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Apogee Consulting Inc

Drafting a Subcontract

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ContractWe’re not lawyers but this week we attended a briefing where lawyers spoke. And one of the briefing topics was drafting a subcontract.

It caught our attention because—as you know if you’ve been reading this blog for a decent amount of time—we think subcontracting is a pretty important topic and one that has been given short shrift in the government acquisition environment. Reason being, of course, is that the Federal government doesn’t do subcontracting. Oh sure, contracting officers must review consent packages and CPSR reviewers must review contractor files; but generally the topic of subcontracting is a mystery to most of the Federal acquisition team. As a result, it’s kind of a mystery to the contractor side as well—even though that’s supposed to be a core competency of contractor acquisition.

As you know if you’ve been reading this blog for a decent amount of time, we think subcontractor management is the single most important factor that determines program outcomes. In today’s environment, where often more than half of a program’s content is sourced from the supply chain via subcontract, a failure to effectively manage those subcontractors almost inevitably leads to program problems.

Effective subcontractor management starts with subcontract formation.

You could go further back in time, if you’d like. You could say that effective subcontractor management starts with subcontractor source evaluation and selection. Or you could say that effective subcontractor management starts with choosing the right teaming partner and putting the right teaming agreement language into place. Those statements wouldn’t be wrong. But we’re going to start with subcontract formation because that’s what the attorneys focused on.

The attorneys segregated the subcontracts into different categories. They identified commercial item subcontracts and non-DoD subcontracts and DoD subcontracts. Each of those categories were subject to different prime contract flow-down requirements. The attorneys identified mandatory flow-down clauses for each type.

But that’s not all. As the attorneys pointed out, there are many non-mandatory clauses that a prime contractor would want to flow down to its subcontracts. Those are clauses that, if something happens at the prime level, the prime would want to have its subcontractors take parallel actions. Without those clauses there is nothing that compels the subcontractors to take such actions—potentially leaving the prime contractor in a world of hurt.

We are reminded of a situation years ago, where the prime contractor failed to include a Termination for Convenience clause in its firm, fixed-price subcontract. And then—whoops!—the prime contract was T4C’d and litigation inevitably followed. One of the (many) problems was that the prime needed to submit a termination settlement proposal within 12 months and the subcontractor was not cooperating about providing actual costs incurred because the parties were in litigation. Suffice to say that the subcontractor had sufficient leverage to obtain a very nice settlement.

The attorneys also discussed additional clauses that would be helpful to the prime. These clauses might not be found in the prime contract at all, but it would be in the prime’s best interests to include them in its subcontracts. Some clauses might be found in a prime’s “standard set” of terms and conditions, but others might not be obvious. The value added by a skilled and experienced subcontract administrator is that they have learned what clauses need to be added in order to protect the prime. If you are a prime contractor, you will want to make sure you have a cadre of skilled and experienced subcontract administrators. It will be worth your while.

On the other hand, subcontractors also have rights and interests that need to be protected. Their “sell side” administrator needs to be just as skilled and experienced as the prime’s “buy side” administrator. While the prime is busy flowing-down mandatory (and non-mandatory) clauses and adding in additional clauses intended to protect it, the subcontractor is similarly busy editing and/or deleting some of those clauses because they impose overly onerous duties that the prime hasn’t (yet) paid enough for. One attorney we spoke with called it “the battle of the forms” and he noted that if the parties authorized the subcontractor to begin work before the battle was over, then that created some interesting challenges with respect to post-award disputes. If the parties hadn’t agreed on the final subcontract language then it would be hard for a trier of fact to interpret the contract. Indeed, it might be possible to say that there was no subcontract, because there hadn’t been a meeting of the minds regarding rights and duties.

All in all, subcontract administration is its own discipline, one with its own body of knowledge. That’s not to say that an individual should specialize only in that body of knowledge and exclude knowledge of prime contract matters or basic procurement matters. As my old boss Bill used to say, he wanted a team of acquisition professionals who were well-rounded and skilled in every aspect of Government contracting, because then he had a versatile team who could solve whatever problem came up.

So you might want to consider whether Bill was right, and whether you should develop your people so that they are knowledgeable about the entire spectrum of government contracting—or whether you want experts in a single discipline. Either way, what you don’t want is people who don’t know what they’re doing or why they’re doing it. Unfortunately, that description fits too many people, both in and outside of government.

 

Defense Innovation Board: “Making an Impact”

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When leaders say they want innovation, what they want is spiral development and predictable forward progress. They don’t want disruptive innovation that upsets the status quo and puts jobs at risk.—Nick Sanders

That quote comes from an article we wrote more than two years ago, discussing the Department of Defense’s bi-polar relationship with technical innovation and change. We’ve written several articles on the topic, and we’ve also made public presentations discussing why DoD’s attempts to woo Silicon Valley firms were (in our view) doomed to fail.

It’s not that we don’t want innovation and change; it’s just that we’ve become cynical by our experiences (and by stories we’ve read and heard) about how the entrenched DoD bureaucracy—aided and abetted by paid lobbyists—kills such innovation and change.

It’s an old story: entrenched bureaucrats feel threatened by change. Entrenched contractors grown slow and indolent by operating within a monopsony with tough barriers to entry feel threatened by upstart tech companies that are nimbly and quickly moving forward. Technical competence meets politics-as-usual.

Politics-as-usual wins.

And yet we keep on trying, don’t we?

In March 2016, then-SECDEF Ash Carter created the Defense Innovation Board “inviting as members 15 innovators from the private sector and academia to enhance the department’s culture, organization and processes.” Six months later, the DIB dropped 11 recommendations on the DoD.

After five meetings and several fact-finding trips, the DIB made 12 more recommendations for change, bringing the total number of recommendations to 23. From a recent article, the DIB is discussing making four more recommendations.

DIB Director Eric Schmidt (Executive Director for Alphabet, the holding company of Google), is optimistic that the DIB’s recommendations are making an impact. Schmidt was quoted in the article as follows—

"I'm quite optimistic that this model is working … I think it shows a hunger for change, an interest in new things and a modernization process that matters a great deal. And the secretary of defense and his staff have been incredibly supportive of this whole maneuver."

With all due respect to Mr. Schmidt, the measure of success will not be found in the recommendations made, but rather in the actions taken in response to those recommendations. If the actions lead to a quicker adoption of technical innovation and change, then that—and that alone—will define success. Simply making recommendations that go nowhere is an example of futility, not success.

Meanwhile, unnamed DoD officials are “reviewing” the DIB’s recommendations ….

So in eighteen months the DIB has made 23 recommendations that have generated zero action. Toyota designed and delivered the Prius in eighteen months. DoD can’t even action a recommendation in that time.

While perpetual optimism is a force multiplier, at some point that optimism becomes foolishness. Let us know when the DIB has crossed that line.

 

 

Another Charge for the KC-46A

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There was a time, 20 or 30 years ago, when awarding a firm, fixed-price development contract was against the law. The rationale for that position was easy to discern: how can you establish a firm, fixed-price for something that hasn’t been designed yet? You can’t, as the government kept learning over and over, to its chagrin.

It’s not sufficient to say “Hey, FFP! All the cost risk is on the contractor—so who cares how much the contract overruns?” For one thing, some of those contracts had authorized progress payments, so those contractors were getting paid for trying really hard. For another thing, change orders baby. You find yourself falling behind, you’re going to start looking for what’s changed since your proposal.

Finally: bailout. As Airbus experienced with its supply chain during the last global financial crisis, it’s sometimes better to reform the contract (at a higher price) than it is to put your suppliers into bankruptcy. The cost of finding another supplier is higher than bailing out the supplier you’ve got. For an example closer to home, remember that, in 1971, the U.S. Government gave Lockheed $250 million in guaranteed loans to bailout the contractor after cost overruns on a Navy contract threatened to bankrupt the company and put thousands of Americans out of work.

So the government learned its lesson: you cannot put all the financial risk on the contractor, simply because the contractor cannot shoulder all that financial risk. And then, after a decade or two (or three), the government forgot that lesson and decided that fixed-price contracting was the way to go, even for development programs where nobody knew how to price the work.

We have elsewhere recounted the story of how Boeing came to win the KC-46A aerial refueling plane development contract—now dubbed “the Pegasus.” We have also noted, from time to time, that the program is experiencing delays and mounting cost growth. For example, the last such article is here.

Now we are back, roughly a year later, to note that Boeing has taken another charge against earnings related to its Pegasus program.

In its Third Quarter financial analysis, Boeing noted that it had recorded another $329 million in charges related to the program. The charges were split between commercial and defense businesses, with defense taking $73 million and commercial taking the rest. A year ago, Boeing's rationale for the 2016 charge cited, among other things, “concurrency between late-stage development testing and initial production.” A year later, Boeing's rationale for the 2017 charge cited, “… incorporating changes into initial production aircraft as we progress through late-stage testing and the certification process”—which seems to us to be the same rationale year-over-year.

For those keeping score, Boeing is now at “roughly $2.9 billion” (according to one report) in pre-tax charges associated with cost growth on the $4.8 billion fixed-price-incentive-fee development contract whose point of total assumption was reached long ago. (Our math says $2.4 billion, not $2.9 billion, but who knows? The point is, it’s a big number. In fact, the overrun recognized to date is equal to at least 50% of the total contract value.)

Further, at least one KC-46A supplier has also recorded reserves associated with cost growth. In February 2017, Cobham recorded a $187 million charge associated with the program, citing “an onerous commercial arrangement” with Boeing.

As we said in 2016—

There are not very many defense contractors that could have afforded to fund nearly half the development cost of a new aircraft. Fortunately for all concerned, one of them is Boeing.

Tell us again why fixed-price development contracts are preferred these days?

We stand by those words today, a year later.

 

The Peregrination of Angela Styles

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Attorneys change firms.

Sometimes they lateral from one firm to another. Sometimes they leave a Big Law practice to start their own firm. Sometimes a group of attorneys leaves en masse. It happens with a certain regularity and there’s nothing particularly noteworthy about the departure of an attorney from a firm.

And not all attorneys depart their firms. For example,, Tom Lemmer has been with the same government contracts practice for more than 35 years. Terry Albertson has been a fixture at Crowell & Moring since we can remember.

But many attorneys do change firms and it’s almost never noticed by the public. Unless you are a client or a colleague, it’s just not that big of a deal.

We’ve followed (from afar) the moves of Ms. Angela B. Styles and we’ve never written about them before. But her latest move prompted us to think about her career. Ms. Styles’ career is interesting (at least to us). We thought it might be of interest to our readers.

Note we have no inside knowledge here. We’ve never discussed this issue with Ms. Styles, nor have we discussed it with any of her (former) colleagues. All we are going on is what we have seen from a distance. (With the help of several websites.)

Why Ms. Styles? Well for one thing for a time she served as the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). That was a Senate-confirmed position. In that role, she established procurement policy (duh) and she also Chaired the Cost Accounting Standards Board. Thus: she is kind of a big deal.

Anyway, Ms. Styles’ career appears to have started when she was a Legislative Aide for Congressman Joe Barton (R-TX). She spent two years in that position and then headed to law school at the University of Texas. After graduating and passing the bar, she worked as an Associate at the inside-the-Beltway firm of Miller & Chevalier. She worked for the firm for five years, before jumping to the Federal government.

In 2001 Ms. Styles joined the General Services Administration (GSA) as a “budget oversight official” (according to one website). But she didn’t stay there long.

She was nominated and confirmed as the Administrator OFPP in 2001. She served in that capacity for two years. While there, she revamped and reissued OMB Circular A-76, covering public/private competitions.

Afterwards, Ms. Styles rejoined Miller & Chevalier—this time as a partner. She was there for three years before departing to join Crowell & Moring’s government contracts practice. While there, she was named as Chair of that practice and, subsequently, as Chair of the entire firm. She served in that capacity until recently, when she joined Bracewell’s growing government contracts practice as a partner. Crowell touted her rise “from lateral to Chairwoman in eight years” in a 2015 press release (a press release that we understandably removed after her departure from the firm).

While at Crowell, Ms. Styles also served as Director of the Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct (DII), replacing Brigadier General Dick Bednar (USA, Retired). She no longer serves in that capacity, though we could not determine when she departed DII.

Ms. Styles’ tenure at Crowell was quite successful, according to published reports. Nonetheless, the partnership voted to replace her, perhaps because of a desire to move in a different strategic direction. According to this article, “Three sources familiar with internal machinations at Crowell & Moring said that there appeared to be disagreement within the partnership about the direction of the Washington, D.C.-based firm, such as a desire to pursue merger opportunities in New York and expand its portfolio of practice groups beyond its traditional strength in the government contracts space.” Although her term as Chairwoman wasn’t due to officially end until February 2018, Ms. Styles opted to depart early for a new role at Bracewell, a move characterized by one report as “unusual.”

Obviously, Bracewell is happy to have such an experience practitioner with impeccable leadership credentials. The Bracewell press release calls her “one of the leading government contracts lawyers in the United States.”

An interesting career—right?

From staffer to associate, and from associate to Senate-confirmation. From Partner to head of a firm’s most important practice, and from there to management of an entire firm.

Now Ms. Styles is at another firm and we are sure great things are in store for both her and that firm.

 

Department of Energy Might Pay for Overtime Associated with Training

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Readers may recall we pointed out more than a year ago that labor costs associated with employee training were unallowable if incurred on overtime (FAR 31.205-44: “Overtime compensation for training and education is unallowable.”)

It doesn’t make much sense, because sometimes the scheduled work takes up the full work week, and the only time left is overtime. But there it is and contractors have been gigged by DCAA for getting it wrong, regardless of the circumstances involved.

We are pleased to note that the Department of Energy just issued a DEARS Class Deviation that permits (but does not require) a contracting officer to approve them in advance. If there is no advance approval, the costs remain unallowable. (The Class Deviation says they are “expressly unallowable.”)

When would a contracting officer consider approving use of overtime for employee training? The Class Deviation provides three circumstances that could lead to approved training overtime. Overtime may be approved when necessary to—

  1. Meet essential delivery or performance schedules;

  2. Make up for delays beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor; or

  3. Eliminate foreseeable extended production bottlenecks that cannot be eliminated in any other way

So – good job DOE!

As has become the norm, DOE is ahead of DoD with respect to managing its contractors’ costs. We can only hope that the DAR Council gets tired of being the slow student in class, and starts taking similarly innovative common-sense steps.

 


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Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.