it properly accrues and assigns. … The regulation must be interpreted in the context of and in conformance with basic accounting principles of incurrence, assignment and accrual. …
The government has failed to sustain its burden of proving that any of the disallowed amount was or will be amortized as part of the transition obligation and claimed during the post-transition years. Its argument is founded on theoretical constructs that have no factual basis or evidentiary support here. In this case, the government's concerns were legitimate, albeit its legal and factual analysis was faulty.
(Emphasis in original.)
So sometimes government contract cost accounting can be complicated. This is one of those times. At the end of the day, Northrop Grumman spent millions of dollars on unallowable attorney fees, money that could have been used to fund IR&D projects or to attract scientists or engineers. The government took time and resources away from fighting overt contractor corruption in order to pursue one DCAA auditor’s legal theory, a theory that had been rejected by DCMA’s own Insurance and Pension experts. However, we need to keep in mind that the matter was complicated and, although the Board found the legal theory to be flawed, the situation was so complicated that it took two decisions over the course of more than three years to get to the answer.
Which may be appealed….
Holiday Hiatus
Readers, clients, friends—and those who fall into all three categories: please be advised that Apogee Consulting, Inc. is shutting down for a summer holiday break. We will not be writing any blog articles, or participating in any conference calls until we return in early August. For that matter, we will not be answering emails, or the phone, or doing anything connected with “work” until our return.
We think we’ve earned a bit of a rest.
In the first half of 2017, this blog published 54 articles. That’s the highest rate of productivity we’ve been able to achieve in a few years—up about 20% from last year, for example. In contrast, DCAA has managed to publish three (3) MRDs in that same time period. (Granted, that’s a false equivalency—but it was a fun one to make.)
We promise to resume the pace upon our return.
In the meantime, feel free to review our archive of well more than 1,000 articles.
If you get bored, consider one of the following actions:
1. Go to the Section 809 panel and submit recommendations for significant changes that could be made to the current acquisition regulatory regime.
2. Write your Congressional Representative or Senator and ask them to demand the current Administration nominate an OFPP Administrator who will become the CAS Board Chair.
If you choose not to try to fix things (and of course it is your choice), then your complaints about the problems with the current system will not be received favorably here at Apogee Consulting, Inc.
Best wishes until our return.
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Small Business Reporting Math Errors Cost Contractor
From time to time Apogee Consulting, Inc. is asked to assist a contractor in the development of its first small business plan. For those who don’t know, most government contracts awarded to large businesses require those large prime contractors to subcontract certain portions of the contract work to “socioeconomically disadvantaged” small businesses. The large prime commits to making a good faith effort to subcontract certain percentages of its contract work to various categories of small businesses. Periodically the contractor has to report the actual percentages it has awarded to each small business category. (See FAR Part 19 and associated contract clauses for more details.)
In a recent ASBCA decision, BAE Systems Southeast Shipyards Mayport LLC (“BAE Systems”) learned that math errors made in calculating its subcontract award percentages cost it more than $1 million dollars of lost award and incentive fees in its naval maintenance and repair contracts.
BAE Systems was dealing with more than the “normal” small business requirements. In order to attain its full amount of award and incentive fees, BAE Systems was required to subcontract out “at least 40 percent of the direct costs of the contract to small business concerns during each fee evaluation period.” If BAE Systems failed to meet its 40 percent goal, then its award and incentive fees would be adjusted downwards.
The issue here was that Atlantic Marine Florida (AMF), a large business, had the only available certified dry-dock suitable for the types of vessels that would be worked on. Thus, if AMF was included in the amount of subcontracted work, then it would be nearly impossible to reach the required 40 percent small business subcontract goal. This issue was raised by multiple offerors during the solicitation phase and the Navy responded by telling all bidders that “offerors will be allowed to exclude the use of the AMF dry-docking facility from the 40% small business subcontracting requirement.”
In the sixth award fee evaluation period, BAE Systems reported subcontracting 40.32 percent to small businesses. However, government reviewers noted errors in the math. BAE System agreed that it had “double-counted” certain costs and revised its calculations.
The revisions included:
The government didn’t care for this math. As Judge Woodrow, writing for the Board, noted:
In calculating the small business utilization for the USS San Jacinto job, appellant excluded the $1,132,854 from the contract cost (the denominator in the formula) but left that amount in the small business cost (the numerator in the formula). This adjustment resulted in a small business utilization percentage of 235.46 percent for the USS San Jacinto job. After these adjustments, appellant calculated its composite small business utilization percentage for all of the jobs included in AFEP 6 to be 44.68 percent. In contrast, the government calculated appellant's composite small business utilization percentage to be 25.96 percent.
(Internal citations omitted.)
The government’s position was summarized as follows:
The government makes two challenges to appellant's calculation of the small business utilization percentage. First, the government contends that appellant should have subtracted the AMF costs from both the numerator and denominator of the fraction. Similarly, in its answer, the government argues that, if appellant is permitted to subtract the AMF costs from the contract cost in the denominator, it also must exclude from the numerator the corresponding costs of second-tier small business subcontractors who performed work for AMF. The government also makes this argument in the COFD, where it states that the subcontracting dollars in the numerator must have a ‘direct correlation and be attributed to the 'direct costs related to production work’’ as contained within the denominator.
(Internal citations omitted.)
The Board agreed with the government’s argument. If BAE Systems excluded AMF costs from the amount of direct contract work, then it must also exclude AMF’s own small business subcontracting dollars from the numerator.
Granted, this was a complicated situation. Most contractors do not count their subcontractors’ subcontract award dollars in their reports. (But that day is coming.)
The point here is that small business plans need to be more than paper. Hitting the commitment amounts involves more than simply attending one or two “outreach” events per year. In order to successfully implement your plan, it needs to be “owned” by somebody in your organization with authority to make it happen, and there needs to be policies and procedures that describe how it will work. Those policies and procedures must be cross-functional, in that everybody who makes a decision regarding which entities receive work must be aware of the overall organizational commitments.
Too often we have seen “paper” plans with no ownership, with no accountability or responsibility or authority, and with little or no policies and procedures that describe their workings. When we encounter such situations, we can say, with a high degree of confidence, that those plans will never be successful.
When we work with contractors to develop their first small business plans, we emphasize the need for organizational accountability and cross-functional “buy-in”—and we urge our clients to develop appropriate policies and procedures to make those plans successful.
It’s the right thing to do.
Communication
If you live in California (or neighboring states, or Texas) you will have heard about In-n-Out Burger, one of the nation’s premier fast-food restaurant chains. The family-owned chain has been around since 1946, and still does things “the old fashioned way”—which includes a relentless focus on food quality and customer service. We visited a local In-n-Out restaurant recently and we were struck by the quality of communication the team exhibited.
It should be obvious that a fast-food restaurant is staffed by a team of individuals, each with a primary assignment. At In-n-Out, some people make the fries and other people grill the patties and still other people take the patties and turn them into custom-ordered hamburgers. (For example, my favorite order is a Double-Single, animal style, extra pickles. That order makes sense at In-n-Out, and nobody pauses for even half a second when I make it.) The bottom-line is that this group of individuals has to work together as a team so as to receive, make, and deliver customer orders. They must do so as quickly and as efficiently as possible (since no order is started before it’s ordered), knowing that each order is going to be a one-off package uniquely tailored to the customer’s specifications. In other words, there is very little standard work at In-n-Out. There are standard processes, but almost no standard work. Thus, the team not only has to work together as one, but it must be flexible and adapt quickly to what the customers are ordering at the time.
The team accomplishes this through communication.
Years ago we worked on teams that used a tailored CMMI maturity model to evaluate the program management function at various aerospace and defense companies. At that time, we didn’t specifically focus on evaluating internal and external communications but, if we had, we probably would have set up a maturity model along the following lines:
1 – Rigid silos in evidence. Little or no internal communication between silos. Customer communications restricted to specific silos (e.g., Contracts) with little or no dissemination outside designated silos. Internal and external lines of communication have gaps and/or are misaligned. No escalation of risks and issues outside of silos.
2 – Rigid silos in evidence. Ad hoc / informal communication between silos. Customer communications officially restricted to specific silos with informal dissemination outside silos. Internal and external lines of communication have no gaps but may be misaligned in some instances. Escalation of risks and issues outside silos reactive and not timely.
3 – Silos in evidence but formal and informal communication between silos noted. Some use of Integrated Process Teams (IPTs) but IPTs are not the norm and may not be aligned when they exist. Customer communication disseminated through program team and matrix functions through documented protocols. Internal and external lines of communication are aligned, and have no gaps. Escalation of risks and issues formalized but posture is still reactive.
4 – IPTs abundant, managed, and aligned to bridge silos. Customer communication quickly disseminated to all stakeholders. Internal and external lines of communication are robust, linked to document management functions, aligned, and have no gaps. Risk and issues managed, escalated timely to minimize reactivity.
5 – Culture of communication and information management. Formal and informal communications abundant, designed to efficiently disseminate information, including risks and issues, to all stakeholders. Document management and retention linked to communication. All internal and external lines of communication operating well.
Our experience at In-n-Out would have pegged that restaurant as operating somewhere between a 3 and a 4 on the scale described above. The shift lead was communicating constantly with her team, telling people where to go and what to do. She clearly communicated her expectations, both for individuals and for the team as a whole. (For example, she said “I expect at least one positive customer comment to the feedback line for this shift. What are you going to do to make that happen?”) In a moment of quiet she went over and explained to a new person running the register how to properly input the special orders so that the rest of the team would understand what they had to do. People spoke to each other and the food was prepared and delivered quickly.
There was one time at a swanky restaurant in Las Vegas when I saw a team operating at a level beyond rating. The kitchen was open and the patrons sat around watching food being prepared. And not a word was exchanged between the individuals in the kitchen. They were silent. They were silent because they all knew what needed to be done and were proficient at doing it. They were demonstrating “unconscious competence” and the patrons were paying for it. (It was worth it.)
How would you rank your operating culture in terms of communication?
In our experience government contractors don’t have really great communication. Which is a problem for the compliance function, because communication facilitates compliance.
Questions to consider when ranking your operating culture:
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Does the proposal team know the terms and conditions that affect the cost estimate? For example, are there Section H terms that impact per diem reimbursement? If personnel are operating OCONUS, does the team understand the tax implications?
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How accurate is the contract brief? What’s the lag time between receipt of a contract mod and the updating of the contract brief? Is the contract brief disseminated to everybody who needs to know contract information, including the billing function?
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What indirect rates are used to prepare program EACs? Are they the most current and accurate rates or are they last year’s FPRA rates?
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What is the time lag between submission of final billing rates and the submission of “period 13” adjustment vouchers?
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In a T&M contract environment, how often are hourly labor billing rates reviewed to make sure all personnel are in the correct rate categories?
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When senior leadership makes a strategic decision, how long does it take for that decision to be disseminated to the rest of the organization?
We could go on.
The point of this article is that communication matters. It may be the single most important indication of the ability of an organization to execute efficiently and effectively.
In-n-Out Burger may have figured out how to communicate and how to use communication to facilitate superior execution.
How are you doing?
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