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Apogee Consulting Inc

Post-Award Accounting System Audits

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Post-award Accounting System audits exist somewhere in the gray area between (1) pre-award Accounting System surveys, (2) audits of Accounting System internal controls, and (3) reviews of the Accounting System as a contractor business system. Accordingly, it’s challenging to prepare for one, even if you have the DCAA’s audit program.

Everybody knows (or should know) that having DCAA determine that your Accounting System is adequate (or, perhaps more accurately, recommending to a contracting officer that your accounting system be determined to be adequate) is a critical step for a government contractor. Yet the subject is surprisingly complex. DCAA devotes an entire chapter in the Contract Audit Manual (CAM)—Chapter 5, “Audit of Policies, Procedures, and Internal Controls Relative to Accounting and Management Systems”—to the topic.

If you are a smaller contractor—a “non-major” in DCAA’s parlance—then you are probably not subject to the Contractor Business System administration and oversight regime defined by DFARS contract clause 252.242-7005. And even if you are a “major” contractor, you still may not be subject to the DFARS Contractor Business System administration and oversight regime, because it is only enforced on the largest contractors. (Why? Because neither DCAA nor DCMA have the resources to enforce the contract clause requirements on all contractors subject to the rule.) Therefore, if you are a “non-major” contractor, then you are likely to be subject either to a very light analysis of your Accounting System internal controls or else be subject to the post-award Accounting System survey.

When DCAA wants to evaluate the Accounting System internal controls at a “non-major” contractor it tends to do so via having the contractor fill-out a questionnaire. The CAM states (at 5-111)—

The process for obtaining an understanding of a contractor's internal controls and assessing control risk at most nonmajor contractors is accomplished by using the Survey of Contractor's Organization, Accounting System, and System of Internal Controls (ICQ) and the Internal Control Matrix, Control Environment and Overall Accounting Controls (ICM-ACTG) which are available on the DCAA Intranet and the APPS.

Obviously, the larger and more complex the contractor’s accounting system, the more rigor that DCAA will use in its evaluation of the ICQ. As the CAM states—

Smaller entities with active management involvement may not need extensive descriptions of accounting procedures, sophisticated accounting records, or written policies. Communications may be less formal and easier to achieve in a small or midsized company than in a larger enterprise due to the smaller organization’s size and fewer levels as well as management’s greater visibility and availability. However, when small or midsized entities are involved in complex transactions or are subject to the same legal and regulatory requirements as larger entities, more formal means of ensuring that internal control objectives are achieved may be necessary.

The CAM further states, “if the nonmajor contractor has one or more of the accounting and management systems listed in 5-102d that generate significant costs, the auditor can use the CAM guidance in Chapter 5, the audit program related to the system, and the related ICAPS with the ICQ to audit the internal controls.”

If the contractor has a contract that contains the DFARS contract clause 252.242-7006 (“Accounting System Administration”) but the 252.242-7005 Business Systems clause is missing (because either the contract or the contractor didn’t qualify for its inclusion), then DCAA will use the official post-award Accounting System audit program (link in the first paragraph). According to the CAM (at 5-203), the post-award audit should be initiated when a pre-award Accounting System survey was not performed or else it was performed but a follow-up review was recommended at that time. Either a contracting officer or a DCAA auditor can initiate the post-award audit.

According to the CAM—

The post award accounting system audit program includes comprehensive steps to gain a detailed understanding of the contractor’s accounting system (e.g., tracing costs billed to source documentation) sufficient to render an opinion on compliance with the DFARS 252.242-7006, Accounting System Administration, requirements. [But if] the procedures in the audit program are not sufficient to render an opinion on the key control activities and objectives that comprise an audit of internal controls. If the auditor determines that the nonmajor contractor's accounting system is so complex, it requires audit procedures contained in the audit program for a major contractor, the auditor should discontinue the audit under 17741 and use the Activity Code 11070, Accounting System Audit.

Again, we see that the nature of the contractor’s accounting system should determine the type and depth of audit. It’s interesting to see that a contractor with a complex enough accounting system can actually be subject to the full-scope Accounting System Review audit program, even if it is a non-major contractor that (presumably) would not normally be subject to that level of scrutiny. Obviously, if the audit results in adverse findings and a recommendation to the contracting officer that the Accounting System not be found to be adequate, there would be no mandatory payment withholds (as would be the case with a large contractor subject to the requirements of the 252.242-7005 clause). That said, we would expect a contractor—of any size—that received such an adverse audit report to make it a high priority to immediately initiate corrective actions to address the audit findings.

Thus, if you think your accounting system is so complex that DCAA may use its formal audit program, then you would be well-advised to go find that audit program and prepare for it.

Only you won’t find it on the DCAA website.

It’s missing.

DCAA is currently preparing a new revision of that Accounting System Review audit program, and you can’t see it until it’s officially published on the DCAA website. In the meantime, any older audit programs have been removed.

Readers may recall that the Accounting System Review audit program was one of the first significant audit programs revised after (1) GAO and DODOIG criticism of DCAA audit quality, and (2) implementation of the 2011 DFARS Contractor Business System administration and oversight regime. Then-Director Fitzgerald discussed it at the time, and pointed to it as one of his most important accomplishments. Indeed, in accordance with its importance, a few of the largest defense contractors were chosen to “pilot” the new audit program to make sure it was effective. (Readers may not be aware that the results of that pilot program were … mixed. In hindsight, the fact that it took DCAA auditors literally years to issue the resulting audit reports presaged the agency’s current challenges with audit timeliness and auditor productivity.) It was a Big Deal.

DCAA is now in the process of rejiggering that Big Deal audit program, and most of us don’t know what it’s going to look like. Thus, it is difficult to prepare for any post-award Accounting System Review audits that may use that as-yet-unpublished audit program. (FYI: We’ve seen a draft of the new program, but there’s no guarantee that the contents won’t change between the draft and the final audit program.)

So what is a contractor to do in the meantime?

Our best advice is to go directly to the Accounting System adequacy criteria found in the DFARS, at 252.242-7006. There are eighteen criteria. DCAA auditors must address each of those criteria in performing their audits. Do a self-assessment and see how well you comply with each criterion. Look at your policies and procedures. Do you have written documentation that addresses each criterion? To the extent you see gaps, you know where you have work to do.

 

 

Intellectual Property Dispute

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We noted in passing that Advanced Aerospace Technologies, Inc. (AATI) had settled its dispute with Insitu and The Boeing Company and the US government over allegations that its patented technology had been infringed upon. AATI received $12.5 million in the settlement.

The settlement marks a long and contentious litigation history, going back to 2012. A key turning point occurred in early 2016, when Chief Judge Braden reviewed documents alleged to be attorney-client privileged, and ruled that many of the documents were not, in fact, privileged—and thus subject to discovery. Another litigation milestone occurred in November, 2016, when Chief Judge Braden denied a late Government Motion to Dismiss. In that latter decision, Chief Judge Braden provided a lengthy recital of the history of the dispute, as well as an appendix detailing “relevant statutory and regulatory provisions” that would seem to be a good resource for those hoping to deal with intellectual property matters within a government contracting environment.

We are not attorneys, nor are we any kind of intellectual property experts. That said, as we understand the decisions, AATI filed its patents, then received a government contract that required use of the patented technology. To summarize the dispute, we’ll just quote from Chief Judge Braden’s decision, omitting all internal citations.

On October 23, 25, and 27, 2000, AATI demonstrated a recovery system having a propeller guard mounted with a latching mechanism for the Coast Guard. Although the Recovery Contract required ten demonstrations, the Coast Guard decided to cease demonstrations, because several UAVs were severely damaged during the demonstrations. Thereafter, a Coast Guard Commander prepared a draft report evaluating the demonstrations and provided it to Mr. McDonnell. This report did not reference ownership of, or licensing rights to, the propeller guard mounted with a latching mechanism that was demonstrated by AATI to the Coast Guard. More than fifteen years later, on March 29, 2016, a Contracting Officer for the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (‘NSWCDD’) sent a letter to AATI demanding title to the ‘inventions disclosed in AATI’s PCT/US/2009 Application; U.S. Patent Nos. 6,874,729; 7,097,137; 8,517,306; 8,167,242; 8,567,718; and 8,864,069; and U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 14/518,348,’ pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 2025 and Federal Acquisition Regulation § 52.227-11.

(The CO demand occurred years after AATI filed a claim asserting that Insitu and Boeing had infringed on its patents, with the government’s authorization and consent.)

So it took five years and an unknown amount of legal fees, but AATI and the defendants reached an acceptable settlement. We do not know where the $12.5 million settlement payment will come from. The government could pay it. Boeing could pay it. Boeing could pay it and be reimbursed by the government. We don’t know. But we know that AATI is $12.5 million richer than it was, before its patents were infringed upon.

 

 

DCAA Audits – Another Point of View

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It’s no secret that we’ve taken a hard line on recent DCAA audit statistics, pointing out decreased productivity and decreased audit quality as well. Not only is DCAA issuing fewer audit reports and questioning fewer costs than ever, the sustention rate is nothing to brag about either. (The sustention rate is the ratio of auditor questioned costs that are upheld by a contracting officer.) We’ve been hard on DCAA, no question about it.

And then we came across a report from the Department of Treasury that shows another point of view. It shows how valid DCAA audit findings can be thwarted because of contracting officer inaction. To be fair to the audit agency, we wanted to share that point of view with our readers.

The report in question was issued by the Department of Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). Audit report no. 2017-10-019, dated March 15, 2017, can be found here. The report is entitled “Resolution of Defense Contract Audit Agency Findings of Questioned Contractor Costs Needs Significant Improvement”.

DCAA performed audits for the IRS on a reimbursable basis, meaning that DCAA received funds from the Department of Treasury intended to reimburse it for its efforts. (Readers may recall that such audits for non-DOD agencies were curtailed by Congress for a brief period of time, so that DCAA could focus on its core mission of auditing Department of Defense contractors.) The funds that the IRS actually paid DCAA were trivial, amounting to some $5.7 million over a period of 9 years (2005 through 2014). Nonetheless, TIGTA auditors were upset that their agency didn’t see a better return on those payments. Although DCAA auditors questioned more than $80 million in IRS contractor dollars during that period, the agency only recovered about $1.4 million of that amount—leading to a situation in which less than 2 percent of questioned costs were recovered.

Actually the situation may have been worse than that, according to TIGTA. Only $540,000 of the claimed cost recoveries of $1.4 million “could be documented.” But let’s go with the $1.4 million figure because why would anybody lie about it? Anyway, here’s the summary from the report:

IRS contracting officers fully recovered questioned costs in response to six DCAA audit reports. In four of the remaining 19 instances, the IRS was able to justify its decisions not to recover the full amount of costs questioned by the DCAA. However, in 13 instances, sufficient documentation to justify IRS decisions could not be located or attempts to recover funds from the contractor were unsuccessful. Two instances were still pending a final resolution.

What went wrong? According to TIGTA the fundamental issue could be summarized in one sentence: “the IRS did not timely pursue questioned costs.”

TIGTA reported that “For 22 (96 percent) of the 23 cases we reviewed, the disposition memorandum indicated that the CO agreed with the DCAA findings overall. However, for 10 (45 percent) of these cases, the COs did not take action in response to the DCAA findings or did not recover the majority of the questioned costs identified in the related DCAA reports.”

TIGTA found that “the IRS took action to resolve the findings of DCAA reports within six months of receiving the report in only one … instance for the 25 audit reports we reviewed. Action was often deferred until contract closeout.”

By then it was often too late to collect questioned costs, because of that pesky Contract Disputes Act Statute of Limitations.

As TIGTA reported—

The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 imposes a six-year SOL on all claims, whether they are asserted by the contractor or by the Government. The limitations period begins to run upon accrual of a claim (when the contractors certified cost proposal is submitted), which is ‘the date when all events . . . that fix the alleged liability of either the Government or the contractor and permit assertion of the claim . . . were known or should have been known.’ We found that the SOL on recovery of disallowed questioned costs expired in six instances prior to the IRS either initiating or completing actions to recover the related funds, based on the date of the contractors’ cost proposal submissions. In two of the six instances, the SOL expired before the IRS received the DCAA report. However, in the remaining four instances, the expiration of the SOL occurred after the IRS received the DCAA report. The IRS was unable to recover the questioned costs in one of the four instances because it did not maintain sufficient documentation to substantiate its position for legal action regarding whether commercial labor rates charged by the contractor were appropriate. In the remaining instances, the IRS discontinued the demand for payment when notified by the contractor that the SOL had expired on the IRS’s claims. In these three instances, the IRS COs had time (which ranged from two-to-37 months after receipt of the DCAA report) to research the audit’s questioned cost findings, decide if the questioned costs were unallowable, and issue a claim to the contractor to recover funds before the SOL expired. However, while the COs may wait for the receipt of a DCAA audit report before making a decision about whether to bring a potential claim against a contractor, it will not extend the SOL time periods for those claims if the underlying facts should have been known earlier. The COs have authority under FAR § 42.801 to disallow costs on their own authority over the life of the contract. The statutory period begins to run when the Government knows or reasonably should know of an alleged violation and the resulting impact, not when DCAA audits identify it. Because the responsible COs did not take action within the six-year SOL period, the IRS lost the opportunity to recoup more than $22 million in questioned costs identified by the DCAA. These delays occurred in part because the Office of Procurement had not established specific procedures for monitoring the date of the contractors cost proposal submission and the time remaining to recover questioned costs before the SOL expires, and because the COs did not place a high priority on making cost recoveries.

(Emphasis added; internal footnotes omitted.

It wasn’t a high priority.

This from the IRS, the agency that’s responsible for pursuing delinquent tax payments. For pursuing under-payments of taxes lawfully owed. That’s kind of ironic; are we right?

But there’s more to the story. According to the TIGTA report—

According to the COs we interviewed, the organizational focus for the COs at the IRS is to expeditiously make awards and obligate funding, not to recover unallowable costs paid to contractors. The COs also cited significant workloads, resource constraints, and a dwindling acquisition workforce due to a hiring freeze at the IRS as reasons for not recouping questioned costs. In some cases, the COs indicated that the questioned cost amount did not warrant the effort and potential expense to make the recovery. In another example, IRS Office of Chief Counsel stated that the COs did not sufficiently develop their position or assemble the documentation that was necessary for them to pursue legal actions to recover disallowed costs from the contractor.

Put yourself in the shoes of the DCAA auditors performing these audits. You do your job. The contracting officer agrees with your findings. Only the government never gets the money it’s owed. That’s gotta suck, big time.

Or put yourself in the shoes of the government agency that paid DCAA for performing audits, audits its contracting officers never had the time or inclination to effectively resolve in a timely manner. That would be disappointing, as well.

So here’s another viewpoint of government audits, one filled with bureaucracy and frustration. The audit is performed the way it’s supposed to be performed, but there is no tangible result as one would expect.

No wonder DCAA has trouble retaining its workforce.

 

 

Teaming Agreements

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FAR 9.6 discusses “contractor team arrangements,” defined as “(1) Two or more companies form a partnership or joint venture to act as a potential prime contractor; or (2) A potential prime contractor agrees with one or more other companies to have them act as its subcontractors under a specified Government contract or acquisition program.” The FAR goes on to state that the teaming arrangements “may be desirable” in order to create teams that “offer the Government the best combination of performance, cost, and delivery” for the resulting contract award.

It is the policy of the U.S. Government to “recognize the integrity and validity of contractor team arrangements; provided, the arrangements are identified and company relationships are fully disclosed in an offer or, for arrangements entered into after submission of an offer, before the arrangement becomes effective.”

Importantly, the FAR notes that the government customer will still “hold the prime contractor fully responsible for contract performance, regardless of any team arrangement …” In other words, the prime contractor cannot transfer contract execution risk to its team members (which is an assertion we’ve made several times on this blog).

There is a long-standing controversy regarding the enforcement of teaming agreements. There are legal decisions that have held that teaming agreements are not enforceable; calling them mere “agreements to agree.” However, some legal forums have upheld the enforceability of such agreements. So it is critical to draft the teaming agreement so that a court will enforce it, should there be a dispute.

At last two legal practitioners believe that “A teaming agreement is only worthwhile if it is enforceable. Without an enforceable teaming agreement, a potential subcontractor could leave a prime contractor unable to perform or a prime contractor could simply disregard a subcontractor once it receives an award.”1 Those authors wrote—

In Cyberlock, a party to the teaming agreement sued for the right to a subcontract promised to it under that agreement. Despite the fact that the parties had a signed teaming agreement, the court found the agreement unenforceable because it (like most teaming agreements) did not include specific subcontract terms, and permitted the parties to terminate the agreement if they did not successfully negotiate the subcontract. For these reasons, the court concluded that a signed teaming agreement was simply ‘an agreement to negotiate in good faith to enter into a future subcontract,’ that is ‘precisely the type of agreement to agree that has consistently and uniformly been held unenforceable in Virginia.’

Thus, in that case the prime contractor won the subcontract award (perhaps based at least in part on the qualifications of the subcontractor it had teamed with) but the subcontractor received nothing.

Other issues that may arise with teaming agreements include: (1) teaming with a subcontractor that is debarred or proposed for debarment (not a good idea), (2) having a small business act as prime and a large business act as subcontractor, even though the large business will in fact manage and perform most of the work (the “ostensible subcontractor” issue), and (3) and evaluation of the past performance of the team as a single entity versus evaluation of the past performance of each of the team members. We have also written (and published an article) on the evaluation of joint ventures, which is a related topic.

However, having the right team member may well be helpful in contracting officer responsibility determinations. For example, in one bid protest at the GAO, the decision stated, “As a general rule, the experience of a technically qualified subcontractor or third party--such as an affiliate or consultant--may be used to satisfy definitive responsibility criteria relating to experience for a prospective prime contractor. In considering whether the experience of a third party subcontractor or affiliate may be relied upon by a prime bidder to meet an experience criterion, we examine the record for evidence of a commitment by the third party to the bidder’s successful performance of the work.” (Charter Environmental, Inc., B-297219, 12/05/2005.) Thus, one important reason for choosing a team member is that the company will bolster the prime’s experience assessment. But note the need for a committed relationship between the two entities; in the absence of evidence of a commitment, the GAO may find that a contracting officer should not have used the experience of a proposed subcontractor to bolster the experience of the proposed prime contractor. The right language in the teaming agreement can provide that evidence.

Looking to post-award matters, typically the biggest area of dispute between team members concerns the amount of workshare. Usually the teaming agreement specifies an amount of work that each team member will receive, should the team be successful and receive the contract for which it is submitting a proposal. The exact language regarding expected workshare is critically important to get right. For instance, on the WIFCON discussion forum, there was a recent post by somebody who was dealing with a workshare ratio based on revenue. If you think about it for a minute, you’ll see why basing the workshare ratio on revenue is a bad idea. Using a percentage of direct labor dollars, or direct labor hours, or full-time equivalent (FTE) heads is a much better idea.

Generally, the agreed-upon workshare is a target. It should be treated as a goal, not a contract term. There are many reasons why the exact workshare percentage may not actually come to pass, including (but certainly not limited to) customer changes to the initial statement of work, changes in personnel at one or both entities, and availability of funding at the CLIN or SLIN level. In other words, so long as the prime contractor is making a good faith effort to achieve the agreed-upon workshare, but falls short because of circumstances outside its control, the subcontractor likely has little if any legal recourse.

In any case, let’s remember that the cost principle at FAR 31.205-47(f)(5) speaks to the allowability of legal costs in disputes between a prime and a subcontractor, or between team members. It states—

Costs of legal, accounting, and consultant services and directly associated costs incurred in connection with the defense or prosecution of lawsuits or appeals between contractors arising from either—

(i) An agreement or contract concerning a teaming arrangement, a joint venture, or similar arrangement of shared interest; or

(ii) Dual sourcing, coproduction, or similar programs, are unallowable, except when—

(A) Incurred as a result of compliance with specific terms and conditions of the contract or written instructions from the contracting officer, or

(B) When agreed to in writing by the contracting officer.

So if teaming partners are thinking about litigating any dispute about workshare, they should remember that the legal costs will be unallowable.

The DCAA publication, Selected Areas of Cost Guidebook, Chapter 37, discusses how DCAA auditors will audit teaming arrangements. It states—

The accounting for teaming arrangements should be consistent with the form of business organization that the teaming contractors have agreed to and disclosed in their proposal(s). For example, if the agreed-to arrangement is in the form of a joint venture, then this should be disclosed in the proposal(s) and the accounting principles applicable to a joint venture should be followed. FAR 9.603 requires contractors to fully disclose all teaming arrangements in their offers. If an arrangement is entered into after submitting an offer, then disclosure is required before the arrangement becomes effective.

Thus, it is important to know, and to document, and to disclose, the form of the post-award business organization within the teaming agreement itself. Further, the cost accounting practices used to estimate contract costs need to be consistent with the (future) business organization.

One issue that is likely to come up for the teaming partners is whether the post-award business organization is a separate CAS business unit or segment for purposes of allocating home office expenses. If the joint business organization is being treated as a separate business segment, then CAS 403 will require an appropriate allocation of all home office expenses for which the joint business organization receives a benefit. To the extent that certain home office expenses (e.g., IR&D or B&P expenses, HR expenses, etc.) are not being allocated, the teaming partners should be prepared to defend their decisions to DCAA. Conversely, if the joint business organization is not being treated as a separate business segment by one or more of the teaming partners, then that decision should also be defensible when the DCAA auditors inquire about it.

Finally, the post-award joint business organization may need a separate CASB Disclosure Statement. The decision regarding preparing and filing an individual Disclosure Statement will turn on the nature of the joint organization, its cost accounting practices, and how the teaming partners are treating it. The DCAA guidance states—

The need for a joint venture CAS Disclosure Statement depends upon the characteristics of the venture itself. The determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. Where the joint venture is the entity actually performing the contract, has the responsibility for profit and/or producing a product or service, and has certain characteristics of ownership or control, a Disclosure Statement should be required. Where the venture merely unites the efforts of two contractors performing separate and distinct portions of the contract with little or no technical interface, a separate joint venture disclosure may not be required.

As readers can tell, this is a complex topic. Typically, once a decision is made to enter into a teaming agreement (and that decision is usually made by the business development folks), the details are left to the legal or contracts folks to hammer out. But (as we trust we’ve demonstrated) the number of decisions to be made afterwards is daunting. Each decision, at each stage—from drafting the teaming agreement to choosing the workshare metric to choosing the nature of the post-award business organization—is critical. Mistakes at any juncture can result in a failed proposal effort or in disputes after contract award. Further, the DCAA audit considerations need to be addressed early in the relationship, lest the parties see significant margin degradation from adverse audit findings.

To sum this up: teaming agreements are important. The right teaming partner can help win a contract. But the wrong teaming partner, or the wrong teaming agreement language, can result in difficulties. You can avoid those difficulties by devoting appropriate attention to the details, and keeping in mind the various landmines that we’ve noted in this article.

 

1 See “Ten Tips for Drafting Enforceable Teaming Agreements,” by C. Apfel and D. Specht, at https://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/13413/original/Apfel_Specht_bloomberg.pdf?1415089419

 

 

Limitation of Cost/Limitation of Funds

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Many people believe that, when they receive a cost-type contract, they will be reimbursed for all costs incurred on that contract. That belief is wrong. First, the government customer will only reimburse the contractor for allowable costs (as defined at FAR 31.201-2). Costs that are not allowable will not be reimbursed. Second, there are a couple of contract clauses that impose a ceiling on the amount of costs that may be reimbursed, even if those costs are allowable. Those contract clauses are 52.232-20 (Limitation of Cost) and 52.232-22 (Limitation of Funds). The Limitation of Funds clause applies when the contract is being incrementally funded and the Limitation of Cost clause applies when the contract has been fully funded.

In order to have an adequate accounting system for government contracts, a company must show that it can comply with those contract clauses. Accordingly, it is very important that you understand those clauses and comply with them to the letter.

It’s difficult to define the clauses with much specificity, because the contracting officer can tailor them for the individual contract. Suffice it to say that the clauses require the contractor to track its costs (and earned fee) against the amount funded to date (or against the total contract’s estimated cost and fee), and report to the contracting officer before it has incurred a specified percentage of those values. Typically, the contractor must report 60 days before incurring 75 percent of the values, but that’s not a given.

Right away it’s clear that the contractor must be managing its costs and projecting its future expenditures, because if you wait until after you’ve passed the reporting values then you are already in noncompliance with the clause requirements. It’s a difficult challenge, but one that must be met in order to have an adequate accounting system and receive cost-type contracts.

The challenge is even more daunting when one has received an ID/IQ contract with multiple task/delivery orders, each with its own ceiling values. The challenge is even more daunting than that when one thinks the ceiling values are associated with the ID/IQ contract instead of the individual task/delivery orders, but then one is informed by a court that the belief was wrong. Let’s look at the recent Court of Federal Claims decision in the appeal of Interimage, Inc.

Interimage is a small woman-owned IT business, qualified under the 8(a) program to receive special set-aside awards. In 2005, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) awarded Interimage a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract. The contract contained included eleven individual delivery orders.

Interimage performed the work satisfactorily and then submitted a (single) final invoice in the amount of $990,000, which “represented the difference between the amount paid and the amount InterImage claimed it was owed for both costs and fee.” The problem was that NCIS lacked sufficient funding to pay the full amount of the final invoice. Interimage submitted a certified claim in the amount of $695.6K (the amount not paid). The contracting officer agreed but Interimage was unable to obtain payment. Interimage “was told that funding would need to come from other appropriations because the funds to pay InterImage had been de-obligated.”

Subsequently, the Navy asserted that it did not owe Interimage anything more, because “the Navy had determined that InterImage was seeking payment for both costs and fee above various delivery order ceiling limitations.”

Thus, the dispute centered on whether the contract established the limitation of cost/funds values, or whether it was each delivery order that did so. From the decision—

InterImage argues that it is undisputed that the amounts claimed for costs are within the base contract ceiling, as amended, and that the contract, and not the individual delivery orders, is controlling with regard to the contract ceiling limitation. InterImage also argues that the government’s objections to InterImage’s claim for its fee must be rejected on the ground that the government can only change the fixed fee through an equitable adjustment, which was not done. InterImage further argues that the amount InterImage has claimed for the fixed fee is justified based on the total hours of work performed under the contract as a whole.

… the government argues that the individual delivery orders and not the base contract set ceilings for costs and that InterImage is seeking payments above the ceilings set in the delivery orders in contravention of the limitation of cost and funds clauses in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (‘FAR’) and incorporated into the contract and delivery orders. With regard to the fixed fee, the government argues that InterImage’s fixed fee also must be adjusted under the terms of the contract because the delivery orders provide limitations inclusive of fee and because InterImage did not perform the required hours under certain delivery orders and is thus not entitled to the amount of fixed fee now claimed.

Judge Firestone denied Interimage’s motion for summary judgment, finding that there were issues of fact that needed to be adjudicated. In the meantime, she also found that the task/delivery orders established individual values that should be used in lieu of the overall contract values.

One of the problems was how DCAA had audited the contract and documented values in the Cumulative Allowable Cost Worksheet (CACWS). The DCMA Closeout Specialist stated “’[p]art of the issue appears to be DCAA’s audit did not limit the direct and indirect cost to the contract ceiling and funding limitations for each [delivery order] on The Schedule of Cumulative Allowable Cost by Contract.’” He also stated that he believed the DCAA’s schedule of cumulative allowable cost was incorrect in that the worksheet should have included entries for contract ceilings for each delivery order ….”

“DCAA stated that although DCAA had ‘potentially made an ‘error’ on the [cumulative allowable cost worksheet] . . . we all agree that the [cumulative allowable cost worksheet] is only a guideline for the Contracting Officer and the actual contract terms and ceiling limitations hold the ultimate authority.’”

(Contractors who have disputes with DCAA regarding the CACWS should memorize that quote, above, and use it as necessary.)

Long story short: DCAA and the contracting officer were willing to use the values at the overall contract level when establishing how much more Interimage should have been paid, but the more that Interimage complained about the lack of payment, the less willing the government was to see things the contractor’s way. Eventually the CO was switched out and a new DCAA auditor was assigned, and suddenly Interimage owed the government $434,000 instead of the government owing Interimage $700,000! (Interesting to note that the new DCAA auditor was unable to locate the working papers of the previous auditor.)

Perhaps the parties will settle this dispute, now that Judge Firestone has made her ruling. Regardless, this is a good lesson on the importance of understanding contract terms (as well as individual task/delivery order terms) and making sure one is complying with them. Among the various contract terms for which compliance is required, the Limitation of Cost and Limitation of Funds stand out as being some of the most important.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.