Defense Innovation Board: “Making an Impact”
When leaders say they want innovation, what they want is spiral development and predictable forward progress. They don’t want disruptive innovation that upsets the status quo and puts jobs at risk.—Nick Sanders
That quote comes from an article we wrote more than two years ago, discussing the Department of Defense’s bi-polar relationship with technical innovation and change. We’ve written several articles on the topic, and we’ve also made public presentations discussing why DoD’s attempts to woo Silicon Valley firms were (in our view) doomed to fail.
It’s not that we don’t want innovation and change; it’s just that we’ve become cynical by our experiences (and by stories we’ve read and heard) about how the entrenched DoD bureaucracy—aided and abetted by paid lobbyists—kills such innovation and change.
It’s an old story: entrenched bureaucrats feel threatened by change. Entrenched contractors grown slow and indolent by operating within a monopsony with tough barriers to entry feel threatened by upstart tech companies that are nimbly and quickly moving forward. Technical competence meets politics-as-usual.
Politics-as-usual wins.
And yet we keep on trying, don’t we?
In March 2016, then-SECDEF Ash Carter created the Defense Innovation Board “inviting as members 15 innovators from the private sector and academia to enhance the department’s culture, organization and processes.” Six months later, the DIB dropped 11 recommendations on the DoD.
After five meetings and several fact-finding trips, the DIB made 12 more recommendations for change, bringing the total number of recommendations to 23. From a recent article, the DIB is discussing making four more recommendations.
DIB Director Eric Schmidt (Executive Director for Alphabet, the holding company of Google), is optimistic that the DIB’s recommendations are making an impact. Schmidt was quoted in the article as follows—
"I'm quite optimistic that this model is working … I think it shows a hunger for change, an interest in new things and a modernization process that matters a great deal. And the secretary of defense and his staff have been incredibly supportive of this whole maneuver."
With all due respect to Mr. Schmidt, the measure of success will not be found in the recommendations made, but rather in the actions taken in response to those recommendations. If the actions lead to a quicker adoption of technical innovation and change, then that—and that alone—will define success. Simply making recommendations that go nowhere is an example of futility, not success.
Meanwhile, unnamed DoD officials are “reviewing” the DIB’s recommendations ….
So in eighteen months the DIB has made 23 recommendations that have generated zero action. Toyota designed and delivered the Prius in eighteen months. DoD can’t even action a recommendation in that time.
While perpetual optimism is a force multiplier, at some point that optimism becomes foolishness. Let us know when the DIB has crossed that line.
Another Charge for the KC-46A
There was a time, 20 or 30 years ago, when awarding a firm, fixed-price development contract was against the law. The rationale for that position was easy to discern: how can you establish a firm, fixed-price for something that hasn’t been designed yet? You can’t, as the government kept learning over and over, to its chagrin.
It’s not sufficient to say “Hey, FFP! All the cost risk is on the contractor—so who cares how much the contract overruns?” For one thing, some of those contracts had authorized progress payments, so those contractors were getting paid for trying really hard. For another thing, change orders baby. You find yourself falling behind, you’re going to start looking for what’s changed since your proposal.
Finally: bailout. As Airbus experienced with its supply chain during the last global financial crisis, it’s sometimes better to reform the contract (at a higher price) than it is to put your suppliers into bankruptcy. The cost of finding another supplier is higher than bailing out the supplier you’ve got. For an example closer to home, remember that, in 1971, the U.S. Government gave Lockheed $250 million in guaranteed loans to bailout the contractor after cost overruns on a Navy contract threatened to bankrupt the company and put thousands of Americans out of work.
So the government learned its lesson: you cannot put all the financial risk on the contractor, simply because the contractor cannot shoulder all that financial risk. And then, after a decade or two (or three), the government forgot that lesson and decided that fixed-price contracting was the way to go, even for development programs where nobody knew how to price the work.
We have elsewhere recounted the story of how Boeing came to win the KC-46A aerial refueling plane development contract—now dubbed “the Pegasus.” We have also noted, from time to time, that the program is experiencing delays and mounting cost growth. For example, the last such article is here.
Now we are back, roughly a year later, to note that Boeing has taken another charge against earnings related to its Pegasus program.
In its Third Quarter financial analysis, Boeing noted that it had recorded another $329 million in charges related to the program. The charges were split between commercial and defense businesses, with defense taking $73 million and commercial taking the rest. A year ago, Boeing's rationale for the 2016 charge cited, among other things, “concurrency between late-stage development testing and initial production.” A year later, Boeing's rationale for the 2017 charge cited, “… incorporating changes into initial production aircraft as we progress through late-stage testing and the certification process”—which seems to us to be the same rationale year-over-year.
For those keeping score, Boeing is now at “roughly $2.9 billion” (according to one report) in pre-tax charges associated with cost growth on the $4.8 billion fixed-price-incentive-fee development contract whose point of total assumption was reached long ago. (Our math says $2.4 billion, not $2.9 billion, but who knows? The point is, it’s a big number. In fact, the overrun recognized to date is equal to at least 50% of the total contract value.)
Further, at least one KC-46A supplier has also recorded reserves associated with cost growth. In February 2017, Cobham recorded a $187 million charge associated with the program, citing “an onerous commercial arrangement” with Boeing.
As we said in 2016—
There are not very many defense contractors that could have afforded to fund nearly half the development cost of a new aircraft. Fortunately for all concerned, one of them is Boeing.
Tell us again why fixed-price development contracts are preferred these days?
We stand by those words today, a year later.
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The Peregrination of Angela Styles
Attorneys change firms.
Sometimes they lateral from one firm to another. Sometimes they leave a Big Law practice to start their own firm. Sometimes a group of attorneys leaves en masse. It happens with a certain regularity and there’s nothing particularly noteworthy about the departure of an attorney from a firm.
And not all attorneys depart their firms. For example,, Tom Lemmer has been with the same government contracts practice for more than 35 years. Terry Albertson has been a fixture at Crowell & Moring since we can remember.
But many attorneys do change firms and it’s almost never noticed by the public. Unless you are a client or a colleague, it’s just not that big of a deal.
We’ve followed (from afar) the moves of Ms. Angela B. Styles and we’ve never written about them before. But her latest move prompted us to think about her career. Ms. Styles’ career is interesting (at least to us). We thought it might be of interest to our readers.
Note we have no inside knowledge here. We’ve never discussed this issue with Ms. Styles, nor have we discussed it with any of her (former) colleagues. All we are going on is what we have seen from a distance. (With the help of several websites.)
Why Ms. Styles? Well for one thing for a time she served as the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). That was a Senate-confirmed position. In that role, she established procurement policy (duh) and she also Chaired the Cost Accounting Standards Board. Thus: she is kind of a big deal.
Anyway, Ms. Styles’ career appears to have started when she was a Legislative Aide for Congressman Joe Barton (R-TX). She spent two years in that position and then headed to law school at the University of Texas. After graduating and passing the bar, she worked as an Associate at the inside-the-Beltway firm of Miller & Chevalier. She worked for the firm for five years, before jumping to the Federal government.
In 2001 Ms. Styles joined the General Services Administration (GSA) as a “budget oversight official” (according to one website). But she didn’t stay there long.
She was nominated and confirmed as the Administrator OFPP in 2001. She served in that capacity for two years. While there, she revamped and reissued OMB Circular A-76, covering public/private competitions.
Afterwards, Ms. Styles rejoined Miller & Chevalier—this time as a partner. She was there for three years before departing to join Crowell & Moring’s government contracts practice. While there, she was named as Chair of that practice and, subsequently, as Chair of the entire firm. She served in that capacity until recently, when she joined Bracewell’s growing government contracts practice as a partner. Crowell touted her rise “from lateral to Chairwoman in eight years” in a 2015 press release (a press release that we understandably removed after her departure from the firm).
While at Crowell, Ms. Styles also served as Director of the Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct (DII), replacing Brigadier General Dick Bednar (USA, Retired). She no longer serves in that capacity, though we could not determine when she departed DII.
Ms. Styles’ tenure at Crowell was quite successful, according to published reports. Nonetheless, the partnership voted to replace her, perhaps because of a desire to move in a different strategic direction. According to this article, “Three sources familiar with internal machinations at Crowell & Moring said that there appeared to be disagreement within the partnership about the direction of the Washington, D.C.-based firm, such as a desire to pursue merger opportunities in New York and expand its portfolio of practice groups beyond its traditional strength in the government contracts space.” Although her term as Chairwoman wasn’t due to officially end until February 2018, Ms. Styles opted to depart early for a new role at Bracewell, a move characterized by one report as “unusual.”
Obviously, Bracewell is happy to have such an experience practitioner with impeccable leadership credentials. The Bracewell press release calls her “one of the leading government contracts lawyers in the United States.”
An interesting career—right?
From staffer to associate, and from associate to Senate-confirmation. From Partner to head of a firm’s most important practice, and from there to management of an entire firm.
Now Ms. Styles is at another firm and we are sure great things are in store for both her and that firm.
Department of Energy Might Pay for Overtime Associated with Training
Readers may recall we pointed out more than a year ago that labor costs associated with employee training were unallowable if incurred on overtime (FAR 31.205-44: “Overtime compensation for training and education is unallowable.”)
It doesn’t make much sense, because sometimes the scheduled work takes up the full work week, and the only time left is overtime. But there it is and contractors have been gigged by DCAA for getting it wrong, regardless of the circumstances involved.
We are pleased to note that the Department of Energy just issued a DEARS Class Deviation that permits (but does not require) a contracting officer to approve them in advance. If there is no advance approval, the costs remain unallowable. (The Class Deviation says they are “expressly unallowable.”)
When would a contracting officer consider approving use of overtime for employee training? The Class Deviation provides three circumstances that could lead to approved training overtime. Overtime may be approved when necessary to—
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Meet essential delivery or performance schedules;
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Make up for delays beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor; or
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Eliminate foreseeable extended production bottlenecks that cannot be eliminated in any other way
So – good job DOE!
As has become the norm, DOE is ahead of DoD with respect to managing its contractors’ costs. We can only hope that the DAR Council gets tired of being the slow student in class, and starts taking similarly innovative common-sense steps.
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