More Discussion on Threshold Changes
Sorry for the continued ranting about rule-makers who do not timely follow Congressional direction, ranting that is focused (today) on the conflicts created between the 2018 NDAA (which raised certain acquisition thresholds, but only for the agencies covered by that public law, to be effective 18 June 2018), the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (which has not yet implemented the statutory changes, but has less than 90 days left to do so), and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (which if not changed timely will conflict with the statute and any DFARS rule-making that implements it).
We’ve already written three articles on this topic: here and also here and then again here. You might think we’d have said about everything there was to say on the topic. Yet over at WIFCON, the debate rages on.
Do Contracting Officers need to follow the statute or the regulation? If they follow the statute and not the regulation, do they need an official FAR deviation? What about the sentence at FAR 1.602-1(b), which states “No contract shall be entered into unless the contracting officer ensures that all requirements of law, executive orders, regulations, and all other applicable procedures, including clearances and approvals, have been met.” How can a Contracting Officer comply with that requirement if a statute and its implementing regulation are in conflict?
The job of the two FAR Councils and the FAR Secretariat is to make sure those conflicts are few and far between. How are they doing?
Well, as we reported in one of those prior articles (links above), the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council issued a Class Deviation, permitting all civilian agencies to implement their own Agency-level Class Deviation to implement, in advance of formal rule-making, the statutory changes to micro-purchase and simplified acquisition thresholds directed by the 2018 NDAA. That’s a clear signal that those two changes are going to be implemented FAR-wide, eliminating any potential conflict between FAR thresholds and DFARS thresholds.
The Department of Energy took that CAAC Class Deviation and ran with it. On March 16, 2018, the DOE issued its Class Deviation, implementing those NDAA acquisition threshold changes. That’s a fairly significant step forward.
But of course, the elephant in the room is the 2018 NDAA change to the threshold for obtaining certified cost or pricing data, which is also the contract-level CAS coverage threshold. Is it going to stay at $750,000 in the regulations and contract clauses, or is it going to increase to $2 million as the statute will read, effective 18 June 2018? That’s the burning question that needs to be answered, and answered quickly.
Some changes, it seems, are more favored than others.
Palantir Prospers Through Compromise
It’s been a long time since we wrote about Palantir, the company that (in our view) is the poster child for why the Department of Defense doesn’t get the innovation it says it wants. We first wrote about Palantir three years ago, in this article.
The article described a conflict between Palantir, a “commercial alternative” to the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS), which reportedly suffered from poor performance in the field. DCGS, naturally, was fielded by traditional defense contractors, while Palantir was offered by Silicon Valley. We quoted one report that stated, “Palantir costs millions, compared to the billions the military has been pouring into DCGS.” At least one Congressman weighed into the fray, asking why “old tired (bureaucrats)” were “stopping the warfighter from getting what they know works.”
Indeed, why would you go with an expensive, poorly performing, solution when the warfighters were clamoring for an inexpensive, high-performing, solution? You wouldn’t in a rational environment. But as we all know, the defense acquisition environment is far from rational.
That first article concluded with a note that the Army continued to push the DCGS solution, by forming “teams of experts” to help with training personnel in the field, and by releasing an RFP for DCGS Increment 2. We noted that response was a “very traditional response by a very traditional defense program” – which is kind of the opposite of innovation, isn’t it?
Eighteen months later, we published a brief update note that Palantir had filed suit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, alleging that the Army’s DCGS strategy was “both illegal and irrational.” Importantly, Palantir alleged that the Army’s insistence on sticking with the problematic DCGS instead of adopting the better functioning Palantir solution had cost lives.
A few months later, we noted that Palantir had been successful in its bid protest suit. We quoted a report, saying the Judge was –
… ordering the Army ‘to go back and look seriously at whether there are in fact commercial products that can meet its needs either without modification or with some modification, but whether there are in fact commercial products, including from Palantir, that meet its needs,’ … The court upheld Palantir’s central legal argument that the Army violated a 1994 law -- the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act -- by not conducting the market research needed to determine if commercially available items could meet its needs with or without modification. …
This was an important ruling, because it reaffirmed the official, statutory, preference for commercial items. The ruling also reaffirmed the need to conduct proper market research before concluding that there were no commercial alternatives available to meet the needs of the warfighter.
That last article was published at the end of 2016 and it’s been radio silence since then.
But now comes news that Palantir has succeeded, and the Army has awarded the company a $876 million contract to “replace the troubled Distributed Common Ground System.” That same report stated “In addition to the Army deal, Palantir has been making inroads elsewhere in the U.S. government. After the company made a similar legal challenge to the U.S. Navy, officials agreed to revamp its technology procurement process last year.”
In another article reporting the contract award, DefenseNews echoed our statement(s) about the situation, writing “DCGS-A is a poster child for how the Army has struggled to develop and field a highly technical capability while ignoring the pace of technological development outside of the defense world. It’s also an example where existing technology could have already provided a functional capability without further development.”
How did Palantir win its battle with entrenched Pentagon bureaucracy? It did so by forming an alliance with one of the traditional defense contractors that supplied DCGS. It partnered with Raytheon, effectively turning that major defense contractor from enemy into an ally. The DefenseNews article (authored by Jen Jensen, link above) reported—
While Palantir has not yet announced what it will be providing to the Army for testing, court documents from its lawsuit stated that its data-management product — Palantir Gotham Platform — does exactly what DCGS-A was trying to do and comes at a much lower cost.
Raytheon, which has been one of the many players in earlier versions of DCGS-A, will supply its FoXTEN open architecture software product, according to Todd Probert, company vice president for Mission Support and Modernization within Raytheon’s Intelligence, Information and Services business, in a statement provided to Defense News.
While we would like to hail this victory as a turning-point for defense acquisition, we suspect it’s not as significant as it might other wise be. Palantir’s co-founder, Peter Thiel, is a well-known Trump fundraiser and supporter who has significant influence in the White House. We’re cynically sure that influence made a difference in the Army’s willingness to contract with Palantir.
Regardless of the rationale for the acquisition sea-change, the fact is that Palantir will now have a chance to showcase its product. If that product performs well, we hope and trust Palantir will join the ranks of successful defense contractors.
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Update on Business Systems
In late February, 2018, DCMA briefed industry on the status of contractor business systems, from the government’s point of view.
Here’s what our readers need to know:
There are 8,826 individual contractor business systems being tracked in the DCMA CBAR database. (The number is calculated by individual CAGE code, so to the extent contractors have multiple CAGE codes, they may be counted more than once). Of that total, 8,529 business systems are currently approved. Of that total, 73 business systems are currently disapproved. And 224 business systems are currently “not evaluated.”
Thus, less than one percent of contractor business systems are disapproved.
Contractors must really have focused on improving their business systems since June 10, 2009, when the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan told Congress and the public that “roughly 30 percent of contractor business systems audited by [DCAA] contained significant deficiencies. The same analysis reveals that contractor billing systems and estimating systems were deficient at even greater rates—50 and 42 percent, respectively.” (Source: Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan Interim Report to Congress, Page 27.)
Things must have really improved in the past nine years, because having less than one percent disapproved business systems is a lot better than the horror story that DCAA was testifying to (under oath) and that the Commission on Wartime Contracting was stating in an official report to Congress, one funded by taxpayer money.
Regardless of the accuracy (or veracity) of testimony and reporting, the rules were revised in 2012, and now significant deficiencies in any of the six business systems lead to mandatory payment withholds for those lucky contractors whose DoD contracts contain the DFARS contract clause 252.242-7005 (“Contractor Business Systems”).
That same DCMA briefing stated that the 73 disapproved contractor business systems have generated $206 million in payment withholds. In fact, the eleven (11) disapproved contractor estimating systems have, all by themselves, generated $200 million in payment withholds – meaning that the other 62 disapproved business systems have generated about $6 million in payment withholds.
Let’s stop for a second to consider the situation. Eleven disapproved estimating systems have generated $200 million in cumulative payment withholds. Those systems must really be bad, right? They must generate such bad estimates that the Pentagon (and Fort Lee) feels it is fair and reasonable to hold back nearly a quarter billion dollars of contractor cash flow.
Moreover, the data indicates that 15 percent (11/73) of the business systems generated 97 percent (200/206) of the total payment withholds. Those disapproved estimating systems must be very important to the Department of Defense—otherwise, somebody might think the situation is inequitable. The word “punitive” might even be tossed into the conversation.
On the other hand, the DCMA briefing didn’t focus on contractor estimating systems. Instead, it focused on contractor purchasing systems and contractor property management systems. Consequently, we don’t have anything more to say about the single contractor business system that generates 97 percent of the payment withholds.
With respect to contractor purchasing systems – which have generated (cumulatively) $5.65 million in payment withholds (as of the date of the briefing) – we have lots of stuff to report. Although only 21 contractor purchasing systems are currently in a disapproved state, there are 129 individual deficiencies associated with those systems. According to DCMA, by far the most common deficiency associated with purchasing system disapproval is an inadequate purchasing system manual (91/129). Not the actual practices themselves; the policies and procedures that guide those practices. The next most common deficiency is a failure to properly perform (and document) the check of the debarred/suspended contractor list (EPLS). Other deficiencies included a lack of file documentation (57/129), inadequate cost/price analyses (59/129), and improper administration of DPAS (54/129). Finally, another common deficiency is a failure to implement internal reviews and self-audits (34/129). Everything might be humming along just fine, but if you’re not checking (and documenting those checks), then you’re going to have a system deficiency.
With respect to contractor property management and control systems – which have generated (cumulatively) a paltry $480,000 in payment withholds – the briefing stated that there were many deficiencies, ranging from deficient procedures (91/978) to a lack of self-assessments (56/978) to inadequate records (89/978).
When your company grows to the point where it is subject to full CAS coverage, you also get to be covered by the DFARS business systems clause (assuming you are a defense contractor). You will probably have had individual business systems clauses in your contracts before reaching that point in time, but you probably haven’t paid too much attention to system “adequacy” once you passed your initial DCAA accounting system adequacy reviews. Then you hit that point and suddenly you need to really focus on CAS and business system adequacy. It can be overwhelming, but the price you pay for failing to focus on those compliance issues can be measured (and is being measured) in the millions of dollars of lost cash flow.
It seems to us that what you want to do is to get a bit ahead of things. You want to start to think about CAS compliance and business system adequacy before you actually get penalized for not focusing on them. The word “proactive” comes to mind. You might consider assessing things now, especially if you see a milestone looming ahead. Look out about two or three years and start to get your house in order today. Invest a little bit today to avoid a large, time-crunched, investment in the future.
Otherwise, when you do hit that point in time, you are likely to join the “payment withhold club.” And while you will be welcomed into that club (because misery loves company), you would very much seem to be better off staying out of it.
Not a Small Business: Expensive Mistake
We have noted several recent Department of Justice press releases about companies that have been found to have falsely certified that they met certain criteria and were thus eligible for award of certain contracts set aside for companies that met the criteria. Companies that claimed to be a small socioeconomically disadvantaged business, but were not. Companies that claimed to be a small woman-owned business, but were not. Companies that claimed to be a small, service disabled veteran owned business, but were not. Companies that claimed to be HUBZone small businesses, but were not. You get the idea.
If you are a small business, you probably know it. FAR Part 19 has lots to say about the subject, as does Chapter 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations. There are rules that address permissible size standards by NAICS code. The Small Business Administration has lots of information to help companies with the complexities of eligibility determination. (For example: here.) While the topic is deep and complex, and there are gray areas, the basics are readily determinable, such that you probably know whether or not your company qualifies.
When you qualify, you “self-certify”—that is, you execute a Representation or a Certification in Section K of your proposal. Those Reps and Certs are, of course, subject to the False Statements Act. If you falsely certify, that’s really not a good thing—as those Department of Justice press releases we noted above testify.
Of course, small businesses grow. As they grow, their compliance risks evolve. We’ve discussed that situation several times on this site, including this article. We wrote—
Many small business government contractors don’t evolve their infrastructure, their back offices, to keep pace with the compliance risks of their newer contract awards. They end up with a mismatch between the needs of their newer contract requirements and the capabilities of their administrative staff. That’s when consultants can add some value. But the real issue is not the knowledge or expertise of the team; the real issue is that the actual practices may need to change to match the compliance requirements of the newer contracts. The company may need to make fundamental changes to the way in which it does business.
Some small businesses get acquired. They get acquired by large businesses, or perhaps they get acquired by another small business. Either the small business becomes a large business or, perhaps, both buyer and target become large businesses by virtue of the acquisition. In either situation, the acquired company may no longer qualify for the socioeconomic niche it had relied on for contract awards. Those Section K Reps and Certs need to be reviewed before execution, lest somebody falsely certify to being something they are not.
In related news, the Department of Justice recently announced that it had reached a settlement with TrellisWare Technologies, Inc., a communications company located in San Diego, with regard to allegations under the False Claims Act that TrellisWare had falsely certified that it was eligible for Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program awards, when it fact the company did not qualify as being a small business. According to the DoJ press release, TrellisWare “is a majority-owned subsidiary of ViaSat, Inc., a global broadband services and technology company also headquartered in San Diego.” The press release explained—
Between 2008 and 2015, TrellisWare was awarded multiple SBIR contracts to provide the Navy, Army and Air Force with a variety of technology services and products involving communications and signal processing systems, including wireless networks used in military tactical environments. TrellisWare self-certified that it met the small business size requirements for eligibility to receive SBIR funding. But based on certain disclosures that TrellisWare later made about its ownership relationship with ViaSat, the government conducted an investigation into TrellisWare’s eligibility for SBIR awards. The government contends that TrellisWare was not eligible for SBIR awards because it was actually a majority-owned subsidiary of ViaSat at the time it was awarded and performed on SBIR contracts.
Apparently, the government asserted TrellisWare falsely certified that it qualified as a small business in order to receive SBIR contract awards, and that every single invoice the company had submitted under those SBIR contracts was an individual false claim. We’re confident that situation led to a very large quantum, and that TrellisWare/ViaSat was content to settle the allegations for $12.2 million.
Word to the wise: you need to review your Section K Reps and Certs from time to time, in order to make sure they are accurate. You probably want to restrict the authority of those who execute Reps and Certs on behalf of the company to those who can do so knowledgeably. You do not want to face a situation similar to the one faced by TrellisWare/ViaSat, where the government alleges you intentionally executed false Reps and Certs.
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