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Apogee Consulting Inc

More on Threshold Changes

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Recently we had an opportunity to point out to readers that the 2018 NDAA had changed the TINA threshold, moving it from $750,000 to $2 million effective June 18, 2018. We also noted that the micro-purchase threshold and the simplified acquisition threshold were also changing. We discussed whether contractors should update their policies, procedures, and instructions to the new thresholds based on changes to statute, or if they should wait until the DAR Council implemented those statutory changes in the DFARS.

We concluded that contractors should lean forward. We opined that contractors should implement the new thresholds in advance of any official rule-making.

However, at a recent industry meeting, we got some pushback. Respected colleagues, frenemies, and competimates pointed out that solicitations issued by DoD components were going to use the “old” TINA threshold of $750,000 to decide when to request certified cost or pricing data. (FAR 15.403-4(a)(1) states “The threshold for obtaining certified cost or pricing data is $750,000.”) They asked if a contractor was supposed to push back and refuse to provide certified cost or pricing data based on the new threshold, and thus risk being found to be non-responsive to the solicitation requirements. When you put it like that, the answer is “no.” (Though we think it would make for a quick bid protest.) If the solicitation contains the 52.215-10 or the 52.215-11 or the 52.215-12 or the 52.215-13 clauses, because the contracting officer followed the regulatory guidance instead of the statute, then obviously the low-risk path is to provide the required certified cost or pricing data in the required format of FAR Table 15.2.

What we are advocating is a change to the contractor’s own policies, procedures, and instructions with respect to how it interacts with its subcontractors. We concluded that the contractor should adopt the statutory threshold changes in advance of any formal rule-making. In other words, the contractor should request certified cost or pricing data from its subcontractors only when necessary and when the value of the proposed subcontract is expected to exceed $2 million.

If a solicitation contains the “TINA clauses” (as listed above) then this may create a conflict. For example, the 52.215-12 provision states “ Before awarding any subcontract expected to exceed the threshold for submission of certified cost or pricing data at FAR 15.403-4 … the Contractor shall require the subcontractor to submit certified cost or pricing data (actually or by specific identification in writing), in accordance with FAR 15.408, Table 15-2 … unless an exception under FAR 15.403-1 applies.” In other words, the solicitation provision references the regulatory threshold and not the statutory threshold (even though FAR 15.403-4 clearly references the underlying statutes themselves). Thus, once again, the contractor may be found to be non-responsive if it uses the statutory threshold rather than the regulatory threshold when determining whether or not to obtain certified cost or pricing data from its subcontractors.

Obviously the more conservative and safer course of action is to wait for the FAR Councils to implement the statutory changes. However, if that’s your plan you may have a very long wait. At that same industry meeting, we heard that certain DoD interests do not like the new TINA threshold, and are planning to drag their feet with respect to regulatory implementation, while working hard to convince Congress to rescind the change. If you don’t implement the statutory change now, you may never implement it.

It’s your call.

We will point out one more thing: the CAS threshold is tied to the TINA threshold.

It’s hard to actually find the linkage, because when the CAS language was moved into 48 CFR Chapter 99, the government abandoned any pretense of maintenance. You can find the recent CAS Board preambles at FAR Chapter 99 on the acquisition.gov website (which is the official government website for acquisition regulations), but you can’t find the CAS program rules or the Standards themselves. Instead, you get a link to “the official codified Cost Accounting Standards” at a Government Printing Office website (gpoaccess.gov/cfr/index.html)—but that link is broken. If you do a search on “48 CFR Chapter 99” you get a hit with the correct GPO address, but that GPO address contains an outdated version of the CAS rules. It says that the 9903.201-1(b)(2) CAS exemption is “Negotiated contracts and subcontracts not in excess of $500,000”—which is woefully out of date. Other CAS exemption language is similarly out of date. And this is the official language. You have to go over to the unofficial Hill AFB website (farsite.hill.af.mil) to get the correct language.

The correct 9903.201-1(b)(2) CAS exemption reads: “Negotiated contracts and subcontracts not in excess of the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) threshold, as adjusted for inflation (41 U.S.C. 1908 and 41 U.S.C. 1502(b)(1)(B)).”

You can confirm this by checking the DCAA Contract Audit Manual, at 8-103.2 (“CAS Exemptions”) which provides that “negotiated contracts and subcontracts (including interdivisional work orders) less than the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) threshold” are exempt from CAS.

Note that the CAS exemption is tied directly to statute and not to regulation. Thus, regardless of what you do for certified cost or pricing data coverage, you must change your policies, procedures, and instructions with respect to CAS administration of subcontractors. Any subcontractor proposal valued at less than $2 million is exempt from CAS, effective 18 June 2018. If you try to impose CAS on such contract actions, say (for example) by including any CAS clause in the subcontract, then you risk being found to have committed a Public Law violation in your next CPSR.

By “slow-rolling” the implementation of the 2018 NDAA threshold changes into the acquisition regulations, the FAR Councils have created a problem for contractors. If the contractors wait for the regulatory implementation, then they must disconnect CAS coverage from TINA coverage. They will end up requesting certified cost or pricing data from subcontractors that are, by statute, exempt from CAS. This helps nobody and may well lead to increased procurement costs.

In our view, the only rational approach is to apply the statutory threshold changes now. The FAR Councils should immediately issue a Class Deviation to FAR 15.403-4(a)(1) to implement the new TINA threshold, even if formal rule-making takes a bit longer. If you are a contractor, you should discuss this quandary with your cognizant contracting officer and try to get some relief. It’s the smart thing to do.

 

 

What Happened to Collaboration?

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Recent news reports indicate that Lockheed Martin and its F-35 customer are having difficulty negotiating an acceptable price for the next tranche (Lot 11) of aircraft.

Again.

This seems to be a frequent issue, as we’ve noted before. For example, in this 2012 article, we quoted several high-ranking military commanders expressing concerns about the adversarial relationship between Lockheed Martin and its customer. (“Air Force Major General Christopher Bogdan, nominated to be the head of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, declared the relationship between his organization and Lockheed Martin … to be ‘the worst he has ever seen.’”) In this 2016 article, we discussed how, after the parties had failed to agree on a price, the government used a “rarely invoked” contract clause to unilaterally establish a price.

Now here we are in 2018 and negotiations are difficult, and the parties are making public comments in order to pressure the other side.

USNI News reported that—

Lockheed Martin submitted its Lot 11 proposal about a year and a half ago, but [Vice Admiral] Winter said the first offer from Lockheed Martin didn’t arrive at the Pentagon until more recently. Winter conceded he had hoped to have the deal finalized by the end of 2017. … ‘I will tell you I am not as satisfied with the collaboration and the cooperation by Lockheed Martin,’ Winter said. ’They could be much more cooperative and collaborative. We could seal this deal faster. We could. They choose not to, and that’s a negotiating tactic.’

‘The price is coming down but it’s not coming down fast enough,’ Winter said. ‘We don’t know to the level of granularity that I want to know, what it actually costs to produce this aircraft.’

Readers of this blog may find issues with Vice Admiral Winter’s quoted comments. For instance, the submission of the Lot 11 proposal was, in all likelihood, Lockheed Martin’s first offer. (Which is why a contractor that responds to an RFP is usually called an “offeror.”) In another for instance, let’s talk about cost “granularity.” The program WBS and OBS is a matter of EVMS adequacy, and Lockheed Martin (finally) received a determination that its EVMS was adequate years ago, after becoming a poster child for failed business systems. MIL-STD-881C is the governing document. As one EVMS consultancy states: “The summary WBS is developed by the procuring agency, approved by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG), and normally provided to the contractor in a Request for Proposal.  The contractor is expected, to expand the WBS down to a level where work will be authorized, planned and managed.” Thus, if the government customer wanted more granularity it could have easily specified the level it wanted.

But Lockheed Martin didn’t point to any of those issues in its public response. Instead, Lockheed Martin’s CFO asserted that Pentagon negotiators have become “less predictable” and are trying to reduce costs in areas that have previously been accepted. In this article, LockMart CFO Tanner was quoted as saying—

‘It’s not like negotiations were always easy, but I’ll say they were more predictable than they are today,’ Tanner said in an interview Monday. ‘There’s just more things that are being changed or things that you thought were sort of foundational elements of negotiation that maybe weren’t up for negotiation that now seem to be up for negotiation.’ For example, he said, the government now wants companies to eat various costs they once would have been reimbursed for. ‘Everyone should be interested in cost reduction, not simply not reimbursing elements of cost that you historically reimbursed,’ Tanner said. ‘That’s a strange way to get cost reduction and, I would argue, a very short-sighted, not helpful, not healthy for the industry and ultimately not healthy for the folks in the Pentagon buying under that strategy to use that approach.’

Further details regarding the costs that the Pentagon negotiators wanted Lockheed Martin to “eat” were not publicly released. But it really doesn’t matter much, does it? The point here is that this is a high-stakes game where the animosity between Pentagon and contractor is, once again, being played out in the public eye.

Shay Assad has been a consistent proponent of contractor price reductions through stronger negotiating tactics from the beginning. In 2011, we quoted: “Speaking at the Credit Suisse 2011 Aerospace & Defense Conference, Shay Assad said that the Pentagon is concerned with cost reduction, not margin reduction, and that he would be surprised if profitability went down even as spending is decreased.” In 2013 we wrote about Mr. Assad’s pet “should-cost” initiative—

Should-cost negotiations that do not result in significant price reductions (when compared to the contractor’s own estimate) seem to be seen as a failure by the government’s negotiators. In other words, the objective of ‘should cost’ does not seem to be to arrive as a ‘best guess’ or “most probable” estimated product cost; the objective appears to be to brow-beat the contractor into price concessions so that victory can be claimed in the fight against contractor profits.

In that same article, we discussed Frank Kendall’s Better Buying Power 2.1 comments about contractor profit, in which he stated—

Current profit levels in the aggregate are reasonable and sustainable, but they are not tied tightly enough to successful performance in meeting DoD goals. Traditionally, the Government’s objective position for contract profitability has been a function of perceived risk and the anticipated value to be achieved by successful contract performance. DoD profit policy and our acquisition strategies should provide effective incentives to industry to deliver cost-effective solutions in which realized profitability is aligned and consistent with contract outcomes.

So here we are in 2018, and Lockheed Martin, as the prime contractor for the largest single military weapon system program in the history of this country, is experiencing the fruits of those seeds planted long ago.

But it’s not just Lockheed Martin, of course. It’s many contractors in many diverse industries that support the Federal government. Many contractors are feeling the animosity from their government customers. The days where the official Pentagon policy of “partnering” with contractors—a policy that culminated in “alpha contracting” where the parties worked side by side in the same room to arrive at estimated costs—have long departed the scene. Its use seems to have peaked in the mid-2000’s, and not much can be found on the topic today.

If you are a government contractor entering into negotiations—particularly sole-source negotiations—you need to be prepared for a rough ride. The negotiators on the other side are trying to squeeze every nickel out of your price. And there is absolutely nothing wrong with that approach; that is their job. You need to be prepared for unpredictable and perhaps “unfair” negotiating tactics. You can best counter those tactics by strictly complying with the FAR requirements, and by bringing facts and figures to support your position.

Good luck.

 

 

CAS Board Back in Action!

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We’ve bemoaned the lack of CAS Board activity several times on this site. The most recent bemoanery may be found here. That article was written in July, 2017—about eight months ago. At that time, we noted that there was no CAS Board website, there was no OFPP website, there was no OFPP Administrator, and therefore there was no CAS Board Chair. There was nothing. We observed—

… it has become clear over the past 10 or so years that the CAS regime is also unworkable. It’s overly complex. It’s ambiguous. It’s burdensome. It’s grounded in a viewpoint that’s more than 40 years old, where DOD acquired more goods than services. But in the past 40 years many things have changed and the CAS regulations and Standards have not kept up with the changes. As we’ve noted from time to time, the CAS Board almost never met even when there was an OFPP Administrator to chair it. The published minutes reflected a situation where literally years would pass between meetings. The published list of CAS Board members included people who had left government service literally years before.

Meanwhile, in the intervening eight months, not very much has changed. We still cannot find a current OFPP website. We still cannot find a current CAS Board website. There is no confirmed OFPP Administrator and, therefore, there is no CAS Board Chair.

However, some things have changed. First, rumors are beginning to swirl that there may, in fact, be a nominee for the OFPP Administrator sometime in the near future. In the interim, it appears that Ms. Lesley Field has been acting as both OFPP Administrator and as CAS Board Chair. Thus, the CAS Board was able to actually hold a meeting and make a decision!

That relative flurry of CAS Board activity led to a Federal Register notice and a final rule, “clarifying” one of the existing exemptions from CAS coverage by adding a single word. As the Federal Register notice states—

… final rule revis[es] the exemption from CAS for firm-fixed-price (FFP) contracts and subcontracts awarded on the basis of adequate price competition without submission of cost or pricing data. This final rule clarifies that the exemption applies to FFP contracts and subcontracts awarded on the basis of adequate price competition without submission of certified cost or pricing data.

(Emphasis added.)

That single word we italicized in the quote above – certified – is the clarification.

This codifies the clarification as a final rule. The proposed rule, which was published for comment and input in 2011, received two comments. Both comments, according to the CAS Board, supported “the proposed change.” (Wait—we thought it was a clarification? Which is it?)

The reason for the change and/or clarification, as explained by the CAS Board, was documented in the proposed rule. “… the Board explained [in 2011] that at the time the CAS rule was promulgated in 2000, the term cost or pricing data was understood to mean certified cost or pricing data. However, as a result of changes made to the Federal Acquisition Regulation in 2010 … the term could also be read to mean cost or pricing data without the certification.”

In other words, it was the FAR Councils mucking about with FAR Part 15 cost or pricing data requirements that necessitated the present seven-year-long rule-making activity by the CAS Board.

We discussed the “mucking about” in this article. We said at the time—

We notice that the prohibition on obtaining cost or pricing data when certain conditions (e.g., adequate competition) are found has been de-emphasized in favor of a more detailed discussion of the types of data the contracting officer should obtain. This appears to represent a return to a pre-Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) pricing environment, which may add to contractors’ proposal costs— meaning that, ultimately, the Government may end up paying more for the goods and services it acquires.

With nearly eight years of hindsight to guide us, it seems that the 2010 changes to cost and pricing date requirements were part of a multi-pronged approach by certain interest groups to ensure that the government paid as low as price as possible, by pushing contractors to provide more and more detailed information. That push ignored the cost that contractors were going to incur in order to provide that information. That push ignored the additional barriers to market entry that were being created—barriers that, today, the government is working hard to remove. Further, that push ignored the impact on subcontractors, many of whom are small businesses, who were going to have to deal with these new requirements.

In the past eight years, prime contractors have seen their purchasing systems put in jeopardy because they failed to adequately comply with the 2010 FAR Part 15 rule changes. As a result, they have pressured their subcontractors to comply, so that cost and price analyses can be performed on subcontractor proposals. That’s been great news for Apogee Consulting, Inc., who has make nice bank by helping those small business subcontractors navigate the cost or pricing data requirements. But it’s been bad news for taxpayers, who have had to pay the bill for the resulting increased costs.

In hindsight, the 2010 FAR Part 15 revisions were ill-advised. They added little except cost. Moreover, those changes led to a seven-year-long rule-making effort by a CAS Board that—trust us—had far better things to do with its limited time and staff.

But the CAS Board is now back, led by Acting Chair Field. We expect to be reporting on more activity in the near future.

 

 

State and Local Cost Allowability Problems

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Over in California’s 2nd District Court of the State Court of Appeal, the Parsons-Dillingham joint venture was recently handed a significant victory in its long-running False Claims Act battle with the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA). In a couple of unpublished opinions, the finding of the Superior Court that the joint venture was liable under the FCA for billing unallowable indirect costs was reversed, and the defendants were awarded attorney fees. Since at one point the joint venture was on the hook for perhaps as much as $93 million, this is indeed a significant victory.

The Parsons-Dillingham joint venture was awarded its “original contract” for Red Line construction in 1984, but the contract was amended in 1991 to add “segment two” to the project. The Court referred to the post-1991 contract as “the Amended Contract,” since the 1991 amendment added additional contract language that affected cost recovery. (In 1993 another amendment added “segment three” to the project, but that did not seem to affect the parties’ rights.)

Suits were filed against the joint venture in 1996 and 1997, based on post-1991 billings, but it was not until 2014 that the Superior Court found liability—"approximately $30 million for improperly billed general and administrative costs (G&A) and overhead charges, $25 million for unauthorized subcontractor overhead charges and $38 million in prejudgment interest.” It took another four years for that finding to be reversed. In summary, we are talking about some 22 years of litigation.

Judge Perlus, writing for the Court, summarized the cost recovery requirements thusly—

Pursuant to Article CP-3.A. of the amended contract Parsons was entitled to its ‘Recoverable Costs,’ defined as, ‘(i) allowable direct labor costs (‘Direct Labor,’ as defined below), (ii) associated allowable Indirect Costs (also referred to herein as ‘Overhead’ or ‘Overhead Costs’) in an amount stated as a percentage (the ‘Overage Rate’) of the appropriate component of Direct Labor, (iii) costs of subcontracts, and (iv) other direct charges (‘ODCs’) necessarily and reasonably required in the performance of this Contract. . . .’ The provision defining Recoverable Costs continues, ‘[N]o costs or expenses incurred by [Parsons] as a result of [Parsons’s] failure to comply with terms and conditions of this Contract shall constitute Recoverable Costs.’ It also states, ‘All Recoverable Costs must be reasonably incurred by [Parsons] exclusively in connection with the performance of the Services subsequent to the date of this Contract. Except where explicitly stated to the contrary in this Contract, Chapter 1, Subpart 31.2 of the FARs [(Federal Acquisition Regulations)] shall be used to determine whether a given cost item is an element of Recoverable Cost.’

(Internal footnote omitted.)

The original dispute alleged that Parsons had failed to adjust its provisional billing rates to actual rates, and that it had billed MTA for unallowable costs. The MTA unilaterally established final billing rates, and Parsons filed a cross-complaint, alleging (among other things) breach of contract.

In analyzing the contract language, the Superior Court found that there was an “exclusivity clause”—i.e., that only costs that were exclusively incurred by Parsons in performance of the project were recoverable in MTA billings. Looking at the FAR definitions of indirect cost, general & administrative expense, allocability and allowabilty, the Superior Court concluded that overhead and G&A expenses were allocable to the project but had been made unallowable by the “exclusivity clause” language. The Appellate Court disagreed, writing—

The key language of the so-called exclusivity provision—'reasonably incurred . . . exclusively in connection with the performance of the Services subsequent to the date of this Contract’—properly (and literally) read, is not a disallowance of reasonably allocated indirect costs, including G&A, incurred in performing the amended contract, but a temporal limitation, requiring Parsons to charge direct costs and allocate indirect costs incurred before the May 1, 1991 effective date of the amended contract to the base contract in effect since 1984.That is, only those expenses for work done after April 30, 1991 on MOS-1 and MOS-2—direct labor, associated allowable indirect costs, subcontract costs and other direct charges—were recoverable under the terms and conditions of the new amended contract. No indirect cost pool to be allocated to the amended contract could include elements, including G&A, that predated May 1, 1991. … although G&A is recognized as a recoverable cost under the FAR and was billed by Parsons and paid by MTA under the base contract without dispute, nothing in the amended contract explicitly disallowed continued recovery of this major cost item as the amended contract required if FAR subpart 31.2 was not to be followed to determine recoverable costs and as the parties did, for example, for facilities costs, a far less significant item. Whatever else may be said about the ‘exclusivity clause,’ it does not explicitly prohibit the recovery of G&A.

There was more to the dispute, and much more to the Appellate Court’s opinion. But that’s not the point of this article. The point is: state and local contracts can be risky. Some of those contracts are funded with Federal dollars; many reference FAR cost allowability requirements. Contractors that bucket such contracts into lower risk categories, because they are not prime contracts directly with a Federal agency or because they are not subcontracts issued under a Federal prime contract, are making a mistake. State and local contracts carry risks, and some of those risks are substantial.

We are reminded of the 2012 SAIC settlement with respect to allegations made about corrupt decisions on SAIC’s “City Time” project—a project with the City of New York. The company’s Statement of Responsibility, made as part of its settlement agreement with the Department of Justice, stated “Those responsible for directly managing the project failed to enforce the company’s procurement policies in ways that allowed the irregular [subcontract] relationship to continue.” As a result of the project’s failure to comply with company policies, the company was required to pay more than $500 million.

We are fairly confident in saying, six years later, that the SAIC management team at the time wished it had classified its New York City project as high risk and applied the appropriate level of scrutiny. $500 million can pay for a heckuva lot of scrutiny.

In addition to regulatory risks, some state and local contracts can be inartfully drafted, as individuals who lack Federal government acquisition experience attempt to mimic the contract language used by Federal government acquisition professionals. (Example: Using the acronym “FARs” when the correct term is “FAR”.) Just because the contract language references or invokes Federal regulations does not mean that the language will be interpreted in the same way as a Federal Court would, should a dispute arise.

All in all—and as we’ve written before—it’s important to accurately assess your contract risks so that you can manage them. Focusing solely on Federal contracts and subcontracts, and ignoring contracts with state and local governments, will likely lead to some problems. In extreme cases, you can be looking at more than 20 years of litigation.

 

Bad Information

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Usually the DCAA website is a good place to go for information regarding government contract accounting matters. It’s chock-full of helpful information, from the Contract Audit Manual to the Selected Areas of Cost Guidebook. It has a list of DCAA audit programs and a list of recently promulgated audit guidance (called MRDs for “Memoranda for Regional Directors”).

DCAA’s website has many checklists to assist contractors in understanding what auditors expect to see. For example, it has a Pre-Award Accounting System Adequacy Checklist and a Contract Pricing Proposal Adequacy Checklist, and it has an “Incurred Cost Submission” Adequacy Checklist and a Cost Impact Adequacy Tool.

DCAA’s available guidance includes the Information for Contractors pamphlet and the FAR Cost Principles Guide. In addition, there are links to “targeted information” presentations intended to “assist with audit issues that relate to small businesses.”

In sum, the DCAA website is a valuable resource and, if you are seeking to learn more about government contract cost accounting and/or compliance requirements, it’s a good place to start.

But beware.

Not all the information found on DCAA’s website is accurate. Nor is the audit agency’s interpretation of regulation always aligned with court decisions on those regulations. Some of the information you might want to see isn’t there; and some of the information you would expect to find is curiously unavailable. So take what you find there with a grain of salt, so to speak, and make sure you check DCAA’s interpretations against other resources.

We can be more specific with respect to our warning, if you’d like.

First and foremost, be advised that DCAA’s guidance and checklists and interpretations lack regulatory effect. What that means is that DCAA’s point of view doesn’t carry the weight of the statutory and/or regulatory language itself. If it comes to litigation, most Judges are going to look to the language first, rather than to DCAA’s interpretation of that language.

Think of it this way: if the government was always right, we’d never need to prepare taxes every year. We’d just tell the IRS how much money we had made, and then they would tell us how much we owed in taxes. But it doesn’t work that way, does it? Instead, we have tax programs and tax preparers and accountants and bookkeepers, who help us navigate the complex tax rules so that we can (legitimately) minimize our taxes. Same thing here. We don't ask DCAA to calculate our indirect rates for the same reason we don't ask the IRS to calculate our taxes for us.

The next thing to discuss is the missing information. DCAA’s list of MRDs has curious gaps in it. MRDs are posted late (if at all) and then they disappear when incorporated into the Contract Audit Manual. There is no published record of MRD disposition; you can’t tell when an MRD was incorporated and you can’t tell where it was incorporated. For example, there was some audit guidance published in the second half of 2017 (or in the first half of government fiscal year 2018, if you will) that discussed DCAA’s view of how subcontractor cost and/or price analyses was to be provided in a prime contractor’s proposal. The MRD disappeared after about 30 days. Where did it go? Was it incorporated into the CAM? If so, where? We don’t know and DCAA won’t tell us.

Looking at the CAM itself, we noted that Chapter 5 “is currently being rewritten.” That’s not particularly helpful if you are researching how DCAA would audit “policies, procedures, and internal controls relative to accounting and management systems”—i.e., the six DFARS contractor business systems.

Similarly, the Selected Areas of Cost Guidebook is missing critical information. There are 75 Chapters, each devoted to a separate area of cost, but several Chapters are “under construction” and have no content. For example, Chapter 10 (Compensation for Personal Services) is missing. This is a critical topic that has formed the basis for several high-profile disputes (the majority of which were lost by the government, based on a flawed DCAA audit approach). If you wanted to understand DCAA’s current position on the allowability of compensation costs, you’d be out of luck. Ditto Chapter 22 (Economic Planning Costs) and Chapter 27 (Fines, Penalties and Mischarging Costs). Point made, we trust.

It’s apparent that things aren’t much better at the section of DCAA’s website entitled “Audit Process Overview—Information for Contractors.” If you are a contractor seeking information, then you are going to have some problems. First, DCAA Manual 7641.90 (“Information for Contractors”) is woefully out of date. The version available on the website is dated June 26, 2012. Now, you could argue that things haven’t changed much since then, in terms of the general acquisition and audit flow—and you’d be right. But some things have changed in the intervening five years. There have been changes to how DCAA is organized, such that the information in Enclosure 1 is just wrong. There have been changes to the application of the Truth in Negotiation Act (TINA), such that information in Enclosure 2 is out of date and potentially misleading. Since 2012, statutes and regulations have changed. Legal decisions and opinions have been issued. So while it’s true that the overall process has remained about the same, it’s equally true that the document needs to be updated. Contractors—especially small business contractors—that rely solely on the information found in DCAA Manual 7641.90 may be misled. That would be unfortunate. Indeed, it would be an interesting defense in a bid protest or other dispute: the contractor relied on DCAA’s written guidance, to its detriment.

Now we’re not looking a gift horse in the mouth here. It’s a GOOD THING that DCAA has resources available for contractors, and the audit agency should be commended for doing so. What we are saying is, since the audit agency has made the decision to provide resources and information, it’s incumbent on the agency to maintain the resources and keep the information current.

Finally, there is some bad information on the website that you need to be wary of. The one thing that caught our eye was found in the listing of “targeted information to assist with audit issues that relate to small business.” In that listing was a link to a DCAA presentation entitled “Monitoring Subcontracts.” Like almost everything on the website, it has good information. But it also has an egregious error that needs to be corrected, or else ignored. On Slide 17 (“Common Prime or Higher Tier Subcontract Deficiencies”) the third bullet is: “Failure to obtain an adequate incurred cost submission from subcontractor.” In other words, DCAA is stating in writing that a prime contractor or higher tier subcontract is required to obtain an adequate incurred cost proposal from its subcontractor(s). Yeah, no. Wrong, wrong, wrong. That particular agency position was laughed out of court and we wrote about it here.

Another, perhaps less egregious, example is found in the DCAA slide show entitled “Elements of An Adequate Proposal.” On Slide 3, bullet 2 states “The contractor bears the burden of proof in establishing reasonableness of proposed costs.” Well, not exactly. The contractor bears the burden of proof if challenged by a contracting officer. See FAR 31.201-3(a), which states in part: “No presumption of reasonableness shall be attached to the incurrence of costs by a contractor. If an initial review of the facts results in a challenge of a specific cost by the contracting officer or the contracting officer’s representative, the burden of proof shall be upon the contractor to establish that such cost is reasonable.” That’s a slightly different emphasis, isn’t it? DCAA’s interpretation implies that the reasonableness of every proposed cost must be provided, when in fact that is not the case.

Okay, enough of this stuff. We think we’ve supported our initial assertion that, when using information and/or resources found on the DCAA website, one should be wary. The less sophisticated the contractor, the more second opinions and other interpretive resources should be sought. Many of the resources and much of the information is helpful, but there are sufficient gaps, out of date information—and even bad information—that this warning is justified.

 

 


Page 56 of 279

Newsflash

Effective January 1, 2019, Nick Sanders has been named as Editor of two reference books published by LexisNexis. The first book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Federal Acquisition Regulation. The second book is Matthew Bender’s Accounting for Government Contracts: The Cost Accounting Standards. Nick replaces Darrell Oyer, who has edited those books for many years.