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Apogee Consulting Inc

Section 809 Panel Report Contains Bold Reform Recommendations

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They met in secret.

Former leaders from government and industry. Acquisition professionals, academics, and accountants. Lawyers and warfighters. Former DCMA folks and former GSA folks and former OFPP folks. Former Congressional staffers. Current Pentagon corridor striders. Current and former Senior Executive Staff.

They met over the past year to try to fix the defense acquisition system.

We’ve mentioned their activities from time to time – notably here.

The Section 809 Panel recently released its first official report.

The first Volume of three Volumes. So: more to follow. But right now we have the first Volume.

You should read it. You should read it all.

The Panel told the public that they would be making bold recommendations for reform. They did not disappoint.

The Panel made 24 official recommendations (though several of the recommendations had multiple subparts—e.g., Recommendation #24 had 28 individual sub-recommendations.) We liked what we read. We think you will as well.

Volume 1 was organized into eight Sections, as follows:

Section 1 – Commercial Buying

Section 2 – Contract Compliance and Audit

Section 3 – Defense Business Systems: Acquisition of IT Systems

Section 4 – Earned Value Management for Software Programs Using Agile

Section 5 – Services Contracting

Section 6 – Small Business

Section 7 – Statutory Offices and Designated Officials

Section 8 – Statutory Reporting Requirements

Each of the above Sections is worth reading. However, knowing the demographics of this blog’s readership, we are going to start with Section 2 (Contract Compliance and Audit).

Section 2 contained several interesting and provocative recommendations. We are going to list them, using the Panel’s numbering system.

5 Align DCAA’s mission statement to focus on its primary customer, the contracting officer.

6 Revise the elements of DCAA’s annual report to Congress to incorporate multiple key metrics.

7 Provide flexibility to contracting officers and auditors to use audit and advisory services when appropriate.

7a Prior to requesting field pricing/audit assistance, contracting officers should consider other available internal resources and tailor their request for assistance to the maximum extent possible.

7b Define the term audit.

7c DCAA should use the full range of audit and nonaudit services available.

7d Direct a review of the roles of DCAA and DCMA to ensure appropriate alignment and eliminate redundancies.

8 Establish statutory time limits for defense oversight activities.

9 Permit DCAA to use IPAs to manage resources to meet time limits.

10 Replace system criteria from DFARS 252.242-7006, Accounting System Administration, with an internal control audit to assess the adequacy of contractors’ accounting systems.

11 Develop a Professional Practice Guide for DoD’s oversight of contractor costs and business systems.

12 Require DCAA to obtain peer review from a qualified external organization.

13 Increase coverage of the effectiveness of contractor internal control audits by leveraging IPAs.

14 Incentivize contractor compliance and manage risk efficiently through robust risk assessment.

15 Clarify and streamline the definition of and requirements for an adequate incurred cost proposal to refocus the purpose of DoD’s oversight.

Before we get into the meat of some of the recommendations above, notice that eleven of the twenty-four recommendations are devoted to contract compliance and audit. That’s just about half the Report, in terms of recommendations. (Using the Panel’s numbering and ignoring sub-recommendations.) That ought to signal to lawmakers and other policy-makers the importance that the Panel places on this issue, in terms of acquisition reform.

Now let’s look at some of the recommendations, using quotes from the Report.

What kind of metrics should DCAA be reporting?

If DCAA is operating effectively, its success cannot be measured only in questioned and sustained costs. As DoD and contractor internal controls improve, there may be fewer costs to question and sustain. In contrast, worsening DoD and contractor internal controls may increase costs questioned and sustained. Similarly, DCAA’s success as an organization cannot be measured by the quantity of audits at the expense of quality. Congress’s current emphasis on questioned costs and DCAA’s emphasis on return on investment alone do not adequately demonstrate performance. DCAA is not, and should not, be considered a profit center. Most importantly, the current DCAA report has no measure of DCAA’s primary customers’ (contracting officer or acquisition team) satisfaction with the quality and timeliness of DCAA’s work.

The Panel provided a long list of metrics it thought were important. Among the list of metrics, we noted –

  • For postaward audits and advisory engagements of contractor costs, the questioned costs accepted by the contracting officers and contractors as a total number and as a percentage of total questioned costs, where questioned costs are expressed as the impact on reimbursable contract[s] (shown separately for the DCAA and qualified private auditors retained by the agency).

  • The aggregate cost of performing audits, set forth separately by type of audit.

  • The ratio of sustained questioned costs to the aggregate costs of performing audits, set forth separately by type of audit.

  • The total number and dollar value of postaward audits that are pending for a period longer than 1 year as of the end of the fiscal year covered by the report, and the fiscal year in which the qualified proposal was received, set forth separately by type of audit.

  • A summary of the reasons for the difference between questioned and sustained costs shown in the statistical tables.

Again, the above list is not inclusive. It is only a sample of the many metrics the Panel recommended DCAA should be reporting to Congress annually.

With respect to Recommendation #8 (Establish statutory time limits for defense oversight activities), the Panel wrote—

Financial and business system oversight of DoD’s contractors often starts too late and takes too long. These delays cause problems for both contracting officers and defense contractors and reduce the utility of oversight findings. To be effective and efficient, DoD’s system of internal controls must operate in a timely manner. … DCAA’s work is untimely, which causes delays in contract awards, as well as other negative effects on the contract life cycle, through and including contract closeout. For example, in FY 2016, DCAA did not begin work on final indirect cost rate proposals until more than 2 years after contractors’ submissions. Contracting officers need DCAA’s work to close out flexibly priced contracts. DoD’s system of acquisition internal controls operates most effectively when controls are applied in a timely way.

It’s tough to argue with anything in the paragraph above (though we’re sure some will try). The Recommendation contained many time limits for Congress’ consideration, including

  • 30 days to issue a report on a contractor provisional billing rate proposal

  • 90 days to issue a report on a contractor forward pricing rate proposal

Readers might be wondering about DCAA audits of contractor proposals to establish final billing rates, commonly called “incurred cost proposals.” That was covered in Recommendation #15 (Clarify and streamline the definition of and requirements for an adequate incurred cost proposal to refocus the purpose of DoD’s oversight). We like this recommendation a lot, and not only because it repeats many of the things we’ve been asserting for years. The Panel wrote—

The term incurred cost proposal is not defined within federal acquisition regulations, the effect of which has been to create unnecessary burdens on both the Government and contractors. Incurred cost proposal is the government contracting community’s shorthand way of referring to a contractor’s final indirect cost rate proposal. An annual final indirect cost rate proposal, the elements of which are defined in FAR 52.216 ‐7(d), is necessary for the contractor and the government to establish final indirect cost rates for purposes of settling provisionally billed (i.e., estimated) indirect costs on flexibly priced contracts. … A final indirect cost rate proposal is not a claim for direct costs incurred and billed during contract performance. FAR 42.702 indicates that an audit of the final indirect cost rate proposal is performed for the sole purpose of negotiating final indirect cost rates. … In recent years, DCAA began auditing direct costs, as well as indirect costs, during its incurred cost audits. Before then, DCAA’s audit procedures concerning direct costs were limited to verifying their completeness such that final indirect cost rates are calculated accurately. In general, expanding the scope of incurred costs audits may increase the time it takes DCAA to complete incurred cost audits and increase the time it takes contracting officers to address and resolve the results of DCAA’s audits.

The government added new requirements of an adequate  final indirect cost rate proposal to FAR 52.216‐7(d)(2)(iii) in 2011. These newly required elements of a final indirect cost rate proposal were directly based on DCAA’s incurred cost electronic model, which DCAA created many years ago to help contractors prepare their final indirect cost rate proposals in a consistent manner and provide appropriate cost detail to make DCAA’s audit oversight more efficient. Many of the required elements of an adequate final indirect cost rate proposal have no bearing on calculating, understanding, auditing, and negotiating final indirect cost rates. This collection of unnecessary data has contributed to DCAA losing its focus on the purpose and scope of contractors’ final indirect cost rate proposal and has created unnecessary work for contractors, DCAA, and especially contracting officers. …

DCAA must refocus on its mission of providing contracting officers with the information they need to do their jobs as prescribed in contracts and by the FAR. DCAA should not be auditing direct contract costs unless requested to do so by the contracting officer as set forth in FAR 52.216‐7(g). Several final indirect cost rate proposal schedules that have no bearing on evaluating or settling final indirect cost rates should be removed.

(Footnotes removed; emphasis in original.)

There’s more to the Report, Section 2, than we have time or space to discuss here. There is Recommendation #10, which would revamp how DCAA reviews contractors’ accounting systems. There is Recommendation #11, which would leverage collaborative input from external sources to define, document, and teach professional standards to DCAA auditors. Et cetera.

Suffice to say, if implemented as drafted, the recommendations in Section 2 would significantly improve contract audit and oversight in the defense acquisition environment. The problem, of course, is that, historically, such recommendations have been bitterly opposed by those who think they have something to lose by their implementation. We will all have to wait and see what DoD leadership and Congress do with these recommendations.

Do we need to tell readers that we endorse them wholeheartedly?

 

 

Export Controls

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If you are a prime contractor selling military equipment (or dual use equipment) only to the U.S. Government, you don’t really need to worry about what happens to your equipment after acceptance. The U.S. Government has it, and it’s pretty much all good from there.

But if you are a company that sells military equipment (or dual use equipment) to a variety of customers, including prime contractors and other commercial entities, then you need to worry about complying with a complex regime intended to control what stuff gets shipped where—and what happens to your equipment after receipt by the entity that purchased it from you.

This is not the article about that complex control regime. We are not experts in that area. Experts exist and, if you think you need them, you should go hire them. You can also take seminars addressing that topic, if you are inclined to get smarter about the subject. The point is, it’s a complex topic and, if you need to know about compliance, you aren’t going to find what you need on this website.

What we want to talk about is a quick object lesson about how a company acquired controlled items and then illegally exported them.

From the Department of Justice—

Peter Zuccarelli, 62, of Plano, Texas was sentenced today to 46 months in prison for conspiring to smuggle and illegally export from the U.S. in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), radiation hardened integrated circuits (RHICs) for use in the space programs of China and Russia. Zuccarelli was also sentenced to three years supervised release and a $50,000 fine.

…

According to the plea agreement, between approximately June 2015 and March 2016, Zuccarelli and his co-conspirators agreed to illegally export RHICs to China and Russia. RHICs have military and space applications, and their export is strictly controlled. In furtherance of the conspiracy, Zuccarelli’s co-conspirator received purchase orders from customers seeking to purchase RHICs for use in China’s and Russia’s space programs. Zuccarelli received these orders from his co-conspirator, as well as payment of approximately $1.5 million to purchase the RHICs for the Chinese and Russian customers. Zuccarelli placed orders with U.S. suppliers, and used the money received from his co-conspirator to pay the U.S. suppliers. In communications with the U.S. suppliers, Zuccarelli certified that his company, American Coating Technologies, was the end user of the RHICs, knowing that this was false. Zuccarelli received the RHICs he ordered from U.S. suppliers, removed them from their original packaging, repackaged them, falsely declared them as ‘touch screen parts,’ and shipped them out of the U.S. without the required licenses. He also attempted to export what he believed to be RHICs. In an attempt to hide the conspiracy from the U.S. government, he created false paperwork and made false statements.

The phrase that leapt to our attention in the foregoing was “He also attempted to export what he believed to be RHICs.” We suspect that means that somebody found out about the scheme while it was going on, and substituted something else for the RHICs. (We hope that’s what that means.) If we’re correct, then it means the company selling the RHICs noticed that something was off in the order, and tipped-off governmental authorities.

If you are a company that sells military equipment (or dual use equipment) to a variety of customers, including prime contractors and other commercial entities, what would you do to detect orders that seemed off? Do you have routine monitoring procedures? What are they?

For example, do you check to see if entities purchasing your equipment have a reasonably legitimate use for the equipment? Look at the name of Zuccarelli’s company in the DoJ announcement—“American Coating Technologies.” It’s possible that the “coating” might apply to PWCs and PWAs and the like, but it’s also possible that the “coating” might refer to powder coating or something very machine-shop oriented. How might you reasonably investigate to find out which one it was?

Further, if a company is re-exporting your equipment under false pretenses, you wouldn’t know that. But you might know that the company was in the exporting business. And you might also make reasonable inquiries into the destination of those exports. In this case, if you found out that “American Coating Technologies” was exporting products—no matter what they were called—to Russia and China, you might be somewhat concerned. And you might call the authorities and ask for some assistance.

This is a big chain of what-ifs, based on a single sentence in a DoJ press release. But that sentence got us thinking. You should know if your goods are subject to export controls, and what type of exports controls they are subject to. But you should also make reasonable efforts to ensure that your customers are complying with those controls.

Obviously, how you do that and how much effort you make must be commensurate with your products and your business size and your customers. But it seems to us that you ought to be doing something. We suspect that the unnamed producer of RHICs from which Zuccarelli acquired his chips was doing something—and it was how the scheme was detected and ultimately stopped.

 

 

Considering Contractor Fraud

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You know when you have your DCAA entrance conference, and the auditor gets all serious and asks about fraud? The auditor asks “Are you aware of any allegations of fraud related to this audit?” or something very much like that. And most times that happens, you wonder who would ask such a silly question and why they would think it would be appropriate to ask it of you.

You think it’s silly because, really, how would you know? Fraud allegations are handled by Legal and discussed with Senior Management, and you would honestly have no idea if there were any allegations of fraud or if those allegations had been confirmed or if those confirmed allegations had been reported as required by contract clause 52.203-13. You honestly have no clue (unless you yourself made or investigated such allegations) and you wonder how to answer the question.

Because you have to answer it. The question (or questions) about known or alleged or suspected fraud must be answered. The auditor must ask and the contractor must answer, honestly.

The question(s) must be asked and answered.

Typically, the question is punted over to Legal for an official answer. And that takes time, because Legal is concerned about risks and what words mean, and the lawyers want to ponder the meaning of words like “fraud” and “allegation” and “suspicion,” and they want to review all open investigations and all recent Hotline reports to see if, maybe, there is an allegation of fraud related to the audit.

While Legal is reviewing the files and preparing the official answer, the auditors are waiting. And they are getting suspicious while they wait, because they are thinking “why would this take so long?” The only answer they can come up with is “because there’s something there—something the contractor wants to hide.” While you are waiting for Legal to get you the answer to the question(s), the auditors are thinking they are going to learn something important. (This rarely happens.)

Less typically, the audit liaison answers the question, and answers it in the negative. The negative response is also honest. “No, I am not [personally] aware of any allegations of fraud related to this audit.” The personally part is never said out loud, but it’s certainly implied. “I am not aware, and I am not aware that management is aware…” Because you are not aware, because they haven’t told you anything.

The auditor notes the response and the date and the fact that it was you who said it … and if it ever turns out that there were, in fact, allegations or suspicions or actual disclosures of fraud that were relevant to the audit, then you will certainly have some explaining to do.

You cross your fingers and hope it never comes to that.

Regardless of which scenario you are participating in, the auditors have asked their fraud-related questions, and received and recorded the answers—thus, one more step in the audit program has been completed.

It’s a required step in most DCAA audit programs. The auditors are required to consider contractor fraud as part of their audits. You know that asking about fraud is probably not the best way to consider fraud, but it’s certainly one way. To be clear, it’s not the only way.

Another resource used by DCAA auditors to consider contractor fraud are the Fraud Detection Resources for Auditors, maintained by the DoD Office of Inspector General. You don’t have to be an auditor to use these resources; anybody can visit the DoD OIG website and peruse “General Fraud Scenarios and Indicators,” “Fraud Red Flags and Indicators,” and “Contract Audit Fraud Detection Resources.” You can also review “Fraud Detection Guidance,” or “Auditor Responsibilities,” or even “Best Practices” for identifying and assessing potential fraud risk factors during audit planning and performance. It’s free!

If you click on (say) “Contract Audit Fraud Detection Resources,” you will see a bunch of interesting stuff, including Fraud Scenarios linked to:

  • Incurred Cost Audits

  • Business System Audits

  • Forward Pricing Proposal Audits

  • Billing Audits

  • Post-Award Audits

If you are a diligent audit liaison, you will actually review the fraud indicators and scenarios that are relevant to the audit you are supporting, because you know that the DCAA auditors are reviewing them and you’d like to have an inkling about what things they are going to be sensitive to in the audit they are performing at your company.

But if you are the average person, no. You’re not going to take the time to review all that stuff, because you’re convinced the whole thing is a “check the box” exercise, without any substance and therefore without any consequences.

And you’d be wrong.

The fact of the matter is that there is a non-zero probability that any DCAA audit is going to unearth some type of fraud. There is a non-zero probability that any contractor a DCAA auditor audits is actually committing some type of fraud right at that moment.

Yes, your company.

In 2017, contractors made 388 “disclosures” to the DoD OIG. And that’s just one Inspector General out of many across the Federal government. According to DoD OIG reports, the number of contractor disclosures is trending up over time, not down. Contractor fraud is a growing problem and DCAA auditors would be silly if they didn’t consider that every single time they performed an audit, there was a chance they would encounter some type of fraudulent activity. You might not like the way they handle it, but it’s something they absolutely have to handle.

Examples of contractor fraud abound on this website, even though (a) we don’t report fraud in the health-care industry, and (b) we don’t report anymore about “routine” contractor fraud—it’s got to be something interesting to merit a blog article. A keyword search using “fraud” as the single term returns more than 40 individual articles dealing with contractor fraud.

So get over it. Auditors are going to continue to ask questions about fraud and they are going to continue to expect answers to those questions.

In unrelated news, on January 19, 2018, Lockheed Martin “agreed to a settlement valued at $4.4 million to resolve allegations that it violated the civil False Claims Act by providing defective communications systems for the United States Coast Guard’s National Security Cutters,” according to this Dept. of Justice press release. The settlement resolved allegations brought by a qui tam relator (a former employee, naturally) who “will receive $990,000 as his share of the government’s recovery from Lockheed.” Importantly, apparently this matter was not disclosed by Lockheed Martin pursuant to the requirements of contract clause 52.203-13.

In more unrelated news, the DoD OIG confirmed allegations that government contractor Leidos had retaliated against an internal whistleblower. Report DODIG-18-044, issued January 3, 2018, stated—

We determined that Complainant made two protected disclosures, one to a company official, and one to a Government official. We also determined that after Complainant’s protected disclosures, Leidos took actions against Complainant by non-selecting her for contract continuation. We further determined Leidos had knowledge of Complainant’s protected disclosures.

Leidos officially disagreed with the IG’s findings. Nonetheless, the matter was referred to the Secretary of Defense for further action.

Moving forward, let’s agree that contractor fraud exists and that government auditors are not being oversensitive or overzealous when they consider that it might be existing right in front of their eyes. Let’s agree to make sure that, when we answer auditors’ fraud-related questions, we do so quickly and forthrightly. As a further step, let’s agree to try very hard to make sure the answers to those questions are “no”—because we’ve already been checking for fraud at our companies, as the government expects us to.

 

 

New and Updated DCAA Audit Programs

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Since we bag on DCAA for failing to publish its MRDs, it’s only fair we let readers know that the audit agency has been busy updating old audit programs and adding some new ones. Here’s what you need to know. All programs are dated November, 2017, unless otherwise noted.

Updates:

10100 Incurred Cost Audits

10110 A-133 Audits

10160 Incurred Costs (Consulting Services)

10310 Non-Major Contractors Labor Floorchecks (MAAR 6)

10320 Purchase Existence and Consumption (MAAR 13)

12500 Material Management and Accounting System (MMAS) Audit

13010 Accounting and Control of Labor Costs

13500 Major Contractors Labor Floorchecks/Interviews (MAAR 6)

14980 Indirect and ODC System Internal Controls

15600 Limitation of Payments

17100 Termination

17200 Claim for Delay or Disruption

17330 Reconciliation of Contracts

17930 Compliance with Billing Instructions

17500 Progress Payments

17740 Pre-Award Survey Contractor Accounting System

17741 Post-Award Accounting System Audit, Non-Major Contractors

19100 Adequacy/Compliance of Initial Disclosure Statement

19100 Adequacy/Compliance of Revised Disclosure Statement

194xx Compliance with Individual Cost Accounting Standards (various)

19500 CAS Cost Impact Proposals

21000 Price Proposals

42000 Truth in Negotiations (TINA) Audits

New:

17600 DFAS Financial Capability

17600 Financial Capability

17800 Government Facility Rental Payments

17850 CPRs, C/SSRs, CFSRs

17870 CCDRs

48600 Suspected Irregular Conduct (SIC)

So yes, some of the ones we called “new” are actually old stuff that’s been missing for a while. And some of the ones we called “updates” are similarly old dogs that have been reissued. And we didn’t list everything. But you can visit DCAA’s website and see all the new and revised audit programs, and you can categorize them any which way you would like to.

And, if you are especially diligent, you can read them to see what to expect what DCAA comes to your place of business in order to perform an audit.

 

 

Subcontractor Management

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Here we go again: another blog article about managing subcontractors.

It’s not like we haven’t beaten this drum already, many times. We’ve asserted, over and over, that effective subcontractor management is the key to effective prime contractor performance. We’ve asserted, over and over, that the prime will be held responsible for contract execution, even if the cause of nonperformance is buried deep in the program supply chain. (For example: here.)

We’ve reviewed FAR 42.202(e)(2) and “plainly invalid” DCAA audit findings regarding its views on what a prime contractor’s duties are with respect to its subcontractors. We’ve reviewed subcontractor risk management and T&M misbilling allegations and contract types. We’ve talked about this issue to death, and readers might justifiably be wondering what the heck is there left to talk about?

Well, let’s try this one.

Let’s say you are performing due diligence activities on a contractor, and you want to assess its management of its subcontractors. How would you go about making that assessment? What would you do? What areas would you examine?

  1. Source selection and award. Don’t bother looking at “depth of competition”—which is a phrase created by CPSR reviewers that lacks substantive meaning. (Adequate competition and adequate price competition are terms already defined in the FAR. Either you have ‘em or you don’t. It’s a pass/fail thing. Having more competition than you need to have isn’t better, and it’s often counterproductive.) But do look at the solicitations. Do they list clear evaluation criteria? Do bidders get a reasonable amount of time in which to respond? Are the same sources being sought each time, or is the contractor trying to find new sources? (If there are sole source justifications, do they look legitimate?) Also look at the amount of “lead time” the buyers get to evaluate bidders and to make an award. Is it reasonable, or is it so short that the people involved will rush through their procedures and make mistakes?

  2. Corruption. Don’t forget to check to see if the same buyer makes an award to the same bidder, over and over. That’s an indication that there may be more to the relationship than there should be.

  3. Subcontract type. Remember that the subcontract type has to be appropriate. If every subcontract is FFP, that’s not necessarily a good thing, especially in a development environment. You can usually tell if the contract type was appropriate by looking at post-award change order activity. If you see a lot of activity, chances are it’s because the wrong subcontract type was selected.

  4. Subcontractor business systems. Smart prime contractors know that the DFARS Business System Administration contract clause is not a mandatory flowdown clause. However, they also know that their subcontractors must have sufficient sophistication (in terms of business systems) to be able to comply with contract terms. If the Davis-Bacon Act or the Service Contract Act is involved, then subcontractors must be able to comply with those onerous rules. If a T&M subcontract is awarded, then the subcontractor must be able to bill labor hours accurately in the right labor categories. If a cost-type subcontract is awarded, then the subcontractor must be able to comply with FAR 52.216-7 (“Allowable Cost and Payment”). Smart subcontractors check these things before making an award; dumb ones don’t. Check the subcontract file to see whether your due diligence target is smart or dumb.

  5. Subcontractor risk management. When things go south, more often than not a subcontractor was involved. Quality escapes that go undetected for too long, counterfeit electronic parts, failure to comply with contract terms. These are a few of our favorite things. (Sorry, couldn’t resist.) The best prime contractors think about the risks ahead of time and then think about risk mitigation, and then they actually deploy their risk mitigation strategies. They budget for subcontractor risk mitigation because they know that its cheaper in the long run to have risk mitigation that you didn’t end up needing rather than experience hugely problematic subcontractor incidents that could have been avoided, had somebody done something proactively. Other prime contractors talk about saving pennies while risking the loss of billions of dollars. Which one are you dealing with?

  6. Subcontractor close-out. Many (most?) prime contractors don’t think that subcontract close-out is part of subcontractor management. They think their job is over when the subcontractor makes its final delivery. They are so, so wrong about that. There is a ton of paperwork to execute, from patent/royalty certifications to property certifications to security certifications. For cost-type or incentive type or T&M type subcontracts, there is a final “true-up” of costs and fee to be made, often (but certainly not necessarily) based on a government audit report that is issued years later. Check the files for evidence that the contractor performs subcontract close-out as a routine part of its subcontract management activities. If you don’t see what you’re looking for, then chances are you will inherit a labor-intensive, very difficult, long-overdue task if you decide to acquire the company.

Just some thoughts about subcontractor management on this winter’s morning. If you are performing due diligence, you may want to consider them.

And even if you are not performing due diligence—even if you are just a government contractor going about its business, managing its subcontractors—perhaps you may want to consider them as well.

 

 


Page 59 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.