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Apogee Consulting Inc

Third-Party Accounting System Reviews

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Accountant2Many readers know that the government has options when it comes to audits that have traditionally been performed by DCAA. For example, draft 2018 NDAA language would permit contractors to engage independent CPAs to perform audits of contractors’ claimed incurred costs in their proposals to establish final billing rates. (Since the NDAA language isn’t final yet, it’s tough to be more specific about the details.)

Another option that is becoming more and more prevalent is the use of independent CPAs to perform audits of a contractor’s accounting system.

Now, you might think that this would be an inherently governmental function. You might think that the government would have a vested interest in performing these audits, since some contract types require a contractor to have an adequate accounting system in order to receive them. You might think that completion of an official “Standard Form” 1408 would be limited to government employees.

And you’d be wrong.

Having an accounting system that has been determined to be adequate for cost-reimbursement contracting is a competitive advantage. Turning that around, we see that the act of establishing an accounting system and having that system found to be adequate for cost-reimbursement contracting is a barrier to market entry. Those contractors that can overcome the challenge(s) are in the club and able to compete for awards; whereas those that cannot are left outside, looking in.

The fact of the matter is that contractors that want to compete for cost-reimbursement contracts need to have an accounting system that has been found to be adequate for such contracts—it is absolutely crucial and it must be done. Yet another fact is that DCAA won’t perform a review of a contractor’s accounting system just because the contractor wants the audit to be performed. DCAA only goes in at a contracting officer request, and a contracting officer only requests a review when the contractor is already a bidder in a competition. Thus, the contractor has to start the bid process, spending precious B&P dollars, without knowing whether or not it has an adequate accounting system. If it gets a pass from DCAA, then great! But if not, then all its efforts have been wasted. That’s a lot of uncertainty to take into a competition that is already an uncertain proposition.

Moreover, it’s not as if DCAA were a swift messenger. It’s not as if a DCAA auditor will come to the contractor and issue a report to the contracting officer that the accounting system is adequate (or not) within a couple of weeks. Normally these things take months. We would say that 60 days would be the absolute minimum, with 90 or 120 days being a more likely duration. In the meantime, both the contractor and the contracting officer are left in the dark, wondering what the auditor is going to say and not knowing. Many a government acquisition schedule could be blown while waiting for a DCAA accounting system adequacy report….

In response to that situation, many RFPs permit a contractor to engage an independent CPA firm to perform an accounting system adequacy review. The contractor can (and should) engage that CPA firm whenever it believes it is ready to have its accounting system found to be adequate. (Never mind that, technically, only a government contracting officer can make such a determination. Contracting officers overseeing a source evaluation and selection process are almost always willing to overlook that nuance and accept whatever the independent CPA is willing to say. It is, sadly, too often a “check-the-box” thing.) Many RFPs require a contractor to have an adequate accounting system, and many RFPs are agnostic regarding who performs the review.

Which is really good news for smaller contractors.

Looking forward, we can see a time when third parties perform reviews of all six contractor “business systems,” but that’s not the focus of this article. We’re talking about accounting system adequacy today, and how third party independent CPA firms can successfully substitute for DCAA in such reviews. (Note: Apogee Consulting, Inc. is not a CPA firm.)

Three caveats on having independent CPA firms perform an adequacy review of your accounting system (or any business system, really).

First, the term “independent” has meaning and is well-defined for such firms. Independent means independent. It means that the same CPA firm that does your bookkeeping and/or taxes cannot perform that review. It means that the same CPA firm that “attests” that your accounting system is adequate cannot help you remediate any internal control deficiencies or issues identified during that review. If you decided to engage an independent CPA firm to review your accounting system for adequacy, you must go find a new firm, one that has both the necessary skills and qualifications, and you must pay them to objectively assess the adequacy of the accounting system using the government’s criteria.

Second, the government’s criteria are not entirely objective and they are tiered. The lowest tier is the Standard Form (SF) 1408 criteria. In theory, when you engage an independent third-party CPA firm to evaluate your accounting system, that’s the set of criteria that should be used. However, DCAA has its own pre-award accounting system review program, and its criteria tend to bias towards the 18 official DFARS accounting system adequacy criteria found at DFARS 252.242-7006. To our way of thinking, those criteria apply only if you have that DFARS clause in your contract. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) wrote the DAR Council years ago, expressing concerns with the subjectivity of some of the 18 DFARS criteria; but of course the DAR Council did nothing with that input. Thus, in a pre-award situation you would want to focus your independent CPA reviewers on the SF 1408 criteria, because it would be a more focused (and less expensive!) audit, and it would also be easier on them. That said, if you have the DFARS accounting system clause in your contract, you may want to engage somebody to look at your system using those criteria because you should want to know if there are any concerns or issues before DCAA shows up.

Third, the format of the independent CPA “attestation” report is very important. When DCAA issues a report, it does so using its impressive government letterhead, using a standard format. You should want the report of your independent CPA firm to look similarly official. Letterhead, sections, signature. You get it. The point is that the outside firm is substituting for DCAA, and they need to be as official as possible. That creates some measure of credibility in the eyes of contracting officers who need to find that somebody has found your accounting system to be adequate. If you don’t get an official-looking attestation report on letterhead, the value of that outside review decreases dramatically.

For a real-life example of what can go wrong, let’s look at a recent bid protest decision filed at the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, in the matter of FreeAlliance.com LLC v. U.S. (H/T to WIFCON.com.) FreeAlliance was a bidder for a National Institutes of Health (NIH). The RFP was specific regarding certain requirements. It stated that offerors “must have verification . . . of an accounting system that has been audited and determined adequate for determining costs applicable to this contract in accordance with FAR 16.301.”

According to the COFC decision—

NIH authorized offerors to provide verification by any one of four sources: (1) the Defense Contract Audit Agency (‘DCAA’); (2) the Defense Contract Management Agency (‘DCMA’); (3) any federal civilian audit agency; or (4) a third-party Certified Public Accounting (‘CPA’) firm. In the event any member of a CTA relied on a third-party CPA, the verification had to be on the letter head of the third-party CPA and certified by a CPA.

Finally, the verification instruction provided that the proposal must include:

[A] contact name and contact information (i.e., phone number, address, email address) of its representative at its cognizant DCAA, DCMA, federal civilian audit agency, or third-party accounting firm and submit, if available, a copy of the Pre-Award Survey of Prospective Contracting Accounting System (SF 1408), provisional billing rate, and/or forward pricing rate agreements.

FreeAlliance had an official DCAA audit report discussing the adequacy of its accounting system. However, its two team members (HealthTech Solutions and NISH Consulting) did not have a DCAA report; instead, they chose to engage third-party CPA firms to evaluate their accounting systems. According to the COFC decision—

Neither verification was submitted on a third-party CPA letterhead. Instead, both verifications were on a brief form, not furnished by the agency. The form recites that ‘[i]n support of the CIO-SP3 Ramp On proposal, the below company has been or is proposed as part of the Contractor Team Arrangement. Determination of compliant and adequate accounting system is marked necessary for performance under this subcontract. This form or representative certification is therefore [required].

HealthTech added that it used a “DCAA-compliant” accounting system and it had purchased a “DCAA-compliant” timekeeping system. It also noted that it had engaged a third-party to review the design of its accounting system controls. NISH Consulting said even less than HealthTech did. Readers should note that there is absolutely no such thing as a “DCAA-compliant” accounting system or timekeeping system. The most that can (or should) be claimed is that such systems can facilitate compliance with FAR requirements when properly implemented and consistently applied. Further, readers will note that neither HealthTech nor NISH Consulting complied with the RFP requirements.

Unsurprisingly, the FreeAlliance team was tossed from the competition. From the decision: “NIH noted that the verification ‘simply stated that the accounting system was found to be adequate; it does not state that the accounting has been audited and determined adequate for determining costs applicable to the contract in accordance with FAR 16.301-3(a)(1) as is required.”

Oops.

FreeAlliance filed a protest at GAO. It was not sustained. FreeAlliance then filed another protest at COFC. It’s protest was similarly not sustained. Let’s quote from the decision—

In the procurement process, the offeror is responsible for ensuring its proposal complies with the requirements of solicitation; the agency has no duty to correct an offeror’s mistakes during the procurement process. The RFP provided four options for verifying an adequate accounting system: DCAA audit, DCMA audit, a federal civilian agency audit, or a third-party CPA audit. The first two options demonstrate that the agency was seeking substance in its verification of an adequate accounting system. A DCAA or DCMA audit would be performed according to a standard that would assure the government that the offeror could adequately track and account for its costs under a cost reimbursement contract.

FreeAlliance itself elected to submit to a DCAA audit, which provided a detailed review of the adequacy of its accounting system to determine costs applicable to a contract.

On the other hand, FreeAlliance’s CTA members submitted verifications using the third-party CPA option. Any verification was required to provide that the system have been ‘audited and determined adequate for determining costs applicable to this contract in accordance with FAR 16.301-3(a)(1).’ In addition, when using a third-party CPA, ‘the verification letter shall be on the letter head of the third-party CPA firm . . . .’ Neither HealthTech nor Nish provided a verification on CPA letterhead. The origin of their verification forms is uncertain; FreeAlliance stated during oral argument that they were likely from a past solicitation.

… FreeAlliance had the responsibility of meeting the RFP requirements and now bears the burden to prove that the agency was arbitrary and capricious in excluding its proposal for noncompliance. We accept the government’s insistence on compliance with the letterhead provision, because the letterhead adds credibility to the third-party verification as contrasted with plaintiff’s form, which is devoid of any comparable authentication. Further, the agency did not act arbitrarily when it read HealthTech’s footnote to mean that the required verification had not yet occurred. HealthTech’s verification was noncompliant due to its lack of third-party CPA letterhead. When the format error is combined with the ambiguous, limited substance, NIH chose a reasonable response of deeming the verification unacceptable.

… Nish’s verification similarly lacks a CPA letterhead and provides no detail regarding the depth or type of review or that the system is adequate for determining costs applicable to the contract.

Due to the deficiencies, the agency’s review of this form was not arbitrary.

[Internal citations and footnotes omitted.]

So take this lesson to heart. If you decide to bypass DCAA—and there are definitely times when that would be the correct decision—make sure that you obtain from your third-party auditor a formal report on letterhead, one that establishes the work that was performed as well as the associated results of those efforts. If you fail to do so, you may have just wasted your money.

 

 

Subcontractor Cost and Pricing Issues

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This past week we delivered our first class in our new training offering, “Subcontractor Cost and Pricing Issues.” The temptation here is to make this article an advertisement for the course, but we’ll try not to do that. Instead, we want to talk about what made it work so well for the client who hired us to bring it to his plant.

It could have been a disaster. More than 80 PowerPoint slides, a couple of discussion questions, one exercise. Over a 6 hour period. Nine people in a conference room, plus 4 more on the phone, sharing the slides via their computers. Some people brought their laptops and checked email. Others were texting on their cell phones. There was an internal audit going on at the same time, and individuals were called out during the class to respond to auditor questions.

That sounds like a recipe for the training class from hell, right?

But somehow it all worked. Afterwards, our sponsor sent an email that said “Everyone really enjoyed the training today. It was right on topic ….” It all worked and it all worked better than we could have expected. The reason it all worked so well is found in the rest of the sponsor’s email. He wrote: “It was right on topic to get our team (Finance, Procurement and Contracts) fully understanding why the process works the way it does and why documentation is so important to prevent unnecessary delays during a DCAA audit.”

See that part we italicized above?

Yeah, that part about “team” – that’s what made the training work so well.

Normally, when you talk about a one-day class in “subcontractor cost and pricing issues” you think only the purchasing department would be interested. You wouldn’t normally expect the folks dealing with prime contract issues to be in the room; and you really wouldn’t expect to have Finance folks there. What value would they find in those topics?

But this defense contractor decided there were no silos when it came to knowledge and understanding. This defense contractor decided that, if it were going to bring in an outside trainer for a day, then it wanted to get maximum value, and so representative from many functions were invited to attend.

And that’s what made the training so much more powerful than we could have hoped.

The thing about subcontractor cost and pricing issues is that they are also very relevant to prime contract cost and pricing issues—especially when the prime contract requires certified cost or pricing data and DCAA expects you to perform cost or price analysis on your subcontractors as part of the process. And if you don’t do a good job supporting your determination that the subcontractor’s price is “fair and reasonable” then you run the risk that DCAA is going to challenge you and, perhaps, question your subcontractor payments as being unreasonable and therefore unallowable. Which gets the Finance folks very concerned.

We did the exercise where people evaluated a subcontractor’s proposed pricing. We identified missing data and we discussed how to better structure an RFP to instruct potential subcontractors on what information was necessary and how to provide it, to facilitate evaluations. Then we turned it around and discussed how the company could better provide its own cost or pricing data to government evaluators, so as to minimize questions and smooth the evaluation.

It was the dual nature of the issues that created the powerful learning experience.

Whatever issues you experience with subcontractor proposal evaluations and cost/price analysis, the chances are that your prime contract customers are also experiencing similar issues with respect to your own proposal. Their own cost/price analysis is suffering, not only from your “inadequate” cost/price analysis of your subcontractors—but also from your own estimating narrative and cost or pricing data. Many issues are intertwined and this particular class reinforced that concept in a big way.

  • Purchasing and estimating are intertwined. It’s hard to have an adequate system in one area if the other is inadequate.
  • Subcontractor and prime contract issues are intertwined. It’s hard to do one area well if the other is not doing well.

So kudos to this defense contractor for ignoring internal silos and for bringing in disparate functions in a roundtable discussion that clearly demonstrated that the government contracting field is highly integrated, and that a micro-focus on subcontractor issues without discussing prime contract issues is suboptimal.

Going forward, we are going to encourage our clients to bring representative from as many functions as possible to our courses, because doing so creates a lot of unexpected value. We think that’s called “synergy.”

 

Acquisition Reform in the Trump Administration

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EinsteinFrom time to time we like to pontificate on acquisition reform.

You know what acquisition reform is, right?

It’s the attempt to change the way the Federal government buys goods and services.

Acquisition reform happens nearly every year, as Congress or the Secretary of Defense or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) make speeches about how broken the current system is and how they intend to fix it.

Frequently such efforts are aimed at the Department of Defense, that multi-billion dollar acquirer of goods and services in support of the warfighters and national security. Almost every time, such efforts are described as “streamlining” or “fixes” or “efficiencies”—but, in reality, they are based on the input of some constituency or another. Annual constituencies include the Department of Defense itself (or components thereof) as well as the lobbyists of the contractors themselves. Input is provided to Congressional staffers who put forth draft language to other Congressional staffers; and then the input is massaged and negotiated until an acceptable compromise—one that most everybody can live with even if nobody is particularly thrilled with it—is reached.

As we noted in prior articles on this topic, the Clinton Administration was focused on acquisition reform and managed to convince Congress and the various constituencies that it was a topic worth working on. (The alignment is commonly credited to the lessons learned from the First Gulf War (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) when everybody saw how broken the system had become. We have no evidence that the common wisdom is wrong about that origin.) In contrast, the Obama Administration was late to the game and what reform efforts occurred were found largely within the Department of Defense itself—although (as we noted in several other articles) SECDEF Gate’s reform efforts were largely stymied by his own team and those who followed him. We bottom-lined the Obama Administration efforts as being primarily focused on undoing the Clinton-era reforms; whether that was a good or bad thing likely depends on where you’re sitting.

So now we have the Trump Administration and we have renewed calls for acquisition reform. “Something must be done!” is the cry. But the cry is without irony and the irony should be there, because haven’t we been through all this hoopla before?

“Something must be done!” doesn’t seem to acknowledge that “something is always being done and it almost always never works, but you keep on doing it, over and over—making Einstein’s observation about the definition of insanity sadly apropos.”

It doesn’t matter which party is in office or which party has the Congressional majority or whether budgets are tight or free-flowing. The fact of the matter is that this country has undertaken acquisition reform over and over and over for at least 50 years, and we have yet to address the fundamental problems in any meaningful way.

So here we are at the end of 2017 (or the beginning of GFY 2018, if you like) and the 2018 NDAA will introduce a new set of acquisition reforms. Meanwhile, according to this article at National Defense magazine (authored by Vivienne Machi), the Army is so focused on acquisition reform that it is going to set up a new Command “to help the service streamline its acquisition priorities.” According to the article, “While details remain vague, the command will prioritize six areas of procurement through cross-functional teams. They are in order: long-range precision fires; the next-generation combat vehicle; future vertical lift platforms; network mobility; air and missile defense capabilities; and soldier lethality.”

People more cynical than we are might say that the real purpose of the new Army acquisition command is to obtain funding for Army pet projects, funding that has been lacking since the Air Force got its F-35 program funded. But we would never say that.

Meanwhile, the (last) USD (AT&L), Ms. Ellen Lord is reforming the Pentagon bureaucracy, according to another article at National Defense (authored by Stew Magnuson). The article reported that—

Her first order of business will be returning oversight of most major acquisition programs from the office of the secretary of defense and the AT&L back to the four services. … The role of her office, which will be broken up into two entities in February — Research and Engineering and Acquisition and Sustainment — will be to simplify the acquisition process. That is where the velocity comes in. It takes too long to make decisions and the bureaucracy must be pared down, she said.

(Lack of quotes in the original.)

So, essentially, the Pentagon is restarting the SECDEF Gates initiative, the one that was blocked by the former USD (AT&L), among others.

Meanwhile, current SECDEF Mattis wants to “reform the business practices of military departments and the DoD itself,” according to this Pentagon press release. Quoting from the press release—

On reforming business practices, Mattis said the department must make more effective use of the people's treasury.

‘The heart of our competitive edge … is reforming the department and its business processes and gaining full value from every taxpayer dollar,’ he said.

Reforming the department is going to require that the acquisition enterprise is transformed, he said. … Transforming the enterprise, the secretary said, ‘will require delegating decision authority in many cases to the outer edges of the enterprises to unleash the great ideas we find among our bright and committed airmen. It's also important to integrate this across the joint force, because the real strength we've exhibited over 16 years of war is jointness.’

Astute observers of history may recall that streamlining bureaucracy and decentralizing decision-making was the hallmark of Clinton-era acquisition reforms. (Remember “A government that works better and costs less”?) Under the Obama Administration, DCMA blamed those reforms for the loss of skills (including cost/price analysis), and moved to reorganize and create more central decision-making, including Review Boards that micro-manage the decisions of many warranted Contracting Officers.

Now it seems we are headed back toward decentralized decision-making, in a streamlined environment. The pendulum is swinging back.

And somewhere Einstein is smiling and shaking his head sadly.

 

Directed Subcontracting

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We’ve all been there.

The phone rings, or an email arrives, and it’s the COTR or the PCO and they want you, the prime contractor, to acquire a thing for the contract. You will acquire it and they will take title, and you can bill the cost along with your other costs and it will be paid.

Only you know and they know the item has nothing to do with the contract’s SOW.

They want a personal computer or a cell phone or an iPad, or maybe even a hibachi, because they have a need and they can’t get the item approved through normal government channels. So they do an end-run and have you acquire it for them.

They have the authority. The COTR and/or the CO have the authority to direct you to acquire stuff, and so you probably will, even though you know and they know they really shouldn’t be asking you to take these actions. But you do, probably in the name of customer relationships. After all, why would you want to upset these folks for such a trivial amount of money—even though there’s a risk that if anybody looks hard enough, you may have some ‘splaining to do.

What’s the harm? After all, the government ends up paying for it one way or another. Either through your contract or through some other agency appropriations. At the end of the day, there’s no harm and therefore no foul.

Right?

It’s not like somebody entirely unconnected to the contract, somebody in the Government agency finance function, called you up and directed you to acquire the thing and charge it to the contract. Because that would be weird, right? It would be weird to have this stranger call you, or email you, and tell you to go to a specified vendor and issue that vendor a P.O. to acquire a thing or two, and then pay the vendor for those things and then bill the prime contract for the cost.

That would be weird and you probably wouldn’t do it.

It’s one thing when the PCO or COTR ask you do to something, but it’s quite another thing when some stranger unconnected with your prime contract asks you to do something. So you probably wouldn’t do it.

Probably.

In completely unrelated news, a former Comptroller for the Navy’s Norfolk Ship Support Activity (NSSA) was recently sentenced for accepting illegal gratuities. (Ed. Note: Are there any other kind of gratuities for government employees?) According to the Department of Justice press release—

William R. Hutsenpiller, 57, of Mount Dora, Florida, oversaw the $200 million operating budget for the NSSA while serving as the civilian GS-15 Financial Department Head/Comptroller from October 2009 through November 2013. During this time, Hutsenpiller conspired with others to essentially force a government prime contractor to use a specified subcontractor—Global Services Corporation, based in Fayetteville, North Carolina—that he knew would collaborate with him to misuse government funds. As part of the scheme, Hutsenpiller directed the prime contractor to pass government funds to Global, a defense subcontractor, and in turn, Hutsenpiller directed Global to withhold unexpended funds that should have been returned to the government or to the prime contractor.

Apparently Global used the funds to, among other things, pay “illegal gratuities” to Mr. Hutsenpiller. The DOJ press release stated—

From 2010 through 2014, Hutsenpiller made numerous requests that Global provide him with various items of value and services for his personal use, which Global agreed to purchase with government funds. The gratuities that Global provided to Hutsenpiller included a variety of personal electronic items and accessories for Hutsenpiller and his family, such as cell phone service and accessories, multiple iPads, a computer, home thermostat, and streaming television boxes.

So this GS-15 guy told the prime contractor to award a P.O. to Global for stuff, and they did. (Possibly they alerted somebody, because the guy was caught. But the article doesn’t say how he was caught so we don’t know.) For four years, the prime contractor followed the direction of this stranger and funded a subcontract.

Why?

Why would you do that?

As noted above, we don’t know why and we don’t know if they tipped somebody off—but four years seems like kind of a lot to keep on following the direction of this stranger who was completely unconnected with the prime contract and who didn’t have authority to order the prime contractor to do anything. But that’s what the prime contractor did.

And now Mr. Hutsenpiller has been sentenced to 40 months in Federal prison and sentenced to pay approximately $70,000 to the taxpayers.

No word on fines or penalties to be paid by Global.

No word on fines or penalties to be paid by the unnamed prime contractor, who was just following directions from the government.

 

Bribery and Kickbacks at the DoDOIG

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Here’s a story, told by the U.S. Department of Justice, as documented in this Department of Justice press release.

We didn’t write the story. The DoJ did. So we will just quote from it.

Two companion indictments were unsealed today charging four men with participating in a bribery and kickback conspiracy involving a contract for the Department of Defense’s Office of Inspector General … According to allegations in the indictments, William S. Wilson, 52, of Florida, paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in kickbacks to Timothy R. Donelson, 56, of Georgia, and Ronald A. Capallia, Jr., 37, of Alabama, in return for Donelson and Capallia providing favorable treatment to Wilson’s companies in connection with prime government contracts. At the time of the kickbacks, Donelson and Capallia were employed by a telecommunications company that had been awarded a prime contract to provide an array of voice and data services to the DOD OIG and other federal agencies.  In return for the kickbacks, Donelson and Capallia provided favorable treatment to Wilson’s companies, including Donelson’s award of a subcontract to one of Wilson’s companies to provide information-technology related support services to the DOD OIG, notwithstanding that Wilson’s company focused on construction and construction management, and had no relevant expertise in information technology. Capallia similarly caused his employer repeatedly to order items such as computer software and hardware and routine office moving services from Wilson’s construction company despite the lack of any legitimate business or economic reason to do so.

So two employees of the prime allegedly accepted kickbacks and, in return, awarded a subcontract to a company that had no relevant expertise.

But wait. There’s more.

The indictment further alleges that Wilson paid tens of thousands of dollars in bribes to Matthew Kekoa LumHo, 42, of Fairfax Station, then employed at the DOD OIG, in return for LumHo taking official acts that benefitted Wilson’s companies. According to the indictment, these actions included LumHo placing numerous fraudulent orders through the prime contract awarded to the telecommunications company employing Donelson and Capallia, thereby causing a continued flow of revenue from that telecommunications company to Wilson’s company as its subcontractor.  … LumHo, along with Wilson and Capallia, repeatedly caused the DOD IG to issue fraudulent service orders that were used to conceal that the co-conspirators were arranging for Wilson’s company to buy standard, commercially available items such as computer software, hardware, and accessories, and routine office moving services, significantly inflating the price, and then falsely billing the government as through it had been supplied with various professional services.  As the indictment alleges, by doing so, the co-conspirators enabled Wilson’s company to reap substantial profits from transactions where there was no legitimate business or economic reason to involve Wilson’s company, and where Wilson’s company provided virtually no value to the United States.

The plot gets more complicated! Now we have an employee of the DoDOIG who allegedly placed orders against the prime contract, which led to additional work for the allegedly fraudulent subcontractor.

But wait. There’s more.

According to the indictment, Wilson paid the bribes and kickbacks in several forms, including hundreds of thousands of dollars paid from Wilson’s companies to a side business owned by Donelson that were masked through fake invoices for non-existent work, hundreds of thousands of dollars in supposed payroll payments to Capallia’s spouse, who was nominally placed on the payroll at Wilson’s company despite doing virtually no work, and tens of thousands of dollars of supposed payroll payments to a relative of LumHo, for a job that LumHo’s relative never actually held.  Wilson further paid bribes and kickbacks by paying for part of the purchase price of two vehicles bought by Donelson, by buying two vehicles outright for Capallia, paying for more than $60,000 worth of Caribbean cruises, hotel accommodations, and flights for Capallia, his family members, friends, friends’ children, and on at least one occasion, babysitters to watch Capallia’s children on one of the cruises, and paid bribes to LumHo by supplying him with electronics and high-end photography equipment.

The story includes salacious allegations of padded payrolls, fraudulent invoices, and cruises. That about covers it, right?

So let’s wrap it up with the traditional conclusion to such stories.

Each defendant has been charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and wire fraud.  The companion indictments further charge Wilson, Capallia, and LumHo with False Claims Act violations, charge Wilson and LumHo respectively with bribery and acceptance of bribes, and charge LumHo and Donelson with false statements. The conspiracy to commit wire fraud and wire fraud charges each carry a maximum sentence of imprisonment of 20 years; the False Claims Act violations each carry a maximum sentence of imprisonment of 5 years; the bribery charges each carry a maximum sentence of imprisonment of 15 years; and the false statement charges each carry a maximum sentence of imprisonment of 5 years. 

And so ends our story for today.

We are quite sure that we’ll be back with similar stories in the future, because that’s how things seem to roll these days.

 

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.